ISSUE 158 : Jan/Feb - 2003 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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28 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 158 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2003 needed to restore its viability, there is no time for extensive consultation within the organisation, and little support for radical change. The majority of organisations more-or-less successfully used this strategy to effect organisational change, in that all the subject organisations managed to survive, albeit with significant short-term costs in service quality and staff morale. See Dexter Dunphy and Doug Stace, Under New Management: Australian Organisations in Transition, Sydney: McGraw-Hill, 1990. 5. Australian Defence Efficiency Review. 6. Nick Jans, Careers in Conflict: A Study of Services Officers’ Careers and Families in Peacetime, Canberra College of Advanced Education, Canberra Series in Administrative Studies, No. 10, 1988; Sigma Consultancy, Development of a career decision support system for analysis and support of HRM policy development in the Australian Defence Force, Report, 1999. 7. Nick Jans, “Options for ADF human resource management: part of the solution or part of the problem” in Maintaining the Strategic Edge: The Defence of Australia in 2015,ed. Des Ball, Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 2000; Nick Jans, “Rich organisation, poor organisation: Defence performance and military leadership”, Australian Defence Force Journal No. 142, May/Jun, 2000; Nick Jans and Judy Frazer-Jans, “Job rotation and military capability: benefits, certainly – but is anyone counting the cost” Australian Defence Force Journal No. 146, Jan/Feb, pp. 47-59, 2001. 8. John Halligan, “What is the SES Concept” Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration, No 61, July 1990, 50-52, p. 50. 9. Nick Jans and Judy Frazer-Jans, Careers and Culture in the SES, Public Service Commission, Senior Executive Staffing Unit, Occasional Paper No. 10, December 1990, pp. 54-55; and http://www.psmpc.gov.au/publications96/sesstats part4.htm. 10. Having made all these points, it must still be conceded that there is a paucity of research on APS and SES careers. This is especially true when it is compared to the volume of information on ADF careers. We may be making generalisations here but, in the absence of other research, we have little choice. 11. Neil James, Reform of the Defence Management Paradigm: A Fresh View, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Working Paper No 59, 2000, p. 36. 12. James, op. cit., p. 27. 13. Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade: Personnel Wastage in the ADF – Report and Recommendations, November 1988. (This was know in Defence as the “Cross Report”, after its chairman.) 14. Review of Australian Defence Force Remuneration, op. cit. Nick Jans, PhD, is a Principal of Sigma Consultancy, a firm that specialises in personnel strategy and research. He served in the Australian Regular Army from 1961 to 1985 and is currently a brigadier in the Reserve, most recently chairing Project OPERA (the Officer Professional Effectiveness Review for the Army). LTCOL David Schmidtchen, PhD, joined the Australian Army in 1989 as a military psychologist. Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in 2001, he is currently chief of staff of the Action Plan for People Team. In 2000 the Chief of the Army awarded him a commendation for contributions to strategic human resource planning in the Army.
Operational Level of War Joint Campaign Analysis: Allied Forces in Papua 21 July 1942-23 January 1943 By Lieutenant Colonel Chris Field 29 [MacArthur’s] GHQ is like a bloody barometer in a cyclone – up and down every two minutes. They’re like the militia – they need to be blooded. 1 Major General George Vasey Deputy Chief of the Australian General Staff (later Commander 7th Division in Papua) 27 August 1942 If he [MacArthur] had been born in Australia and had gone to Duntroon [the Australian Army’s Royal Military College], he could not have shown a higher concern for Australian interests. 2 John Curtin, Australian Prime Minister, 22 October 1943 General Douglas MacArthur’s execution of the campaign in the South-West Pacific Area against the Japanese from 1942 until 1944 was, from an Australian perspective, paradoxical. His charisma and charm initially enamoured Australian political and military leaders, but later led to distrust and disappointment. His successful campaigns through the Solomon Islands, Papua, and New Guinea provided security to Australia, but his operational plans and proclivity towards interference at the tactical level were often inappropriate. He formed a successful coalition with Australia in Papua and New Guinea, but at times treated his ally with contempt. MacArthur’s paradox sets the scene for this article on the Allied Campaign in Papua, 21 July 1942-23 January 1943. T his study separates the Papuan campaign of 1942-43 from the geographically linked New Guinea campaign of 1943-44. MacArthur and Admiral Halsey purposely linked their two campaigns in Papua and the securing of Guadalcanal in their joint determination to move the bomber line, which along with airlift capability was the Allied operational centre of gravity, forward from Australia and Port Moresby, to Buna and Guadalcanal. The Guadalcanal and Papuan campaigns represented a transition for the Allies from the defensive to the offensive phase. For the Japanese these simultaneous campaigns marked their culminating points which occurred at Guadalcanal and 30 miles from Port Moresby on the Kokoda Trail. After the successful completion of the Guadalcanal and Papuan campaigns, the Allies had established firm footholds in the Solomons and Papua forcing the Japanese to consolidate their positions in the South-West Pacific Area by retracting their first line of defence. 3 This vulnerable new defensive perimeter was the last territorial frontier preventing the Allied penetration of the Philippines, and the southern reaches of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. The aim of this article is to analyse the Allied operations in Papua from the time of the Japanese invasion of Buna on 21-22 July 1942, until the fall of Sanananda to Allied forces on 23 January 1943. Emphasis is placed on Australian operations within the broader strategic and operational framework that was largely shaped by the United States. This article examines the events of the Papuan campaign, the strategic situation the Americans and Australians faced, operational level factors including geography, command and control, campaign planning, coalition and joint operations, enemy forces, and applications the campaign had for subsequent strategic Allied goals.
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ISSUE 158 : Jan/Feb - 2003 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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