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STRUCTURED FINANCE/BANKING<br />

RATING METHODOLOGY<br />

Moody’s Rating Approach to European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s<br />

AUTHORS<br />

Nicholas Lindstrom<br />

VP – Senior Credit Officer<br />

London<br />

(44) 20 7772 5332<br />

Nicholas.Lindstrom@moodys.com<br />

Saul Greenberg<br />

VP – Senior Analyst<br />

London<br />

(44) 20 7772 5354<br />

Saul.Greenberg@moodys.com<br />

CONTRIBUTORS<br />

Jose de Leon<br />

AVP - Analyst<br />

Madrid<br />

(34) 91 702 6697<br />

Jose.Deleon@moodys.com<br />

David Rosa<br />

VP – Senior Analyst<br />

London<br />

(44) 20 7772 5341<br />

David.Rosa@moodys.com<br />

Henry Tabe<br />

VP – Senior Credit Officer<br />

London<br />

(44) 20 7772 5482<br />

Henry.Tabe@moodys.com<br />

CONTACTS<br />

Juan Pablo Soriano<br />

Managing Director<br />

Madrid<br />

(34) 91 702 6608<br />

Juanpablo.Soriano@moodys.com<br />

Detlef Scholz<br />

Managing Director<br />

Frankfurt<br />

(49) 69 707 307 37<br />

Detlef.Scholz@moodys.com<br />

EMEA Investor Liaison<br />

Edward Bowden<br />

London<br />

(44) 20 7772 5454<br />

Edward.Bowden@moodys.com<br />

TABLE OF CONTENTS<br />

• Summary<br />

• Moody’s Rating Approach to <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s<br />

• Issuer<br />

• Credit Quality of the Cover Pool<br />

• Refinancing the Cover Pool<br />

• Market Risks<br />

• Appendices<br />

• Combining the Analysis of the Issuer and Cover Pool<br />

• Issuer<br />

• Credit Quality of the Cover Pool<br />

• Refinancing the Cover Pool<br />

• Market Risks<br />

• Other Appendices<br />

SUMMARY<br />

“<strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s” are defined as debt instruments that have recourse to either the<br />

issuing entity (the “Issuer”) or the group to which it belongs, or both, and, upon<br />

Issuer Default 1 , to a pool of collateral (the “Cover Pool”). 2<br />

Moody’s rating methodology for European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s focuses on the expected<br />

loss to investors. The rating model employed is thus referred to as the “Moody’s<br />

<strong>Expected</strong> <strong>Loss</strong> <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating <strong>Model</strong>” (or “Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>”).<br />

The Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> employs a so-called ‘joint default’ approach which takes into<br />

account both the credit strength of the Issuer and the value of the Cover Pool. While<br />

the Issuer is performing, there will be no loss under the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>. In the<br />

event of an Issuer Default, the final loss will be determined by the value of the Cover<br />

Pool, which will be impacted by various factors, notably the credit quality of the<br />

Cover Pool, and refinancing and market risks. These in turn will be impacted by the<br />

strength of the legal framework and any contractual commitments, as applicable.<br />

Moody’s is now employing this method for all new <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> issuances and<br />

programmes, and intends to migrate ratings on existing <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s to the new<br />

method over the coming year. This process will include a further review of all primary<br />

legislations and a more detailed analysis of collateral in the Cover Pools and hedging<br />

arrangements. We anticipate that during this review some aspects of this<br />

methodology are likely to be further updated, in particular when making country-bycountry<br />

adjustments for specific market or legislative features.<br />

This Rating Methodology Report comprises two key sections. The first provides an<br />

overview of Moody’s rating approach for <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s, whilst the second provides<br />

a set of appendices that describe particular aspects of Moody’s rating approach in<br />

greater detail.<br />

WEBSITE<br />

www.moodys.com<br />

1<br />

2<br />

See the following page for a definition of “Issuer Default”.<br />

In many jurisdictions, covered bonds are instruments defined by statute; in others, they are structured<br />

to resemble such instruments.<br />

13 June, 2005


MOODY’S RATING APPROACH FOR COVERED BONDS<br />

Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> looks at each <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> issued on a month-by-month basis from its date of issue through<br />

to its legal final maturity. For each month, Moody’s calculates the probability of an Issuer Default (defined below)<br />

based on its senior unsecured rating 3<br />

and the loss (if any) to the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s following such default. The<br />

probability of Issuer Default in each month is then multiplied by the relevant loss (if any) for that month to give the<br />

expected loss to <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> investors for each such month. These amounts are then discounted and the<br />

discounted numbers summed for each month from the time of issue of the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> to its legal final maturity.<br />

The resulting number gives the expected loss to the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> on which Moody’s rating is based (see<br />

Appendix A1 for a worked example of how Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> combines the benefit of an Issuer’s probability of<br />

default with the value of the Cover Pool to reach a rating on the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s).<br />

In Moody’s approach, “Issuer Default” is assumed to have the effect of creating a stand-alone Cover Pool that may<br />

need to be administered by a newly appointed party. 4 It should be noted that Issuer Default does not necessarily<br />

mean there has been a default on the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s. Moody’s expects that an administrator (or a party delegated<br />

by the administrator) would run the Cover Pool following an Issuer Default.<br />

The loss following Issuer Default will depend on (i) the value of the Cover Pool in relation to the outstanding <strong>Covered</strong><br />

<strong>Bond</strong>s and (ii) any outstanding claim against the Issuer. The analysis of the value of the Cover Pool will be<br />

considered in the context of the Issuer Default and thus assumes a stressed environment. In assessing the value of<br />

the Cover Pool, Moody’s considers (i) the credit quality of the Cover Pool, (ii) the refinancing risk if funds need to be<br />

raised against the Cover Pool, and (iii) any interest and currency rate risk to which the Cover Pool is exposed.<br />

Analysis of (i) to (iii) will include consideration of any impact of legislative provisions and contractual commitments,<br />

which includes the role of the administrator (appointed following Issuer Default) in administering and servicing the<br />

Cover Pool as well as any incremental cost of such process.<br />

Moody’s rating approach thus comprises the following four key categories, which are each briefly discussed below<br />

as well as in more detail under similar headings in the Appendices.<br />

Prior to Issuer Default<br />

• Issuer.<br />

and following Issuer Default<br />

• Credit quality of the Cover Pool.<br />

• Refinancing the Cover Pool.<br />

• Market risks.<br />

Issuer<br />

The minimum rating that a <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> should achieve is equivalent to the senior unsecured rating of the Issuer. 5<br />

During the life of the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>, Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> calculates the probability of Issuer Default based on the<br />

Issuer’s senior unsecured rating. Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> assumes that when the Issuer performs these obligations<br />

throughout the life of the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>, there will be no loss to investors. However, in the event of Issuer Default,<br />

the analysis switches to the Cover Pool and, if applicable, any unsecured claim against the Issuer. 6<br />

When rating <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s, the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> takes into account various Issuer and Issuer group-related<br />

benefits in addition to the senior unsecured rating of the Issuer. These are discussed in Appendix B1, and<br />

Appendices A1 and A2 demonstrate with examples the practical application of such benefits in Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>.<br />

Credit Quality of the Cover Pool<br />

The credit quality of the Cover Pool will determine the amount of loss due to credit deterioration on the assets in the<br />

Cover Pool that Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> assumes will impact the Cover Pool after Issuer Default.<br />

The credit quality of the Cover Pool is measured by the Collateral Score. The definition of and method for calculation<br />

of the Collateral Score are set out in Appendices C1 to C3. Moody’s aims to publish Collateral Scores, where<br />

sufficient information on the Cover Pool is provided, and with the Issuer’s approval.<br />

3<br />

4<br />

5<br />

6<br />

Moody’s calculates the monthly default rates by interpolating from our published idealised default tables, which are reproduced in Appendix<br />

F1.<br />

“Issuer Default” may be defined as the removal from the Cover Pool of: 1) support provided by other entities within the Issuer group; 2)<br />

ancillary activities of the Issuer (i.e. those not related to the Cover Pool); and 3) usually, the management functions of the Issuer.<br />

These ratings continue to be assigned and monitored by Moody’s Financial Institutions Group. In many cases, the Issuer will benefit from<br />

either direct or indirect support from the group of which it is a part. In addition to the credit strength derived from the group of which it is part,<br />

the Issuer may benefit from specific aspects of the legislation, which may, for example, limit the business activities of the Issuer and thus offer<br />

investors incremental protection from event risk.<br />

An Issuer Default will not normally lead to an acceleration of the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s. In many cases, the Cover Pool is expected to survive Issuer<br />

Default, which will typically trigger the appointment of an administrator to administer and service the Cover Pool. Following Issuer Default, and<br />

pending sale of the Cover Pool where applicable, the administrator may manage the Cover Pool or delegate its servicing to other parties. One<br />

restriction on the power of the administrator to run the Cover Pool to legal final maturity of the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s may be the failure of any<br />

matching test, which may lead to acceleration (a more detailed description of the matching tests is set out in Appendix E3).<br />

2 • Moody’s Investors Service European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating Methodology


Within the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>, the Collateral Score plays a key role in determining the cash flow that is assumed<br />

will be received by the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s following Issuer Default. The use and impact of Collateral Scores in<br />

Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> are described in Appendices C4 and C5.<br />

Refinancing the Cover Pool<br />

Following an Issuer Default, the timely repayment of principal may rely on funds being raised against the Cover<br />

Pool. The reason for this is that the duration of the assets in the Cover Pool will generally be longer than that of the<br />

<strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s. In other words, the “natural” amortisation of the Cover Pool assets may not be sufficient to repay<br />

principal under the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s.<br />

Where the “natural” amortisation of Cover Pool assets alone cannot be relied on to repay principal, Moody’s EL<br />

<strong>Model</strong> assumes that funds must be raised against the Cover Pool, most likely at a discount to the notional value of<br />

the Cover Pool. Little pricing data is available for this type of fund-raising, and accordingly, Moody’s will calculate<br />

refinancing margins based on the price history seen for similar asset pools in the securitisation and other markets.<br />

