Modeling Climate Policy Instruments in a Stackelberg Game with ...
Modeling Climate Policy Instruments in a Stackelberg Game with ...
Modeling Climate Policy Instruments in a Stackelberg Game with ...
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
28 3 MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND ANALYSIS<br />
The amount of total energy E is a function of fossil and renewable energy<br />
E fos and E ren , respectively. Although a CES function is common to comb<strong>in</strong>e<br />
both energy forms, I use a l<strong>in</strong>ear composition to study the consequences of the<br />
absence of renewable energy for climate policy <strong>in</strong>struments. 31<br />
The Optimization Problem Good produc<strong>in</strong>g firms seek to maximize their<br />
profit:<br />
max<br />
{K Y ,L,E} Π Y<br />
subject to:<br />
Π Y = Y − rK Y − ¯wL − p¯<br />
E E (26)<br />
Y = (a 1 Z σ1 + (1 − a 1 )(A E E) σ1 ) (1/σ1) (27)<br />
Z = (a 2 K σ2<br />
Y + (1 − a 2)(A L L) σ2 ) (1/σ2) (28)<br />
E = E fos + E ren (29)<br />
˙K Y = I Y − δK Y (30)<br />
Optimiz<strong>in</strong>g Conditions Due to the strict concaveness of the production<br />
function <strong>in</strong> each <strong>in</strong>put factor, there exists an <strong>in</strong>terior maximum of Π Y <strong>in</strong> (K Y , L, E)<br />
that can be found by derivat<strong>in</strong>g Π Y respect to the <strong>in</strong>put factors and sett<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
derivatives equal to zero: 32 r(1 + τ KY ) = Y ′ K Y<br />
(31)<br />
¯w = Y ′ L (32)<br />
¯p E = Y ′ E (33)<br />
Further Considerations Because of the l<strong>in</strong>ear homogeneity 33 of the CES<br />
function optimal profits are zero (Arrow et al., 1961).<br />
3.1.3 Fossil Energy Produc<strong>in</strong>g Firms<br />
Description of the Sector Fossil energy firms produce f<strong>in</strong>al energy E fos<br />
from the two <strong>in</strong>put factors fossil resources R and capital K E . Labor is neglected<br />
s<strong>in</strong>ce it is no essential production factor and may not br<strong>in</strong>g new <strong>in</strong>sights for the<br />
policy analysis. To give a consistent description of the sectoral disaggregated<br />
economy I chose a CES function <strong>in</strong> analogy to the production sector. 34<br />
31 Popp (2006a) and Grimaud et al. (2007) use a CES function that treats both energy forms<br />
as imperfect substitutes. Van der Zwaan et al. (2002) justify this by the existence of niche<br />
markets that make at least a small energy production always efficient. In contrast, Edenhofer<br />
et al. (2005) treats <strong>in</strong> MIND all energy forms as perfect substitutes by l<strong>in</strong>ear comb<strong>in</strong>ation.<br />
32 Apply<strong>in</strong>g the Maximum Pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of dynamic optimization to an <strong>in</strong>tertemporal objective<br />
function yields the same conditions as the static optimization problem, because no <strong>in</strong>tertemporal<br />
decisions are made.<br />
33 A function f(q 1 , ...,q n) is called homogene of degree a if f(λq 1 , ...,λq n) = λ a f(q 1 , ..., q n).<br />
L<strong>in</strong>ear homogene means homogene of degree one.<br />
34 Several other approaches are common: Popp (2004, 2006a) and Grimaud et al. (2007) use<br />
a l<strong>in</strong>ear production function of fossil resources divided by an (decreas<strong>in</strong>g) carbon efficiency<br />
variable. Nordhaus and Yang (1996) neglect the production of energy completely and assume<br />
carbon emissions as side-effect of production that decreases <strong>in</strong> the presence of technological<br />
change. In contrast, Edenhofer et al. (2005) use a CES function the same way as I will