Islam and Politics - The Stimson Center

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Role of Religion in Afghan Politics: Evolution and Key Trends Prakhar Sharma Afghanistan faces a serious crisis of political stability, threatening its modest development gains, the survival of its government, and the interests of the West and the international community. In order to meet these challenges, the country will need broad social unity and should therefore avoid alienating important bodies of opinion wherever possible. Integrating religious leadership into the political mainstream is essential to the viability and stability of the country’s continued transition into a free and democratic political order. Equally important is to give religious practice an outlet in other aspects of public life, such as education. Interviews with locals in six different provinces including Kabul, indicate a growing frustration with the government’s lack of effort in integrating religious leaders into the political process. [1] Showing respect for Islam can play a key role in building political legitimacy in a country whose population is overwhelmingly Muslim. Madrassas, or religious schools, are also a contentious issue. There is a concern in Afghanistan and among its Western supporters, that madrassas could be fostering antidemocratic or even terrorist ideologies. However, several nationwide surveys conducted during the last three years reveal the importance that the populace accords to education [2] and the accepted prevalence of religion in education. The international community, in showing its support to Afghanistan’s government and the country’s developmental process, must recognize the importance of Islam for the Afghan population and encourage its inclusion in the political process and in the formal educational system. However, it must also be careful not to be seen as interfering in religious matters, as this risks inflaming public sentiment. This paper examines recent trends in the role of religion in Afghan statecraft and in the context of broader political developments in the country. The paper also attempts to explain the historical evolution of the relationship between the state and religion. Background The last nationwide population census in Afghanistan was done in 1979, but current unofficial estimates put the Sunni population at around 80 percent of the total, with Shi’as 33
34 | Role of Religion in Afghan Politics: Evolution and Key Trends making up the rest (including a small minority of Ismailis comprising a few thousand people in the northeastern provinces). There are only tiny numbers of Sikhs, Hindus, and Zoroastrians living in the country. Afghan society is religiously conservative, and rulers have traditionally maintained close relations with the clergy. Rulers who instituted reforms that were seen as un-Islamic by the clerics and society often lost their popular support. Thus, the current administration of President Hamid Karzai has been wary of putting a secular face to the government. It has especially taken care to appear sensitive about protection of madrassas and shrines. Some efforts were made early in the current peace process to include religious voices in politics. In 2001, the role of the religious establishment was formally recognized by its inclusion in the Bonn meeting that articulated the plan for governing the country following the ousting of the Taliban by the United States. In 2002, President Karzai reorganized the Shura-e Ulama (a council of religious scholars that advises on sharia law and other matters) and asked it to issue a religious edict that invalidated the Taliban’s call for holy war against international coalition forces and the Afghan government. Since then, the engagement of religious figures in elections (2004) and constitutional arrangements (2005) has continued. When he came to power in 2002, President Karzai inherited the madrassas that were built during the pre-Soviet and Taliban periods. In addition to these, the new government established a few madrassas as “an essential counterweight to the privately run madrassas,” in spite of intense pressure from the international community to refrain from doing so. [3] The role played by the Iranian and Pakistani madrassas in the Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union shaped the state policy in Afghanistan toward religion and its role in politics. The government was concerned that private madrassas in Afghanistan would proliferate through funds and charities in the country, as well as from individuals and groups abroad. Certain segments of the Karzai administration also believed that Afghan religious scholars were radicalized in madrassas in neighboring countries, especially in Pakistan and Iran. These segments of the administration felt the best way to stem the prospect of militant tendencies was to establish peaceful religious institutions domestically, thus minimizing the need for Afghans to go abroad for religious education. [4] Key Trends in Politics Historically, several broad trends can be described. Several of them reflect the political and social realities of various periods during the last century, with the influence of religion in Afghanistan’s politics declining steadily until the Soviet invasion, resurging during the jihad against the Soviets, and receding after the ouster of the Taliban.
Page 2 and 3: Islam and Politics Renewal and Resi
Page 4 and 5: Contents Preface...................
Page 6 and 7: Preface Stimson’s Regional Voices
Page 8 and 9: Acknowledgments This volume would n
Page 10 and 11: Introduction In the past two years,
Page 12 and 13: Introduction | xi radicalize, prefe
Page 14: Perspectives from the Regions
Page 17 and 18: 4 | Political Islamist Movements: T
Page 23 and 24: 10 | Political Islamist Movements:
Page 31 and 32: 18 | Radicalization of Muslims in M
Page 48 and 49: Prakhar Sharma | 35 The Changing Ro
Page 50 and 51: Prakhar Sharma | 37 advent of Afgha
Page 52 and 53: Prakhar Sharma | 39 Afghanistan, wi
Page 54: Prakhar Sharma | 41 Religious leade
Page 57 and 58: 44 | Ethnoreligious and Political D
Page 70 and 71: Madrassas in Pakistan: Role and Eme
Page 72 and 73: Khalid Rahman | 59 number of studen
Page 74 and 75: Khalid Rahman | 61 at colleges and
Page 76 and 77: Khalid Rahman | 63 to pay the expen
Page 78 and 79: Khalid Rahman | 65 • While there
Page 80 and 81: Khalid Rahman | 67 • Many madrass
Page 82 and 83: Khalid Rahman | 69 Outreach The omn
Page 84: Khalid Rahman | 71 Interpreting the
Page 87 and 88: 74 | Faith, Justice, and Violence:
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Appendix 1: Author Biographies Amit
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Appendix 2: Experts Consulted Saadi
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Appendix 2: Experts Consulted | 111
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Appendix 3: Partner Institutions Mi
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Appendix 3: Partner Institutions |
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Notes Political Islamist Movements:
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Notes | 119 term “secularized Bud
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