Download this publication - PULP
Download this publication - PULP
Download this publication - PULP
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
Luboya and Another v State<br />
(2007) AHRLR 165 (NaSC 2007)<br />
171<br />
(the Director), according to Mr Windstaan’s explanation at the pretrial<br />
hearing, thereupon made a decision denying the appellants legal<br />
aid. He gave no reason for his decision, and Mr Windstaan said that<br />
under the enabling statute the Director was not obliged to give any<br />
reasons for his refusal to grant legal aid.<br />
[22.] In the first place the Legal Aid Act does not contain any<br />
provision stating, as Mr Windstaan erroneously stated, that the<br />
Director is not obliged to give any reasons for refusing to grand legal<br />
aid. In so asserting Mr Windstaan was relying on a figment of his own<br />
imagination. Furthermore, <strong>this</strong> court has repeatedly stated that when<br />
public officials and administrative bodies are charged with the<br />
responsibility of making decisions which may adversely affect<br />
members of the public, they are in the first place required to comply<br />
with the audi alterem partem rule, thereby enabling the affected<br />
member of the public to be heard on the matter before the decision<br />
is made. See for example our unanimous judgment in the case of the<br />
Minister of Health and Social Services v Eberhard Wolfgang Lisse,<br />
appeal case SA 23/2004 (unreported). Our ratio decidendi is based on<br />
the interpretation of article 18 of the Constitution which provides as<br />
follows:<br />
Administrative bodies and administrative officials shall act fairly and<br />
reasonably and comply with the requirements imposed upon such bodies<br />
and officials, by common law and any relevant legislation, and persons<br />
aggrieved by the exercise of such acts and decisions shall have the right<br />
to seek redress before a competent court or tribunal.<br />
[23.] The dictum of O’Linn, J, as he then was, in the case of Aonin<br />
Fishing v Minister of Fishing and Marine Resources, 1998 NR 147 (HC)<br />
150G was to the like effect. He said:<br />
There can be no doubt that article 18 of the Constitution of Namibia<br />
pertaining to administrative justice requires not only reasonable and<br />
fair decisions based on reasonable grounds, but fair procedures which<br />
are transparent.<br />
[24.] In the present case the refusal to grant legal aid was made<br />
without the appellants even knowing that their fate regarding access<br />
to such aid was being considered to their detriment. Additionally no<br />
reasons for the decision were disclosed to them. Such exercise of<br />
public duty did not measure up to the requirement of the common<br />
law and did not accord with the precept of transparency required by<br />
article 18 of the Constitution. Transparency encapsulates the<br />
application of the audi alterem partem rule.<br />
[25.] It is my considered view that the Director failed to comply with<br />
the requirements of article 18 of the Constitution. In particular, he<br />
failed to abide by the requirement to hear the appellants before<br />
deciding to deny them legal aid. Better still, and although he was not<br />
obliged under the law to do so, he should have given reasons for not<br />
granting them legal aid. Had he done so he might have forestalled the<br />
speculation which was aired by the appellants' counsel that they were<br />
denied legal aid because they were foreigners. We have seen that<br />
Supreme Court, Namibia