The collapse of global trade, murky protectionism, and the crisis:

VOX
Research-based policy analysis and commentary from leading economists
Facilitation Agreement emerge? The challenge here is to capitalize on progress in the
WTO trade facilitation negotiations to speed up implementation of much needed
reforms.
While there are many possible variations on the theme there are essentially only
two possibilities thus far articulated.
The first involves securing agreement to separating trade facilitation from the "single
undertaking" requirement of the DDA and treating success in the trade facilitation
negotiations as a so called "early harvest". However, the negative reaction among
large segments of the WTO membership suggests that such an approach is not politically
viable. A so called "early harvest" simply isn't going to happen.
A second, arguably more realistic option, would involve speeding up conclusion of
the content of a new trade facilitation agreement and then moving rapidly toward
effective implementation in advance of a comprehensive Doha deal. Such an
approach would front-load the development benefits of the trade facilitation agenda
and would capitalize on the fact that many members are already implementing customs
and logistics reforms in their own self interest as part of larger programs to
improve competitiveness. Moreover, moving toward immediate implementation
would test donor willingness to provide adequate technical assistance resources and
do much to allay the remaining concerns of developing countries.
Progress in implementation would lay the foundation for rapid approval of any
Trade Facilitation Agreement as part of a comprehensive Doha deal. This option effectively
postpones the need to secure full consensus on the DDA agenda while not postponing
implementation of a range of practical measures where the benefits for all
Members are not in dispute.
As a starting point, and where demand from Members was clearly articulated,
donors could assist developing country members to prepare practical implementation
action plans to both guide the implementation process and to provide a basis for discussions
between recipient countries and donors.
Such an approach would of course need to build on existing donor efforts as well
as assessments and action plans already in place where they exist. 29 Commitment to
support implementation of the needs identified would of course be a matter for discussion
between potential donors and recipient countries but would ensure some of
the key criteria identified above could be addressed. The development of such implementation
action plans would also assist members to better identify and calibrate the
timing of binding commitments to their own implementation capabilities.
Two objections might surface about this strategy.
Some might say that implementing reforms undermines bargaining power of one
or another coalition on the single undertaking.
However, it is unlikely that that any offensive interests in trade facilitation are so
great that a defensive posture would precipitate movement in other, more difficult,
parts of the negotiation.
More importantly, trade facilitation is one area where the gains transparently
accrue to those that implement reforms.
It therefore makes no sense for any government to hold important reforms hostage
to an agreement in Geneva.
This approach would provide a sound framework to guide delivery of trade related
29 A six country case study undertaken in 2006 by the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO noted that
none of the countries studied were starting from scratch and that all had reform efforts underway in
trade facilitation. In many cases implementation of the measures under negotiation in the WTO could
be accommodated by modifying existing donor financed projects.
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