Under Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>, the following three key considerations are taken into account in determining the<br />

refinancing risk for any Cover Pool:<br />

• The refinancing margin that is required to refinance the Cover Pool remaining after adjustment for any<br />

write-off following Issuer Default. Refinancing margins assumed in Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> are described in<br />

Appendix D1, and the method for their calculation is explained in Appendix D3. Refinancing margins are<br />

also impacted by the Collateral Score, and this is discussed in Appendix C5.<br />

• The size of the Cover Pool that is required to redeem in full all <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s prior to their legal final<br />

maturity. A further description is set out in Appendix D2.<br />

• The average life of the Cover Pool that is expected at the time of refinance.<br />

A simplified example in Appendix D4 shows how the loss on the Cover Pool due to refinancing risk may be<br />

calculated, and in particular how this is impacted by the refinancing margin and average life of the Cover Pool.<br />

Market Risks<br />

Following Issuer Default, investors in <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s may be exposed to interest and currency rate risk, which<br />

may arise from the different payment promises and durations made on the Cover Pool and the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s.<br />

Under Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>, the following two key considerations are taken into account in determining the interest<br />

and currency rate risks for <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s:<br />

• The level and length of exposure to these market risks. The level and length of exposure depends on the<br />

specific characteristics of the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s and the Cover Pool backing the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s, and in<br />

addition, the hedging arrangements in place. The main market risks to which a Cover Pool is exposed are<br />

discussed in Appendix E1, while Appendix E3 discusses how the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> considers hedging<br />

arrangements. A simplified example which shows how the loss on the Cover Pool due to interest rate risk<br />

may be calculated at time of refinancing of the Cover Pool is discussed in Appendix E5.<br />

• The stress imposed by the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> on any exposure to these market risks. These are<br />

discussed in Appendix E3, and the method of calculation is explained in Appendix E4.<br />

European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating Methodology Moody’s Investors Service • 3


APPENDICES: Table Of Contents<br />

Combining the Analysis of the Issuer and Cover Pool<br />

Appendix A1: The joint default approach<br />

Appendix A2: The relative contribution of the Issuer and Cover Pool to a <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> rating<br />

Issuer<br />

See Appendix A1 and A2<br />

Appendix B1: <strong>Model</strong>ling the credit strength of the Issuer<br />

Credit Quality of the Cover Pool<br />

Appendix C1: Defining and calculating the Collateral Score<br />

Appendix C2: Meaning of haircut to Collateral Score<br />

Appendix C3: Calculation of haircut to Collateral Score<br />

Appendix C4: Using the Collateral Score in Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong><br />

Appendix C5: Impact of the Collateral Score on refinancing margins in Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong><br />

Refinancing the Cover Pool<br />

See Appendix C5 above<br />

Appendix D1: Refinancing risk – the refinancing margins<br />

Appendix D2: Refinancing risk – the portion of a <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> that must rely on refinancing to be repaid on a<br />

timely basis<br />

Appendix D3: Refinancing risk – calculation of refinancing margins<br />

Appendix D4: Simplified example to show how to translate a stressed refinancing margin into<br />

a loss on the Cover Pool<br />

Market Risks<br />

Appendix E1: Market risks – key risks<br />

Appendix E2: Market risks – Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>’s analysis of hedging arrangements<br />

Appendix E3: Market risks – the levels of stress applied by Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong><br />

Appendix E4: Market risks – calculation of interest and currency rate stresses<br />

Appendix E5: Simplified example to show how to translate a stressed interest rate movement into<br />

a loss on the Cover Pool<br />

Other Appendices<br />

Appendix F1: Moody’s idealised probability of default and expected loss tables<br />

Appendix F2: Rating a Programme: the impact<br />

Appendix F3: Over-collateralisation: what value when “not committed”<br />

Appendix F4: Probability of default of a <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong><br />

4 • Moody’s Investors Service European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating Methodology


APPENDIX A1: THE JOINT DEFAULT APPROACH<br />

Under Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>, the credit strength of the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s is determined by the combination of (i) credit<br />

strength of the Issuer, and (ii) the value of the Cover Pool. The contribution from the Issuer includes the three<br />

components listed in Appendix B1, and the first of these is the Issuer’s probability of default. The aim of this<br />

Appendix is to show how Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> combines the benefit related to an Issuer’s probability of default with<br />

the value of the Cover Pool through a number of worked examples. It should be noted that the examples below<br />

are not intended to be a reflection of specific/particular circumstances, but rather illustrative of how these two<br />

components are combined in the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>.<br />

The examples are based on a number of assumptions which include the following, amongst others.<br />

• The Issuer will either have a senior unsecured long-term rating of A2 or Baa2.<br />

• Following Issuer Default, recovery will arise only from the Cover Pool (i.e. no recovery is assumed from a<br />

full-recourse unsecured outstanding claim against the Issuer, and if relevant, other group companies or<br />

guarantors).<br />

• The <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s issued are ‘bullet bonds’ which have a three-year maturity.<br />

• At the time of issue, the nominal balance of the Cover Pool matches the nominal balance of the <strong>Covered</strong><br />

<strong>Bond</strong>s outstanding (i.e. there is no over-collateralisation).<br />

• Cash flows which arise at a future date have not been discounted back to present value.<br />

• For the purposes of the example, following Issuer Default, losses in respect of the Cover Pool are<br />

assumed at a level, respectively, of 3% and 12% of the Cover Pool. 7<br />

• The examples will make use of Moody’s idealised tables, respectively for probability of default (“Moody’s<br />

PD Tables”) and expected loss (“Moody’s EL Tables”) which are included in this report in Appendix F1.<br />

The results of the following four examples are shown below.<br />

Example 1: assumes Issuer rated A2 and, following Issuer Default, losses on the Cover Pool 3%<br />

Example 2: assumes Issuer rated A2 and, following Issuer Default, losses on the Cover Pool 12%<br />

Example 3: assumes Issuer rated Baa2 and, following Issuer Default, losses on the Cover Pool 3%<br />

Example 4: assumes Issuer rated Baa2 and, following Issuer Default, losses on the Cover Pool 12%<br />

To show how these results were obtained, example 1 is considered.<br />

The first step is to calculate the probabilities of default of the Issuer over the life of a three-year covered bond.<br />

These are taken from Moody’s PD Tables which are found in Appendix F1. As seen from this table, the probability<br />

of default of an A2-rated Issuer in one year is 0.011%, and the probability of this Issuer defaulting in year two is<br />

0.059% (the probabilities in the Moody’s PD Tables are cumulative, i.e. 0.070% - 0.011% = 0.059%).<br />

For this example, the loss of the Cover Pool following Issuer Default is simply assumed to be 3%. To calculate the<br />

expected loss for each of the years of the life of the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>, the product of this 3% and the probability of<br />

default for each year is calculated. The aggregate expected loss is then calculated by summing the expected<br />

losses for each of the three years of the life of the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>.<br />

This example is reproduced in table form below.<br />

Year<br />

Probability of<br />

Issuer Default<br />

<strong>Loss</strong> on Cover Pool following<br />

Issuer Default<br />

<strong>Expected</strong> <strong>Loss</strong><br />

on <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong><br />

1 0.011% 3% 0.000%<br />

2 0.059% 3% 0.002%<br />

3 0.152% 3% 0.005%<br />

Cumulative <strong>Expected</strong> <strong>Loss</strong> of the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> 0.007%<br />

The cumulative expected loss of the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> is then mapped to the corresponding three-year rating in the<br />

Moody’s EL Tables. In this case this results in a Aa1 rating, which is four notches above the Issuer rating.<br />

7<br />

These percentages are assumed to be the aggregate of the following categories of loss: (i) loss due to credit quality of the Cover Pool, (ii) loss<br />

as a result of refinancing risk, and (iii) loss arising from market risks (or exposure to unhedged market risks).]<br />

European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating Methodology Moody’s Investors Service • 5


Accordingly the following results arise from applying these steps to each example.<br />

Example 1<br />

a) Issuer senior unsecured rating A2<br />

b) <strong>Loss</strong> in respect of Cover Pool 3%<br />

c) Rating of <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s based on expected loss Aa1<br />

d) Number of notches between a) and c) 4<br />

Example 2<br />

a) Issuer senior unsecured rating A2<br />

b) <strong>Loss</strong> in respect of Cover Pool 12%<br />

c) Rating of <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s based on expected loss Aa3<br />

d) Number of notches between a) and c) 2<br />

Example 3<br />

a) Issuer senior unsecured rating Baa2<br />

b) <strong>Loss</strong> in respect of Cover Pool 3%<br />

c) Rating of <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s based on expected loss Aa3<br />

d) Number of notches between a) and c) 5<br />

Example 4<br />

a) Issuer senior unsecured rating Baa2<br />

b) <strong>Loss</strong> in respect of Cover Pool 12%<br />

c) Rating of <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s based on expected loss A2<br />

d) Number of notches between a) and c) 3<br />

The above examples show how both the credit strength of the Issuer and the quality of the Cover Pool can impact<br />

the number of notches achieved between the senior unsecured rating of the Issuer and the rating on the <strong>Covered</strong><br />

<strong>Bond</strong>s.<br />

These examples have assumed a loss on the Cover Pool following Issuer Default. The primary focus of the<br />

remaining appendices is to describe in more detail how Moody’s calculates this loss.<br />

6 • Moody’s Investors Service European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating Methodology


APPENDIX A2: THE RELATIVE CONTRIBUTION OF THE ISSUER AND COVER POOL<br />

TO A COVERED BOND RATING<br />

This section illustrates the relative importance of one of the Issuer benefits when targeting a covered bond rating –<br />

the benefit of the “probability of Issuer Default” (item 1 under Appendix B1). The conclusion of the section is that<br />

the further the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> rating is from the rating of the Issuer, the lower the importance of this benefit – and<br />

this is particularly the case when a Aaa rating is targeted. When a Aaa rating is targeted and the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong><br />

rating is more than four notches away from the Issuer rating, the probability of Issuer Default provides less than 1%<br />

of the overall protection to investors.<br />

To illustrate the importance of the role played by the probability of Issuer Default and the Cover Pool in enabling<br />

programmes to achieve the target rating, the table below shows by how much the probability of default of a highly<br />

rated Issuer can reduce the amount of collateral that would otherwise be required to achieve a Aaa rating.<br />

