Cross-Border Risks in the Baltic Sea Region: Lessons to ... - Helsinki.fi

CROSS-BORDER RISKS IN THE 

BALTIC SEA REGION 

Lessons to be Learned 

Timo Hellenberg and Sigrid Hedin

About the authors 

Timo Hellenberg (Dr. Int. Rel.) is the Head of the EU Affairs at the 

Aleksanteri Institute, Finnish Centre for Russian and East European 

Studies at the University of Helsinki. Before joining the Institute in 1997, 

Dr. Hellenberg served as a research fellow at the United Nations 

Department for Humanitarian Affairs (International Decade for Natural 

Disaster Reduction). Dr. Hellenberg has also worked as a Special 

Adviser (EU Affairs) to the Prime Minister of Finland (2003). 

Sigrid Hedin has been working as Senior Research Fellow at 

Nordregio since 2003. Her field of specialisation is the transition in East 

European countries. She received her Ph.D. from the Department of 

Social and Economic Geography, University of Uppsala, Sweden, 

where she studied from 1999 to 2003. 

A publication of: 

Aleksanteri Institute 

Töölönkatu 3 A (PO Box 42) 

FIN-00014 University of Helsinki 

www.helsinki.fi/aleksanteri 

ISBN 952-10-3044-5 

Printed by Multiprint Oy 

Design and layout by Metaneira Oy 

Helsinki, 2006

Contents 

Eurobaltic 

Foreword 

1. Introduction 7 

2. Definition of Cross-Border Risks 8 

2.1. International Assistance in Case of Cross-Border Risks 9 

2.1.1. European Community Mechanism 9 

2.1.2. Oil Spills 10 

3. Cross-Border Risks in the Baltic Sea Region 13 

3.1. Natural Disasters 14 

3.2. Technological Disasters 14 

3.3. Oil Spills 15 

4. Some Examples of Emergency Situations in Case of Cross-Border 

Risks in the Baltic Sea Region 15 

4.1. Denmark 15 

4.1.1. Oil Pollution from the "Baltic Carrier" in 

Groensund 2001 and "Fu Shan Hai" in 2003 16 

4.2. Estonia 16 

4.2.1. Lessons Learned from an Oil Spill and 

Accidents at Seveso II Enterprises 16 

4.3. Finland 17 

4.4. Germany 17 

4.5. Latvia 18 

4.5.1. Experiences from Pollution Accidents 18 

4.6. Lithuania 19 

4.6.1. The Nemunas Oil Spills Exercise (NOSE) 20 

4.7. Norway 20 

4.8. Poland 20 

4.9. The Russian Federation 21 

4.10. Sweden 22 

4.10.1. "Prestige-Accident" in the Stockholm Archipelago 22 

5. Conclusions: Lessons to be Learned 22 

6. Recommendations 24 

7. References 25

EUROBALTIC 

This report is a part of a series of reports on the Eurobaltic Civil Protection 

Project. The Eurobaltic project is part of the wider Eurobaltic Programme 

for Civil Protection in the Baltic Sea Region (BSR). While the project is 

part-financed by the European Union BSR Interreg IIIB programme, it is 

also part of the activities of the civil security working body in the Council of 

the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). The Swedish Rescue Services Agency 

(SRSA) leads the project, and the whole network includes over twenty 

partners from all the BSR countries, including civil protection authorities, 

regions, and municipalities, scientific institutions and non-governmental 

organisations. Within the project, Nordregio (Nordic Centre for Spatial 

Development, Stockholm) and the Aleksanteri Institute (Finnish Centre for 

Russian and East European Studies at the University of Helsinki) are 

responsible for research and reports. The reports will cover the whole 

spectrum of contemporary challenges to civil protection, from the point of 

view of the EU and the BSR in particular.

FOREWORD 

The aim of the Eurobaltic Civil Protection Project is to improve abilities 

in protecting human life and the environment as well as cultural heritage. 

The project aims to support the sustainable development of safe communities 

in the Baltic Sea Region and to promote safe industrial development 

and cooperation on spatial planning and sustainable land use management, 

thereby also contributing to the mitigation of the cross-border effects 

of accidents. 

We would like to thank all the institutions and individuals who have participated 

in the project and in the preparation of this report. Particular 

thanks go the following persons and institutions that have contributed to 

this report with their comments and by sending material: 

Denmark: Henrik G Petersen, Ministry of Defence 

(Beredskapsstryselsen) 

Estonia: Kristiina Vilu, Estonian Rescue Board 

Finland: Janne Koivukoski, Taito Vainio, Timo Viitanen, Jari Honkanen, 

Finnish Ministry of the Interior, Rescue Department 

Germany: Central Command for Maritime Emergencies, Germany 

Latvia: Zane Lunta, State Fire and Rescue Service, Latvian Coast 

Guard Service, Ministry of Transportation. 

Sweden: Clas Hebring, Swedish Rescue Services Agency 

Poland: Rafal Porowski, HQ of the State Fire Service of Poland 

The Authors

7 

1. Introduction 

The Baltic Sea Region can basically face 

the whole spectrum of potential civic risks 

and hazards. These include disasters of both 

natural and man-made origin, such as environmental 

degradation or maritime accidents 

at sea. Civil protection experts share a common 

concern for the main risk factor, which 

stems from the interaction of the everincreasing 

maritime traffic, a fragile and vulnerable 

ecosystem and continuous pollution. 

This state-of-the-art report includes the 

identification of areas for cross-border risks 

and the needs for cross-border, cross-sectoral 

and multi-level cooperation in the Baltic 

Sea Region (BSR). As this report indicates, 

the most potential cross-border risks in the 

BSR are oil spills, both on the coast and at 

sea. This report focuses particularly on oil 

spill prevention. It also aims to develop guidelines 

for other cross-border and cross-sectoral 

cooperation, primarily at transnational, 

regional and local levels. 

Particularly hazardous areas in the Baltic 

Sea are the Gulf of Finland, the Archipelago 

Sea and the Quark, the threshold between the 

Bothnian Sea and the Bothnian Bay, which 

have a specific ecological value but also serve 

heavy maritime traffic, particularly on the route 

between Helsinki and Tallinn. Acknowledging 

that national measures are not sufficient to 

prevent environmental disasters in the Baltic 

Sea, the Baltic Sea States signed the Helsinki 

Convention in 1974, which came into force in 

1980. Finally, regional cooperation for environmental 

protection (HELCOM) was initiated. 1 

At the Helsinki Commission Meeting in 

February 2003, Finland proposed that the 

Baltic Sea be designated as a Particularly 

Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA). This was later 

endorsed. A PSSA is an area, which needs 

special protection through actions of the 

International Maritime Organization (IMO) 

"because of its significance for recognized 

ecological or socio-economic or scientific reasons 

and which may be vulnerable to damage 

by international shipping." 2 The designation 

is seen as essential for the protection of 

both population and property in the coastal 

areas, as well as of marine wildlife. 

