Privy Council Review of intercept as evidence: report - Official ...
Privy Council Review of intercept as evidence: report - Official ...
Privy Council Review of intercept as evidence: report - Official ...
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– <strong>of</strong>ten in real time – and those commanding the operational response. Lines<br />
can swiftly be set up or closed <strong>as</strong> operational priorities change.<br />
COOPERATION BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT<br />
42. The whole <strong>intercept</strong>ion community – law enforcement <strong>as</strong> well <strong>as</strong><br />
intelligence – benefits from *** the shared tools and techniques that the<br />
intelligence agencies have developed. This close co-operation is not found in<br />
other comparable countries including the USA which have a strategic<br />
intelligence capability ***. When hostages have been taken the police craft a<br />
dynamic response around a wide variety <strong>of</strong> covert collection techniques,<br />
relying critically on support from the intelligence community *** to provide<br />
information on the capability and intent <strong>of</strong> the hostage takers, to mitigate risks<br />
to life, and to identify opportunities for the safe rele<strong>as</strong>e <strong>of</strong> the hostages.<br />
SUPPORT FROM COMMUNICATION SERVICE PROVIDERS<br />
43. Under RIPA, Communications Service Providers in the UK may be<br />
required to provide, at public expense, an adequate <strong>intercept</strong>ion capability on<br />
their networks. In practice all significant providers do provide such a<br />
capability. ***<br />
44. Incre<strong>as</strong>ingly communications services (especially over the Internet) can<br />
be provided by companies b<strong>as</strong>ed outside the UK’s jurisdiction. Existing UK<br />
providers could, at little cost or risk to their operations, move some or all <strong>of</strong><br />
them <strong>of</strong>fshore. In some, but not all, such c<strong>as</strong>es adequate access can be<br />
obtained through international agreements such <strong>as</strong> the EU Mutual Legal<br />
Assistance Convention. But in other c<strong>as</strong>es legally mandated access is simply<br />
not possible.<br />
45. ***<br />
CONCLUSION<br />
46. As illustrated above, <strong>intercept</strong>ion is a critical component <strong>of</strong> the UK’s<br />
strategic intelligence capability. The <strong>Review</strong> is confident that this<br />
capability is essential for national security and so must be retained and<br />
protected. We regard it <strong>as</strong> our starting point that any scheme for the use <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>intercept</strong> in <strong>evidence</strong> in criminal c<strong>as</strong>es must respect this strategic imperative.<br />
47. In addition to this strategic use, <strong>intercept</strong>ion is used today in a very<br />
effective and efficient way to investigate terrorists and serious organised<br />
criminals, and to <strong>as</strong>sist with their prosecution and conviction. We accept the<br />
principle that all cl<strong>as</strong>ses <strong>of</strong> <strong>evidence</strong> should be admissible unless there are<br />
compelling re<strong>as</strong>ons against; and there is an obvious practical disadvantage in<br />
the present prohibition on the use <strong>as</strong> <strong>evidence</strong> <strong>of</strong> material which might allow<br />
the conviction <strong>of</strong> individuals who may now go free or have to be restrained by<br />
other means which have proved controversial. On the other hand we have<br />
had to consider how much <strong>of</strong> today’s use <strong>of</strong> <strong>intercept</strong>ion might be lost <strong>as</strong> a<br />
result <strong>of</strong> capabilities being revealed in court, new requirements imposed to<br />
Chapter II<br />
13