In the preparation of this table, the following assumptions are made.<br />

• Independence between the Issuer and the collateral.<br />

• A 7-year horizon.<br />

• €100 of collateral is required to rate €100 of Aaa bonds (i.e. the collateral comprising the Cover Pool has<br />

no credit risk associated with it).<br />

The table below gives the reduction in the amount of collateral possible when taking into account the probability of<br />

Issuer Default for Issuers with different rating levels assuming different <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> rating targets.<br />

Issuer’s Rating<br />

Rating Target<br />

Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3<br />

Aaa<br />

Aa1 9.6%<br />

Aa2 4.7% 48.6%<br />

Aa3 2.3% 23.8% 48.9%<br />

A1 1.3% 13.3% 27.3% 55.9%<br />

A2 0.7% 7.6% 15.6% 32.0%<br />

For example, instead of €100 collateral being required to rate €100 bonds Aaa, when the benefit of the probability<br />

of Issuer Default is incorporated into the analysis from an A2-rated Issuer, the amount of collateral required falls to<br />

€99.3. This result is a best case as it assumes independence between the rating of the Issuer and the<br />

performance of the collateral.<br />

All the numbers in the above table can be calculated in the same way – and an example of how one of these<br />

numbers can be calculated follows.<br />

Example of Calculation in Table<br />

The number selected is the 0.7 for an A2-rated Issuer wishing to secure a Aaa rating for its covered bond<br />

programme. The following formula has been used:<br />

Issuer <strong>Expected</strong> <strong>Loss</strong> * (1 – recovery on assets) = Aaa <strong>Expected</strong> <strong>Loss</strong><br />

Thus, from the Moody’s idealised expected loss table (found in Appendix F1) and assuming a 7-year horizon:<br />

= .39% * (1 – recovery on assets) = 0.003%<br />

Therefore the required recovery against the Cover Pool = 99.3%<br />

So the A2 Issuer support is worth c.0.7% enhancement (100%-99.3%).<br />

European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating Methodology Moody’s Investors Service • 7


APPENDIX B1: MODELLING THE CREDIT STRENGTH OF THE ISSUER<br />

Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> will take into account various Issuer or Issuer group-related benefits when rating <strong>Covered</strong><br />

<strong>Bond</strong>s. The following may be considered in this respect.<br />

• The minimum rating that a <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> should achieve is equivalent to the senior unsecured rating of<br />

the Issuer. Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> calculates the probability of Issuer Default during the life of the covered<br />

bond, and assumes prior to Issuer Default that where the Issuer performs these obligations throughout the<br />

life of the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>, there will be no loss to investors.<br />

The way this benefit is incorporated into the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> is discussed in Appendix A1. The relative<br />

contribution of this strength versus the value of the Cover Pool is analysed in Appendix A2.<br />

• One of the key inputs into Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> is the credit quality of the Cover Pool. The Cover Pool credit<br />

quality will be assessed as part of Moody’s analysis, and a score (“Collateral Score”) calculated and<br />

determined based on a number of assumptions and considerations. For a more detailed description of the<br />

determination and meaning of the Collateral Score, see Appendix C1 below.<br />

In particular circumstances and under certain conditions, the Collateral Score may be reduced for an<br />

issuance of <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s – and this is related to the rating of an Issuer and the extent to which the<br />

performance of the Issuer is correlated with the performance of the Cover Pool. A further description of<br />

this potential reduction of collateral stress and the corresponding haircut to the Collateral Score are set out<br />

in Appendices C2 and C3.<br />

• Under Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>, loss following Issuer Default will take into account, amongst other<br />

considerations, any full-recourse unsecured outstanding claim against the Issuer (and, if relevant, other<br />

group companies, or guarantors), if applicable. This claim will be assumed to follow after any realisation of<br />

the Cover Pool. In those instances where the issuer may be part of a larger financial group or the covered<br />

bond issuance activity is only part of the activities of the Issuer, under Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>, this unsecured<br />

claim may reduce losses by up to 45%.<br />

8 • Moody’s Investors Service European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating Methodology


APPENDIX C1: DEFINING AND CALCULATING THE COLLATERAL SCORE<br />

One of the key inputs into Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> is the credit quality of the Cover Pool. The Cover Pool credit quality<br />

will be assessed as part of Moody’s analysis, and a score (“Collateral Score”) calculated and determined based on<br />

a number of assumptions and considerations. The better is the credit quality of the Cover Pool, the lower will be<br />

the Collateral Score.<br />

The Collateral Score is calculated by Moody’s using techniques routinely used in structured finance transactions.<br />

The method of calculation will vary depending on the type of collateral in the Cover Pool, and also the jurisdiction<br />

or market in which it is located. 8<br />

The Collateral Score can be seen as a representation of how much risk-free credit enhancement may be required<br />

to protect the Aaa rating of the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s against a credit deterioration of the assets in the Cover Pool.<br />

Limiting the analysis to the credit deterioration of the assets in the Cover Pool means that:<br />

• There is no support from Issuer and Issuer group;<br />

• No forced sale is required to make timely payments on the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s (i.e. the assets in the Cover<br />

Pool are allowed to amortise naturally over their term); and<br />

• There are no market risks between assets and liabilities (i.e. no mismatches between the underlying<br />

collateral in the Cover Pool and the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s).<br />

So, for example, assuming that the risk-free credit enhancement required for such a Cover Pool to achieve a Aaa<br />

rating is 5%, the Collateral Score would be 5%. The higher the credit quality of the Cover Pool, the lower the riskfree<br />

enhancement required to protect against a credit deterioration of the assets and therefore the lower the<br />

Collateral Score.<br />

The rank-ordering of Collateral Scores between different asset types will typically be as follows (ranging from<br />

Collateral Scores of highest credit quality to lowest credit quality).<br />

• Public sector obligations.<br />

• Residential mortgages.<br />

• Commercial mortgages.<br />

However:<br />

• Cover Pools made up of high-quality residential mortgages may have a Collateral Score which is lower<br />

than that for a Cover Pool made up of public sector obligations; and<br />

• Cover Pools made up of high-quality commercial mortgages may have a Collateral Score which is lower<br />

than that for a Cover Pool of residential mortgages.<br />

Each transaction and asset type (and, where applicable, each jurisdiction and market) will be considered on its<br />

own merits and a Collateral Score determined accordingly.<br />

8<br />

Moody’s has published a number of methodology reports covering residential and commercial mortgages, and collateralised debt obligations.<br />

European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating Methodology Moody’s Investors Service • 9


APPENDIX C2: MEANING OF HAIRCUT TO COLLATERAL SCORE<br />

Following Issuer Default, for certain investment-grade regulated Issuers, Moody’s may reduce the stress (or<br />

Collateral Score) imposed on the Cover Pool below the stress used for a structured finance transaction targeting<br />

the same rating level. So, for example, if a <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> targets a Aaa rating, Moody’s may assume a stress on<br />

the Cover Pool lower than a “Aaa” stress.<br />

Reasons for the assumed reduction in stress for certain Cover Pools include the following, amongst others.<br />

• Prior to Issuer Default, most Issuers are likely (and in some cases required by legislation) to support the<br />

Cover Pool, e.g. by replacing defaulting assets in the Cover Pool with similar performing assets.<br />

Accordingly prior to Issuer Default some of the losses that would have otherwise arisen on the Cover Pool<br />

will have been made whole by the Issuer. Moody’s is of the view that the higher the senior unsecured<br />

rating of the Issuer, the greater is its capacity to protect the Cover Pool from credit deterioration and other<br />

similar sources of loss.<br />

• Moody’s is of the view that not every Issuer Default should be assumed to expose the Cover Pool to a<br />

Aaa stress scenario. Moody’s has considered the probability that a Aaa stress on the Cover Pool<br />

immediately follows an Issuer Default. Moody’s has concluded that, whilst this probability will depend on<br />

the correlation between the Issuer and the Cover Pool, it expects a typical probability of less than 10%.<br />

• Moody’s will give value in determination of the stress to the Issuer’s status as a regulated entity. This is the<br />

case even where Moody’s considers the Issuer to be highly correlated to the Cover Pool.<br />

The method for calculation of the Collateral Score haircuts is further described in Appendix C3. The following<br />

summary may be considered.<br />

• A <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> that has (i) an Issuer that targets a Aaa rating, (ii) a “standard” level of correlation<br />

between Cover Pool and Issuer (the expected case for <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s issued with Cover Pools<br />

comprising non-public sector collateral) and (iii) an Issuer with a senior unsecured rating which is no lower<br />

than A3, may benefit from a Collateral Score haircut that ranges from 25% to 35%.<br />

• A <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> that has (i) an Issuer that targets a Aaa rating, (ii) a low level of correlation between Cover<br />

Pool and Issuer (the expected case for <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s issued with Cover Pools comprising public sector<br />

collateral), and (iii) an Issuer with a senior unsecured rating which is no lower than Baa3, may benefit from<br />

a Collateral Score haircut that ranges from 25% to 35% (and for Issuers with senior unsecured ratings of<br />

no lower than A3, a Collateral Score haircut that ranges from 40% to 50%).<br />

• In circumstances where the targeted ratings are below Aaa, these haircuts may increase. In any event no<br />

haircut will exceed 60%.<br />

10 • Moody’s Investors Service European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating Methodology


APPENDIX C3: CALCULATION OF THE HAIRCUT TO COLLATERAL SCORE<br />

In determining the reduction of the collateral stress (as described in Appendix C2), and when considering Cover<br />

