NZ Report / Proposal Template - State Services Commission
NZ Report / Proposal Template - State Services Commission
NZ Report / Proposal Template - State Services Commission
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information at the project level that was emerging from August 2005). Decisions were<br />
often taken with discussion, but before the provision of supporting information. The<br />
Steering Group comprised a majority of busy Departmental functional line managers, with<br />
heavy reliance on contractors for advice regarding large construction project decisions.<br />
These managers did address some knowledge gaps through the appointment of an<br />
independent member with construction, project and procurement methodology experience<br />
in 2004, and the conduct of internal and external audits to assess aspects of process.<br />
1.19 Prior to 2005, there was a lack of clarity amongst some, including Steering Group<br />
members, of the role of the Steering Group as to its role as an advisory group<br />
representing the different areas of Department endeavour, or a governance group. This<br />
may have affected the strength of the Steering Group to challenge the issues with<br />
reporting and information for key decisions.<br />
1.20 Due to the pressing nature of the growth in the projected prison population, the<br />
completion of the projects to the proposed schedule became a paramount factor in<br />
decision-making.<br />
1.21 Overall, these arrangements made it very challenging for the Steering Group to<br />
assess governance risks and to communicate these beyond the Steering Group. The<br />
Steering Group seemed surprised to learn of the actual size of the cost escalations in late<br />
2005.<br />
1.22 The nature and level of reporting to Ministers was also an issue. In our view, the<br />
information provided to Ministers as part of Budget 05 did not sufficiently or clearly signal<br />
the uncertainty around the estimates and the risk of cost increase. Further, the fiscal risks<br />
should have been on the radar for the pre-election fiscal update in mid-August 2005, at<br />
least in a qualitative sense.<br />
Lessons Learned<br />
1.23 Growth in the prison population drives the need for additional capacity. Given the<br />
long lead times involved with building new prisons, a longer term view of future capacity<br />
requirements is needed (than is provided by the Ministry of Justice five year forecasts) in<br />
order to enable the Department to appropriately plan, resource and schedule the delivery<br />
of additional greenfield capacity.<br />
1.24 The choice of CWA methodology has assisted the Department to deliver the<br />
required increase in capacity. However, CWA will not be suited to all projects. There is a<br />
need to identify the conditions under which CWA is likely to be preferred ahead of other<br />
forms of procurement. The methodology chosen should be justified on a project by<br />
project basis.<br />
1.25 The CWA methodology adopted by the Department requires careful and<br />
experienced management to protect the Crown’s interests. A blend of competencies and<br />
experience (commercial, construction and public sector management) is required for<br />
effective management. For future projects of this size and complexity, sponsoring<br />
agencies need to be confident that they have the appropriate mix of competencies and<br />
these are represented within the CWA Principal’s Group.<br />
1.26 The development of the TOC is a central part of the CWA methodology adopted by<br />
the Department. It needs to be finalised sooner than has been the case with respect to<br />
Spring Hill and Otago. Specifically, the TOC should ideally be completed at, or about, the<br />
time construction commences. However, appropriate time and resources need to be<br />
planned for to enable this. Until the draft TOC is well developed, estimates of construction<br />
Executive Summary 4