Privy Council Review of intercept as evidence: report - Official ...

CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION
1. On 25 July 2007, the Prime Minister announced that he and the Home
Secretary had established a Privy Council Review with the following Terms of
Reference:
‘To advise on whether a regime to allow the use of intercepted material in
court can be devised that facilitates bringing cases to trial while meeting the
overriding imperative to safeguard national security.
It will consider:
The benefits that might reasonably be expected to result from such use
(in terms, for example, of increases in the number of successful
prosecutions in serious organised crime and terrorism cases);
The risks, including from exposure of interception capabilities and
techniques;
The resource implications of any changes in the law;
The implications of new communications technology; and
The experiences of other countries and their relevance to the UK.’
2. This Report is the outcome of that Review. We describe how
interception is currently authorised and used in the UK, and estimate the
benefits interception currently brings through its use as intelligence as well as
the potential further benefits it could bring if used as evidence. We examine
the risks and resource implications of using intercept as evidence, and the
changes that are likely to result from new communications technology now
coming into widespread use. We cover in some detail the experiences of
other countries (almost all of which use intercept as evidence), and what they
teach us. We examine the many different legal models that have been
proposed for evidential use of intercept in the UK. Finally, we set out our
conclusions from all of this and list our recommendations.
3. The question posed to the Review may at first sight seem simple,
especially given the widespread use of intercept as evidence across the
world. It is in fact far from straightforward. All the bodies and individuals that
met with or provided written views to this Review were in favour in principle of
intercept as evidence. We are in agreement with this. But once that
principle was stated, there were very different views on whether national
security could be safeguarded effectively, and whether the benefits of
intercept as evidence outweighed the risks and costs.
4. These different views were in almost all cases strongly held, and in
many instances have been the firm views of the organisations involved for
many years. However, some of those involved have changed their views in
the light of experience. The arguments they bring, for and against intercept as
evidence, are by their nature asymmetric. Those in favour of intercept as
evidence make their case on the basis of openly available material. Those
who believe that the case has not been made, or that a model with the
necessary safeguards has not been found, cannot put their case fully in
Chapter I
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