Pools which enjoy a good degree of diversity, Moody’s may make use of the following grids based on assumptions<br />

which include the following amongst others:<br />

• The first grid applies to the majority of <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> transactions and assumes a standard (high) level of<br />

correlation between Issuer and Cover Pool.<br />

• The second grid applies to <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> transactions issued in respect of a Cover Pool of public sector<br />

obligations.<br />

Grid 1<br />

standard correlation<br />

Rating of Issuer<br />

Rating of Issuer<br />

Rating of Cover Pool<br />

Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3<br />

Aaa Aaa<br />

Aa1 Aaa Aaa<br />

Aa2 Aaa Aaa Aa1<br />

Aa3 Aaa Aaa Aa1 Aa1<br />

A1 Aaa Aaa Aa1 Aa1 Aa1<br />

A2 Aaa Aaa Aa1 Aa1 Aa1 Aa1<br />

A3 Aaa Aaa Aa1 Aa1 Aa1 Aa1 Aa2<br />

Baa1 Aaa Aa1 Aa1 Aa1 Aa1 Aa2 Aa2 Aa3<br />

Baa2 Aaa Aa1 Aa1 Aa1 Aa2 Aa2 Aa3 Aa3 A1<br />

Baa3 Aaa Aa1 Aa1 Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 Aa3 A1 A1 A2<br />

Grid 2<br />

low correlation<br />

Rating of Cover Pool<br />

Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3<br />

Aaa Aaa<br />

Aa1 Aaa Aaa<br />

Aa2 Aaa Aaa Aaa<br />

Aa3 Aaa Aaa Aaa Aa1<br />

A1 Aaa Aaa Aaa Aa1 Aa1<br />

A2 Aaa Aaa Aaa Aa1 Aa1 Aa1<br />

A3 Aaa Aaa Aaa Aa1 Aa1 Aa1 Aa1<br />

Baa1 Aaa Aaa Aa1 Aa1 Aa1 Aa1 Aa1 Aa2<br />

Baa2 Aaa Aaa Aa1 Aa1 Aa1 Aa1 Aa2 Aa2 Aa3<br />

Baa3 Aaa Aaa Aa1 Aa1 Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 Aa3 A1 A1<br />

Reading the grids<br />

The ratings in the grids are the target rating of the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s and show the combination of Issuer and Cover<br />

Pool ratings required to achieve a given rating on a <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>.<br />

By way of an example, the following may be considered in respect of grid 1.<br />

• It will be possible to achieve a Aaa rating for <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s in circumstances of an Issuer’s senior<br />

unsecured rating of A3 and a Cover Pool rating of at least Aa1.<br />

• If the Issuer has a senior unsecured rating of Baa1, in order to achieve Aaa rating for <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s, the<br />

Cover Pool must be rated a stand-alone Aaa.<br />

What is a Cover Pool rating?<br />

If the Cover Pool must be rated Aaa for a <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> to achieve its Aaa rating target, the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong><br />

will not apply any haircut to the Collateral Score. However, if a lower rating on the Cover Pool is sufficient to<br />

achieve a given rating target, then a haircut may be applied on the Collateral Score. The following are haircuts that<br />

may be applied for a given Cover Pool rating.<br />

• Aaa 0%<br />

• Aa1 25-35%<br />

• Aa2 40-50%<br />

• Aa3 45-55%<br />

• A1 55-60%<br />

• A2 60%<br />

European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating Methodology Moody’s Investors Service • 11


These haircuts have been calculated by looking at what the percentage of the Collateral Score is required to<br />

enhance the Cover Pool to its target rating. For example, if the Cover Pool rating that is required to achieve the<br />

target covered bond rating is Aa1, then a 25-35% reduction in the Collateral Score may be applied in the Moody’s<br />

EL <strong>Model</strong>.<br />

The haircut to the Collateral Score is subject to a maximum of 60%. The reason for this is that a certain level of<br />

losses might be expected to impact the Cover Pool following Issuer Default, and also this is approximately the<br />

amount of equity that would be required to fund the Cover Pool if it were refinanced as a structured finance<br />

transaction.<br />

How the grids were prepared<br />

There are two key inputs in the generation of the grid tables above.<br />

• A minimum asset correlation for any pair of ratings. For the standard correlation table this minimum is<br />

higher than for the low correlation table. 9<br />

• The “theoretical asset correlation”. This is used where this is higher than the minimum asset correlation<br />

inputs mentioned above. The theoretical asset correlation was calculated by considering the maximum<br />

and minimum correlation levels which in turn were derived with the help of the following well-established<br />

formula. 10 P(<br />

A I B)<br />

− P(<br />

A)<br />

P(<br />

B)<br />

Corr(<br />

A,<br />

B)<br />

=<br />

,<br />

P(<br />

A)(1<br />

− P(<br />

A))<br />

P(<br />

B)(1<br />

− P(<br />

B))<br />

where P(X<br />

) denotes the probability that entity X defaults during the horizon of interest, and<br />

Corr( A,<br />

B)<br />

denotes the default correlation between entities A and B .<br />

The theoretical maximum correlation between two entities based solely on ratings (hence default probabilities) is<br />

obtained by setting the expression P( A I B)<br />

in the above equation to the default probability of the higher rated<br />

entity.<br />

By contrast, the theoretical minimum is obtained by first observing that the lowest joint default probability for any<br />

pair of entities is equal to the lowest historically observed default probability for any entity; that is, this quantity is<br />

equal to the probability of default of a single Aaa-rated entity. In practice, for all pairs of entities, we therefore set<br />

P( A I B) equal to P (A)<br />

in the above equation, where A in this instance denotes a Aaa-rated entity.<br />

The impact of taking the higher of the key inputs above is that the “average” asset correlation used when achieving<br />

a Aaa rating using the standard correlation grid is over 50%, while the asset correlation using the low correlation<br />

grid is in region of 40%.<br />

9<br />

To calculate these asset correlations, Moody’s has studied the historic observed correlations of rating movements between corporate and<br />

financial institution issuers. For more information, see Moody’s Revisits Its Assumptions Regarding Corporate Default (and Asset) Correlations<br />

for CDOs November 2004.<br />

10<br />

See Default Correlation and Credit Analysis, Douglas J. Lucas, March 1995.<br />

12 • Moody’s Investors Service European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating Methodology


APPENDIX C4: USING THE COLLATERAL SCORE IN MOODY’S EL MODEL<br />

The preceding Appendices provide a description in respect of Collateral Score as follows.<br />

• Defining and explaining a Collateral Score.<br />

• Method of calculation and determination of a Collateral Score.<br />

• Haircuts that may be applied to the Collateral Score.<br />

This Appendix and Appendix C5, describe how the Collateral Score, after any haircut if applicable, will impact the<br />

Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>.<br />

The Collateral Score determines, amongst others:<br />

• The level of losses due to the credit deterioration of the assets in the Cover Pool following Issuer Default.<br />

This ignores any losses on the Cover Pool arising from refinancing or market risks. In Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong><br />

these losses will be equal to the Collateral Score, after any haircut if applicable, and are assumed to be<br />

spread equally over the four years following Issuer Default. In scenarios where the Cover Pool is refinanced<br />

prior to the all losses materialising (i.e. within four years following Issuer Default), Moody’s will assume no<br />

value is attributed to an amount of the Cover Pool equal to the amount of the remaining losses (i.e. not yet<br />

written off).<br />

• The refinancing margin assumed for the Cover Pool. The lower the Collateral Score, and thus the stronger<br />

the credit quality of the Cover pool, the lower the assumed cost of refinancing in respect of the remaining<br />

Cover Pool. This is further described in Appendix C5.<br />

The foregoing may be summarised as follows:<br />

Following Issuer Default, the lower the Collateral Score, the lower the write-off for losses against the Cover Pool,<br />

and the lower the refinancing margin applicable to the remaining Cover Pool. A corresponding result arises for<br />

higher Collateral Scores, with higher write-off and refinancing margins.<br />

European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating Methodology Moody’s Investors Service • 13


APPENDIX C5: IMPACT OF THE COLLATERAL SCORE ON REFINANCING MARGIN<br />

IN MOODY’S EL MODEL<br />

At time of refinance the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> assumes the Cover Pool is apportioned into various tranches, each<br />

with a specific risk profile. The main reason for this tranching is to calculate the refinancing margin for the portion of<br />

the Cover Pool against which finance is being raised. The Collateral Score is the key driver in determining the<br />

amount of the Cover Pool that is allocated to any tranche. A lower Collateral Score will imply that a greater amount<br />

of the remaining Cover Pool will be allocated to tranches with low risk, and correspondingly result in a lower<br />

refinancing margin.<br />

Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> usually takes into account the following three factors in making determination of what amounts<br />

should be apportioned into each of the tranches.<br />

• The Collateral Score (prior to any haircut).<br />

• <strong>Expected</strong> loss on the Cover Pool, which is determined from an analysis of the Cover Pool.<br />

• An assumption that losses on the Cover Pool will follow a lognormal distribution.<br />

A loss distribution will be constructed for the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> based on the information in respect of the above<br />

three drivers. On the basis of this loss distribution, the required level of enhancement will be determined for each<br />

tranche. The following broad tranches are used.<br />

• Aaa tranche.<br />

• High investment-grade tranche.<br />

• Low investment-grade tranche.<br />

• Sub-investment-grade tranche.<br />

Under the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>, refinancing margins are lowest in the Aaa tranche and will increase for each tranche<br />

below the Aaa tranche. Further discussion on refinancing margins follows in Appendices D1 and D4.<br />

14 • Moody’s Investors Service European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating Methodology


APPENDIX D1: REFINANCING RISK – THE REFINANCING MARGINS<br />

Under Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>, determination of refinancing margins will take into account the following considerations,<br />

amongst others:<br />

• The time period available for completion of the refinancing. Higher refinancing margins are assumed in the<br />

Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>, if the time period to complete refinance is six months or less. This may arise in case of<br />

Issuer Default within a period of six months of the legal final maturity of any <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s.<br />

• The time period between the time of issue of a <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> and the time of refinancing. The shorter the<br />

time period (or closer the time of refinancing is to the time of issuance), the greater certainty in respect of<br />

refinancing margins required to refinance the Cover Pool.<br />

• The Collateral Score, and more generally the credit quality of the Cover Pool. In general it may be<br />

concluded that all else being equal, a lower Collateral Score (and the lower the Collateral Score the higher<br />

the credit quality of the assets) will lead to lower refinancing margins.<br />

• The type of collateral in the Cover Pool. In Moody’s experience and as shown in historical data, certain<br />

types of collateral in the Cover Pool will trade at lower refinancing margins than others, under similar<br />

trading conditions and circumstances. Examples may include ‘repo-eligible’ collateral (often included<br />

within Cover Pools made up mainly of public sector obligations), in respect of which the Moody’s EL<br />