The Baltic Sea and its archipelago is 

not only a vulnerable and diversified ecosystem 

that suffers from increasing passenger 

traffic. The sea is especially sensitive to oil 

spills and to protect it IMO has banned the 

use of single-hulled oil tankers in the Baltic. 

Another challenge in the protection of the 

Baltic is to treat waste in an appropriate way 

in the ports. HELCOM recommends the creation 

of "reception facilities in ports", where 

the transference of waste is taken care of and 

the dropping of waste can be made without 

charges, at least at the regulation level. 

However, all countries do not yet have their 

system working properly. To be able to protect 

the Baltic Sea from spills it is important to 

cooperate at the international level. Crossborder 

exercises are also important for the 

efficient handling of all oil spills. 

The risk of major oil spills happening in 

the Baltic Sea is increasing. For the next couple 

of years the traffic, e.g. the amount of 

transported oil, is forecast to increase. 

Referring to HELCOM HABITAT (4/2003, 

Document 3.1/3), during the last six years the 

amount of oil transported in the Sea has doubled, 

being currently about 40 million tons per 

year. By the year 2005 it is expected to 

increase up to 80 million tons. Oil and chemical 

transportation is expected to increase up 

to 160 million tons by 2010 as a result of the 

building of new oil harbours in Russia, in 

Primorsk and Vysotsk. 

An increase in traffic volumes causes 

risks to grow. This is particularly true in some 

sub-regions of the Baltic Sea, e.g. the Baltic 

proper and the Sound, where the narrow and 

shallow straits are causing additional risks. As 

such, any accident generating oil or chemical 

spills has disastrous effects on the vulnerable 

Baltic Sea. 3 HELCOM HABITAT points out 

that since 1980 twenty major oil incidents, 

where oil outflow has been more than 100 

tons, have occurred. 4 It takes 30 years for the 

Baltic's waters to be renewed since the points 

of entry for new water are few and narrow. 

These narrow ship lanes and shallow 

waters increase the probability for collisions 

and groundings. These incidents together 

with other kinds of risks, for instance terrorist 

attacks, may have severe consequences for 

the people, property and environment of the 

region. According to a risk analysis that was 

carried out, the advantages at the moment 

include the comparative modernity of the 

fleets sailing the Baltic, the strict legislation, 

an effective information flow, and the possibili- 

1 

State of the environment of the Baltic Sea, Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, 27 May 2002, 1. 

2 

HELCOM HABITAT 4/2003, Document 3.1/3, 3 

3 


4 


5 

Baltic Sea Threatened Environment, Leyla Alyanak, Earth Times News Service, Lithuania, 1999, 3.

8 

ty of identifying ships and oil spills. For 

instance, satellite pictures and the monitoring 

by aircraft and ship have improved the control 

of the traffic. Disadvantages include the 

increased traffic, the old ships still used, and 

insufficient harbours routines. And the threat of 

terrorism has to be always taken into account. 

Well aware of the fact that risks for these 

kinds of accidents are a common problem for 

all the countries in the Baltic Sea Region 

(BSR), it was considered necessary to develop 

close cross-border cooperation. The longterm 

objective has been to create a common 

understanding, an agreement on common 

tactics, and to introduce similar techniques. 

The aim has been to make it possible for rescue 

personnel to work together using common 

or each other's resources. The effective 

common use of available resources should 

increase the level of preparedness for mitigating 

environmental damage in the BSR. In 

addition, cooperation between the rescue 

services of neighbouring countries will 

increase the ability to deal with these kinds of 

accidents at the earliest possible time, preferably 

before the pollution reaches the coasts. 

The initial ideas behind cross-border rescue 

cooperation were mainly based on the 

experiences gathered from the cooperation 

between the Nordic Rescue Services. Later, 

more information was gotten from the close 

collaboration between the Nordic Countries 

and the Baltic Sea States. 

One of the first major joint oil spill exercises 

in the BSR was "BERE", which was carried 

out in 1996 in Ventspils, Latvia, starting 

with an analysis of the risks and available rescue 

resources. Since then such activities 

have been conducted in the big ports of 

Estonia (Tallinn, the islands and the west 

coast), Lithuania (Klaipeda and Kaunas) and 

the North-West Region of Russia (Kaliningrad 

and St. Petersburg). In 2001, specialists representing 

these places and their central 

administrations, gathered on the island of 

Tärnö, Karlskrona, Sweden for a workshop. 

The purpose of this workshop was to summarise 

the specialists' experiences, check the 

present situation and list future needs for joint 

actions. The participants stated that it was 

necessary to connect all the Baltic Sea 

States' rescue services in order to fulfil the 

main objective of increased understanding 

and the effective use of common resources. 

Finland, Denmark, Poland and Germany were 

not involved at that time. Other needs that 

were identified during the workshop were joint 

training courses, joint exercises and joint 

research and development projects. Annual 

meetings were proposed in order to plan activities. 

Also the importance of keeping the activities 

on an operational level was emphasised. 

2. Definition of Cross-Border 

Risks 

Cross-border risks are familiar as a concept 

but their content is less known. They can 

be defined as potential civic and systemic 

risks that affect several countries by creating 

potential or actual losses on both sides of governmental 

borders. They are caused by interactions 

between four major systems: the physical 

environment, where the hazardous events 

take place; the social and demographic characteristics 

of the communities that experience 

them; the buildings, roads, bridges and other 

components of the constructed environment; 

and the political environment, which is expected 

to tackle and prevent the risks. 

The growing amount of cross-border risks 

result partly from the fact that the nations' capital 

stock is expanding. They also stem from 

the fact that all these systems - and their interactions 

- are becoming more complex with 

each passing year. 6 According to Dennis S. 

Mileti, three main processes affect the development 

of cross-border risks. Firstly, continuous 

global warming is expected to generate 

ongoing hazardous events, such as natural 

disasters (storms, floods and drought). 

