24.05.2014 Views

Modeling Climate Policy Instruments in a Stackelberg Game with ...

Modeling Climate Policy Instruments in a Stackelberg Game with ...

Modeling Climate Policy Instruments in a Stackelberg Game with ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

28 3 MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND ANALYSIS<br />

The amount of total energy E is a function of fossil and renewable energy<br />

E fos and E ren , respectively. Although a CES function is common to comb<strong>in</strong>e<br />

both energy forms, I use a l<strong>in</strong>ear composition to study the consequences of the<br />

absence of renewable energy for climate policy <strong>in</strong>struments. 31<br />

The Optimization Problem Good produc<strong>in</strong>g firms seek to maximize their<br />

profit:<br />

max<br />

{K Y ,L,E} Π Y<br />

subject to:<br />

Π Y = Y − rK Y − ¯wL − p¯<br />

E E (26)<br />

Y = (a 1 Z σ1 + (1 − a 1 )(A E E) σ1 ) (1/σ1) (27)<br />

Z = (a 2 K σ2<br />

Y + (1 − a 2)(A L L) σ2 ) (1/σ2) (28)<br />

E = E fos + E ren (29)<br />

˙K Y = I Y − δK Y (30)<br />

Optimiz<strong>in</strong>g Conditions Due to the strict concaveness of the production<br />

function <strong>in</strong> each <strong>in</strong>put factor, there exists an <strong>in</strong>terior maximum of Π Y <strong>in</strong> (K Y , L, E)<br />

that can be found by derivat<strong>in</strong>g Π Y respect to the <strong>in</strong>put factors and sett<strong>in</strong>g the<br />

derivatives equal to zero: 32 r(1 + τ KY ) = Y ′ K Y<br />

(31)<br />

¯w = Y ′ L (32)<br />

¯p E = Y ′ E (33)<br />

Further Considerations Because of the l<strong>in</strong>ear homogeneity 33 of the CES<br />

function optimal profits are zero (Arrow et al., 1961).<br />

3.1.3 Fossil Energy Produc<strong>in</strong>g Firms<br />

Description of the Sector Fossil energy firms produce f<strong>in</strong>al energy E fos<br />

from the two <strong>in</strong>put factors fossil resources R and capital K E . Labor is neglected<br />

s<strong>in</strong>ce it is no essential production factor and may not br<strong>in</strong>g new <strong>in</strong>sights for the<br />

policy analysis. To give a consistent description of the sectoral disaggregated<br />

economy I chose a CES function <strong>in</strong> analogy to the production sector. 34<br />

31 Popp (2006a) and Grimaud et al. (2007) use a CES function that treats both energy forms<br />

as imperfect substitutes. Van der Zwaan et al. (2002) justify this by the existence of niche<br />

markets that make at least a small energy production always efficient. In contrast, Edenhofer<br />

et al. (2005) treats <strong>in</strong> MIND all energy forms as perfect substitutes by l<strong>in</strong>ear comb<strong>in</strong>ation.<br />

32 Apply<strong>in</strong>g the Maximum Pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of dynamic optimization to an <strong>in</strong>tertemporal objective<br />

function yields the same conditions as the static optimization problem, because no <strong>in</strong>tertemporal<br />

decisions are made.<br />

33 A function f(q 1 , ...,q n) is called homogene of degree a if f(λq 1 , ...,λq n) = λ a f(q 1 , ..., q n).<br />

L<strong>in</strong>ear homogene means homogene of degree one.<br />

34 Several other approaches are common: Popp (2004, 2006a) and Grimaud et al. (2007) use<br />

a l<strong>in</strong>ear production function of fossil resources divided by an (decreas<strong>in</strong>g) carbon efficiency<br />

variable. Nordhaus and Yang (1996) neglect the production of energy completely and assume<br />

carbon emissions as side-effect of production that decreases <strong>in</strong> the presence of technological<br />

change. In contrast, Edenhofer et al. (2005) use a CES function the same way as I will

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!