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Privy Council Review of intercept as evidence: report - Official ...

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CHAPTER V - RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS<br />

INTERCEPTING AGENCIES<br />

93. There are several re<strong>as</strong>ons why <strong>intercept</strong>ing agencies may need extra<br />

resources if <strong>intercept</strong> were adducible <strong>as</strong> <strong>evidence</strong>. The main ones are:<br />

To retain the original <strong>intercept</strong>ed material, and any notes or transcripts,<br />

until the criminal process is completed (where<strong>as</strong> for intelligence<br />

purposes it would be deleted after a short time)<br />

To <strong>as</strong>sure the integrity <strong>of</strong> retained material and any processing it<br />

undergoes (so that a court can judge that it accurately represents what<br />

w<strong>as</strong> in fact sent, and h<strong>as</strong> not been tampered with in any way)<br />

To monitor, transcribe or translate more <strong>of</strong> the material, or in greater<br />

detail, than is required for intelligence purposes<br />

To provide an effective guide to the content <strong>of</strong> what would be a larger<br />

quantity <strong>of</strong> retained material, so that the prosecution can identify<br />

anything that might undermine their c<strong>as</strong>e or support the defence (<strong>as</strong><br />

required by the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996).<br />

Most <strong>of</strong> these potential requirements depend on what legal model is adopted,<br />

and what that would mean in practical terms – which may be determined <strong>as</strong><br />

much by decisions in the courts <strong>as</strong> by legislation. The size <strong>of</strong> the requirement<br />

for a particular agency will also depend on that agency’s current practice, by<br />

no means uniform between agencies. As a result there are big uncertainties<br />

in estimating the new resources required, and there are differences between<br />

estimates provided by different agencies.<br />

94. ***<br />

95. ***<br />

96. ***<br />

97. ***<br />

98. ***<br />

99. ***<br />

100. ***<br />

101. In addition to all this the new systems being developed to carry out<br />

<strong>intercept</strong>ion in the IP era would have to be brought up to appropriate<br />

evidential standards. As noted in Chapter VI, the cost – and indeed practical<br />

challenges – <strong>of</strong> doing this are unclear, but are likely to be substantial.<br />

102. The <strong>intercept</strong>ing agencies express further concerns. Many terrorist<br />

and criminal targets communicate in obscure languages and dialects,<br />

requiring the <strong>intercept</strong>ing agencies to recruit transcribers and monitors who<br />

have sufficient knowledge <strong>of</strong> these languages. ***<br />

Chapter V<br />

25

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