Secondly, changes in the demographic composition 

in the Baltic Sea Region and the 

increasing movement of people that augments 

the hazardous exposure potential. 

Further, the unequal distribution of wealth 

makes some parts of the society particularly 

vulnerable, as they are obliged to live in hazardous 

regions, such as flood prone areas, 

industrial zones or near heavy traffic routes. 

Thirdly, the planning of infrastructure and the 

built environment is often mainly based on 

economic incentives, such as tourism. When 

community planning is business-driven and 

lacking proper risk assessment and mapping, 

the results might be unexpected. 

Preparedness involves building an emergency 

response and management capability 

before a disaster occurs in order to facilitate 

an effective response when needed. This 

6 

Mileti, Dennis; Disasters by Design, A Reassessment of Natural Hazards in the United States, National Academy of 

Sciences, 1999, 3.

9 

requires a vulnerability analysis to identify 

what hazards could occur in a particular place, 

and a risk analysis to determine the likely 

problems that an extreme event could impose. 

It is important also to notify hazard detection 

and warning systems, to identify evacuation 

routes and shelters, to maintain emergency 

supplies and communications systems, to 

establish procedures for notifying and mobilizing 

key personnel, to agree on pre-established 

mutual aid agreements with neighbouring 

communities, and other items. Also education 

programmes are often considered as an 

important safety component. 7 

Response refers to the actions taken 

immediately before, during, and after a disaster 

occurs. It aims to save lives, minimize damage 

to property, and enhance the effectiveness 

of recovery. Response efforts include hazard 

detection and warning, evacuation of threatened 

populations, sheltering of victims, emergency 

medical care, search and rescue operations, 

and the security and protection of property. 

Other activities can be the construction of 

temporary dams, the closure of roads or 

bridges, the provision of emergency water or 

power supplies, and attending to secondary 

hazards such as fires or hazardous materials. 8 

Disaster recovery involves short-term 

activities to restore vital support systems and 

long-term activities to return life to normal. An 

initial step to recovery is a comprehensive 

damage assessment to help set priorities. 

Recovery encompasses repairing and reconstructing 

houses, commercial establishments 

etc. Recovery can take a few weeks or several 

years, even decades. 

Mitigation refers to the policies and activities 

that will reduce a region's vulnerability to 

damage from future disasters. These measures 

are generally, and should be, in place 

before a disaster occurs. Mitigation activities 

can be characterized as structural, infrastructural, 

and non-structural. Structural mitigation 

measures aim to keep hazards away from people 

and buildings, or strengthen buildings, infrastructure 

and transportation systems, i.e. the 

critical infrastructure. Flood prevention, building 

codes and construction practices are typical 

parts of structural mitigation. Non-structural mitigation 

measures attempt to allocate the population 

and the constructed environment in a 

way to limit their exposure to disaster losses. 9 

2.1. International Assistance in Case 

of Cross-Border Risks 

The intergovernmental cooperation to 

tackle cross-border risks in the Baltic Sea 

Region is based either on multinational 

agreements and cooperative forums or 

bilateral agreements. The Nordic Countries 

have a long tradition in establishing mutual 

and regional emergency assistance agreements. 

These have taken place already 

since the 1960's and in these last decades 

cooperation has been deepened especially 

in the field of civil protection. The Baltic 

Countries, Germany and Poland have 

based their emergency assistance cooperation 

mainly on bilateral agreements. 

Particularly Poland has been active in 

establishing assistance agreements, not 

only with the neighbouring countries, but 

also with strategically important countries 

such as the United States (the Polish 

Ministry of Defence and FEMA). Russia's 

strategy on international cooperation has 

been based both on bilateral arrangements 

and a strong political presence at regional 

forums, such the Arctic Council and Barents 

Euro-Arctic Council. 

Whereas Nordic Cooperation, Arctic 

Council and Barents Euro-Arctic Council do 

not have representatives from the Baltic 

Countries, Poland and Germany, the Council 

of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), and particularly 

its Eurobaltic Programme for Civil 

Protection, forms a unique platform that 

includes all the Baltic Sea States in the field 

of civil protection and emergency management. 

2.1.1. European Community Mechanism 

Another possibility in case of an oil spill is 

to use the European Community Mechanism. 

The European Commission started to provide 

operational support to its Member States that 

faced major pollution incidents in 1987, when 

an "Urgent Pollution Alert Section" was established 

in Brussels to help whenever there was 

need. This section was operated on a 24h/day 

basis. The Community Mechanism to Facilitate 

Reinforced Cooperation in Civil Protection 

Assistance Interventions came into force in 

2001. All Member States, as well as the 

7 


Sciences, 1999, 22-23 

8 


Sciences, 1999, 23 

9 


Sciences, 1999, 24

10 

Table 1: Some essential regional and bilateral agreements to tackle cross-border risks in the 

Baltic Sea Countries 

European Economic Area Countries (Norway, 

Iceland and Liechtenstein) and Bulgaria and 

Romania, are connected to it. The mechanism 

aims to grant mutual assistance and covers 

both civil protection and some marine pollution 

emergencies. 

"The mechanism thus enables concrete 

and prompt assistance from intervention 

teams from EU Member States when the 

resources of a country are not sufficient to 

deal with disasters. Additionally, the objective 

of the new scheme is to improve interventions 

in case of disasters throughout Europe 

by a better coordination of means and the 

strengthening of communication and training 

capacities." 

The alarm systems within countries differ, 

but the alarm process to Brussels is the same 

for all countries. For instance, in Sweden the 

alarm chain can start when a County 

Administrative Board alerts the SRSA's 24- 

hour duty officer. The Ministry of Defence will 

then be informed and the SRSA contacts the 

MIC (the Monitoring and Information Centre). 

The request is distributed to the Member 

States by the MIC, and the Member States 

send their response back to MIC, which in turn 

provides the concerned country with information 

on the assistance that has been offered. It 

is up to the country to decide what assistance 

to accept. The assistance can consist of both 

people and equipment, and the affected country 

pays for it. 

2.1.2. Oil Spills 

The character of international assistance in 

connection with oil spills depends on whether 

there is a need to stop the spreading of the oil 

or if a country needs help to clean up an oil spill. 

Another major factor is whether the oil spill or 

pollution takes place on land or at sea. 

Concerning the latter, there are bilateral agreements 

between states in the Baltic Sea Region. 

