A study of Patent Thickets (1.31Mb) - UK Intellectual Property Office
A study of Patent Thickets (1.31Mb) - UK Intellectual Property Office
A study of Patent Thickets (1.31Mb) - UK Intellectual Property Office
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A Study <strong>of</strong> <strong>Patent</strong> <strong>Thickets</strong> 37<br />
3 Empirical Methodology<br />
3.1 Methodology to identify entry and exit <strong>of</strong> firms<br />
In this report, we are concerned with the ability <strong>of</strong> firms to compete in particular technology<br />
spaces. Therefore we define entry and exit in terms <strong>of</strong> the patenting behavior <strong>of</strong> firms rather than<br />
as market entry or survival in a market. In the case <strong>of</strong> entry, this approach has the advantage <strong>of</strong><br />
providing us with a pool <strong>of</strong> all potential entrants, that is, we also observe those firms that could<br />
have entered a given technology, but chose not to do so. If we were to consider product market<br />
entry, we would only observe the set <strong>of</strong> firms that entered the market but not the entire pool <strong>of</strong><br />
potential entrants, which makes a <strong>study</strong> <strong>of</strong> entry impossible.<br />
In addition, linking the analysis <strong>of</strong> market entry in a specific market context to patenting activity<br />
requires a great deal <strong>of</strong> work on linking patents to products and product markets. We are not<br />
aware <strong>of</strong> any research that contains this kind <strong>of</strong> analysis at the level <strong>of</strong> an entire patent system.<br />
For this reason we limit our analysis to entry into patenting activity, which is a reasonable proxy<br />
for a firm’s ability and desire to compete in a certain area. However, looking at entry into patenting<br />
conditional on the firm existing is not able to capture any negative effects <strong>of</strong> patent thickets on<br />
the creation <strong>of</strong> new firms, so our estimates are likely to understate the true social impact <strong>of</strong> this<br />
phenomenon.<br />
3.2 Methodology for the measurement <strong>of</strong> patent<br />
thickets<br />
In this section we discuss a number <strong>of</strong> ways in which economists have sought to quantify the<br />
extent <strong>of</strong> patent thickets. Some <strong>of</strong> these measures have also been used to identify effects <strong>of</strong><br />
patent thickets for different types <strong>of</strong> patent applicants.<br />
The main problem that patent thickets create for firms are the costs <strong>of</strong> adequate patent search,<br />
the ability to identify all relevant technology, and the consequent threat <strong>of</strong> hold-up ex post, even<br />
if adequate due diligence has been done. This problem is most likely to arise for firms producing<br />
and selling products that use a complex technology, for instance the producer <strong>of</strong> a mobile<br />
phone. Such a firm cannot effectively ensure that its products do not infringe on patents granted<br />
to another firm, because there are usually very many relevant patents (Shapiro, 2000), because<br />
the claims in these patents are not always precise (Bessen and Meurer, 2008; Lemley and<br />
Shapiro, 2007) and because it is increasingly in the strategic interest <strong>of</strong> some applicants to hide<br />
their applications within the system for as long as the rules allow (Hegde et al., 2009), leading<br />
to uncertainty over exactly which patents and claims will be granted in the end.<br />
Therefore, a measure <strong>of</strong> patent thicket density measuring the hold-up potential existing in<br />
different parts <strong>of</strong> the patent system is needed. In the early literature on patent thickets these<br />
were identified using qualitative techniques such as interviews (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). Both<br />
in this paper and in Hall (2005) changes in the number <strong>of</strong> patent applications that are the result