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Teaching Consumer Credit Law in an Evolving Australian Economy

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STATE COURTS<br />

Texas Supreme Court discusses calculation under Lodestar Method.<br />

Under Texas law, a claim for attorney’s fees under the Texas Commission<br />

on Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights Act is subject to the Lodestar method<br />

employed by federal courts. In a recent decision, the Texas Supreme<br />

Court reversed the st<strong>an</strong>dard of proof to recover such fees,<br />

not<strong>in</strong>g, “[w]hile Texas courts have not rout<strong>in</strong>ely required bill<strong>in</strong>g<br />

records or other documentary evidence to subst<strong>an</strong>tiate a claim<br />

for attorney’s fees, the requirement has merit <strong>in</strong> contested cases<br />

under the lodestar approach.” The court cont<strong>in</strong>ued, “[w]hen apply<strong>in</strong>g<br />

for a fee under the lodestar method, the applic<strong>an</strong>t must<br />

provide sufficient details of the work performed before the court<br />

c<strong>an</strong> make a me<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>gful review of the fee request. For the purposes<br />

of lodestar calculations, this evidence <strong>in</strong>cludes, at a m<strong>in</strong>imum,<br />

documentation of the services performed, who performed them<br />

<strong>an</strong>d at what hourly rate, when they were performed, <strong>an</strong>d how<br />

much time the work required.” El Apple I, Ltd. v Olivas, 55 Tex.<br />

Sup. J. 954 (2012).<br />

Federal b<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g law preempts a state law regulat<strong>in</strong>g convenience<br />

checks. The California Supreme Court held that a state law requir<strong>in</strong>g<br />

credit card comp<strong>an</strong>ies to make certa<strong>in</strong> disclosures regard<strong>in</strong>g<br />

the use of convenience checks is preempted by the federal National<br />

B<strong>an</strong>k Act. The court noted, “[i]f disclosure requirements such<br />

as those <strong>in</strong> [the state law] were allowed to st<strong>an</strong>d, national b<strong>an</strong>ks<br />

operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> multiple states would face the prospect of ‘limitations<br />

<strong>an</strong>d restrictions as various <strong>an</strong>d as numerous as the states.’ National<br />

b<strong>an</strong>ks would have to monitor requirements as to the content, l<strong>an</strong>guage,<br />

m<strong>an</strong>ner, <strong>an</strong>d format of disclosures for each of the 50 states<br />

(<strong>an</strong>d possibly municipalities as well), <strong>an</strong>d cont<strong>in</strong>ually adjust their<br />

convenience check offers to comply with the prescriptions of each<br />

local jurisdiction. Such ‘[d]iverse <strong>an</strong>d duplicative [regulation] of<br />

national b<strong>an</strong>ks’ engagement <strong>in</strong> the bus<strong>in</strong>ess of b<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g … is precisely<br />

what the NBA was designed to prevent.’” Parks v. MBNA<br />

Am. B<strong>an</strong>k, N.A., 278 P.3d 1193 (Cal. 2012).<br />

their crim<strong>in</strong>al proceed<strong>in</strong>gs are complete. The Court reasoned that<br />

the claims were <strong>in</strong>herently tr<strong>an</strong>sitory, <strong>an</strong>d, thus, even though the<br />

named pla<strong>in</strong>tiffs’ claims were now moot, that did not make the<br />

class action moot. Heckm<strong>an</strong> v. Williamson Cnty., 55 Tex. Sup. J.<br />

803 (2012).<br />

<strong>Law</strong>yer c<strong>an</strong>not enforce arbitration agreement <strong>in</strong> reta<strong>in</strong>er contract.<br />

The Supreme Court of Louisi<strong>an</strong>a held that <strong>an</strong> attorney could not<br />

enforce <strong>an</strong> arbitration clause when a former client sued him for<br />

malpractice. The pla<strong>in</strong>tiff argued that the arbitration clause could<br />

not be enforced because the state’s rules of professional conduct<br />

prohibit lawyers from limit<strong>in</strong>g liability to a client unless the client<br />

is <strong>in</strong>dependently represented by counsel when the reta<strong>in</strong>er agreement<br />

is negotiated. The state supreme court rejected a per se rule<br />

aga<strong>in</strong>st arbitration clauses <strong>in</strong> attorney-client reta<strong>in</strong>er agreements.<br />

However, the court emphasized that such provisions must be “fair<br />

<strong>an</strong>d reasonable” to the client. In this case, the court decided that<br />

the defend<strong>an</strong>t’s arbitration clause was unenforceable because he<br />

failed to make the necessary disclosures to the pla<strong>in</strong>tiff. Hodges v.<br />

Reasonover, No. 2012-CC-0043, 2012 La. LEXIS 1962 (La. July<br />

2, 2012).<br />

President of corporation c<strong>an</strong>not represent bus<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>in</strong> arbitration proceed<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

The Supreme of Ark<strong>an</strong>sas jo<strong>in</strong>ed other states <strong>in</strong> hold<strong>in</strong>g<br />

that a corporate officer, director, or employee, who is not a licensed<br />

attorney, engages <strong>in</strong> the unauthorized practice of law by<br />

represent<strong>in</strong>g the corporation <strong>in</strong> arbitration proceed<strong>in</strong>gs. The court<br />

also held that a court, not the arbitrator, should determ<strong>in</strong>e issues<br />

regard<strong>in</strong>g legal representation dur<strong>in</strong>g arbitration proceed<strong>in</strong>gs. NI-<br />

SHA, LLC v. TriBuilt Constr. Grp., LLC, No. 11-927, 2012 Ark.<br />

LEXIS 157 (Ark. Mar. 29, 2012).<br />

The Court held that not<br />

every named pla<strong>in</strong>tiff<br />

must have st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g at<br />

the time of suit as to<br />

every claim. As long as<br />

the pla<strong>in</strong>tiffs, taken together,<br />

have st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g<br />

as to each claim, the<br />

case c<strong>an</strong> proceed.<br />

Texas Supreme Court<br />

discusses st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d<br />

mootness <strong>in</strong> class actions.<br />

The Court held that<br />

not every named pla<strong>in</strong>tiff<br />

must have st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g<br />

at the time of suit as to<br />

every claim. As long as<br />

the pla<strong>in</strong>tiffs, taken together,<br />

have st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g as<br />

to each claim, the case<br />

c<strong>an</strong> proceed. The Court<br />

also rejected the county’s<br />

argument that the suit<br />

was moot because all the<br />

named pla<strong>in</strong>tiffs eventually<br />

obta<strong>in</strong>ed counsel <strong>an</strong>d<br />

36 Journal of <strong>Consumer</strong> & Commercial <strong>Law</strong>

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