In addition, there are some multilateral agreements, 

e.g. the Helsinki Convention (HELCOM) 

and the Copenhagen Agreement between the 

Nordic Countries. 

 

The Bonn Agreement (signed in 

1969 and amended in 1983) is an 

international agreement between the 

North Sea coastal states, together 

with the EC, that offers mutual assistance 

and co-operation in combating 

pollution and executes surveillance 

as an aid to detecting and combating 

pollution and to prevent violations of 

anti-pollution regulations. A member 

country applies for assistance 

through the form "POLREP". The 

Bonn Agreement is a network of professionals 

with responsibility for ade-

11 

quate pollution response. The members 

of the Bonn Agreement are 

Belgium, Denmark, the European 

Community, France, Germany, the 

Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and 

the United Kingdom of Great Britain 

and Northern Ireland. 

The Helsinki Convention. The 

Helsinki Commission, or HELCOM, 

works to protect the marine environment 

of the Baltic Sea from all 

sources of pollution through intergovernmental 

co-operation between 

Denmark, Estonia, the European 

Community, Finland, Germany, 

Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the 

Russian Federation and Sweden. 

HELCOM is the governing body of 

the "Convention on the Protection of 

the Marine Environment of the Baltic 

Sea Area" - more known as the 

Helsinki Convention. In the Helsinki 

Convention it has been agreed that 

the oil combating policy of the Baltic 

Sea Countries shall primarily be 

based on mechanical recovery due 

to the sensitive ecology of the Baltic 

Sea. Other methods can also be 

used under certain conditions (desperants 

are possible under certain 

circumstances). In accordance with 

the recommendations of the Helsinki 

Convention there is also a wish to 

organise the system of combating oil 

spills at sea. The aim is that every 

country fulfils the objectives defined 

in the recommendations. The means 

each country decides to use to reach 

the objectives is up to them to 

decide. Oil spills on beaches is now 

an issue of HELCOM Response. 

The Copenhagen Agreement 

between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 

Norway and Sweden concerning the 

combating of oil spills or other pollu 

tion at sea was signed in March 

1993. The agreement stipulates the 

establishment of suitable prepared 

ness to combat pollution at sea. In 

addition, the countries shall be prepared 

to give each other assistance. 

Within the cooperation, jointly performed 

exercises are also organised. 

 

The DenGer Agreement was signed 

between Denmark and Germany in 

1982. The agreement covers the 

Wadden Sea. The agreement 

includes different maritime prepared 

ness plans to combat pollution at 

Table 2: Major regional and bilateral agreements on pollution response in the Baltic Sea Region

12 

 

sea. Once the Dengertneth plan will 

be ratified, it will include bilateral 

agreements between Germany / 

Denmark and the Netherlands. 

The SWEDENGER plan was signed 

in November 2002 between 

Denmark, Sweden and Germany 

concerning cooperation on combating 

pollution at sea. 

Most countries in the BSR have ratified the 

International Convention on Oil Pollution 

Preparedness, Response and Co-operation of 

1990, which entered into force in 1995. 

Parties to the OPRC convention are required 

to establish measures for dealing with pollution 

incidents, either nationally or in cooperation 

with other countries. 

Another important agreement, maybe not 

explicit in an emergency phase but important 

in the planning phase, is the Espoo 

Convention on Environmental Impact 

Assessment in a Transboundary Context, 

which was signed in 1991. This convention is 

an information channel regarding transboundary 

environmental problems. The convention 

stipulates that States have "to notify and consult 

each other on all major projects under consideration 

that are likely to have a significant 

adverse environmental impact across boundaries". 

Concerned objects are for instance 

crude oil refineries, larger oil pipelines etc. In 

the Baltic Sea Region the Russian Federation 

has not ratified the document. 

According to the EU directive 2002/59/EC 

all EU countries shall have designated "places 

of refuge" (Article 20) by February 2004 where 

ships can go to if they need assistance. The 

work is in progress, for instance in Sweden 

the Coast Guard and Swedish Maritime 

Administration have the task of designating 

"safe harbours" along the Swedish coast. Also 

municipalities and County Administrative 

Boards are working on the issue of defining 

"safe places". 

Training is also provided within the 

European Union. In order to advise and assist 

the European Commission on all problems 

concerning the implementation of Community 

measures dealing with marine pollution, the 

Management Committee on Marine Pollution 

(MCMP) has been established. The EU- 

MCMP has replaced the Urgent Pollution Alert 

Section. One of the three major elements of 

Community action on marine pollution is the 

training programme. Within this element EUtraining 

courses are carried out. 

Organization of civil protection within the EU 

European Commission 

Permanent Network 

of National 

Correspondents 

(PNNC) 

DG 

Environment 

Directorate D: Life 

Program, Legal 

Implementation & 

Civil Protection 

D3. Civil protection 

Table 3: Civil protection within the European Union

13 

3. Cross-Border Risks in the 

Baltic Sea Region 

Whereas the countries of Southern 

Europe are more hazard-prone and affected 

by meteorological and geological disasters, 

such as floods and earthquakes, the Baltic 

Sea Region faces fewer natural disasters but 

more demanding weather conditions and a 

lower population density. This forces the 

BSR countries to rely more on information 

technologies and communications in civil 

protection. 

The Nordic Countries in general belong 

to a low risk area where serious meteorological 

and geological hazards do not occur 

except for minor-scale forest fires, floods 

and storms. These minor-scale accidents 

usually cause damage to property and very 

seldom to people. 10 Also the threat of terrorism 

has been acknowledged for instance by 

the Finnish authorities, although the country 

has not been directly involved in any terrorist 

incident. Additional challenge for the rescue 

services arises from the migration flow of citizens 

from the countryside to the cities, as 

the volunteer fire brigades constitute a large 

part of the national rescue force. 11 Also 

Sweden is not frequently burdened by 

severe natural disasters. Flooding, heavy 

snowfall etc. have resulted neither in high 

death tolls nor in extraordinary economic 

losses. 

Interestingly, Sweden has based its emergency 

management and civil protection policy 

on an "all-hazards approach", which means 

that each municipality must be capable of 

managing a spectrum of risks and crises, 

including natural disasters. In the beginning 

of 2004 a new law was accepted, which 

states that all Swedish municipalities are 

obliged to provide protection from all types of 

accidents (2003:778). There is no distinction 

between natural and man-made risks. 12 

Besides the cross-border risks related to 

oil spills at sea, Norway and also partly 

Denmark mostly face risks that result from 

the oil drilling activities in the North Sea. In 

Norway, there are significant oil drilling activities 

at Haltenbanken and Trenabanken. 

