The Glencairn Uprising, 1653-54 Helen Baker Department of ...

advantage.’ 122 He then embarked on a more far-reaching policy aimed at alleviating
the financial burdens of the Scottish people. In the summer of 1653 he ordered a
revaluation of all the burghs and shires in the country in order to correct the relative
amounts of assessment attained from each region. A conference in Edinburgh of July
– attended by one or two gentlemen from each locality – agreed that the total amount
of tax should be reduced from £10 000 per month to £8500. Despite the fact that the
English government failed to support Lilburne’s initiative or answer his complaints,
by late January 1654, only £6000 per month was actually being collected. 123
Assessment abatements continued to be employed as rewards to those who displayed
particular co-operation. For example, the Marquis of Argyle, Sir James Macdonald of
Sleat and the laird of Glenorchy all had parts of their cess waived. In addition,
Lilburne also considered granting compensation to those people whose land and
property had suffered at the hands of Royalist insurgents. In February 1654 he
recommended using sequestered estates of leading rebels to recompense trustworthy
Scots. He also suggested that all loyalist countrymen should be exempt from
sequestration themselves. 124
To alleviate the burdens of heavy debt, Lilburne recommended that Judges should
have the authority to defer legal proceedings in certain cases. In December he
formally proposed that sentences should be moderated, execution of Judges’ decreets
should be postponed, and creditors should be obliged to accept land as payment for
debts or for the interest on debts. Moreover, he recommended that all sequestrations
and forfeitures should be cancelled except for those ruled on a handful of leading
offenders. However, the Council of State did not take note of Lilburne’s advice
concerning debt and sequestrations until, respectively, 16 May and 12 April 1654
when he was no longer commander-in-chief of the English forces in Scotland. 125
Although the greatest instrument of the Royalist forces was arguably their nationality,
their constant attempts to procure money, men and supplies often alienated the local
122 Firth, C.H. Scotland and the Commonwealth, p.95 and Dow, F.D. Cromwellian Scotland, pp.90, 99,
109.
123 Dow, F.D. Cromwellian Scotland, pp.109-110.
124 Ibid., pp.111-112.
125 Ibid., pp.112-113.