<strong>Model</strong> may assume a refinancing margin of zero.<br />

• Legislation and contractual-specific considerations. For those jurisdictions where the legislation is<br />

more/less supportive than others of the process of sale of collateral in the Cover Pool following Issuer<br />

Default (i.e. presenting obstacles to any refinancing), refinancing margins may be correspondingly<br />

lowered/increased. Similar consequences may be considered in circumstances of contractual-specific<br />

provisions that have a similar effect.<br />

Refinancing required to be completed within a short time period (six months)<br />

The following data represents examples of refinancing margins (in basis points) which may be applied in the<br />

Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> if refinancing is required to be completed within a time period of six months.<br />

Refinancing Margins (in bps)<br />

Residential<br />

Mortgages*<br />

Commercial<br />

Mortgages<br />

Public Sector<br />

Loans**<br />

1 73 108 27<br />

2 79 105 32<br />

3 86 117 36<br />

4 91 126 39<br />

5 95 133 41<br />

* these are examples of refinancing margins that may apply for prime residential mortgages<br />

** these are examples of refinancing margins that may apply for ‘non-repo eligible’ public<br />

Years<br />

The following may be considered in respect of the above data.<br />

• The three columns represent the three most prominent collateral types found in Cover Pools.<br />

• The rows refer to the time period in years from the time of issuance of <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s to Issuer Default.<br />

By way of example from the data, consider the following scenarios and conclusions:<br />

• In circumstances of an Issuer Default that occurs five or more years after issue of <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s,<br />

Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> will apply a refinancing margin at the time of Issuer Default to the Cover Pool of<br />

residential mortgages in an amount of around 95 basis points.<br />

• In circumstances of an Issuer Default which occurs two years after issue of <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s, Moody’s EL<br />

<strong>Model</strong> will apply a refinancing margin at the time of Issuer Default to the Cover Pool of residential<br />

mortgages in an amount of 79 basis points.<br />

As described at the top of this appendix refinancing margins will be different from deal to deal and jurisdiction to<br />

jurisdiction.<br />

European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating Methodology Moody’s Investors Service • 15


A further stress may be applied to refinancing margins for those Cover Pools that require refinancing within a<br />

period of less than four months following Issuer Default. In these circumstances, the refinancing margins may<br />

increase by up to the following amounts:<br />

Refinance<br />

Stress<br />

Time Available to complete<br />

Refinancing<br />

100% One Month<br />

75% Two Months<br />

50% Three Months<br />

25% Four Months<br />

If an Issuer Default occurs a very short period before a <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> is due, it might be concluded that timely<br />

refinancing is not possible. However, it may be possible that an investor could sell its <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s on the<br />

secondary market to realise payment. Such a sale may incur substantial additional costs, and these are partly<br />

reflected in the stresses above.<br />

Refinancing required to be completed within a longer time period (more than six months)<br />

The following data represents examples of refinancing margins (in basis points) which may be applied in the<br />

Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> if refinancing can be completed over a period exceeding six months.<br />

Years<br />

Refinancing Margins (in bps)<br />

Residential<br />

Mortgages<br />

Commercial<br />

Mortgages<br />

Public Sector<br />

Loans<br />

1 60 91 20<br />

2 64 85 23<br />

3 69 94 26<br />

4 73 101 28<br />

5 76 107 29<br />

The following may be considered in respect of the above data.<br />

• The three columns represent the three most prominent collateral types found in Cover Pools.<br />

• The rows refer to the time period in years from the time of issuance of <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s to Issuer Default.<br />

By way of example from the data, consider the following scenarios and conclusions.<br />

• In circumstances of an Issuer Default which occurs five or more years after issue of <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s,<br />

Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> will apply a refinancing margin to the Cover Pool of residential mortgages in an amount<br />

of around 76 basis points.<br />

• In circumstances of an Issuer Default which occurs two years after issue of <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s, on refinance<br />

Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> will apply a refinancing margin to the Cover Pool of residential mortgages in an amount<br />

of 64 basis points. It should be noted that this 64 basis points is not increased if following Issuer Default<br />

the Cover Pool is not promptly refinanced.<br />

As discussed above these refinancing margins will be different from deal to deal and jurisdiction to jurisdiction.<br />

16 • Moody’s Investors Service European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating Methodology


APPENDIX D2: REFINANCING RISK – THE PORTION OF A COVERED BOND THAT<br />

MUST RELY ON THE REFINANCING TO BE REPAID ON A TIMELY BASIS<br />

Post Issuer Default, the portion of a <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> that must rely on refinancing in order to be repaid on a timely<br />

basis depends on the level of principal collections (or “natural amortisation”) prior to any refinancing. Under the<br />

Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> from the following considerations amongst others it is possible to determine the amount of<br />

principal collections against any <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s following Issuer Default.<br />

• Following Issuer Default the length of time available to collect principal collections (the “Collection Period”).<br />

In Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>, where there is a single <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> in a programme the Collection Period runs<br />

from Issuer Default up until earlier of the legal final maturity of the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> (or, where applicable, the<br />

later extended legal final maturity), or following acceleration, any refinance date which is earlier than the<br />

legal final maturity. When considering the Collection Period for a programme under which there are many<br />

<strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s issued, the start date for the Collection Period may change. When there is more than one<br />

<strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> in issue under a programme, the start date for a specific <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> in Moody’s EL<br />

<strong>Model</strong> is:<br />

• Prior to acceleration, a date between the date of Issuer Default and the legal final maturity date of the<br />

immediately preceding maturing <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>.<br />

• Following acceleration, the acceleration date.<br />

• The principal payment rate under the Cover Pool during the Collection Period. The higher the principal<br />

payment rate from collateral under the Cover Pool, the greater the principal cash flows collected during<br />

the Collection Period.<br />

• The number of <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s issued under a programme. For mature programmes, the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong><br />

that matures first following Issuer Default may be a fraction of the size of the overall Cover Pool at the time<br />

of Issuer Default. This may lead to a leveraged effect on principal collections during the Collection Period<br />

as principal collections will be based on the principal payment rate on a Cover Pool which may be many<br />

times the size of a specific <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>. Later-paying <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s in a mature programme may not<br />

benefit from this leveraged effect to the same extent. However, another consequence of a mature<br />

programme is that there will be additional <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s maturing on various dates, therefore potentially<br />

reducing the length of the “Collection Period”.<br />

• The amount of over-collateralisation in the Cover Pool. Where a <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> programme has a<br />

substantial amount of over-collateralisation, all <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s in the programme may benefit from the<br />

“leverage” effect discussed in point three above.<br />

It may be concluded that in the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>:<br />

• the longer the Collection Period;<br />

• the higher the principal payment rate; and<br />

• the greater the amount of over-collateralisation,<br />

the greater the level of cash flow that will be collected from principal payments under the Cover Pool in the<br />

Collection Period. The greater the amount of cash flow collected during the Collection Period, the lower the<br />

amount of the Cover Pool that will be subject to refinancing risk.<br />

European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating Methodology Moody’s Investors Service • 17


APPENDIX D3: REFINANCING RISK – CALCULATION OF REFINANCING MARGINS<br />

Moody’s has built a refinancing margin generator which calculates the refinancing margins used in the Moody’s EL<br />

<strong>Model</strong>. The generator is defined as (the “Formula”):<br />

dS = η(ζ − S)dt + σdW<br />

Where:<br />

dS is the spread change;<br />

η is the speed the time series reverts to its long term meanζ ;<br />

dt is the change in time;<br />

2<br />

σ is the volatility of the spread time series; and<br />

dW represents the standard Wiener process. 11<br />

The parameters of the Formula (adjusted for timing) were set by minimising the differences of the results produced<br />

for parts of the Formula and the data historically observed on refinancing margins. This exercise was repeated to<br />

calculate the long-term mean and standard deviation for each rating category for each collateral type. 12<br />

The<br />

Formula is then run for a large number of simulations. From these simulations refinancing curves are generated by<br />

working to the desired confidence levels. The confidence levels used for calculating refinancing margins are:<br />

• 99% for margins used when refinancing must be completed within six months; and<br />

• 95% for margins when more than six months is available for refinancing.<br />

The following graph illustrates the refinancing margins produced when working to a 99% confidence level. The<br />

main assumptions used are broadly in line with those used to calculate the refinancing margins for Aaa-rated<br />

residential mortgage pools. The assumptions used include a standard deviation of 20 bps, and a long-term<br />

average refinancing margin of 30 bps.<br />

Refinancing Margins for a Aaa-rated Pool of<br />

Prime-Quality Residential Mortgages<br />

1.20%<br />

1.00%<br />

0.80%<br />

0.60%<br />

0.40%<br />

0.20%<br />

0.00%<br />

1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58<br />

Months<br />

For a discussion of the meaning of these refinancing margins, see Appendix D1.<br />

11<br />

For further information, refer to “The Moody’s Capital <strong>Model</strong> Version 1.0, January 2004”.<br />

12<br />

Moody’s has not used the calculated factor for mean reversion. Instead Moody’s has used a fixed parameter for mean reversion. This is<br />

because an analysis suggests that using the limited available data would overestimate the rate of mean reversion. Moody’s has used the<br />

same fixed parameter for mean reversion when calculating refinancing margins for each rating category of each major asset class.<br />

18 • Moody’s Investors Service European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating Methodology


APPENDIX D4: SIMPLIFIED EXAMPLE TO SHOW HOW TO TRANSLATE A<br />

STRESSED REFINANCING MARGIN INTO A LOSS ON THE COVER POOL<br />

This Appendix presents an example to show what effect the stressed refinancing margin in Appendix D1 may have<br />

on the value of the Cover Pool. It should be noted that the example below is a simplification of the corresponding<br />

calculation in Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>.<br />

The example is based on the following assumptions, amongst others.<br />

• A single <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> is outstanding under a “programme” of <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s.<br />

• Issuer Default takes place one month prior to legal final maturity of the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>.<br />

• The remaining average life of the Cover Pool at the time of its refinancing is two years.<br />

• The refinancing takes place five years after the <strong>Covered</strong> bond was issued.<br />