Exploration drilling occasionally takes place 

also in the Barents Sea, south of Bear 

Island. 

Whereas the Nordic Countries are mostly 

threatened by natural calamities and the 

increasing potential of oils spills, the Baltic 

Countries are exposed to natural and Natech 

disasters as a result of the deteriorating infrastructure 

built in the Soviet times. Natech disasters 

are technological disasters generated 

by natural disasters. For instance, in 

Lithuania the Ignalina nuclear power plant is 

one of the most risky objects that requires 

most of the attention of the civil protection 

system. The risk management plans include 

long-term protective zones to cover Lithuania, 

Latvia and Belarus. Lithuania is permanently 

trying to harmonize procedures of preparedness 

to nuclear accidents with neighbouring 

countries as much as possible. Nevertheless, 

it should be noticed that procedures (notification, 

population protection, decision making 

etc.) with Latvia have been harmonised to a 

higher level than with Belarus. 

Other kinds of possible threats in 

Lithuania are potential accidents at dangerous 

chemical plants. On the 17 th of August 

2004, the Government of Lithuania approved 

the Provisions on Major Industrial Accidents 

Prevention and Consequences Liquidation. 

These provisions were prepared according to 

the SEVESO II Directive as well as to the 

Lithuanian Civil Protection Law. According to 

these provisions, all potentially dangerous 

objects (economic entities) are obliged to 

perform safety analysis, emergency plans, 

etc. Nevertheless, vulnerability analysis is 

not obligatory and as a rule is not being carried 

out. 

In 2002, the Commission for the Extreme 

Situations Prevention and Elimination of the 

Republic of Lithuania and the Kaliningrad 

Province of the Russian Federation was established. 

The activities of this Commission cover 

information exchange on environmental emergencies 

and floods in the basin of the river 

Nemunas, water protection from industry, 

mutual assistance, and coordination of activities. 

There is also a common project of Belarus, 

Lithuania and the Kaliningrad district. The main 

purpose of this project is information exchange 

in a manner that allows timely response to 

emergencies. In the meantime, the 

Transboundary Warning and Information on 

Emergencies in the Basin of River Nemunas 

Plan (IWAN) is under preparation. The plan 

foresees the establishment of international 

information points in Belarus, Lithuania and the 

Kaliningrad district. The contact point in 

10 

ISDR Country Report, Finland, August 23, 2004. Finnish Ministry of the Interior, 3 

11 

ISDR Country Report, Finland, August 23, 2004. Finnish Ministry of the Interior, 3 

12 

ISDR Country Report, Sweden, June 17, 2004, Swedish Rescue Services Agency, 1

14 

Lithuania is the Environmental Protection 

Agency under the Ministry of the Environment. 

Interestingly, whereas Lithuania has listed 

its cross-border risks, Latvian authorities 

do not regard that there are potential 

"sources for cross-border risks" on their territory. 

On the contrary, Latvia is seen to be 

threatened by cross-border risk sources from 

other countries, namely, Lithuania (Ignalina 

AES, Butinge oil product terminal) and 

Belarus (Novopolock chemical and oil processing 

enterprises). 

In case of cross-border risks Poland 

seems to be somewhere between the Nordic 

and Baltic Countries. On one hand, the country 

is characterized by a heavy flow of annual 

natural disasters, such as floods and forest 

fires. On the other hand, there is a clear 

potential for threat caused by technological 

disasters, such as oil spills caused by the 

transportation of dangerous goods by road 

and rail. Industrial accidents, such as refinery 

fires, explosions in industry and environmental 

pollution caused by the improper use of 

technological installations, also play an 

essential role in risk mapping. The reason for 

this is basically the same than in the Baltic 

Countries: a deteriorating infrastructure 

inherited from the 20 th century. 

3.1. Natural Disasters 

Droughts are caused by a natural reduction 

in precipitation over an extended period of 

time. Droughts can occur in any climate conditions 

and during all seasons. Dust storms 

are usually caused by winds blowing over dry, 

loosely consolidated sediments not anchored 

by vegetation. Dust storms are more likely and 

more severe during droughts; they can further 

erode soils whose fertility has already been 

diminished by drought. 13 

Extreme cold is defined as temperatures 

that remain cold enough to cause deaths, 

injuries and damage to property and crops. 

Extremely cold temperatures and severe winter 

storms cause socio-economic losses 

through damaged infrastructure, lost economic 

output (crop losses, interrupted production 

cycle etc.), victims, and vulnerabilities. 14 

Floods can occur at any time of the year 

but they are most common in springtime 

when snowmelt combines with rain. Floods 

pose severe problems for the national fire 

and rescue services regardless of their magnitude 

and location. They are also typical 

cross-border risks, which need multinational 

efforts to be prevented and tackled. For 

instance, the water supply system was seriously 

affected by the flooding in Germany in 

2002. Extreme rainfalls caused the flooding 

and continued for several days. The issue 

that the military was working with mitigating 

the flooding was discussed. Both Technische 

Hilfwerke and Bundeswehr participated, but 

they were under civil command and followed 

orders from the established crisis teams. 

Their skills and technology were of great 

importance to the work. 15 

Forest fires and wildfires are uncontrolled 

burning of grasslands, brush, or woodlands. 

Lightning is the prime source of fires not ignited 

by people. Forest and wildfires are among 

the main risks related to cross-border risks in 

the Baltic Sea Region. 

3.2. Technological Disasters 

Risks and disasters, whether natural or 

man-made, often have border-crossing 

effects. For instance chemical processes, 

storage installations and the transportation of 

dangerous goods are all real risk factors in the 

BSR countries. These risks are heavily 

dependent on the state of the infrastructure 

and the geographical character of the country. 

According to the Joint Research Centre of 

the European Commission (JRC) there is 

clear evidence that natural disasters can trigger 

technological disasters (the domino 

effect), and that these concomitant events (or 

Natechs) may pose tremendous risks to countries 

and communities that are unprepared for 

them. In Europe there are many vulnerable 

installations close to rivers, or located in earthquake 

prone areas that are potential risk 

zones for Natechs. For instance the floods in 

Poland in 2002 proved the devastating effects 

of Natech disasters. 16 

The influence of natural and extreme nat- 

13 



14 



15 

Tränckner, Jens; Oil spill risks, Seminar Memorandum on Lessons learned from disasters, near accidents and exercises, 

9.9.2004, 6. 

