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Government Merits Brief - Hamdan v. Rumsfeld

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29<br />

particular reference to the facts”: namely, that the defendant<br />

in Milligan, as a person who was not “a part of or associated<br />

with the armed forces of the enemy,” was a “non-belligerent.”<br />

317 U.S. at 45. And in Hamdi, a majority of this Court rejected<br />

a far more plausible invocation of Milligan, by an<br />

American citizen, and reaffirmed Quirin. See 542 U.S. at 523<br />

(plurality opinion) (“Quirin was a unanimous opinion. It both<br />

postdates and clarifies Milligan, providing us with the most<br />

apposite precedent that we have.”); id. at 593 (Thomas, J.,<br />

dissenting) (“Quirin overruled Milligan to the extent that<br />

those cases are inconsistent.”). 6<br />

Petitioner contends that he should be considered a nonbelligerent<br />

like the defendant in Milligan, rather than an<br />

enemy combatant like the defendants in Quirin, because he<br />

contests his combatant status. But the Hamdi plurality refused<br />

to limit Quirin to cases in which enemy-combatant status<br />

was conceded, noting that the AUMF authorizes the<br />

United States to detain even citizen enemy combatants captured<br />

in a foreign combat zone and concluding that “whether<br />

[enemy-combatant status] is established by concession or by<br />

some other process that verifies this fact with sufficient certainty<br />

seems beside the point.” 542 U.S. at 523. Petitioner is<br />

an alien enemy combatant captured abroad. Because a CSRT<br />

found that petitioner had the status of an enemy combatant<br />

(as either a member or an affiliate of al Qaeda), see Pet. App.<br />

2a, 31a, petitioner squarely falls within the four corners of the<br />

6<br />

Petitioner seeks (Br. 26 n.17) to distinguish Quirin on the ground that two<br />

of the four charges (Counts 2 and 3) were statutorily authorized to be tried by<br />

military commission. But Quirin upheld the commission’s authority to try the<br />

individuals based solely on the common-law-of-war charge (Count 1). Indeed,<br />

Quirin noted that, through Article 15 of the Articles of War, Congress had<br />

recognized the military’s ability to enforce common-law rules of warfare which<br />

Congress had chosen not to codify in detail. 317 U.S. at 30.

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