Islam and Politics - The Stimson Center

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Amit Pandya | 81 closely with the political organizing and agenda of organizations associated with the BJP, which leads the opposition in the Indian Parliament. The alleged conspirators of the Malegaon plot had come from an organization, Abhinav Bharat, which has an established historical pedigree in a little-known tradition of Hindutva terrorism. Although its current incarnation was founded in 2006, it bears the name of an organization that was founded in 1904 by V. D. Savarkar, the founder of Hindutva ideology and the Rashtriya Svayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Hindu Mahasabha, the mother organizations of the BJP. Hindutva terrorism has at least as long a pedigree. The iconic Indian nationalist leader Bal Gangadhar (“Lokmanya”) Tilak embraced terrorist violence, modeled on anti-czarist terrorism in the Russian empire and anti-British terrorism in Ireland, as a means of national liberation. Among those drawn to his message were young Western-educated Hindus. At that time India’s Muslims remained immune to the allure of radical measures. In one Abhinav Bharat manifesto, its followers vowed to “shed upon the earth the lifeblood of enemies who destroy religion,” while another militant journal considered murder of foreigners in India “not a sin but a [ritual sacrifice].” The first four decades of the 20th century saw many terrorist incidents in India resulting in deaths of civilian officials or innocent bystanders. None of these were perpetrated by Muslims. While many Hindutva leaders have been forthright about their admiration of 20th century European fascism and of Adolf Hitler, Hindutva’s long pedigree of ideological justification for terrorism might bear further study. Of course, none of this suggests a particular Hindu proclivity to terrorism, any more than there is a Muslim proclivity as believed by partisans of Hindutva. What does seem clear is that the embrace of terrorism reflects political circumstances and vicissitudes of a given historical period, not features innate to the culture or “mind” of one religious tradition or another. Muslim political thinkers and analysts consider the Western view of violence in the Muslim world, and in Islamic thought, as ahistorical and normative. Muslims believe that this view thereby obscures the actual political, economic, and social roots of antistate violence. Traditions of violent resistance appear from within to be rooted in anticolonial struggles, or in resistance to indigenous oppression, not in anti-Western sentiment or religious faith. The extent to which violence is accepted as legitimate in contemporary Muslim societies depends on its perceived political causes. In summary, the Muslim consensus is that if terrorism means resorting to violence against innocent civilians, then all forms of terrorism, individual, group, and state should be equally condemned. The issue of legitimacy and justness of the objectives as well as of the means used to combat terrorism are equally important and relevant.
82 | Faith, Justice, and Violence: Islam in Political Context Jihad, Justice, Mobilization, and Militancy Opposing the facile assumption that the religious concept of jihad justifies political violence, Muslim exponents and Islamic scholars in speaking to non-Muslims have propounded the argument that jihad refers more properly to spiritual and moral struggle. This may be an equally facile misstatement of a more complex idea. The term does indeed appear to mean more than simply striving for spiritual and ethical improvement. We might perhaps say that even as a spiritual and ethical precept, the idea partakes of a characteristically Islamic refusal to separate the inner or personal and the social or political. Even if not a justification for violence, jihad does refer to struggle in the political world against the enemies of Allah and those who would harm the Muslim ummah (the worldwide Muslim community). At issue is the duty to mobilize against injustice and other threats, a duty of militant resistance. This relates jihad to the central importance of justice discussed above. In this respect, it is of the highest importance that many Muslim intellectuals see mobilization as not only a central principle of Islam, but also as a distinguishing characteristic. Islam is seen as an intellectual and social tradition based neither on radical personal autonomy nor on authority and obedience. Thus the beneficial organization of an Islamic society is seen as requiring mobilization for common endeavor, based upon a common ideological understanding among its members. To discuss jihad in terms of political mobilization and contestation, of practical day-to-day politics, can also explain why, despite the almost universal condemnation of terrorism in Muslim societies, attitudes toward political violence remain more ambiguous. Many Muslims accuse the West of the same in its attitudes to political violence, at least toward the Muslim world. Muslims who categorically reject terrorism as a political and ideological distraction from the jihad of the struggle for social justice and equality nonetheless still reserve judgment about the use of violence against entrenched injustice. Many also embrace the notion of ideological war against the enemies of Islam, defined either as those who violate basic social justice (understood as a core Islamic precept applied to Muslims or non-Muslims), or those whose perpetration of injustice harms particular Muslim communities or the ummah as a whole. Others embrace the notion of unyielding struggle against non-Muslim ideologies in the conviction that only Islam can secure justice. Army of God The areas straddling the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan are the epitome—almost a caricature—of the confrontation between the West and Islam. The area is both a meeting of conflicting cultural systems and the epicenter of the “global war on terror.” This region
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Islam and Politics Renewal and Resi
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Contents Preface...................
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Preface Stimson’s Regional Voices
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Acknowledgments This volume would n
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Introduction In the past two years,
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Introduction | xi radicalize, prefe
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Perspectives from the Regions
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4 | Political Islamist Movements: T
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10 | Political Islamist Movements:
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18 | Radicalization of Muslims in M
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Page 43 and 44: 30 | Radicalization of Muslims in M
Page 46 and 47: Role of Religion in Afghan Politics
Page 48 and 49: Prakhar Sharma | 35 The Changing Ro
Page 50 and 51: Prakhar Sharma | 37 advent of Afgha
Page 52 and 53: Prakhar Sharma | 39 Afghanistan, wi
Page 54: Prakhar Sharma | 41 Religious leade
Page 57 and 58: 44 | Ethnoreligious and Political D
Page 70 and 71: Madrassas in Pakistan: Role and Eme
Page 72 and 73: Khalid Rahman | 59 number of studen
Page 74 and 75: Khalid Rahman | 61 at colleges and
Page 76 and 77: Khalid Rahman | 63 to pay the expen
Page 78 and 79: Khalid Rahman | 65 • While there
Page 80 and 81: Khalid Rahman | 67 • Many madrass
Page 82 and 83: Khalid Rahman | 69 Outreach The omn
Page 84: Khalid Rahman | 71 Interpreting the
Page 87 and 88: 74 | Faith, Justice, and Violence:
Page 93: 80 | Faith, Justice, and Violence:
Page 120 and 121: Appendix 1: Author Biographies Amit
Page 122 and 123: Appendix 2: Experts Consulted Saadi
Page 124 and 125: Appendix 2: Experts Consulted | 111
Page 126 and 127: Appendix 3: Partner Institutions Mi
Page 128 and 129: Appendix 3: Partner Institutions |
Page 130 and 131: Notes Political Islamist Movements:
Page 132 and 133: Notes | 119 term “secularized Bud
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