16 

The Nedies project has been launched by the UN ISDR and the JRC to optimise prevention strategies, the level of preparedness, 

the existing mechanism of response to face Natech risks in fostering a wider discussion regarding Natech disaster risk 

management and exchange of experiences in order to deal holistically with multi-hazard scenarios, which have transboundary 

dimensions.

15 

ural phenomena (heavy rains, hurricanes or 

thunderstorms) leads to catastrophes, which 

are often created by man. It is often the deficiencies 

of human condition that transform a 

natural phenomenon into a natural disaster, 

e.g. the construction of dangerous industrial 

plants in risk areas, the construction of residential 

areas in naturally hazard-prone areas, 

the destruction of natural compensation 

areas, and so on. 17 

For instance, in Germany the gas supply 

system was affected by the 2002 flooding. An 

investigation was carried out to inspect, depict 

and classify damages on gas provision facilities. 

Damages on the gas system were 

caused by both the physical impact of water 

and the kinetic energy of water flow and flotsam. 

Results from the study showed that 

there is a need for a more efficient pre-warning 

system. Communication between the 

authorities and the gas provision companies 

must also be improved. Also, an "independent" 

communication system must be developed. 

Planning is important to avoid damages. 

One recommendation is to prepare 

information to the providers, customers and 

companies that are situated in a risk area for 

flooding. It is also important to include the gas 

provision companies in the crisis teams. 18 

3.3. Oil Spills 

Oil spill prevention and preparedness is a 

vital part of bilateral and multilateral cooperation 

based on the existing everyday needs 

and risks in a society. Oil spillage is a particular 

type of accident, integrated into the sphere 

of international activities and mostly it has to 

be solved by means of international cooperation. 

In the Baltic Sea Region, cooperation in 

this field was established with the Helsinki 

Convention (17/03/92). 

There exist also bilateral agreements 

between BSR countries to tackle oil spills, e.g. 

between Sweden and Germany. There are 

variable sources for potential oil spills in the 

BSR. For instance, in Lithuania there are 

around seven oil spill risk areas: the industry, 

water pollution from road and railway traffic, 

industrial plants in Kaliningrad and Belarus, 

export of oil products, oil refineries, oil 

pipelines, and local oil accidents. An additional 

challenge is the pipeline on the Latvian border, 

where illegal connections are quite common. 

Transit of oil is also a risk, for example in 

2000 there was a railway accident. To manage 

the risks, training, manuals, equipment and 

exercises are needed. During the last years, 

exercises have been arranged together with 

Poland and Russia (the Kaliningrad region). 19 

4. Some Examples of 

Emergency Situations in 

Case of Cross-Border Risks 

in the Baltic Sea Region 

In the following section we briefly deal with 

oil spill response arrangements in the Baltic 

Sea States. Even if the Eurobaltic Project 

mainly deals with land-related oil spills, it also 

describes how an oil spill is combated at sea. 

The main reason for this is that an oil spill at 

sea may or may not reach land. In addition, 

the risk of oil spills is named as the highest 

potential risk factor among the BSR civil protection 

authorities interviewed for this study. 

4.1. Denmark 

Since 2000, the Admiral Danish Fleet 

under the Ministry of Defence has been 

responsible for the control of oil and chemical 

pollution at open sea in Denmark. Marine pollution 

and responses at sea and in shallow 

waters near the coasts are divided between 

the Defence Command and the Naval 

Operative Command. In addition, the Admiral 

Danish Fleet is responsible for national contingency 

arrangements at sea. The regional and 

local councils have the responsibility of combating 

pollution on the shores. The Danish 

Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) can 

under special circumstances, e.g. if a NATU- 

RA 2000 or Ramsar area is threatened, assist 

the local authorities in the job. The municipalities 

are responsible for the combating of pollution 

in harbours and ports. The Danish Law for 

the Protection of the Marine Environment stipulates 

that oil drilling and production companies 

must develop their own contingency 

plans and provide their own equipment. The 

navy possesses four spill response vessels 

and DEMA has eleven bases of equipment for 

near and on-shore response. 

17 

Zaayenga, Bernd; Natech Disaster Risk Management in Bavaria, Analysis of Natech Disaster Management, European 

Commission, DG Joint Research Centre, 2004, 64. 

18 

Fröbel, Jörg; Oil spill risks, Seminar Memorandum on Lessons learned from disasters, near accidents and exercises, 

9.9.2004, 7. 

19 

Tubis, Laimonas; Oil spill risks, Seminar Memorandum on Lessons learned from disasters, near accidents and exercises, 

9.9.2004, 5-6.

16 

4.1.1. Oil Pollution from the 

"Baltic Carrier" in Groensund 2001 

and "Fu Shan Hai" in 2003 

In March 2001, a freight ship and an oil 

tanker collided east of the Danish island 

Falster. This collision led to an oil spill. The oil 

spill demanded cross-organisational cooperation 

and understanding. Improvisation was 

needed to find solutions for gathering and 

depositing oil and polluted materials. Despite 

this challenging task the overall impression is 

that the response was performed satisfactorily. 

During the incident Denmark received international 

assistance, since German and 

Swedish environmental units participated in 

the response and provided material. EU 

observers were also sent to the site. However, 

some problems and technical defects were 

revealed during the response. 

Firstly, there was a need to have access to 

committed and numerous manual resources. 

Secondly, the equipment at hand was not able 

to collect the heavy high viscosity oil. 

Consequently, new solutions had to be found 

and an evaluation of existing technical equipment 

was needed. The need for improved 

cross-organisational planning was also displayed. 

In the evaluation of the incident three 

recommendations were made. The first recommendation 

was to establish a general plan 

describing tasks and operational phases in a 

control operation following pollution at sea. 

The second proposal was to prepare a separate 

risk analysis for the waters around 

Denmark. The analysis would be used to 

judge if necessary equipment is available. The 

last recommendation concerned the need for 

more training: "Exercises and education in the 

handling of larger and/or longer lasting 

mishaps and disasters should be given higher 

priority with all operational authorities". 

