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The collapse of global trade, murky protectionism, and the crisis:

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VOX<br />

Research-based policy analysis <strong>and</strong> commentary from leading economists<br />

Survey measures <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> decline in <strong>trade</strong> credit<br />

According to an unreleased BAFT (Banker's Association for Trade <strong>and</strong> Finance) survey,<br />

flows <strong>of</strong> <strong>trade</strong> finance to developing countries seem to have fallen by some 6% or<br />

more year-on-year – probably more than <strong>the</strong> reduction in <strong>trade</strong> flows – hence implying<br />

that <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> <strong>trade</strong> financing is indeed an issue for <strong>the</strong>se countries. If such numbers<br />

were to be confirmed (at least local bankers seem to agree on <strong>the</strong>m according to<br />

<strong>the</strong> survey), that would mean that <strong>the</strong> market gap could be well over <strong>the</strong> $25 billion<br />

estimate mentioned above (up to $100 billion, possibly more). <strong>The</strong> scarcity <strong>of</strong> <strong>trade</strong><br />

finance is very likely to accelerate <strong>the</strong> slowdown <strong>of</strong> world <strong>trade</strong> <strong>and</strong> output.<br />

Of course, it can be argued that such "exogenous" factors as liquidity squeeze,<br />

exchange rate fluctuations <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs impacting risk are not specific to <strong>trade</strong> finance.<br />

Any unhedged cross-border flow is likely to be affected by exchange rate fluctuations<br />

<strong>and</strong> increased risk. Likewise, all credit is dampened by <strong>the</strong> credit crunch. <strong>The</strong> combination<br />

<strong>of</strong> scarce liquidity <strong>and</strong> a re-assessment <strong>of</strong> customer <strong>and</strong> country risks resulted<br />

in a sharp increase in <strong>the</strong> price <strong>of</strong> credit transactions. Spreads on 90-days letters <strong>of</strong><br />

credit have ramped up in <strong>the</strong> course <strong>of</strong> 2008 from 10 to 16 basis points on a normal<br />

basis, to 250 to 500 basis for letters <strong>of</strong> credit issued by emerging <strong>and</strong> developing<br />

economies. Even under stress, it is hard to believe this sort <strong>of</strong> loan – which is among<br />

<strong>the</strong> safest <strong>and</strong> most self-liquidating form <strong>of</strong> finance due to strong receivables <strong>and</strong> marketable<br />

collaterals – could see its price increase by a factor <strong>of</strong> 10 to 50.<br />

While overall flows cannot be estimated with precision, <strong>the</strong> overall increase in<br />

spreads requested for opening letters <strong>of</strong> credit, particularly at times when liquidity<br />

constraint hitting <strong>the</strong> money market seems to have relaxed a bit, <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r factors<br />

point to a mismatch between supply <strong>and</strong> dem<strong>and</strong>.<br />

Mismatch between supply <strong>and</strong> dem<strong>and</strong><br />

Why has this happened? Two arguments are put forward. Public sector actors emphasise<br />

market failure while private sector actors tend to blame <strong>the</strong> costs associated with<br />

implementing <strong>the</strong> Basel II rules. 20<br />

<strong>The</strong> market failure argument relies on <strong>the</strong> inability <strong>of</strong> private sector operators to<br />

avoid herd behaviour, especially when <strong>the</strong> credit risk <strong>and</strong> country risk are confused<br />

(e.g. amid rumours <strong>of</strong> sovereign default). Cooperation between <strong>global</strong> suppliers dries<br />

up during <strong>crisis</strong>, with <strong>the</strong> best run ones refusing to <strong>of</strong>f load/refinance in <strong>the</strong> secondary<br />

markets <strong>the</strong> positions <strong>of</strong> banks that are in less favourable liquidity situations, or<br />

carrying excess exposure to <strong>trade</strong> credit. <strong>The</strong> failure <strong>of</strong> private lenders, which account<br />

for an estimated 80% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>trade</strong> loan market, to meet <strong>the</strong> dem<strong>and</strong> for cross-border<br />

<strong>trade</strong> finance is unusual given <strong>the</strong> self-liquidating nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> market (<strong>of</strong>ten backed<br />

by strong deliverables, e.g <strong>the</strong> cargo itself acts as collateral for <strong>the</strong> loan).<br />

On <strong>the</strong> regulatory side, commercial bankers have long complained about <strong>the</strong><br />

implementation <strong>of</strong> Basel II rules, which are regarded as having a pro-cyclical effect on<br />

<strong>the</strong> supply <strong>of</strong> credit. That is, in poor market conditions, <strong>trade</strong> finance would be<br />

unfairly treated as capital requirements for it would be significantly increased, particularly<br />

for counterparty risk with developing countries' customers. <strong>The</strong> system <strong>of</strong> rat-<br />

20 <strong>The</strong>se arguments are not necessarily new (see WTO 2003, page 6) but at present <strong>the</strong>y may well apply<br />

with even greater force.<br />

76

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