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Wireless Security.pdf - PDF Archive

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<strong>Security</strong> Defined 227<br />

to provide security for our applications? The most common use of the digital signature<br />

for authentication is a part of a digital certifi cate . A digital certificate consists of three<br />

primary sections: information about the owner (such as real or company name, Internet<br />

address, and physical address), the owner’s public-key, and the digital signature of that<br />

data (including the public-key) created using the owner’s private key. Digital certificates<br />

are typically encoded using a language called ASN.1 (Abstract Syntax Notation),<br />

developed by the telecommunications industry in the late 1970s, and more specifically, a<br />

subset of that language called Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER). This language was<br />

designed to be flexible, allowing for any number of extensions to the certificate format,<br />

which are created and used by some users of digital certificates to provide additional<br />

information, such as which web browsers should be able to accept the certificate. The<br />

public-key is stored using a base-64 encoding.<br />

A digital certificate is provided by sending an application at the start of a secure<br />

communication. The receiving application parses the certificate, decrypts the digital<br />

signature, hashes the information, and compares it to the decrypted signature hash. If the<br />

hashes do not match, then the certificate has been corrupted in transit or is a counterfeit.<br />

If the hashes do match, then the application does a second check against a field in the data<br />

section of the certificate called the Common Name (CN) . The common name represents<br />

the Internet address (url or IP address) of the sending application. If the common name<br />

and the address of the sending application do not match, then the receiving application can<br />

signal a warning to the user. Finally, a valid date range can be assigned to the certificate by<br />

the owner that will tell the recipient whether the certificate should be trusted at a certain<br />

time. If the current date (today) is between the initial date and the expiration date indicated<br />

in the certificate, then the certificate is considered valid (this does not supersede the other<br />

checks). Note that all these checks are up to the receiving application; the recipient of<br />

a digital certificate can choose to ignore all checks, or only perform one or two, but the<br />

guarantee of security is obviously not as strong if any failed checks are ignored. The digital<br />

certificate provides a useful mechanism for authentication, assuming that the public-key<br />

in the certificate can be trusted. This leaves us with a problem, however. If we only get the<br />

public-key as part of the digital certificate, how can we be certain that the person who sent<br />

the certificate is who they say they are? It turns out that this is a very difficult problem to<br />

solve, for many reasons. We will look at those reasons and the most common solution to<br />

the problem in use today, the Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) .<br />

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