Royal Society - David Keith

Submission: Evans; Submission: IOP). This raises the
obvious question of who decides when the point of last
resort has been reached and how such a decision should
be made? Different political ideologies, theories of
government and of international relations give very
different answers to these questions.
The view of geoengineering as an option of last resort
overlooks the possibility that some options may offer the
possibility of stabilising atmospheric carbon concentrations
at lower costs than some forms of conventional mitigation.
The question then is why they should only be implemented
in extreme circumstances?
From the standpoint of carbon removal, there seems to be
no reason to regard direct air capture technologies as
inherently inferior to biological methods (afforestation),
especially where they could be located in desert or arid
environments, powered by solar energy, and placed close
to spent oil and gas wells suitable for sequestration (eg in
the Middle East). Similarly, if a rigorous programme of
research was to show that adding calcium (as chalk or
lime) to sea water increases ocean uptake of carbon and
counteracts ocean acidification, at an acceptable cost, and
without negative consequences for biodiversity, this might
then be regarded as an attractive way to reduce CO 2
concentrations. Assuming that acceptable standards for
effectiveness, safety, public acceptance and cost were
established, why should appropriate geoengineering
options not be added to the portfolio of options that
society will need and may wish to use to combat the
challenges posed by climate change?
SRM methods should however be treated with caution as
they create an artificial and only approximate balance
between greenhouse warming and reduced solar radiation
which must be maintained actively, potentially for many
centuries. Given that they do not reduce greenhouse gas
concentrations, SRM methods are widely regarded only as
options of last resort, and they should not be deployed
without a clear and credible exit strategy, involving strong
mitigation policies and (perhaps) the use of CDR methods
which are sustainable.
4.9 Conclusion
There appear to be three distinct perspectives on the
potential role for geoengineering:
1. that it is a route for buying back some of the time lost
in the international mitigation negotiations;
2. that it represents a dangerous manipulation of Earth
systems and may be intrinsically unethical;
3. that it is strictly an insurance policy against major
mitigation failure.
There is often an assumption that geoengineering
represents a moral hazard, and could undermine popular
and political support for mitigation or adaptation. Although
this prospect should be taken seriously, there is as yet little
empirical evidence on whether the prospect of climate
intervention galvanises or undermines efforts to reduce
emissions. The moral hazard argument requires further
investigation to establish how important an issue this
should be for decision makers. Because of the possibilities
that geoengineering could have unintended and undesirable
environmental or social effects, priority could be given
to forms of CDR geoengineering research that are
encapsulated and reversible. When considering the
issue of reversibility, the potential for social and economic
‘lock-in’ to such technologies should also be taken into
consideration.
A variety of ethical positions on geoengineering research
and deployment are possible. Utilitarian traditions, which
emphasise consequences, will probably tend towards a
more favourable view, while deontological traditions,
which emphasise morally-right behaviour, tend towards
greater scepticism.
Because the technologies involved in geoengineering are
at such an early stage of development, and uncertainties
are pervasive, conventional economic approaches to
cost-benefit analysis will likely give misleading results.
The history of projects with similar characteristics suggests
that cost estimates in such a state of uncertainty will
almost certainly be highly optimistic. Moreover, the
costs to develop and eventually deploy geoengineering
technologies may not prove to be a major factor in
determining which (if any) of them is ever actually
deployed, as the costs of the impacts that they seek to
avoid are themselves likely to be very large.
Geoengineering, like other emerging areas of technology,
requires flexible frameworks of governance and regulation,
which can be adapted in light of fresh evidence and
analysis. The legal landscape is both fragmented and
uncertain and relevant controls necessarily span domestic,
regional and international law. While no single international
instrument applies, there are a number of existing treaties
and customary rules which could be brought to bear,
depending on where the activity and its effects occur.
However, many of the questions and uncertainties over
geoengineering extend beyond the realm of economic
assessments, regulation or risk management, to
encompass broader questions about direction, ownership
and control. Research into ethical, legal and social issues
associated with both research into geoengineering and the
implications of implementing geoengineering options will
require some targeted funding from governments and, in
the UK, from the Research Councils, alongside larger-scale
investments in the scientific and technical aspects of
geoengineering. Scientists and policymakers also need
to find meaningful ways of engaging diverse publics and
civil society in debates over geoengineering and in the
development of governance frameworks.
The Royal Society
Geoengineering the Climate I September 2009 I 45