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The Glencairn Uprising, 1653-54 Helen Baker Department of ...

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etreated into the Hills where the lack <strong>of</strong> provisions and approaching nightfall had<br />

stopped the English army in their tracks. 135<br />

Why could Lilburne’s forces not make quick work in dispatching the Royalist enemy?<br />

<strong>The</strong> main reason the Royalists were not immediately defeated is that they rarely<br />

engaged the English troops. Like Monck in the previous Scottish campaign,<br />

Lilburne’s attempts to surprise the rebels were usually unsuccessful and he was forced<br />

to accept a war <strong>of</strong> attrition. 136 <strong>The</strong> strategy <strong>of</strong> the Royalists was to avoid outright<br />

confrontation in favour <strong>of</strong> attacking small parties <strong>of</strong> the enemy and engaging in<br />

sudden raids. <strong>The</strong> native Scots had the geographical advantage, being more familiar<br />

with the challenging Scottish territory and able to retreat into the mountains when<br />

necessary. <strong>The</strong> conflict then took the form <strong>of</strong> a kind <strong>of</strong> guerrilla warfare, focussing on<br />

the Highland territory. Such tactics were also useful in enabling the Royalists to<br />

divide their men and, therefore, keep apart feuding Highland leaders.<br />

Moreover, the Scottish community, albeit for the greater part unwilling to commit to<br />

open rebellion, refused to inform the English <strong>of</strong> the rebels’ movements. In November<br />

<strong>1653</strong> Lilburne was complaining <strong>of</strong> the ‘secrett contrivements and incouragements the<br />

generality <strong>of</strong> this people affords [the Royalists]’. In another report <strong>of</strong> the same month<br />

he writes that even victims <strong>of</strong> the Royalists’ plunder refused to provide intelligence<br />

and that every appearance or victory <strong>of</strong> the enemy seemed to heighten the spirit <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Scottish people. 137 This is perhaps the greatest indicator <strong>of</strong> the feelings <strong>of</strong> the majority<br />

<strong>of</strong> native Scots. Encouraged by every Royalist victory, the ordinary people <strong>of</strong><br />

Scotland were illustrating their innate hostility to their foreign conquerors.<br />

In Parliament it was feared that a Scottish uprising might spur the English royalists<br />

into action. Although limitations <strong>of</strong> space render it impossible to discuss royalist<br />

activity outside <strong>of</strong> Scotland in any depth, it is relevant to give some indication <strong>of</strong> how<br />

the <strong>Glencairn</strong> uprising was viewed by English Royalists. Did the supporters <strong>of</strong> the<br />

King in England actively help their political brethren in the north? Underdown has<br />

135 Firth, C.H. Scotland and the Commonwealth, pp.203, 204 and Willcock, J. A Scots Earl in<br />

Covenanting Times, p.50.<br />

136 Kenyon, J. & Ohlmeyer, J. (ed.) <strong>The</strong> Civil Wars: A Military History <strong>of</strong> England, Scotland, and<br />

Ireland 1638-1660 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.315.<br />

137 Firth, C.H. Scotland and the Commonwealth, pp.271, 273.

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