• The Cover Pool consists of prime residential mortgages (and matches the sample pool used to create the<br />

refinance margins in Appendix D1).<br />

The impact of the refinancing margin stress on the value of the Cover Pool may be calculated as follows:<br />

Refinancing margin * liquidity stress *average life of the Cover Pool = reduction in the value of the Cover Pool<br />

95 * 2 * 2 = 380 bps reduction in the value of the Cover Pool<br />

Amongst others, this example highlights the importance of the average life of the Cover Pool. If the example were<br />

repeated with an average life of the Cover Pool at time of refinance of four years, the reduction in the value of the<br />

Cover Pool would be doubled. Conversely, if the example were repeated with an average life of the Cover Pool at<br />

time of refinance of one, the reduction in the value of the Cover Pool would be halved.<br />

European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating Methodology Moody’s Investors Service • 19


APPENDIX E1: MARKET RISKS – KEY RISKS<br />

For purposes of the appendices which describe market risks, the expression “market risks” will be reference to the<br />

mismatches between <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s and the Cover Pool that arise from the different payment promises and<br />

durations made on the Cover Pool and the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s. Specific examples of some of the material market risks<br />

to which <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s are exposed are discussed below.<br />

Under the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> analysis of market risks following Issuer Default will be undertaken in respect of two<br />

time periods as follows.<br />

• Market risks that arise after Issuer Default and prior to any refinancing of part or whole of the Cover Pool.<br />

• Market risks that arise on refinancing of part or whole of the Cover Pool.<br />

Market risks that arise after Issuer Default and prior to any refinancing of the<br />

Cover Pool<br />

During this period prior to any refinancing of part or the whole of the Cover Pool, Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> will assess<br />

whether market risks materialising may lead to an acceleration of the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s. This may arise as follows.<br />

• Cash flow deficiencies may result from market risk materialising. For example, interest or currency rate<br />

movements might lead to collections being below that required to pay interest (in the case of interest and<br />

currency rate differences) and principal (in the case of currency rate differences) on the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s. A<br />

missed payment could in turn lead to acceleration of all payment obligations under the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s,<br />

whether or not then due.<br />

• Market risk materialising may affect matching test compliance under the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s, failure of which<br />

may lead to acceleration of payment obligations under the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s. The applicable approach to<br />

calculating any matching tests will be set out in the relevant legislation or contractual arrangements for the<br />

<strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s. Methods of calculation may include:<br />

• Notional value matching, which will not be affected by any changes in interest rates (but may be<br />

affected by changes in currency rates).<br />

• Net present value matching, which may be affected by both interest and currency rate changes.<br />

Where net present value matching is applicable, the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> will recalculate the net present value of the<br />

Cover Pool and <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s on monthly or quarterly basis to check for failure of the matching test.<br />

Market risks arising on refinancing of the Cover Pool<br />

Under the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>, if part or whole of the Cover Pool is subject to refinancing either to meet the principal<br />

payment due on a <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> or following acceleration payment of all <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s outstanding, then various<br />

market risks may be crystallised.<br />

The Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> will measure the extent of the risk to the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s in different ways depending on the<br />

nature of the market risk.<br />

Interest rate risks<br />

The exposure to interest rate movements at time of refinance will depend on the mismatch that exists between the<br />

<strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s and the Cover Pool. Material levels of exposure to interest rate movements will arise in the following<br />

circumstances amongst others:<br />

• Interest rates applicable to (i) the collateral in the Cover Pool are based on a fixed rate with a long maturity<br />

(assuming no reset), and (ii) the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s are based either on a short maturity or floating rate.<br />

• Interest rates applicable to (i) the collateral in the Cover Pool are based either on a short maturity or are<br />

floating rate, and (ii) the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s are based on a fixed rate with a long maturity (assuming no reset).<br />

In the first bullet above, a loss on the Cover Pool may arise in respect of a rising interest rate environment. By<br />

contrast, in the second bullet above, the loss to the Cover Pool may arise in respect of a falling interest rate<br />

environment. Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> considers scenarios of both rising and falling interest rate environments and<br />

assumes application of the scenario with the more stressed result. Appendices E3 and E4 describe further the<br />

levels of stress considered in Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> as well as setting out the relevant workings of Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong><br />

for exposure to interest rate risks. Appendix E5 provides an example of the impact of interest rate risk on the Cover<br />

Pool.<br />

Currency rate risks<br />

Currency rate risks are less commonplace in respect of <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s than interest rate risk. However,<br />

increasingly, collateral in Cover Pools is originated, and <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s are issued, respectively in currencies other<br />

than the currency of the Issuer. Appendices E3 and E4 describe further the levels of stress considered in Moody’s<br />

EL <strong>Model</strong> for exposure to currency rate risks as well as setting out the relevant workings of the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>.<br />

20 • Moody’s Investors Service European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating Methodology


APPENDIX E2: MARKET RISKS – MOODY’S EL MODEL’S ANALYSIS OF HEDGING<br />

ARRANGEMENTS<br />

Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> will analyse the market risks that may arise between the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s and the Cover Pool<br />

following Issuer Default. Consideration will be given under Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> to which of the following market riskrelated<br />

scenarios may arise after Issuer Default:<br />

• Structured finance-compliant arrangements are in place to cover all relevant market risks. The meaning of<br />

the expression “structured finance-compliant arrangements” will include the following requirements,<br />

amongst others:<br />

• Hedging arrangements are designed to survive Issuer Default (reasons for this requirement are described<br />

in the next following paragraph).<br />

• Moody’s swap-related criteria will be fulfilled in all respects for all hedging arrangements. 13<br />

• Arrangements are in place to cover market risks, though these do not comply with all requirements of<br />

structured finance-compliant arrangements in one or more respects. These hedging arrangements do,<br />

however, survive Issuer Default.<br />

• No suitable arrangements in place, or if there are arrangements in place, these will terminate on Issuer<br />

Default.<br />

Under Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>, any market risk not covered by arrangements that are designed to survive Issuer Default<br />

may negatively affect the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s. Reasons for this approach include the following considerations, amongst<br />

others:<br />

• An administrator will be assumed to be appointed to manage the Cover Pool following Issuer Default.<br />

• However, it is Moody’s view that an administrator may experience difficulty in trying to cover market risks<br />

following Issuer Default. 14<br />

Under Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>, account may be taken of any legislation- or contractual-specific features that mitigate<br />

any of the above considerations as well as any other market risks taken into account.<br />

The remainder of the appendices which describe market risks focus attention on stresses that are applied by<br />

Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> in the event that hedging arrangements do not constitute structured finance-compliant<br />

arrangements.<br />

13<br />

See Swaps in European Term Securitisations, May 2002 and Impact of Swap Counterparty Risks on Global Structured Finance Transactions<br />

Moody’s Revised Methodology - Call for Comments, March 2005.<br />

14<br />

In support of its view, Moody’s expects that, in considering entering into hedging arrangements with an administrator, a hedge counterparty<br />

may require collateralisation of the arrangements. This may include frequent posting of collateral, dependent on the evolution of the exposure.<br />

An administrator may not always be permitted following Issuer Default to enter into additional or replacement hedging arrangements.<br />

Furthermore, if entering into hedging arrangements is permitted, an administrator may either additionally not be permitted to provide<br />

collateralisation to hedge counterparties, or have sufficient funds available for this purpose.<br />

European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating Methodology Moody’s Investors Service • 21


APPENDIX E3: MARKET RISKS – THE LEVELS OF STRESS APPLIED BY MOODY’S<br />

EL MODEL<br />

Interest rate stresses<br />

The Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> uses a series of interest rate curves, which effectively means there are ten different interest<br />

rates for every month of what is defined below as the Interest Exposure Period. The “Interest Exposure Period” can<br />

be defined as the period of time during which it is assumed that <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s will be exposed to changes in<br />

interest rates (see footnote for more complete definition). 15<br />

Accordingly to simplify the communication of the interest rate stresses used in the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>, Moody’s has<br />

come up with “average” interest rate movements during different Interest Exposure Periods. These simplified<br />

stressed interest rate movements for interest rates are as follows:<br />

Interest Exposure<br />

Cumulative Interest Rate<br />

Period (in years)<br />

Increase/Decrease<br />

1 1.65%<br />

2 2.25%<br />

3 2.75%<br />

4 3.00%<br />

5 3.00%<br />

>5 3.00%<br />

To understand two particular results from the table:<br />

• Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> will increase and decrease interest rates by an “average” of around 3% when the<br />

Interest Exposure Period is five years.<br />

• Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> will increase and decrease interest rates by an “average” of around 2.25% when the<br />

Interest Exposure Period is two years.<br />

The Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> looks separately at the impact of the increasing and decreasing interest rates on the<br />

expected loss of the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s, and takes the path of interest rates that leads to the harsher result on the<br />

expected loss on the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s. This is because different <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s will be impacted differently by<br />

different interest rate environments, dependent on whether the Cover Pool and/or <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s are subject to<br />

fixed or floating rates of interest, and the duration gap between <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s and the Cover Pool.<br />

To understand the impact of the interest rate changes in the table above on the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>, Moody’s has<br />

prepared a simple illustration in Appendix E5 of how these might be seen to affect the loss on the Cover Pool at<br />

time of refinancing. 16<br />

Currency rate stresses<br />

The stress applied by Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> to currency rate market risks will depend on the length of time assumed<br />

for the “Interest” Exposure Period (see definition above, and in footnote 13, except that for the purpose of currency<br />

rate risks this should be the period between Issuer Default until the time of refinance of the Cover Pool if a matching<br />

test is in place to ensure currency rate risks are hedged up to Issuer Default). Examples of stresses that may be<br />

applied are as follows:<br />

“Interest” Exposure Cumulative Adverse Currency<br />

Period (in years)<br />

Rate Movements<br />

1 15%<br />

2 25%<br />

3 30%<br />

>3 30%<br />

As for interest rate movements, the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> assumes that currency rate movements do not increase<br />

linearly over time. Given this tendency, the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> caps exposure to currency rate risk at the three-year<br />

stress.<br />

15<br />

In the environment of <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s, the Interest Exposure Period will usually be determined by the type of matching test that is being run by<br />

the Issuer. So, for example:<br />

a) In those circumstances where the matching test that is applied prior to Issuer Default is based on net present values (or an equivalent<br />

approach), the Interest Exposure Period will extend from Issuer Default until the time of refinance of the Cover Pool.<br />

b) In those circumstances where the matching test that is applied prior to Issuer Default is not based on net present values (or an<br />

equivalent approach), the Interest Exposure Period will extend from the time of issue of <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s until the time of refinance of<br />

the Cover Pool.<br />

16<br />

The interest rate increases and decreases above were extracted from the future term structures (see Appendix E4) which are generated by<br />

the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>. The future term structures in practice have the following effect in Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>:<br />

c) For the Interest Exposure Period, they project cash flows in respect of <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s and the Cover Pool to the extent these are not<br />

subject to fixed interest rates.<br />

d) As at the time of refinancing of the Cover Pool, they enable calculation of the market risks by providing rates for discounting all future<br />

cash flows under the Cover Pool.<br />

22 • Moody’s Investors Service European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating Methodology