In 2003, the "Fu Shan Hai" accident in the 

Bornholm Straits caused damage on a small 

group of islands called Ertholmene, 10 nautical 

miles north of the main island. The incident 

also affected Sweden. The main problem was 

that there was no proper machinery on 

Ertholmene that could be used to clean up the 

oil, and the spill had to be cleaned up using 

manual labour. When the response was evaluated, 

it was stated that the work organisation 

was successful during that operation. In addition, 

the different organisations cooperated 

well, e.g. the police and the Swedish Coast 

Guard, and sufficient personnel and expertise 

were available. What did not work so well 

were, firstly, the insufficient Swedish weather 

forecasting and spreading model for oil, and 

secondly, the fact that oil spill combating and 

cleanup plans had not been elaborated for 

South East Skåne. The lack of plans implied 

that the rescue services' information concerning 

the responsibility and role of the municipalities 

was insufficient. 20 

4.2. Estonia 

In Estonia, the Board of Border Guard with 

its structure units organizes the detection and 

handling of sea pollution. It is also responsible 

for the necessary equipment. The Board's 

task further includes the detection and handling 

of pollution at Peipsi, Lämmi and Pihkva 

lakes. The localization of oil pollution in 

coastal areas is the duty of rescue services 

(also the limiting of pollution and its diffusion), 

but the final handling of pollution is the task of 

local administrations. 

In case of pollution on mainland, the primary 

reaction comes from the rescue services. 

After the prevention of further leakage and 

diffusion, the obligation of handling the pollution 

is passed either to the Road 

Administration, the Railway Administration, 

the Environmental Inspectorate, or the local 

administration. The port authority is in charge 

of oil spills in ports or terminals. A sensitivity 

atlas showing the Estonian shoreline and its 

sensitive ecological and socio-economic 

areas is available. 

4.2.1. Lessons Learned from an 

Oil Spill and Accidents 

at Seveso II Enterprises 

Usually, three to four very small oil spill 

accidents happen every year in Estonia. In 

2003, a Maltese tanker ship with thick crude 

oil arrived in Estonia. After a while, oil was 

seen in the water and the unloading was 

stopped in order to check the problem. The 

captain of the tanker declared that no oil was 

leaking and unloading started again until new 

oil was seen in the water. Both the captain and 

the harbour authorities sent down divers who 

discovered that the hull had been poorly 

mended. Altogether 300 tons of oil was spilled 

out. Estonia did not have enough equipment 

for the cleanup and help was received from 

20 

Presentation by Göran Norberg, Lars-Erik Larsson and Thomas Hermansson, South East Skåne Rescue Services, and 

Magnus Holmqvist, Southern Military District, "Training Course for operational personnel in the field of oil spill response on 

land and in rivers and lakes" Karlskrona 13-14 September 2003.

17 

Finland. The cleanup operation took approximately 

one month but all the oil was cleaned 

up and no damage was caused to the environment. 

The responsible shipping company is 

being prosecuted to compensate the cleaning 

costs of the Estonian Government. 21 

In June 2004, there was a fire on a waste 

collection site near Tallinn. There were several 

issues that made this incident rather difficult 

to handle. First of all, it was not known 

which substances were stored inside the 

burning building, and therefore the fire fighters 

could not enter it. In addition, a railway 

passed close to the fire. During this incident, 

cooperation with the rail authorities was 

problematic and it took a while to stop the 

railway traffic. After the incident, the importance 

of giving "right" information to the 

media was stressed. However, this task was 

difficult since the Fire and Rescue Services 

did not have enough information themselves. 

During the same year, there was a fire in 

a chemical plant. This fire was caused by the 

human factor since the workers were not 

properly trained. Also the fire fighters lacked 

necessary training for fighting chemical fires. 

Consequently, they suffered from injuries 

during their work. Conclusions from this incident 

were the need for training, the use of 

right equipment, and the need for practising 

and developing communication with the 

media. 22 

4.3. Finland 

The Ministry of the Environment is responsible 

for the management and control of oil and 

chemical spill response in Finland. The Finnish 

Environment Institute (SYKE) is the governmental 

marine pollution combating authority. 

SYKE has the responsibility of responding to 

major incidents and to those that take place at 

open sea. SYKE is also in charge of the equipment 

and maintains 13 depots. SYKE can provide 

international assistance. 

A number of authorities have the legal 

obligation of collaborating in oil destruction 

measures. According to the "Act on the 

Prevention of Pollution from Ships" 

(1979/300, Section 31), the Frontier Guard, 

the Finnish Defence Forces, the Finnish 

Maritime Administration, the Finnish Institute 

of Marine Research, Police, the State 

Provincial Offices, and the Finnish Road 

Administration have a duty, when requested, 

to provide executive assistance to the 

authority responsible for ship oil and chemical 

damage prevention measures. If the prevention 

measures require, the above-mentioned 

authorities should promptly start the 

prevention procedure even before a request 

for executive assistance has been made. 

The municipalities are responsible for combating 

pollution within the municipal limits. The 

coastal regional rescue services have to provide 

emergency response in the areas they 

cover. The Rescue Services Authorities 

respond to oil spills and, together with the local 

authorities, create a joint contingency plan. 

The regional Environmental Centres also 

advise local municipalities about pollution preparedness 

and response. Three coastal areas 

have developed regional contingency plans 

and there is also one plan for the inland waterways. 

The governmental "Decree on Ship Oil 

Damage and Chemical Damage Prevention" 

(Chapter 3; Section 6) has laid down provisions 

on a cooperation plan. The regional 

Environment Institute formulates the required 

plans in cooperation with the above-mentioned 

authorities. The Decree also contains the minimum 

requirements for the plan. 

Finland has started a project where volunteers 

can sign up for duty in case of an oil accident. 

Until now, 10,000 people have signed up. 

The training includes, among other things, 

training on collecting oil and the functioning of 

the Coast Guard. 

4.4. Germany 

In Germany, spill response is shared 

between the Federal Government (Federal 

Waterways and Shipping Board of the Ministry 

of Transport) and the Federal Coastal Länder 

of Bremen, Hamburg, Niedersachsen, 

Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Schleswig- 

Holstein. In case of a spill, a national response 

group that includes the Ministry of Transport 

and the concerned Land / Länder is created. 

After the Pallas disaster experience in the 

Wadden Sea in 1998, these partners founded 

the Central Command for Maritime 

Emergencies Germany (Havariekommando) 

in 2002. It is responsible for all heavy maritime 

disasters and carries out the cleaning operations 

both offshore and on shorelines. All ports 

and harbours have to have their own response 

resources and create contingency plans. 

