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Working papers published by IMAD ISSN: 1318-1920 ... - UMAR

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An analysis of past and future GDP growth in Slovenia<br />

Sensitivity analysis of base projection<br />

<strong>Working</strong> paper 3/2004<br />

<strong>IMAD</strong><br />

43<br />

index falls from 2.3% to 1.5%. At the upper margin, the growth in the human<br />

capital index rises from 2.3% to 3.2%. Taking into account both the effect on<br />

future TFP growth and the future growth in the human capital index, we expect<br />

future real GDP growth to lie between 3.4 and 3.9%. Note that a large part of the<br />

resulting higher or lower future growth in the human capital index is offset <strong>by</strong> the<br />

opposing change in projected TFP growth.<br />

Next, we consider alternative developments for capital deepening in the past. Our<br />

preferred capital series has an average annual growth rate of 6.8% over the period<br />

1993-2002. We have reliable data for real investment over this period. However,<br />

we have only limited knowledge of the depreciation of capital, and the level of the<br />

capital stock in any given year. This makes past capital growth relatively unreliable.<br />

However, given the drop in the user cost of capital it does seem likely that there<br />

was some capital deepening (i.e. a rise in the capital-output ratio). Let us then<br />

take as a lower margin that capital grew at the rate of output, 4.1%, over the<br />

period 1993-2002, and let us take the ‘symmetric opposite’ from our preferred<br />

series, 9.5% (=6.8% + (6.8-4.1)%), as the upper margin. How do these lower and<br />

higher capital growth rates in the past affect projected growth? Via TFP. With<br />

physical capital growth at the lower and upper margin, TFP growth would be<br />

0.8% higher or lower, respectively. Following our base scenario methodology, this<br />

would imply that the future growth of real GDP could be 1.1% higher or lower, for<br />

the lower and upper margins respectively. Hence, changes in past growth in physical<br />

capital have a substantial impact on projected GDP growth. Note that because<br />

we assume this has no effect on future capital deepening, there is no offsetting<br />

effect on projected capital growth.<br />

5.2. Sensitivity to alternative developments in the future<br />

The growth in labour is expected to fall slightly, from about 0.16% over the period<br />

1993-2002 to about 0.12% over the period 2002-2013. This is mostly due to a fall<br />

in the unemployment rate. As an alternative, consider the case where there would<br />

be no drop in unemployment. 58 Employment would then fall at an annual rate of<br />

-0.06%. This lowers projected output growth to 3.4% per year. However, we may<br />

also envisage a higher growth rate of employment due to e.g. a higher increase in<br />

the participation of the elderly than in the base projection for example. 59 Suppose<br />

that we take the symmetric opposite again, where employment would grow at<br />

0.30% per year over the period 2002-2013. This would raise GDP growth to 3.8%<br />

over the period 2002-2013.<br />

Regarding human capital, we considered alternative assumptions regarding skillbiased<br />

technological change above in the sensitivity analysis regarding developments<br />

in the past. Here we concern ourselves with alternative future developments in<br />

the share of high-skilled workers. Given the high recent enrolment rates in tertiary<br />

education and the projected outflow of relatively low educated workers from the<br />

workforce, it seems reasonable to expect a further rise in the share of high-skilled<br />

workers. Let us consider a scenario where the growth in the share of tertiary<br />

educated workers is 50% lower or higher than in the base scenario. This would<br />

result in annual growth in the human capital index of 2.0% and 2.5%, respectively.<br />

58<br />

Assuming no drop in the unemployment rate leads to almost the same quantitative results, the change in the gross number of<br />

participants is relatively small.<br />

59<br />

For a more elaborate analysis of the participation rates of the elderly in the future, see Jongen (2004a).

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