APPENDIX E4: MARKET RISKS – CALCULATION OF INTEREST AND CURRENCY<br />

RATE STRESSES<br />

Interest rates<br />

Spot Rate Curves<br />

To build a picture of interest rate risk, Moody’s has constructed a series of curves from a series of spot rates which<br />

are defined by upper and lower boundaries of possible interest rate movements. Each of these curves represents a<br />

distribution of possible interest rate changes in either direction (i.e. increasing and decreasing) over periods of time<br />

and covering changes to a confidence level of 95%.<br />

An example of curves created for spot rates with different terms are shown below.<br />

Spot Rates Boundaries for Different Risk Horizons<br />

% IR<br />

8.00%<br />

7.00%<br />

6.00%<br />

5.00%<br />

4.00%<br />

3.00%<br />

2.00%<br />

1.00%<br />

0.00%<br />

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65<br />

Risk Horizon (months)<br />

1 yr 1 yr 2 yr 2 yr 3 yr 3 yr 4 yr 4 yr 5 yr 5 yr<br />

6 yr 6 yr 7 yr 7 yr 8 yr 8 yr 9 yr 9 yr 10 yr 10 yr<br />

The curves above show the interest rate stresses do not increase linearly over time, and instead, the cumulative<br />

movements over time start converging. Given this tendency, the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> caps exposure to interest rate<br />

risk at the five-year stress.<br />

The spot rate curves above are derived from application of the following steps:<br />

• Analysis of relative changes in historical interest rates.<br />

• Scaling interest rates based on a confidence level.<br />

• Analysis of relative changes in historical interest rates. Under the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> a factor will be<br />

calculated (“µ”) based on historical data for spot rates of various maturities of between one year and 10<br />

years. This calculation is repeated for monthly periods ranging from one month to 60 months.<br />

µ is calculated using the following formula:<br />

ri<br />

− r<br />

µ =<br />

r<br />

i−1<br />

i−1<br />

Where:<br />

µ = the relative change in spot rates between period i and i-1<br />

r i<br />

- r i-1<br />

= the absolute change in spot rates over the period<br />

r i-1<br />

= the spot rate in the previous period<br />

Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> will calculate µ for each maturity of between one year and 10 years and for each month up to<br />

five years. For each series of µ the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> will calculate a standard deviation. A “volatility surface” will be<br />

calculated plotting these resulting 600 standard deviations.<br />

European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating Methodology Moody’s Investors Service • 23


• Scaling interest rates based on a confidence level. Using the volatility calculated above, the spot rates are<br />

increased or decreased to a 95% confidence level. 17<br />

Future Term Structure<br />

From the spot rate curves calculated above, Moody’s has prepared a future term structure 18 for each month of the<br />

Interest Exposure Period (see Appendix E3 for definition). The future term structures determine the interest rate<br />

stresses used in the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>.<br />

As a starting point for the future term structure, the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> uses spot rates based on average rates and<br />

not those calculated from the current interest rates. These levels are currently set at an average rate. The reason<br />

Moody’s has set these rates as constants, as opposed to using current interest rates, is to prevent <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong><br />

ratings being overly sensitive to interest rate changes in the market.<br />

Currency rates<br />

Under Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>, a similar approach is applied in respect of currency rates as for interest rates. This<br />

includes the analysis of historical currency rates.<br />

17<br />

The distribution used to calculate the confidence level is based on the normal as it has been observed that µs have been shown to be<br />

normally distributed.<br />

18<br />

At each point in the simulation the model generates a set of Nelson-Siegel parameters describing the entire spot rate curve. The model<br />

calibrates the Nelson-Siegel parameters by using Newton-Raphson method. The advantage of the Nelson Siegel formulation is that it provides<br />

a parsimonious model of the yield curve. Thus it is computationally very efficient and any point in the curve can be obtained with few<br />

parameters. For further information please refer to “The Moody’s Capital <strong>Model</strong> Version 1.0, January 2004”.<br />

24 • Moody’s Investors Service European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating Methodology


APPENDIX E5: SIMPLIFIED EXAMPLE TO SHOW HOW TO TRANSLATE A<br />

STRESSED INTEREST RATE MOVEMENT INTO A LOSS ON THE COVER POOL<br />

This Appendix presents an example to show what effect the stressed interest rate movement calculated in<br />

Appendix E3 may have on the value of the Cover Pool. It should be noted that this is a simplification of the<br />

corresponding calculation in Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> and assumes no hedging arrangements are in place to protect<br />

against interest rate exposure.<br />

The example is based on the following assumptions, amongst others;<br />

• There has been an Issuer Default.<br />

• A single <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> is outstanding under a “programme” of <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s.<br />

• The remaining average life of the Cover Pool at the time of its sale is two years.<br />

• The Cover Pool comprises collateral which is all based on fixed rates of interest until respective maturity<br />

(which means for this example the average life of Cover Pool is also the period of interest rate exposure).<br />

• No principal payments will be made in respect of the collateral in the Cover Pool.<br />

• The Interest Exposure Period (see Appendix E3) is one year.<br />

• The increase in interest rates during the Interest Exposure Period is 165 basis points (as described in<br />

Appendix E3).<br />

The impact of market risk stress on the value of the Cover Pool may be calculated as follows:<br />

Interest rate increase * average life of the interest rate exposure = reduction in the value of the Cover Pool<br />

165bps * 2 = 330bps reduction in the value of the Cover Pool<br />

European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating Methodology Moody’s Investors Service • 25


APPENDIX F1: MOODY’S IDEALISED PROBABILITY OF DEFAULT AND EXPECTED<br />

LOSS TABLES<br />

Table 1<br />

Moody’s Idealised Cumulative Probability of Default<br />

Rating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10<br />

Aaa 0.00005% 0.00020% 0.00070% 0.00180% 0.00290% 0.00400% 0.00520% 0.00660% 0.00820% 0.01000%<br />

Aa1 0.00057% 0.00300% 0.01000% 0.02100% 0.03100% 0.04200% 0.05400% 0.06700% 0.08200% 0.10000%<br />

Aa2 0.00136% 0.00800% 0.02600% 0.04700% 0.06800% 0.08900% 0.11100% 0.13500% 0.16400% 0.20000%<br />

Aa3 0.00302% 0.01900% 0.05900% 0.10100% 0.14200% 0.18300% 0.22700% 0.27200% 0.32700% 0.40000%<br />

A1 0.00581% 0.03700% 0.11700% 0.18900% 0.26100% 0.33000% 0.40600% 0.48000% 0.57300% 0.70000%<br />

A2 0.01087% 0.07000% 0.22200% 0.34500% 0.46700% 0.58300% 0.71000% 0.82900% 0.98200% 1.20000%<br />

A3 0.03885% 0.15000% 0.36000% 0.54000% 0.73000% 0.91000% 1.11000% 1.30000% 1.52000% 1.80000%<br />

Baa1 0.09000% 0.28000% 0.56000% 0.83000% 1.10000% 1.37000% 1.67000% 1.97000% 2.27000% 2.60000%<br />

Baa2 0.17000% 0.47000% 0.83000% 1.20000% 1.58000% 1.97000% 2.41000% 2.85000% 3.24000% 3.60000%<br />

Baa3 0.42000% 1.05000% 1.71000% 2.38000% 3.05000% 3.70000% 4.33000% 4.97000% 5.57000% 6.10000%<br />

Ba1 0.87000% 2.02000% 3.13000% 4.20000% 5.28000% 6.25000% 7.06000% 7.89000% 8.69000% 9.40000%<br />

Ba2 1.56000% 3.47000% 5.18000% 6.80000% 8.41000% 9.77000% 10.70000% 11.66000% 12.65000% 13.50000%<br />

Ba3 2.81000% 5.51000% 7.87000% 9.79000% 11.86000% 13.49000% 14.62000% 15.71000% 16.71000% 17.66000%<br />

B1 4.68000% 8.38000% 11.58000% 13.85000% 16.12000% 17.89000% 19.13000% 20.23000% 21.24000% 22.20000%<br />

B2 7.16000% 11.67000% 15.55000% 18.13000% 20.71000% 22.65000% 24.01000% 25.15000% 26.22000% 27.20000%<br />

B3 11.62000% 16.61000% 21.03000% 24.04000% 27.05000% 29.20000% 31.00000% 32.58000% 33.78000% 34.90000%<br />

Caa1 17.38160% 23.23416% 28.63861% 32.47884% 36.31374% 38.96665% 41.38538% 43.65696% 45.67182% 47.70000%<br />

Caa2 26.00000% 32.50000% 39.00000% 43.88000% 48.75000% 52.00000% 55.25000% 58.50000% 61.75000% 65.00000%<br />

Caa3 50.99020% 57.00877% 62.44998% 66.24198% 69.82120% 72.11103% 74.33034% 76.48529% 78.58117% 80.70000%<br />

Table 2<br />

Moody’s Idealised Cumulative <strong>Expected</strong> <strong>Loss</strong><br />

Rating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10<br />

Aaa 0.00003% 0.00011% 0.00039% 0.00099% 0.00160% 0.00220% 0.00286% 0.00363% 0.00451% 0.00550%<br />

