The collapse of global trade, murky protectionism, and the crisis:

VOX
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the globe is through the Internet. Additional surveillance does not need to be 'run' by
an existing institution or even located in a single media outlet. But for practical purposes
a single high profile website, funded and managed by for example, the World
Bank, would improve the effectiveness of surveillance. Specifically, websites that
allow editorial access by individuals have proved their worth in spreading information.
But they are also vulnerable to the 'abuse of the commons'. Moderation is essential
to ensure comments are transparent (made by identified individuals), on-topic,
and proportional. But moderation is labour-intensive and never free of controversy.
In this case, it will need moderators with subject knowledge and probably some institutional
affiliation to assure funding and independence.
This proposal calls for the G20 countries to agree on some standards that could be
monitored at the website at their April 2009 meeting (more about these later).
Surveillance would then operate as follows:
• Participating governments (G20 and any others who signed-on to the G20
standards) would be invited to notify actual or planned measures by other
governments that were inconsistent with the standards adopted by the G20
• Private sector bodies (business, non-business, academic) and individuals would
be able to post (moderated) information on protectionist measures and their
(moderated) views on any notified measures. Private information and comments
would not be limited to measures breaching the standards adopted by G20
governments.
• G20 governments, and others that signed on, would agree to respond to
allegations concerning a breach of the standards within 10 days of the
notifications appearing on the website. They may also respond to any other
criticisms.
No other action should be necessary. The pressure generated through this highly public
process (we would expect to see key news media tuned into the website) should be
sufficient to pressure the "offending government" into not taking the planned protectionist
measure. An advantage of the proposal is that the entire process from notification
to justification or stand-down could take place in the space of a fortnight.
What triggers a notification?
A notification to the surveillance mechanism should be triggered by a measure that
is judged inconsistent with a commonsense standstill commitment to be adopted by
G20 members and other countries willing to participate. We all know that a measure
need not be inconsistent with a government's WTO obligations to be capable of
harming international trade and, in any event, the surveillance mechanism should
not aim to supplant WTO notifications or dispute settlement. A commonsense standstill
would also allow non-WTO members like Russia to be part of the surveillance
mechanism.
No standard that G20 governments would endorse will cover all protectionist
action. Some governments (the US for example) could not sign-away individuals'
rights in law to seek 'trade-remedies' such as anti-dumping duties and safeguards. Yet
these measures are among the most harmful to trade and prone to 'tit-for-tat' responses
from trading partners. The best way to handle them would be to allow private notifications
on the Surveillance Website, identifying the harm while flagging their 'consistency'
with the G20 undertaking.
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