SAN DIEGO DISTRICT ATTORNEY The Fourth Amendment and ...

(i.e., misdemeanor not in the officer’s presence.), and/or the “stale
misdemeanor” rule (see above).
Mistaken Belief in Existence of Probable Cause to Arrest or Search, an
Arrest Warrant, or that a Fourth Waiver Exists, Based upon Erroneous
Information received from Various Sources:
Problem: An officer arrests and/or searches a person under the
mistaken belief that there is an arrest warrant outstanding for the
person, the person is subject to a “Fourth Waiver” (i.e., he has
previously waived his Fourth Amendment search and seizure
rights), or the officer is given other erroneous information through
either court, law enforcement, or other official channels.
Rule: The United States Supreme Court initially held that an
officer’s “good faith” will validate the resulting arrest and/or
search, at least in those cases where the erroneous information
came from a “court source.” (Arizona v. Evans (1995) 514 U.S. 1
[131 L.Ed.2 nd 34]; see also People v. Downing (1995) 33
Cal.App.4 th 1641.)
Extension of Rule: The United States Supreme Court subsequently
ruled (in a 5-to-4 decision) that an officer’s good faith reliance on
erroneous information will not invalidate an arrest even when that
information comes from a law enforcement source, so long as the
error was based upon non-reoccurring negligence only. Deliberate
illegal acts, or a reckless disregard for constitutional requirements,
or reoccurring or systematic negligence, will not excuse the
resulting unlawful arrest. (Herring v. United States (2009) __
U.S. __ [129 S.Ct. 695; 172 L.Ed.2 nd 496].)
Reasoning: This is because the “Exclusionary Rule” was
implemented primarily to deter intentional or reckless police
misconduct; not misconduct by the courts or other non-law
enforcement sources, or even law enforcement when their error
was simply non-reoccurring negligence. It is not necessary to
suppress the resulting evidence when to do so does not further the
purposes of the Exclusionary Rule. (Arizona v. Evans, supra. At
pp. 15-16 [131 L.Ed.2 nd at pp. 47-48]; United States v. Leon
(1984) 468 U.S. 897, 920-921 [82 L.Ed.2 nd 677, 697]; People v.
Willis (2002) 28 Cal.4 th 22; People v. Tellez (1982) 128
Cal.App.3 rd 876, 880; Illinois v. Krull (1987) 480 U.S. 340 [94
L.Ed.2 nd 364].)
© 2011 Robert C. Phillips. All rights reserved
“(E)vidence should be suppressed ‘only if it can be said
that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may
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