Aa1 0.00031% 0.00165% 0.00550% 0.01155% 0.01705% 0.02310% 0.02970% 0.03685% 0.04510% 0.05500%<br />

Aa2 0.00075% 0.00440% 0.01430% 0.02585% 0.03740% 0.04895% 0.06105% 0.07425% 0.09020% 0.11000%<br />

Aa3 0.00166% 0.01045% 0.03245% 0.05555% 0.07810% 0.10065% 0.12485% 0.14960% 0.17985% 0.22000%<br />

A1 0.00320% 0.02035% 0.06435% 0.10395% 0.14355% 0.18150% 0.22330% 0.26400% 0.31515% 0.38500%<br />

A2 0.00598% 0.03850% 0.12210% 0.18975% 0.25685% 0.32065% 0.39050% 0.45595% 0.54010% 0.66000%<br />

A3 0.02137% 0.08250% 0.19800% 0.29700% 0.40150% 0.50050% 0.61050% 0.71500% 0.83600% 0.99000%<br />

Baa1 0.04950% 0.15400% 0.30800% 0.45650% 0.60500% 0.75350% 0.91850% 1.08350% 1.24850% 1.43000%<br />

Baa2 0.09350% 0.25850% 0.45650% 0.66000% 0.86900% 1.08350% 1.32550% 1.56750% 1.78200% 1.98000%<br />

Baa3 0.23100% 0.57750% 0.94050% 1.30900% 1.67750% 2.03500% 2.38150% 2.73350% 3.06350% 3.35500%<br />

Ba1 0.47850% 1.11100% 1.72150% 2.31000% 2.90400% 3.43750% 3.88300% 4.33950% 4.77950% 5.17000%<br />

Ba2 0.85800% 1.90850% 2.84900% 3.74000% 4.62550% 5.37350% 5.88500% 6.41300% 6.95750% 7.42500%<br />

Ba3 1.54550% 3.03050% 4.32850% 5.38450% 6.52300% 7.41950% 8.04100% 8.64050% 9.19050% 9.71300%<br />

B1 2.57400% 4.60900% 6.36900% 7.61750% 8.86600% 9.83950% 10.52150% 11.12650% 11.68200% 12.21000%<br />

B2 3.93800% 6.41850% 8.55250% 9.97150% 11.39050% 12.45750% 13.20550% 13.83250% 14.42100% 14.96000%<br />

B3 6.39100% 9.13550% 11.56650% 13.22200% 14.87750% 16.06000% 17.05000% 17.91900% 18.57900% 19.19500%<br />

Caa1 9.55988% 12.77879% 15.75124% 17.86336% 19.97256% 21.43166% 22.76196% 24.01133% 25.11950% 26.23500%<br />

Caa2 14.30000% 17.87500% 21.45000% 24.13400% 26.81250% 28.60000% 30.38750% 32.17500% 33.96250% 35.75000%<br />

Caa3 28.04461% 31.35482% 34.34749% 36.43309% 38.40166% 39.66107% 40.88169% 42.06691% 43.21964% 44.38500%<br />

26 • Moody’s Investors Service European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating Methodology


APPENDIX F2: RATING A PROGRAMME: THE IMPACT<br />

There are a number of specific adjustments that have been made to the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> to accommodate a<br />

programme of <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s, where applicable. These adjustments are intended to provide a certain amount of<br />

flexibility to an Issuer of <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s and ultimately also for the ratings produced by the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>.<br />

These adjustments include the following, which are divided into two categories.<br />

The cushion enjoyed by <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s<br />

There are many ways flexibility has been built into Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong>, and examples include the following:<br />

• Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> will assume that in the future <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s with a certain variety of maturities may be<br />

issued, and will check that the rating of existing <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s will not be adversely affected as a result. It<br />

is assumed that, unless advised otherwise, the Issuer will require flexibility to issue <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s of<br />

different maturities over time.<br />

• The Collateral Score may be adjusted to assume a certain limited deterioration in Cover Pool quality. This<br />

will, for example, be the case as follows:<br />

• An Issuer communicates to Moody’s ahead of time that lower-quality collateral may be included in the<br />

Cover Pool in the future.<br />

• If the Collateral Score benefits from recent house price growth which is greater than average, Moody’s<br />

may ignore the majority of this benefit on the basis that this benefit might not be enjoyed by collateral<br />

added to the Cover Pool in the future.<br />

• The Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> may limit the benefit from the gross margin generated by the Cover Pool to<br />

Moody’s current view on the long-term sustainable margin.<br />

Other adjustments that might be credit positive or negative<br />

These will include the following:<br />

• In the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> each <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> is modelled to rely on only its share of the overcollateralisation<br />

available to the programme. However, following Issuer Default, an administrator of the<br />

Cover Pool might have the power to use all programme-wide over-collateralisation to pay down a single<br />

<strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>, even though there may be later-maturing <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s.<br />

• When assessing market risk, the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> assumes that the base interest rate is set at a longterm<br />

“average” level. The level of interest rate stress that a <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> programme will experience under<br />

the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> is a function of this base interest rate. The reason Moody’s has set this base interest<br />

rate as a constant, as opposed to using the current interest rate, is to prevent <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> ratings being<br />

overly sensitive to interest rate changes in the market.<br />

Moody’s will continue to review the level of flexibility being built into the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> and make amendments<br />

to increase or reduce flexibility. A number of assumptions made will also be determined on an Issuer-specific basis.<br />

For example, if an Issuer expects a certain improvement or deterioration in the quality of the collateral to be included<br />

in the Cover Pool in the future, Moody’s would take this into account in its rating of the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s.<br />

European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating Methodology Moody’s Investors Service • 27


APPENDIX F3: OVER-COLLATERALISATION: WHAT VALUE WHEN “NOT<br />

COMMITTED”<br />

Moody’s distinguishes between over-collateralisation in the Cover Pool which is (i) committed or (ii) “not committed”.<br />

Moody’s regards committed over-collateralisation as an amount required to be added to the Cover Pool pursuant<br />

to legislation or in terms of the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s’ terms and conditions. 19 Any other over-collateralisation is regarded<br />

as “not committed”.<br />

Moody’s is concerned that over-collateralisation that is “not committed” may not be available to the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s<br />

at the time of Issuer Default. Accordingly the Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> will only give value to over-collateralisation that is<br />

“not committed” subject to the following conditions:<br />

• The short-term senior unsecured rating of the Issuer is Prime-1.<br />

• The Issuer agrees on a non-binding basis that the agreed amount of over-collateralisation will be included in<br />

the Cover Pool.<br />

• The Issuer provides quarterly updates to Moody’s confirming the amount of over-collateralisation in the<br />

Cover Pool.<br />

An Issuer should be aware that if its short-term senior unsecured rating falls below Prime-1 then in its analysis the<br />

Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> will only continue to give value to over-collateralisation which is committed.<br />

19<br />

or reaches other arrangements.<br />

28 • Moody’s Investors Service European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating Methodology


APPENDIX F4: PROBABILITY OF DEFAULT OF A COVERED BOND<br />

Under Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> the rating target is the expected loss on a <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>. However, probability of default<br />

on a <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> may also be taken into account by Moody’s to ensure that it is consistent with the rating<br />

assigned.<br />

There is a margin of difference which will be acceptable under Moody’s rating approach between the expected loss<br />

rating of <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s and probability of default rating of the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s. Accordingly all Issuers rated A1 or<br />

above have the ability to achieve a Aaa rating for <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s, subject to the expected loss analysis confirming a<br />

Aaa rating. This means that, even if a default on a <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> is expected following Issuer Default, while the<br />

Issuer is rated A1 or above, the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s can still be rated Aaa.<br />

Issuers with senior unsecured ratings below A1 can achieve Aaa ratings on a <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> issued if the <strong>Covered</strong><br />

<strong>Bond</strong> are expected to be paid on a timely basis following Issuer Default (again subject to the expected loss analysis<br />

confirming a Aaa rating). The higher the level of support offered by either the legislation of the jurisdiction or a<br />

contractual promise (or both) in terms of ensuring timely payments under <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s, the lower the rating level<br />

the Issuer will need to attain in order to achieve a Aaa rating for the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s in question.<br />

Moody’s does not currently view any <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> as de-linked from the rating of the Issuer. Probability of Issuer<br />

Default is a significant consideration in the analysis in that it could lead to a late payment on the related <strong>Covered</strong><br />

<strong>Bond</strong>s. After Issuer Default, a delayed payment under the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s may occur for a number of reasons<br />

including the following:<br />

• Failure to raise sufficient finance against the Cover Pool to pay principal when due on a <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>.<br />

• Failure to secure timely servicing of the Cover Pool at a cost that is manageable by the Cover Pool.<br />

• Failure to make the first interest payment due on the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>s following Issuer Default.<br />

• Failure to transfer hedging arrangements to a replacement counterparty.<br />

Under Moody’s EL <strong>Model</strong> the majority of <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> ratings are not expected to be constrained by their<br />

probability of default. However, the likelihood that the probability of default of a <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> could constrain its<br />

rating increases with the number of notches between the Issuer rating and the rating of the <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong>.<br />

European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating Methodology Moody’s Investors Service • 29


SF57011isf<br />

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MOODY’S, in particular, makes no representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy, timeliness, completeness, merchantability or fitness for any particular purpose of any<br />

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statements of opinion and not statements of fact or recommendations to purchase, sell or hold any securities. NO WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AS TO THE ACCURACY, TIMELINESS,<br />

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ANY FORM OR MANNER WHATSOEVER. Each rating or other opinion must be weighed solely as one factor in any investment decision made by or on behalf of any user of the information<br />

contained herein, and each such user must accordingly make its own study and evaluation of each security and of each issuer and guarantor of, and each provider of credit support for, each<br />

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MOODY’S hereby discloses that most issuers of debt securities (including corporate and municipal bonds, debentures, notes and commercial paper) and preferred stock rated by MOODY’S<br />

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Information regarding certain affiliations that may exist between directors of MCO and rated entities, and between entities who hold ratings from MIS and have also publicly reported to the SEC<br />

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and Shareholder Affiliation Policy.<br />

30 • Moody’s Investors Service European <strong>Covered</strong> <strong>Bond</strong> Rating Methodology

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