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Teaching Consumer Credit Law in an Evolving Australian Economy

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Express warr<strong>an</strong>ty requires privity. The Fifth Circuit held that a<br />

claim aga<strong>in</strong>st a m<strong>an</strong>ufacturer for breach of express warr<strong>an</strong>ty requires<br />

that the affirmation or promise be made to the pla<strong>in</strong>tiff.<br />

Scott v. Dorel Juvenile Grp. Inc., No. 11-10349, 2012 U.S. App.<br />

LEXIS 155 (5th Cir. J<strong>an</strong>. 4, 2012).<br />

Class-wide arbitration claim may proceed even without express agreement.<br />

The First Circuit held that <strong>an</strong> arbitrator, <strong>an</strong>d not a judge,<br />

must decide if <strong>an</strong> arbitration agreement allows for a dispute to<br />

move forward <strong>in</strong>dividually or on a class-wide basis. The pla<strong>in</strong>tiff<br />

fr<strong>an</strong>chisor argued that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010 rul<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>in</strong> Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corporation required<br />

the express consent of the parties before arbitration could<br />

proceed as a class action. But the First Circuit disagreed, hold<strong>in</strong>g<br />

not only that <strong>an</strong> agreement silent on the class-action question did<br />

not control, but also that the arbitrator was properly <strong>in</strong> a position<br />

to decide the <strong>in</strong>tent of the parties. “We . . . reject the . . . precept,<br />

on which [the fr<strong>an</strong>chisor’s] argument depends, that there must be<br />

express contractual l<strong>an</strong>guage ev<strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g the parties’ <strong>in</strong>tent to permit<br />

class or collective arbitration,” the court held. “Stolt-Nielsen<br />

imposes no such constra<strong>in</strong>t on arbitration agreements.” F<strong>an</strong>tastic<br />

Sams Fr<strong>an</strong>chise Corp. v. FSRO Ass’n Ltd., 683 F.3d 18 (1st Cir.<br />

2012).<br />

Defend<strong>an</strong>t has right to show amount <strong>in</strong> controversy. The Tenth Circuit<br />

held that a defend<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong> a consumer lawsuit should have had<br />

the opportunity to show that the amount <strong>in</strong> controversy was sufficient<br />

for removal under the Class Action Fairness Act. The district<br />

court rem<strong>an</strong>ded the consumer’s class action lawsuit to state court,<br />

conclud<strong>in</strong>g from the face of the compla<strong>in</strong>t that the damages at<br />

issue did not meet the Act’s $5 million jurisdictional threshold.<br />

The court held that defend<strong>an</strong>t should have had the opportunity<br />

to show by the preponder<strong>an</strong>ce of the evidence that the amount<br />

at stake satisfied the Act’s requirements. It noted that the circuits<br />

are divided over the proper st<strong>an</strong>dard <strong>in</strong> this context. Frederick v.<br />

Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2012).<br />

<strong>Law</strong> firm br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g replev<strong>in</strong> action is subject to Fair Debt Collection<br />

Practices Act. The Fourth Circuit held that the aunt of the debtor<br />

could ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> action aga<strong>in</strong>st a law firm based on <strong>an</strong> alleged<br />

violation that occurred <strong>in</strong> connection with a replev<strong>in</strong> proceed<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

Rawl<strong>in</strong>son v. <strong>Law</strong> Office of William M. Rudow, No. 10-2148, 2012<br />

U.S. App. LEXIS 173 (4th Cir. J<strong>an</strong>. 5, 2012) (per curiam).<br />

<strong>Law</strong> firm c<strong>an</strong>not sue b<strong>an</strong>k to recover loss from fake check. The First<br />

Circuit held that a law firm could not sue Citib<strong>an</strong>k to recover lost<br />

funds from a fraudulent check deposited <strong>in</strong>to the firm’s IOLTA<br />

account. Aresty Int’l <strong>Law</strong> Firm v. Citib<strong>an</strong>k, 677 F.3d 54 (1st Cir.<br />

2012).<br />

Parties c<strong>an</strong> waive arbitration notwithst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g a no waiver clause.<br />

The Sixth Circuit affirmed a district court’s f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g that the defend<strong>an</strong>t<br />

had waived its right to arbitration by participat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong><br />

litigation for eight months. Johnson Assocs. Corp. v. HL Operat<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Corp., 680 F.3d 713 (6th Cir. 2012).<br />

Debt collector may have violated Telephone <strong>Consumer</strong> Protection<br />

