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admitted <strong>in</strong> another <strong>in</strong>ternal document produced by Chicago <strong>in</strong> discovery. 36 Indeed, the code<br />

phrase adopted by Chicago and its consultants to speak about <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g “capacity” — i.e., the<br />

ability to add more flights — is “<strong>in</strong>creased operational efficiency”.<br />

This game <strong>of</strong> characteriz<strong>in</strong>g measures to provide capacity <strong>in</strong>creases — such as new<br />

runways — as simply “delay reduction” started <strong>in</strong> 1988. In 1988, Chicago, the FAA and the<br />

Airl<strong>in</strong>es started what they called a “delay task <strong>for</strong>ce.” In reality, the ef<strong>for</strong>t was part <strong>of</strong> a<br />

“capacity enhancement” program funded by FAA to develop “capacity enhancement plans” <strong>for</strong><br />

many <strong>of</strong> the nation’s airports. Because the concept <strong>of</strong> capacity <strong>in</strong>creases or “capacity<br />

enhancement” was political anathema <strong>in</strong> Chicago — the City hav<strong>in</strong>g promised only a few short<br />

years earlier to halt capacity expansion at O’Hare — Chicago and its public relations consultants<br />

claimed that they were not plann<strong>in</strong>g ways to <strong>in</strong>crease capacity but simply study<strong>in</strong>g ways to<br />

reduce delays at O’Hare or to “enhance operational efficiency.” The concept <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g<br />

capacity was never mentioned.<br />

Yet <strong>in</strong>ternal documents <strong>for</strong> the development <strong>of</strong> the so-called “Delay Task Force Study”<br />

show that, <strong>in</strong> reality, the purpose <strong>of</strong> the so-called Delay Task Force ef<strong>for</strong>t was to develop<br />

methods to <strong>in</strong>crease the capacity <strong>of</strong> O’Hare. For example, on December 6, 1988, Chicago’s<br />

Aviation Commissioner wrote the FAA outl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Chicago’s proposal <strong>for</strong> a “Delay Task Force.”<br />

His letter spoke <strong>of</strong> discussions to “enhance the operational efficiency <strong>of</strong> Chicago’s airports:<br />

For several months members <strong>of</strong> our staffs as well as the airl<strong>in</strong>es<br />

and other parties have discussed options to enhance the<br />

operational efficiency <strong>of</strong> Chicago’s airports. 37<br />

But the letter from Chicago’s Aviation Commissioner attach<strong>in</strong>g the proposed Scope <strong>of</strong><br />

Work openly acknowledged that the product <strong>of</strong> the so-called “Delay Task Force” will be a<br />

“Capacity Enhancement Action Plan”:<br />

36 March 10, 1993 memo by Mary Vigilante, Vice President <strong>of</strong> Landrum & Brown and Chris Young, Chief<br />

Operat<strong>in</strong>g Officer <strong>for</strong> Landrum & Brown to Deputy Commissioner Robert Repel, Department <strong>of</strong> Aviation. Exhibit<br />

C 89.<br />

20

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