Child Support Enforcement - Sarpy County Nebraska
Child Support Enforcement - Sarpy County Nebraska
Child Support Enforcement - Sarpy County Nebraska
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This case includes an excellent summary of other similar and dissimilar cases determining<br />
just what constitutes a “final order” for purposes of appeal. See also the Appellate Practice<br />
section of this outline for additional discussion.<br />
There is no more fundamental jurisdictional precept than the doctrine that appeals<br />
can only be taken from final orders.<br />
Citing Huffman v. Huffman, 236 Neb. 101, 459 N.W.2d 215 (1990)…<br />
Generally, when multiple issues are presented to a trial court for simultaneous<br />
disposition in the same proceeding and the court decides some of the issues,<br />
while reserving some issue or issues for later determination, the court’s<br />
determination of less than all the issues is an interlocutory order and is not<br />
a final order for the purpose of an appeal.<br />
The trial’s court attempted 14-day extension of the time in which to appeal was error<br />
as a matter of law and is of no force and effect on the question of whether this court<br />
has appellate jurisdiction.<br />
See also Kilgore v. <strong>Nebraska</strong> Dept. of Health & Human Servs. And Wagner v.<br />
Wagner, below.<br />
Conaty v. Boelhower, 218 Neb. 193, 352 N.W.2d 619 (1984)<br />
a personal money judgment could not be supported on the basis of substituted<br />
service.<br />
Hagelstein v. Swift-Eckrich, 257 Neb. 312, 597 N.W.2d 394 (1999).<br />
In re Interest of Tabitha J., 5 Neb. App. 609, 561 N.W.2d 252 (1997)<br />
Evidence presented in a prior related hearing is not the proper subject of judicial<br />
notice. Only adjudicative facts are properly the subject of judicial notice.<br />
Helter v. Williamson, 239 Neb. 741, 478 N.W.2d 6 (1991)<br />
Private paternity action filed by boyfriend of married woman, against woman. Her<br />
husband was not named as a party. This proved fatal to the plaintiff’s efforts to be named dad.<br />
[T]he presumption that children born during the marriage are rebuttably deemed to<br />
be legitimate is a tenet of our common law that perseveres for reasons that are as<br />
sound today as they were in the 18 th century. The presumption prevents nonparents<br />
from arriving on the scene, either during or after the marriage, and staking claims,<br />
parental visitation rights, and responsibilities without the knowledge or consent of the<br />
true parent.<br />
the testimony or declaration of a husband or wife is not competent to<br />
bastardize a child.<br />
[As the husband is an indispensible party], notice of a paternity proceeding and<br />
an opportunity to appear must be served upon the husband of the mother of the<br />
child when the child was born into the marriage of the mother and husband,<br />
regardless of whether the mother agrees that the husband is not the biological father<br />
of the minor child.<br />
Hohertz v. Estate of Hohertz, 19 Neb. App. 110, 802 N.W.2d 141 (2011)<br />
The meaning of a decree presents a question of law, in connection with which an<br />
appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of the determination reached by<br />
the court below.<br />
Once a decree for dissolution becomes final, its meaning is determined as a matter<br />
of law from the four corners of the decree itself.<br />
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