Privy Council Review of intercept as evidence: report - Official ...

182. However, even with these examples we have found some important
differences that need to be considered:
The interwoven nature of the current use of intercept by UK law
enforcement and intelligence agencies, to combat serious crime and
terrorism, and the cooperation and support they provide to each other
does not exist to the same degree in Australia, Canada or the United
States.
These countries are not bound by ECHR. Such aspects of their
systems (such as transcribing only that material which the law
enforcement agencies intend to use in court, and using closed hearings
in criminal proceedings) would need to be judged ECHR Article 6
compliant if they were to be replicated in any UK system.
US prosecutors are able to use intercept material together with pleabargaining,
to “turn” defendants and to secure early guilty pleas. This
experience might not be replicated in the UK, where plea-bargaining in
the US sense is not permitted.
183. The Common Law countries examined by this Review have tended to
adopt a dual warrant approach, separating intelligence and law enforcement
use of intercept. The Australian example, in particular, provides a number of
interesting ideas for how the UK could attempt to derive benefit from intercept
as evidence, whilst not unacceptably increasing the risk of disclosure to
intelligence agencies and their sensitive capabilities and techniques, and
allowing for cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement agencies
to continue.
184. The ‘Two Warrant Model’ which we have developed, and which is set
out in greater detail below in Chapter VIII, has been informed by the
Australian approach.
Chapter VII
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