Act. The Seventh Circuit held that a debt collector may have violated<br />

the TCPA when its automated dial<strong>in</strong>g system contacted cell<br />

phone users with reassigned numbers. The debt collector argued<br />

that it had the consent of the prior owner <strong>an</strong>d therefore didn’t violate<br />

the Act. The court disagreed, not<strong>in</strong>g “there c<strong>an</strong>’t be <strong>an</strong>y longterm<br />

consent to call a given cell number, because no one . . . has a<br />

property right <strong>in</strong> a phone number. Consent to call a given number<br />

must come from its current subscriber.” Soppet v. Enh<strong>an</strong>ced<br />

Recovery Co., 679 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 2012).<br />

Purchaser of mortgage may be a debt collector under the Fair Debt<br />

Collection Practices Act. The Sixth Circuit held that a mortgage<br />

purchaser may be a “debt collector” liable for violations of the federal<br />

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The court also noted that<br />

although the debt was not actually <strong>in</strong> default, the FDCPA still applies.<br />

“A FDCPA defend<strong>an</strong>t<br />

c<strong>an</strong>not escape coverage under<br />

the Act by assert<strong>in</strong>g to<br />

the court that the debt was<br />

not actually <strong>in</strong> default, despite<br />

hav<strong>in</strong>g dunned pla<strong>in</strong>tiffs<br />

for months or years <strong>in</strong><br />

the face of pla<strong>in</strong>tiffs’ pleas or<br />

proof that the collector has<br />

made some error.” Bridge v.<br />

Ocwen Fed. B<strong>an</strong>k, 681 F.3d<br />

355 (6th Cir. 2012).<br />

The Sixth Circuit<br />

held that a mortgage<br />

purchaser may be a<br />

“debt collector”<br />

liable for violations<br />

of the federal Fair<br />

Debt Collection Practices<br />

Act.<br />

Purchaser has three years to<br />

resc<strong>in</strong>d under L<strong>an</strong>d Sales<br />

Act. [Interstate L<strong>an</strong>d Sales Full Disclosure Act (“ILSFDA”), 15<br />

U.S.C. § 1701] The Fourth Circuit held that purchasers of a lot <strong>in</strong><br />

<strong>an</strong> upscale real estate development had three years to exercise their<br />

rescission rights under federal law impos<strong>in</strong>g disclosure requirements<br />

<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terstate l<strong>an</strong>d sales. Nahigi<strong>an</strong> v. Juno-Loudoun, LLC,<br />

677 F.3d 579 (4th Cir. 2012).<br />

<strong>Law</strong> firm’s validation notice does not violate Fair Debt Collection<br />

Practices Act. The N<strong>in</strong>th Circuit held that a validation notice sent<br />

by a law firm that implied notice had to be <strong>in</strong> writ<strong>in</strong>g did not<br />

violate the FDCPA. The court concluded that a validation notice<br />

violates § 1692g(a)(3) only by expressly requir<strong>in</strong>g a consumer to<br />

dispute a debt <strong>in</strong> writ<strong>in</strong>g. “We hold that [the firm’s] notice does<br />

not violate § 1692g(a)(3) of the FDCPA by impermissibly requir<strong>in</strong>g<br />

[the pla<strong>in</strong>tiff] to dispute her debt <strong>in</strong> writ<strong>in</strong>g. The notice<br />

does not expressly state such a requirement. Assum<strong>in</strong>g without<br />

decid<strong>in</strong>g that the notice could be understood to imply a writ<strong>in</strong>g<br />

requirement, that implication is part of the statute itself. Such<br />

<strong>an</strong> implicit requirement does not violate § 1692g(a)(3).” Riggs v.<br />

Prober & Raphael, 681 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2012).<br />

TILA pla<strong>in</strong>tiffs do not need to plead ability to repay. The Tenth Circuit<br />

held that home borrowers were not required to plead that<br />

they had the ability to repay their lo<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> order to <strong>in</strong>voke their<br />

rescission rights under the Federal Truth <strong>in</strong> Lend<strong>in</strong>g Act. S<strong>an</strong>ders<br />

v. Mounta<strong>in</strong> Am. Fed. <strong>Credit</strong> Union, No. 11-4008, 2012 U.S.<br />

App. LEXIS 15714 (10th Cir. July 30, 2012).<br />

Nurs<strong>in</strong>g home c<strong>an</strong> enforce arbitration clause. The Eleventh Circuit<br />

held that a nurs<strong>in</strong>g home could enforce <strong>an</strong> arbitration clause<br />

signed by a patient upon admission when her estate later sued for<br />

wrongful death. Entrek<strong>in</strong> v. Internal Med. Assocs., No. 11-10730,<br />

2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 16655 (11th Cir. Aug. 9, 2012).<br />

Journal of <strong>Consumer</strong> & Commercial <strong>Law</strong> 35

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