vulcan-cryptanalysis

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Linus and Lucy might also have been implemented in forms other than the SOV IC, perhaps even in software. We are simply unaware of specific details and would welcome further information and analysis. As with Vulcan, all of these proprietary ciphers have been rendered obsolete in favor of more recent ciphers such as AES. Nonetheless, Linus and Lucy are tempting targets. For that matter, Motorola is far from the only manufacturer that sold proprietary cryptographic devices. We know of many different manufacturers of equipment, much of which is now cheaply available at ham fests and on eBay. Recent advances in tools and techniques for reverse-engineering place most historical cryptographic equipment within easy reach of anyone with the will to understand how these devices work. 7.3 Epilog We undertook this endeavor primarily as a learning exercise. We hope that others will find this material both interesting and informative. Furthermore, we hope this project inspires others to undertake similar projects, uncovering the hidden secrets lurking beneath every proprietary cryptographic device. Many such proprietary devices exist, providing ample material for would-be reverseengineers and cryptographers. The Son-of-Vulcan device we mentioned is but one of a plethora. Many older cryptographic devices are simple enough to allow a complete analysis by a single individual. However, some devices are sufficiently complex to require a team effort to fully reverse-engineer and understand. To this end, we recognize and wish to call attention to the need for an anonymous and secure collaboration framework that would allow multiple team members to remain anonymous while still enabling cooperation on potentially sensitive work such as cryptographic reverse engineering. Anyone seeking a noble thesis project should give serious thought to this most critical need. References [1] A. Klein, “Introduction to Stream Ciphers”, in Stream Ciphers, 1st ed., London, UK, Springer, 2013, ch. 1, sec. 1.2, pp. 6-7. [2] S. Golomb, Shift Register Sequences, 1st ed., Laguna Hills, CA, Aegean Park Press, 1982. [3] J. Greefkes, K. Riemens, “Code Modulation with Digitally Controlled Companding for Speech Transmission”, Philips Technical Review, vol. 31, no. 11-1, pp. 335, 1970. [4] Export of Cryptography from the United States, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Export of cryptography from the United States [5] A Legacy of Innovation: Timeline of Motorola History since 1928, http://www.motorolasolutions.com/US-EN/About/Company+Overview/History/Timeline 28
[6] Motorola Encryption Topics, http://wiki.radioreference.com/index.php/Motorola Encryption Topics [7] Encryption Protocols: A Brief Look at Analog and Digital Encryption Devices, http://www.radioreference.com/trunked/stuff/encrypt.html [8] 2-Way Encryption Primer, http://www.batlabs.com/encrypt.html [9] KY-57 Vinson Voice Encryption Unit, http://www.cryptomuseum.com/crypto/usa/ky57/ [10] The Layman’s Guide to IC Reverse Engineering, http://siliconzoo.org/tutorial.html [11] Voice Security FAQs, http://www.midians.com/voice-security-faqs [12] W. Braun, A. Leitich, “Digital Privacy System”, U.S. Patent 3,639,690, February 1, 1972. [13] R. Coe, D. McQuade, D. Weiss, “Digital Voice Protection System and Method”, U.S. Patent 4,167,700, September 11, 1979. [14] M. Bright, E. Ziolko, A. Wilson, M. Bray, H. Hennen, D. Weiss, “Secure Communication System”, U.S. Patent 4,893,339, January 9, 1990. [15] Motorola, Inc., “Securenet”, U.S. Trademark Reg. Num. 1842824, January 1, 1982. 29
Page 1 and 2: Vulcan: A Proprietary Cipher of the
Page 3 and 4: As a final comment concerning Motor
Page 5 and 6: known how vulnerable this cipher ac
Page 7 and 8: 7 Figure 3: SC76807 Die Shot
Page 9 and 10: of the SC76807 in a later section,
Page 11 and 12: At the far right side of the chip i
Page 13 and 14: signal. The WE input on Pin 9 and t
Page 15 and 16: its and are always set to 0 by the
Page 17 and 18: 4 DVP Key Loader Based on our analy
Page 19 and 20: 4.2 Reverse Engineering Understandi
Page 21 and 22: 5.1 Key Schedule We created an Octa
Page 23 and 24: plaintext bit (i.e. we are mounting
Page 25 and 26: cryptovariable in real time solely
Page 27: exposed, it would be enlightening i
Page 31 and 32: % form 8-bit data word from 7 bits
Page 33 and 34: B Vulcan Encrypt Simulation %------
Page 35 and 36: D Vulcan Cryptanalysis Simulation %
Page 37 and 38: 0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,1
Page 39 and 40: 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
Page 41 and 42: c = bitxor(c,bitand(cv8(7),ctd(nn-2
Page 43 and 44: E DVP Key Loader Firmware Disassemb
Page 45 and 46: F09A : BD F1 C0 " " jsr $F1C0 put t
Page 47 and 48: F166 : 5C "\" incb F167 : 20 F9 " "
Page 49 and 50: F22C : CE FF 9D " " ldx #$FF9D Load
Page 51 and 52: -----------------------------------
Page 53 and 54: F3B9 : 81 04 " " cmpa #$04 F3BB : 2
Page 55 and 56: F48B : 39 "9" rts -----------------
Page 57 and 58: F553 : 39 "9" rts -----------------
Page 59 and 60: F62C : 8E F8 E2 " " lds #$F8E2 tab:
Page 61 and 62: F707 : 7E F9 10 "~ " jmp $F910 disp
Page 63 and 64: F7CA : 97 82 " " staa PB F7CC : 96
Page 65 and 66: F87F : 08 " " inx F880 : D6 74 " t"
Page 67 and 68: F947 : 97 82 " " staa PB F949 : 88
Page 69 and 70: FA05 : 5A "Z" decb FA06 : 26 F4 "&
Page 71 and 72: FAE4 : 27 03 "’ " beq $FAE9 FAE6
Page 73 and 74: FBC8 : 27 05 "’ " beq $FBCF . . .
Page 75 and 76: FC80 : 01 " " nop FC81 : D6 74 " t"
Page 77 and 78: FD31 : 20 08 " " bra $FD3B --------
Page 79 and 80:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . FE0
Page 81 and 82:
FEAD : 27 04 "’ " beq $FEB3 FEAF
Page 83 and 84:
FF61 : BD F1 70 " p" jsr $F170 writ
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