SHOT Annual Report 2009 - Serious Hazards of Transfusion
SHOT Annual Report 2009 - Serious Hazards of Transfusion
SHOT Annual Report 2009 - Serious Hazards of Transfusion
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Case 8<br />
When the laboratory knows <strong>of</strong> a special requirement it should not have to be reiterated on request<br />
A request was made for platelets. The BMS noted the requirement for HLA matched platelets and ordered them to<br />
arrive to cover overnight and for use the next day. The on-call BMS booked in and issued the HLA matched platelets.<br />
The platelets were not used overnight and the pack was returned to stock the following morning. A different BMS<br />
on specimen reception received a request for a unit <strong>of</strong> platelets for the patient. The need for HLA matched platelets<br />
was not mentioned. The BMS failed to notice the comment regarding the need for HLA matched platelets, entered on<br />
the laboratory system and on the laboratory whiteboard, and a pool <strong>of</strong> non-HLA matched platelets was issued and<br />
transfused. On discovering the error the ward was contacted and reminded that the patient needed HLA matched<br />
platelets and that this needed to be stated on the request. The HLA matched platelet was then reissued to the patient<br />
and transfused.<br />
Case 9<br />
Checking the need for a special requirement is the responsibility <strong>of</strong> all staff groups<br />
A patient had received fludarabine and required irradiated components. While being transfused irradiated components,<br />
the patient stated that the blood he had received on a previous occasion had not been irradiated. An investigation<br />
ensued.<br />
In the clinical area:<br />
• the patient’s notes did not have an ‘irradiated blood’ alert sticker on them<br />
• the prescription did not state irradiated blood – the relevant field on the prescription was blank.<br />
In the laboratory:<br />
• the patient’s notes on LIMS contained a large amount <strong>of</strong> information including that irradiated blood components<br />
were required.<br />
Clearly a number <strong>of</strong> problems led to this error: omissions at ward level and an error on the part <strong>of</strong> the BMS. Was this<br />
simply a lapse by the BMS or could the notes on the LIMS have been clearer?<br />
COMMENTARY on SRNM laboratory cases<br />
This year has seen an increase in the number <strong>of</strong> paediatric cases: 7 cases where MB-treated FFP should have been<br />
issued to patients under 16 years <strong>of</strong> age and 3 cases where apheresis platelets should have been issued to the same<br />
patient group. 24 Two cases resulted from patients having more than 1 record in which data was not successfully merged<br />
or reconciled and as a result warning flags were deleted/missed during the transfer process.<br />
Failure to provide irradiated components when required was the biggest group (22/67 cases). Some hospitals are<br />
relying on a ticked box on a request form to highlight the need for irradiation. This can be missed in the laboratory.<br />
As recommended in 2008, a more robust mechanism should be in place for informing the laboratory that irradiated<br />
components are required. The laboratory must then ensure that these requirements are consistently met without the<br />
need for further prompts.<br />
Once again the failure <strong>of</strong> laboratory staff to select appropriate components when warnings flags are present is hard to<br />
understand, especially as the majority <strong>of</strong> the cases reported were during normal working hours. There does seem to<br />
be a particular problem when there are multiple special requirements. IT should be used to its full potential to prompt<br />
staff about special requirements either through algorithms based on date <strong>of</strong> birth and/or gender, or via warning flags.<br />
Warnings need to be clear and unambiguous and must be linked to the patient record, not one sample. Staff must then<br />
be competency-assessed to ensure that they fully understand all prompts/warnings/flags.<br />
Case 8 above shows, again, that multiple errors, both clinical and laboratory, <strong>of</strong>ten contribute to cases <strong>of</strong><br />
mistransfusion.<br />
7. Incorrect Blood Component Transfused (IBCT) 53