The collapse of global trade, murky protectionism, and the crisis:

The collapse of global trade, murky protectionism, and the crisis
priate mechanisms that provide developing countries with a sense of genuine confidence
that the necessary support will be delivered when and where it is most needed.
Several suggestions on how to manage the implementation process have been
tabled, but the technical assistance negotiations have generally lagged behind discussions
on specific trade facilitation measures to be included in a new WTO
Agreement. The final nature and shape of a suitable mechanism to manage this
process is therefore far from clear.
To satisfy all parties the final mechanism will likely need to:
• Provide a sense of confidence that any "hard" disciplines included in the
agreement will be balanced and complemented by equally firm commitments
on the provision of adequate technical assistance;
• Ensure that implementation of a new agreement complements rather than
replaces or duplicates existing bilateral and multilateral mechanisms for
designing and implementing trade facilitation reform; and
• Encourage recipient governments to develop implementation plans and
timetables and integrate these with national programs to improve
competitiveness and reform trade-related institutions to promote growth.
These issues are well recognized and all WTO Members are aware of the importance
of effectively dealing with the technical assistance issue. To date however, no agreement
has been reached on how to coordinate and manage the process or on how
implementation of a new agreement would be specifically linked to the 'Aid for Trade'
initiative.
While acknowledging the positive progress made in the trade facilitation negotiations
all commentators acknowledge is that trade facilitation is likely to be captive to
the wider Doha agenda. As the Doha round is subject to a "single undertaking" – i.e.
an all-or-nothing proposition – it is difficult to consider the prospects for trade facilitation
independently from the prospects for agreement in other areas of the negotiating
agenda. As a result, progress, or lack of it, in other more controversial negotiating
areas is likely to have a significant impact on the prospects for a successful conclusion
to the trade facilitation negotiations.
What can the G20 do?
What are the practical ways in which the benefits of a new trade facilitation agreement
could be realized in spite of delays in concluding an overall Doha Round deal?
The first would be to capitalizing on the growing consensus that trade facilitation is
a good news agenda for all.
The current global economic downturn should force a rethink of priorities.
Governments are increasing public investments so as to counter falling demand and
ought to be targeting those projects with large economic payoffs, such as those associated
with trade facilitation. While the trade facilitation negotiations are a star performer
in the WTO and the case for a new Trade Facilitation Agreement is strong, it
is nevertheless always likely to be captive of the wider Doha agenda. If WTO Members
want to see some progress out of their years of investment in the Doha round, trade
facilitation seems like one of the few candidates without any strong opposing constituency.
The question therefore is how, given the seemingly intractable issues to be
resolved in other areas of the negotiating agenda, can consensus on a new Trade
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