Islam and Politics - The Stimson Center

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Amit Pandya | 97 and civic initiative, which proved the basis of their long-term institutional viability. These constraints formed several of their current characteristics. They were compelled thereby to coexist with the broad range of Indonesian political opinion, including the substantial body of secular opinion. These formative conditions also served to bolster their conservative instincts, and moderate the temptation to adopt an oppositional stance, even when the political order opened up. The more corrupt and autocratic systems in the Muslim world have meanwhile spawned the most radical Islamist groups, which have enjoyed varying degrees of support or success. The examples of Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon demonstrate a curious segmentation within movements that operate as sophisticated political actors and maintain military capacities. Some have suggested that Western policy should tolerate such segmentation, with the understanding that military capacity related to the conflict with Israel should not blind us to the political importance of these movements to future political stability within their societies. The reality is more troublesome, as is suggested by the deployment of Hezbollah’s military capacity within Lebanese politics. However, in either case the capacity to diminish the importance of the military element to the benefit of the political depends on acceptance and engagement of the complexity of these movements, not their demonization and their exclusion from diplomacy and politics. The majority of Islamist political parties are pluralistic to the extent that they accept that all citizens, Muslim and non-Muslim, are capable of being responsible participants in an Islamic polity. Their intention is not to purportedly “re-Islamicize” Muslims or “Islamicize” non-Muslims, but to reorganize society on the basis of ideals and values acknowledged already to be held by the majority. They confront their states, not their societies. They are also ideologically pragmatic. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt looked to Sufi principles, while the closely related Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan did not hesitate to look to the Sudanese Communist Party as a source of ideological guidance and understanding. Jihadis, in contrast, see themselves as involved in confrontation with their societies as well as their states, and reject established value systems and ideologies indigenous to their societies, both traditional and modernist. Because of their appeal to popular opinion and because they have suffered at the hands of autocratic political systems, political Islamists have at various times championed principles such as a free press, an independent judiciary, and representative government. On the other hand, they are committed to the imperative to base all political actions on divinely guided principles, and the notion that all political and social arrangements must correspond to a unitary vision of the relationship between the worldly and the divine. This dominant trend among Islamist movements, the predominantly political, may be distinguished from what are often called “jihadi” (though the discussion of jihad above
98 | Faith, Justice, and Violence: Islam in Political Context Human Rights and Tolerance One of the more controversial features of the Western-Muslim dialogue is the question of human rights. The controversy is not about whether some governments of Muslim states violate basic rights. About this there is wide agreement. However, questions of pluralism—issues such as tolerance of varieties of Muslim opinion, of non-Muslim religions, of irreligion, and attitudes to apostasy— are hotly contested within the Muslim world and between the Muslim world and Western opinion. Controversy also arises from Muslim resentment at the Western perception that there is something intrinsic to Muslim society or Islamic thought that provides a larger enabling environment of human rights violations. Among the dimensions that many Muslim intellectuals seek to bring into this particular discussion is the extent to which Western societies themselves act against Islam, through a secularism perceived as aggressive and intolerant, and through the resurgence of Christian or Judeo-Christian discourse in Western public life. There is also substantial discussion of discrimination and persecution against Muslim citizens and communities in societies such as India or Western Europe, but not against Islam as a religion. Some see ideological variety within Muslim societies as a sign of vigor; others see particular sectarian minorities such as Ismailis or Ahmadis in terms such as “Western-inspired mischief to be nipped in the bud.” The latter point of view seems to some to be based on political, not religious, concerns; that is to say, that the concern is about a threat to political stability and order rather than a concern with ideological rectitude. Questions of pluralism, particularly the treatment of apostasy, remain difficult. There is on the one hand a sense that pluralism is not a threat, and that Islamic thought thrives in an open intellectual environment. On the other hand, there is a repeated discussion about the point at which intellectual freedom becomes a challenge to the Islamic nature of the society—a challenge that is considered beyond the pale and therefore legitimately sanctionable. In one point of view, the tradition of Islamic statecraft and social norms going back to the time of the Prophet in Madina offers progressive and liberal models of justice and welfare, the rights of minorities, unity within the Muslim community, and cohesion with non-Muslim minorities and neighbors. This perspective is encapsulated in the observation that the term ummah was used by the Prophet not to describe the Muslim community but as a collective noun applied to all the communities of Madina, including Jews, Christians, and pagans as well as Muslims. Muslim critics of intolerance in their own societies, as well as those who deny its existence or defend it, draw attention to the intellectually, socially, and politically warm and generous attitude toward Christian and Jews found in the Quran and in the early life of the Muslim community. Others suggests that any such label is problematic). Whereas Islamist political movements are focused on their own societies and on addressing the specific problems of those, “jihadis” by contrast are focused on a more revolutionary agenda in relationship to their own societies and on a global agenda of ideological and strategic confrontation with the West.
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Islam and Politics Renewal and Resi
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Contents Preface...................
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Preface Stimson’s Regional Voices
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Acknowledgments This volume would n
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Introduction In the past two years,
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Introduction | xi radicalize, prefe
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Perspectives from the Regions
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4 | Political Islamist Movements: T
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10 | Political Islamist Movements:
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18 | Radicalization of Muslims in M
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Role of Religion in Afghan Politics
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Prakhar Sharma | 35 The Changing Ro
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Prakhar Sharma | 37 advent of Afgha
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Prakhar Sharma | 39 Afghanistan, wi
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Prakhar Sharma | 41 Religious leade
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44 | Ethnoreligious and Political D
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Page 70 and 71: Madrassas in Pakistan: Role and Eme
Page 72 and 73: Khalid Rahman | 59 number of studen
Page 74 and 75: Khalid Rahman | 61 at colleges and
Page 76 and 77: Khalid Rahman | 63 to pay the expen
Page 78 and 79: Khalid Rahman | 65 • While there
Page 80 and 81: Khalid Rahman | 67 • Many madrass
Page 82 and 83: Khalid Rahman | 69 Outreach The omn
Page 84: Khalid Rahman | 71 Interpreting the
Page 87 and 88: 74 | Faith, Justice, and Violence:
Page 109: 96 | Faith, Justice, and Violence:
Page 120 and 121: Appendix 1: Author Biographies Amit
Page 122 and 123: Appendix 2: Experts Consulted Saadi
Page 124 and 125: Appendix 2: Experts Consulted | 111
Page 126 and 127: Appendix 3: Partner Institutions Mi
Page 128 and 129: Appendix 3: Partner Institutions |
Page 130 and 131: Notes Political Islamist Movements:
Page 132 and 133: Notes | 119 term “secularized Bud
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