Journal of the Royal Naval Scientific Service. Volume 27, Number 2 ...
Journal of the Royal Naval Scientific Service. Volume 27, Number 2 ...
Journal of the Royal Naval Scientific Service. Volume 27, Number 2 ...
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Torpedo History: Kir by 99<br />
for a new 25-knot active /passive helicopterborne<br />
weapon <strong>of</strong> 14 in. diameter. The project<br />
was pursued and by 1957 a prototype passive<br />
weapon was running using <strong>the</strong> basic Mk. 30<br />
motor with a new homing system. The active<br />
electronics were bench-tested and ready to be<br />
fitted but in 1957 a Staff decision was made<br />
to stop all air-dropped weapons and concentrate<br />
on submarine and ship torpedoes. As a<br />
result it was abandoned along with a 12 in.<br />
weapon developed " un<strong>of</strong>ficially" a year or<br />
two earlier code-named NEGRESS.<br />
Also abandoned at this time was <strong>the</strong> illstarred<br />
PENTANE, one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> best engineered<br />
weapons so far produced in Britain or America.<br />
PENTANE was born in 1947, following <strong>the</strong><br />
collapse <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fabulous (literally!) Z-weapon<br />
programme. The requirement was set down<br />
for an active homing air-dropped weapon to<br />
cope with submarines <strong>of</strong> potentially enormous<br />
propulsion improvements likely to be found<br />
in <strong>the</strong> 1950's and beyond. Work was initially<br />
concentrated at Teddington and T.E.E.<br />
engineers were moved from Greenock.<br />
The weapon was designed to run at 30 knots<br />
and be capable <strong>of</strong> catching high-speed submarines.<br />
The carrying aircraft were <strong>the</strong><br />
Gannet, Sturgeon, Lancaster, Shackleton and<br />
flying boats. It was not until 1954 that a final<br />
design was selected on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> extensive<br />
research carried out over <strong>the</strong> preceding six<br />
years. By this time however <strong>the</strong> fixed wing<br />
aircraft capable <strong>of</strong> carrying a 21 in. weapon<br />
were being withdrawn from service and <strong>the</strong><br />
helicopter was being considered as <strong>the</strong> prime<br />
torpedo delivery system. Instead <strong>of</strong> cancelling<br />
<strong>the</strong> project and starting a new lightweight torpedo,<br />
<strong>the</strong> work was allowed to drop from <strong>the</strong><br />
top priority that it had enjoyed up to <strong>the</strong>n and<br />
it continued until 1958 at which point it was<br />
finally cancelled. The cancellation was not,<br />
ra<strong>the</strong>r unexpectedly, due to lack <strong>of</strong> a suitable<br />
carrier but due to an assessment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
weapon's performance. This showed that <strong>the</strong><br />
search rate was too slow for <strong>the</strong> targets <strong>the</strong>n<br />
likely to be available* 42 '. Pentane died <strong>the</strong>refore<br />
because it was too late in development,<br />
not initially well matched to <strong>the</strong> future carriers<br />
and not adequately matched in homing<br />
performance to targets' capabilities.<br />
Excluding <strong>the</strong>se failings, <strong>the</strong> weapon itself<br />
was well engineered, as Fig. 43 shows from<br />
<strong>the</strong> tail unit alone, and as <strong>the</strong> first British<br />
active torpedo it provided valuable experience<br />
for future weapon considerations.<br />
FIG. 43. Pentane tail.<br />
The sad facts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PENTANE affair were<br />
(a) that <strong>the</strong> potentially very successful Mk.<br />
30 mod 1 was cancelled because <strong>of</strong> Pentane's<br />
top priority and U.S. Mk. 43<br />
weapons were purchased instead,<br />
(b) that o<strong>the</strong>r potentially worthwhile projects<br />
were held back for <strong>the</strong> same reason,<br />
and<br />
(c) that £1,726,000 were spent on <strong>the</strong> project;<br />
more than <strong>the</strong> total spent on <strong>the</strong><br />
only two successful projects by a factor<br />
<strong>of</strong> two.<br />
The initial doubts over <strong>the</strong> propulsion performance<br />
<strong>of</strong> Pentane gave considerable<br />
impetus to <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> silver/zinc<br />
batteries and <strong>the</strong>rmal propulsion systems which<br />
have proved <strong>of</strong> great value in recent years.<br />
With <strong>the</strong> cancellation <strong>of</strong> Pentane, <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>Naval</strong> Staff decreed that Britain would in<br />
future concentrate on ship and submarinelaunched<br />
weapons. The 21 in. BIDDER (Mk.<br />
20) had already entered service as a result <strong>of</strong><br />
a development programme extending from<br />
1945 and wire-guidance work had also continued.<br />
Initially, trials <strong>of</strong> wire-guidance were<br />
carried out by paying captured German wire<br />
(from <strong>the</strong>ir SPINNE weapon) out from Mk. 11<br />
weapons. This work was carried out with <strong>the</strong><br />
help <strong>of</strong> Post Office engineers. The work was<br />
pursued under <strong>the</strong> code-name MACKLE with<br />
Vickers Armstrong playing a large part. In<br />
1956, <strong>the</strong> contract with industry was terminated;<br />
<strong>the</strong> result being a very complex guidance<br />
system applied to Mk. 20 weapons. The system<br />
was simplified and improved and renamed<br />
GROG. This weapon was a leng<strong>the</strong>ned version<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Mk. 20 with a drum <strong>of</strong> guidance wire<br />
carried in <strong>the</strong> extra length. A dispenser is