VOX Research-based policy analysis <strong>and</strong> commentary from leading economists Andrew L. Stoler is Executive Director <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> University <strong>of</strong> Adelaide's Institute for International Trade, a position he has held since 2003. He was Deputy Director-General <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> World Trade Organization from 1999 to end-2002. Earlier, he had a long career with <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> US Trade Representative, including as Deputy Chief <strong>of</strong> Mission in Geneva from 1989 to 1999. 68
14. Disavowing <strong>protectionism</strong>: A streng<strong>the</strong>ned G20 st<strong>and</strong>still <strong>and</strong> surveillance Biswajit Dhar, Simon J. Evenett, Guoqiang Long, Andre Meloni Nassar, Stefan Tangermann <strong>and</strong> Alberto Trejos See end <strong>of</strong> paper for affiliations <strong>The</strong> G20 st<strong>and</strong>still on <strong>protectionism</strong>, agreed less than five months ago inWashington DC, has lost much <strong>of</strong> its force. This calls into question <strong>the</strong> credibility <strong>of</strong> leaders' claims to disavow beggar-thy-neighbor responses to <strong>the</strong> <strong>global</strong> economic downturn. While no major trading power has yet to resort to across-<strong>the</strong>-board restrictions on international <strong>trade</strong> <strong>and</strong> investment, enough elements <strong>of</strong> many national economic recovery programmes contain discriminatory measures – or appear to – that a new approach is needed, especially as <strong>the</strong> measures <strong>of</strong> greatest concern today are very different from <strong>the</strong> protectionist measures <strong>of</strong> yesteryear. <strong>The</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong> this chapter is to argue for a streng<strong>the</strong>ned G20 st<strong>and</strong>still that covers <strong>the</strong> new, murkier forms <strong>of</strong> protection as well as traditional discriminatory measures, backed up a tough real-time surveillance mechanism. <strong>The</strong> original rationales for a G20 st<strong>and</strong>still – avoiding beggar-thy-neighbor measures <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> almost inevitable retaliation <strong>and</strong> descent into <strong>trade</strong> wars that would follow – are sound. That's why <strong>the</strong> G20 shouldn't ab<strong>and</strong>on its st<strong>and</strong>still. Even so, recognition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> many – some blatant, some far more subtle – ways in which discrimination against foreign <strong>trade</strong>rs, investors, <strong>and</strong> workers, can creep into national, sectoral, <strong>and</strong> firm-specific government measures calls for a new form <strong>of</strong> st<strong>and</strong>still. Moreover, many non-discriminatory recovery measures that governments may take can have <strong>the</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> reducing international commerce, even though <strong>the</strong> latter is not <strong>the</strong>ir purpose. A st<strong>and</strong>still that is both more comprehensive in scope <strong>and</strong> better able to discourage stealthy as well as blatant <strong>protectionism</strong> is needed. Plus, any new st<strong>and</strong>still should not seek to stop government intervention per se, but ra<strong>the</strong>r to encourage governments to use whatever discretion <strong>the</strong>y have in a non-discriminatory manner when designing <strong>and</strong> implementing measures to promote economic recovery. To prevent retaliation discretion must not just be used in a non-discriminatory manner, but seen to be so. In this chapter we propose that <strong>the</strong> G20 leaders adopt, at <strong>the</strong>ir April 2009 summit in London, a comprehensive Protocol that reaffirms <strong>the</strong>ir commitment to find nondiscriminatory ends <strong>and</strong> means to combating <strong>the</strong> <strong>global</strong> economic downturn. <strong>The</strong> Protocol would not be permanent <strong>and</strong> would lapse after two years. Subsequently o<strong>the</strong>r, non-G20 nations would be encouraged to sign this Protocol too. As a sign <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir willingness to take leadership during <strong>the</strong> current <strong>global</strong> economic downturn, <strong>the</strong> G20 would implement <strong>the</strong> Protocol on an unconditional most-favored nation basis. Taking <strong>the</strong>se steps would send a strong signal to <strong>the</strong> financial markets <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> private sector, boosting confidence. In addition, signing up to this Protocol would provide useful benchmarks against which state measures could be judged. <strong>The</strong> combination <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se agreed benchmarks <strong>and</strong> a new real-time surveillance mechanism would generate <strong>the</strong> necessary peer pressure to discourage governments from taking 69
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