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Wireless Security.pdf - PDF Archive

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<strong>Wireless</strong> Policy Essentials 651<br />

network before they join it, and also employs “ mutual authentication ” so that the wireless<br />

user doesn’t accidentally join a rogue network that might steal its network credentials.<br />

WiFi Protected Access will be forward-compatible with the IEEE 802.11i security<br />

specification currently under development by the IEEE. WiFi Protected Access is a subset<br />

of the current 802.11i draft, taking certain pieces of the 802.11i draft that are ready to<br />

bring to market today, such as its implementation of 802.1x and TKIP. These features<br />

can also be enabled on most existing WiFi certified products as a software upgrade.<br />

The main pieces of the 802.11i draft that are not included in WiFi Protected Access are<br />

secure IBSS, secure fast handoff, secure deauthentication and disassociation, as well as<br />

enhanced encryption protocols such as AES-CCMP. These features are either not yet<br />

ready for market or will require hardware upgrades to implement. The IEEE 802.11i<br />

specification is expected to be published at the end of 2003.<br />

WiFi Protected Access effectively addresses the WLAN security requirements for<br />

the enterprise and provides a strong encryption and authentication solution before<br />

the ratification of the IEEE 802.11i standard. In an enterprise with IT resources,<br />

WiFi Protected Access should be used in conjunction with an authentication server<br />

such as RADIUS to provide centralized access control and management. With this<br />

implementation in place, the need for add-on solutions such as VPNs may be eliminated,<br />

at least for the express purpose of securing the wireless link in a network.<br />

A.1.1 Typical <strong>Wireless</strong> <strong>Security</strong> Architectural Concerns<br />

Normally, wireless networks are outside of the institutional firewall(s). In addition,<br />

they use static WEP keys on the WLAN to keep administrative costs low and provide a<br />

Network Intrusion Detection (NID) facility to monitor possible attacks emanating from<br />

the WLAN to the Internet and other networks. As part of the architecture, it is normally<br />

recommended that neither the IP address range nor the domain name of the wireless<br />

network be associated with any of the existing internal networks. This will allow for<br />

better segregation of wireless traffic and will assist in identifying and filtering traffic to<br />

and from this network.<br />

WLANs are normally treated as though they are an untrusted network, like the Internet.<br />

Assuming that RF propagation is limited by a thorough site survey and the use of<br />

proper antenna and transmitter power settings, the WLAN does not represent any more<br />

significant a threat to internal networks than the Internet itself. Because roaming between<br />

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