2012 Conference Executive Record Report.pdf - YMCA of Greater ...
2012 Conference Executive Record Report.pdf - YMCA of Greater ...
2012 Conference Executive Record Report.pdf - YMCA of Greater ...
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Team 57 v 25<br />
RAPHAEL ORTEGA Appellant, v. THE<br />
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,<br />
Respondent.<br />
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third<br />
Department, New York<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Argued<br />
March 10, <strong>2012</strong>, Decided<br />
COUNSEL: Katie Seeger and Maggie<br />
Miller, for Appellant.<br />
Jasmine Somers, for Respondent.<br />
JUDGES: Mallone, Al-Ajmi, Dhami, Vanini,<br />
King, Finan<br />
OPINION<br />
We the Appellate Court <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New<br />
York find in favor <strong>of</strong> the appellant, Raphael<br />
Ortega. The appellant properly proved that<br />
Judge Murtaugh’s decision in not granting the<br />
third adjournment was considered as violating<br />
Ortega’s right to call a witness to court.<br />
However, the appellant failed to prove that the<br />
lower court violated the defendant’s right to<br />
confer with his counsel.<br />
An important aspect <strong>of</strong> this case was proving<br />
whether the defendants’ right to call a witness to<br />
stand was violated or not. The appellant proved<br />
that the witness, Atrion Raimundi, was a<br />
material witness because he was an alibi witness<br />
and the whole defense essentially centered his<br />
presence in court. The appellant proceeded to<br />
properly apply the first prong <strong>of</strong> the Foy test,<br />
found in People v. Foy, to support her claim that<br />
Raimundi was essential to the case and that<br />
Judge Murtagh abused her discretion when<br />
denying the third adjournment. The appellant<br />
continued to effectively apply the second and<br />
third prong <strong>of</strong> the Foy test in the argument. They<br />
went about proving the second prong <strong>of</strong> the Foy<br />
test, that the party who applies has been guilty <strong>of</strong><br />
no neglect, successfully by stating that it is the<br />
court is at fault by not issuing the material<br />
witness warrant that was requested in the<br />
original trial. By stating that the court failed to<br />
show importance towards the material witness in<br />
this case proves that a new trial is in order due to<br />
the violation <strong>of</strong> the defendant’s constitutional<br />
right to call a witness to the stand. Finally, the<br />
appellant established that the third prong <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Foy test, that the witness can be had at the time<br />
to which the trial is deferred, was met in this<br />
case. The appellant went on to prove this by<br />
stating that the witness was on his way to court<br />
when he was last contacted and that the thirty<br />
minutes could have, in fact, been enough time<br />
for the witness to get to there. This argument<br />
clarifies the question <strong>of</strong> whether the defendants’<br />
right to call a witness to the stand had been<br />
violated or not and affirms that the lower court<br />
did, indeed, abuse its’ discretion by not granting<br />
the third adjournment.<br />
Another crucial aspect <strong>of</strong> this case was the<br />
proving that Judge Murtagh abused her<br />
discretion when not allowing the defendant<br />
enough time to confer with their counsel. While<br />
the appellant was successful in properly proving<br />
the first aspect <strong>of</strong> the case they failed to address<br />
the second one. The appellant was incorrect in<br />
comparing the case to that <strong>of</strong> People v. Spears,<br />
where a judge vocally expressed impatience and<br />
only allowed the counsel five seconds to confer<br />
with his defendant. This case is incomparable to<br />
that <strong>of</strong> People v. Spears because in our case the<br />
defendant was given a total <strong>of</strong> 23 hours to<br />
effectively confer with their counsel and failed<br />
to properly use that time. The court cannot be<br />
held accountable for the irresponsibility <strong>of</strong> the<br />
defense. Therefore, the appellant failed to show<br />
the court that Judge Murtagh abused her<br />
discretion by not allowing more time for the<br />
defendant to confer with his counsel.<br />
We disagree with the original ruling <strong>of</strong> the court<br />
and certify that Raphael Ortega be granted a new<br />
trial.<br />
58