2012 Conference Executive Record Report.pdf - YMCA of Greater ...

Team 4 v 14
MARK RUTKOWSKI, Appellant, v. THE
YMCA, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, New York
COUNSEL:
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
Joey Catalano, for Appellant.
Jordin O'Reilly and Lynsey
Springman, for Respondent.
JUDGES: Orr, Mazzeo, Jacobs, Cicerelli,
Kappel, Sutton
OPINION BY: Last
OPINION
We the Appellate Court of the State of New
York find in favor of the respondent, The
YMCA. The respondent properly sufficed to
show that Officer Bugenis’ decision should be
upheld. The respondent adequately proved that
Mark Rutkowski’s punishment was not arbitrary
and capricious, did not “shock one’s sense of
fairness” and was proportionate to his crime.
Crucial to this case was the determination of
whether the punishment of the lower court was
“proportionate” to the crime. According to
Iarocci v. West Haverstraw, 31 Misc. 3d 1222A
(N.Y. 2011) “the test is whether such
punishment is ‘…..so disproportionate to the
offense, in light of all the circumstances, as to be
shocking to one’s sense of fairness.’” In Iarocci,
the court annulled the termination where
Iarocci’s termination was based on excessive
absences due to hospitalizations for medical
reasons. Unlike in Iarocci, however,
Rutkowski’s absenses in this case were tainted
by moral turpitude because he was using the
time to falsify records and misappropriate funds.
While the petitioner showed that Rutkowski’s
40-year career was notable, Rutkowski’s
negative actions out-weighed the positive years
he spent with the Y. Therefore, the respondent
proved that Rutkowski’s punishment of losing
his job and pension was proportional to the
crime of committing fraud and falsifying
records.
The respondent adequately proved that
Rutkowski’s actions were ones constituting
“moral turpitude.” As stated in Goudy v.
Shaffer, 24 A.D.3d 764 (N.Y. 2005) “…the
petitioner’s misconduct was one of moral
turpitude or motivated by malice or selfishness.”
In the case of Goudy, there were 42
specifications of incompetence, but none were as
severe as the offenses Rutkowski committed.
Rutkowski’s use of the YMCA’s money in order
to further his own interest in the Youth and
Government program proved to be motivated by
selfishness and his failure to ask permission
constituted malice.
In addition, the court needs to make a
determination of whether the punishment of the
lower court is “shocking to one’s sense of
fairness.” In Muraik v. Landi, 19 A.D.3d 697
(N.Y. 2005), Muraik’s termination was reversed
even where there were “several instances of
misconduct by the petitioner in knowingly
submitting false time records for his
subordinates,” because of the “minimal
prospects of alternative employment thus
imposing a devastating impact on his ability to
support his family.” In the case at bar,
Rutkowski acted in such a way that reflected
moral turpitude, unlike the case involving
Muraik. The respondent proved that Rutkowski
knowingly submitted false records while
“redirecting” YMCA funds. Therefore, the
matter of removing Rutkowski’s pension, could
not constitute a “shock to one’s sense of
fairness.”
In conclusion, even though the petitioner
brought about points that were notable, the court
has decided that the hearing officer’s decision
will be upheld, and that the punishment with
proportionate to the crime committed.
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