STATE COURTS Texas Supreme Court discusses calculation under Lodestar Method. Under Texas law, a claim for attorney’s fees under the Texas Commission on Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights Act is subject to the Lodestar method employed by federal courts. In a recent decision, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the st<strong>an</strong>dard of proof to recover such fees, not<strong>in</strong>g, “[w]hile Texas courts have not rout<strong>in</strong>ely required bill<strong>in</strong>g records or other documentary evidence to subst<strong>an</strong>tiate a claim for attorney’s fees, the requirement has merit <strong>in</strong> contested cases under the lodestar approach.” The court cont<strong>in</strong>ued, “[w]hen apply<strong>in</strong>g for a fee under the lodestar method, the applic<strong>an</strong>t must provide sufficient details of the work performed before the court c<strong>an</strong> make a me<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>gful review of the fee request. For the purposes of lodestar calculations, this evidence <strong>in</strong>cludes, at a m<strong>in</strong>imum, documentation of the services performed, who performed them <strong>an</strong>d at what hourly rate, when they were performed, <strong>an</strong>d how much time the work required.” El Apple I, Ltd. v Olivas, 55 Tex. Sup. J. 954 (2012). Federal b<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g law preempts a state law regulat<strong>in</strong>g convenience checks. The California Supreme Court held that a state law requir<strong>in</strong>g credit card comp<strong>an</strong>ies to make certa<strong>in</strong> disclosures regard<strong>in</strong>g the use of convenience checks is preempted by the federal National B<strong>an</strong>k Act. The court noted, “[i]f disclosure requirements such as those <strong>in</strong> [the state law] were allowed to st<strong>an</strong>d, national b<strong>an</strong>ks operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> multiple states would face the prospect of ‘limitations <strong>an</strong>d restrictions as various <strong>an</strong>d as numerous as the states.’ National b<strong>an</strong>ks would have to monitor requirements as to the content, l<strong>an</strong>guage, m<strong>an</strong>ner, <strong>an</strong>d format of disclosures for each of the 50 states (<strong>an</strong>d possibly municipalities as well), <strong>an</strong>d cont<strong>in</strong>ually adjust their convenience check offers to comply with the prescriptions of each local jurisdiction. Such ‘[d]iverse <strong>an</strong>d duplicative [regulation] of national b<strong>an</strong>ks’ engagement <strong>in</strong> the bus<strong>in</strong>ess of b<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g … is precisely what the NBA was designed to prevent.’” Parks v. MBNA Am. B<strong>an</strong>k, N.A., 278 P.3d 1193 (Cal. 2012). their crim<strong>in</strong>al proceed<strong>in</strong>gs are complete. The Court reasoned that the claims were <strong>in</strong>herently tr<strong>an</strong>sitory, <strong>an</strong>d, thus, even though the named pla<strong>in</strong>tiffs’ claims were now moot, that did not make the class action moot. Heckm<strong>an</strong> v. Williamson Cnty., 55 Tex. Sup. J. 803 (2012). <strong>Law</strong>yer c<strong>an</strong>not enforce arbitration agreement <strong>in</strong> reta<strong>in</strong>er contract. The Supreme Court of Louisi<strong>an</strong>a held that <strong>an</strong> attorney could not enforce <strong>an</strong> arbitration clause when a former client sued him for malpractice. The pla<strong>in</strong>tiff argued that the arbitration clause could not be enforced because the state’s rules of professional conduct prohibit lawyers from limit<strong>in</strong>g liability to a client unless the client is <strong>in</strong>dependently represented by counsel when the reta<strong>in</strong>er agreement is negotiated. The state supreme court rejected a per se rule aga<strong>in</strong>st arbitration clauses <strong>in</strong> attorney-client reta<strong>in</strong>er agreements. However, the court emphasized that such provisions must be “fair <strong>an</strong>d reasonable” to the client. In this case, the court decided that the defend<strong>an</strong>t’s arbitration clause was unenforceable because he failed to make the necessary disclosures to the pla<strong>in</strong>tiff. Hodges v. Reasonover, No. 2012-CC-0043, 2012 La. LEXIS 1962 (La. July 2, 2012). President of corporation c<strong>an</strong>not represent bus<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>in</strong> arbitration proceed<strong>in</strong>g. The Supreme of Ark<strong>an</strong>sas jo<strong>in</strong>ed other states <strong>in</strong> hold<strong>in</strong>g that a corporate officer, director, or employee, who is not a licensed attorney, engages <strong>in</strong> the unauthorized practice of law by represent<strong>in</strong>g the corporation <strong>in</strong> arbitration proceed<strong>in</strong>gs. The court also held that a court, not the arbitrator, should determ<strong>in</strong>e issues regard<strong>in</strong>g legal representation dur<strong>in</strong>g arbitration proceed<strong>in</strong>gs. NI- SHA, LLC v. TriBuilt Constr. Grp., LLC, No. 11-927, 2012 Ark. LEXIS 157 (Ark. Mar. 29, 2012). The Court held that not every named pla<strong>in</strong>tiff must have st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g at the time of suit as to every claim. As long as the pla<strong>in</strong>tiffs, taken together, have st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g as to each claim, the case c<strong>an</strong> proceed. Texas Supreme Court discusses st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d mootness <strong>in</strong> class actions. The Court held that not every named pla<strong>in</strong>tiff must have st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g at the time of suit as to every claim. As long as the pla<strong>in</strong>tiffs, taken together, have st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g as to each claim, the case c<strong>an</strong> proceed. The Court also rejected the county’s argument that the suit was moot because all the named pla<strong>in</strong>tiffs eventually obta<strong>in</strong>ed counsel <strong>an</strong>d 36 Journal of <strong>Consumer</strong> & Commercial <strong>Law</strong>
Is Send<strong>in</strong>g Notice With<strong>in</strong> Three Years Sufficient to Preserve Rescission Rights Under Truth-<strong>in</strong> Lend<strong>in</strong>g? Why Not? By Steven Herrera* Journal of <strong>Consumer</strong> & Commercial <strong>Law</strong> 37