21 

Presentation by Riho Sömermaa, Estonian Tartumaa Rescue Service, "Training Course for operational personnel in 

the field of oil spill response on land and in rivers and lakes" Karlskrona 13-14 September 2003. 

22 

Presentation by Priit Laaniste, Estonian Rescue Board, "Lesson learned from disasters, near accidents and exercises", 

September 2004, Trondheim.

18 

4.5. Latvia 

The National Oil Spill Contingency Plan 

(NOSCP) of Latvia was adopted by the 

Cabinet of Ministers in March 2004. Within the 

framework of contingency planning, GIS sensitive 

area maps and accident risk assessment 

calculations are used. Oil spill drift and weather 

forecast modelling is in place. Organizations 

involved in activities foreseen by the Plan are 

Latvian Coastguard, MRCC Riga, MRCC 

Committee, ARCC, Crisis Control Centre 

under the State Chancellery, State 

Environmental Service, State F&RS, State 

Border Guard, Centre of Emergency and 

Disaster Medicine, Port Authorities and municipalities 

located on the Latvian coastline. The 

National Chemical Spill Contingency Plan of 

Latvia (2004) has been elaborated, but has not 

been adopted. The implementation is expected 

to be similar to that of oil spill contingency. 

Two laws are important for civil protection 

in Latvia: the "Civil protection law" from 1992 

(amended in 1998) and the "Fire safety and 

fire fighting law" from 2002. Latvia has bilateral 

cooperation agreements at state level with 

Lithuania since 2001, Sweden (2002), Estonia 

(2001) and Hungary (2004). 

In Latvia, oil is transported by rail, by road 

and in pipelines. Oil is also transported at sea, 

and transit harbours are located in Riga and 

Ventspils. As in Lithuania, there are illegal connections 

to pipelines. Latvia is also exposed to 

risks existing in Lithuania. A wind from the 

south might imply pollution in case of an accident 

in a refinery, the nuclear power plant of 

Ignalina or the Butinge oil terminal. During the 

last years, experiences from road and railway 

accidents have been gathered. The international 

exercise "NOSE" was arranged in 2004. 

In case of an oil spill, the responsible 

authority varies: the harbour captain in the harbours, 

the fire brigade inland, and the Coast 

Guard, under the Ministry of Defence, at sea. 23 

The Marine and Inland Water Administration 

(MIWA) of the State Environmental Service 

(SES), under the Ministry of Environment, is 

responsible for policy making in the field of 

marine pollution, the coordination of the implementation 

of the National Oil Spill Contingency 

Plan (NOSCP), and the fulfilment of international 

obligations. 

The Coast Guard Service has response 

stations in the three largest Latvian ports - 

Riga, Liepaja and Ventspils. Three levels of 

management and decision-making exist in 

Latvia. For small spills, the Response 

Commander of MRCC Riga leads the 

response operations. For major oil spills, a 

MRCC Committee is convened by the 

Response Commander for the overall coordination 

and management of the pollution. The 

Committee has permanent members from 

MIWA, the Latvian Coast Guard, the Maritime 

Administration of Latvia, the State F&RS, the 

Ministry of Defence, and port authorities. In 

case of a major pollution leading to a national 

emergency, the State Emergency Commission 

is activated under the Ministry of the Interior. 

The State Fire Fighting and Rescue 

Service under the Ministry of the Interior, in 

cooperation with the local municipalities, are 

responsible for shoreline and beach cleanup. 

Port authorities are responsible for response 

operations in port areas. Land and sea activities 

are carried out in cooperation between the 

Coast Guard Service and the State Fire 

Fighting and Rescue Service. The State F&RS 

operates its own technical equipment. Local 

municipalities furnish extra manpower and 

means to oil pollution response operations on 

the coast. The coordination of sea and land 

activities is accomplished through direct contact 

between involved authorities and the 

respective Commanders. 

The Latvian response capacities are based 

on the mechanical recovery technology. The 

use of chemical agents, such as dispersants, 

is not foreseen in the marine environment. The 

Latvian Coast Guard Service does not have 

special vessels for oil spill contingency purposes. 

In case of an oil spill, the coast guard cutters, 

equipped with booms, skimmers and 

floating rubber bags, will carry out the 

response operations. A 100 m³ non-propelled 

barge will be used for primary storage. For aerial 

surveillance, small aircrafts with no remote 

sensing equipment will be used. The involvement 

of private vessels is foreseen in contingency 

operations through agreements with 

port authorities. 

4.5.1. Experiences from 

Pollution Accidents 

Besides the above-mentioned risks in oil 

transportation, and the dangers that might 

cross borders, Latvia suffers from floods. 

These floods are often contaminated with 

mineral oil from road or transportation accidents 

and technological failures, spills from 

pipelines and oil storage. These spills are 

23 

Rugals, Gunars; Oil spill risks, Seminar Memorandum on Lessons learned from disasters, near accidents and exercises, 

9.9.2004, 6.

19 

local in character, and the pollution is taken 

care of by the State F&RS and the management 

of the responsible polluter. As a result, 

there is no record on how much significant 

damage is caused to the environment. Lawenforcement 

bodies and the responsible 

authorities for the protection of the environment 

ask for information from those responsible 

for such incidents as a basis for imposing 

corresponding penalties and for conducting 

legal court proceedings. 

In the ports, mineral oil spills happen due 

to technical reasons, mainly in connection 

with discharging ballast water from bulk-oil 

tankers. Minor pollution of port waters is 

taken care of by the emergency services 

under the management of the ports together 

with the State F&RS. Ventspils Harbour 

Special Forces are responsible for action in 

the event of an accident. These forces have 

the best available equipment. The Special 

Forces in Ventspils work in close cooperation 

with the municipality fire and rescue services. 

The industrial rescue forces' personnel 

have earlier worked as fire fighters for the 

government. In view of having the highest 

rate in the world of large failures with bulk-oil 

tankers and catastrophic pollution of its 

coastal areas, the Government of Latvia is 

seriously concerned over the risks of pollution 

in the Baltic Sea and, as a consequence, 

in its coastal zone. In the event of a spill 

threatening to pollute the coast, the Latvian 

State F&RS will raise the alarm, and the relevant 

corresponding ministries and departments 

will participate in the work. Once a 

year a field exercise is carried out and all 

involved organisations take part in the exercise, 

which has the purpose of improving 

their coordination. 24 Regular exercises are 

carried out to maintain response readiness 

and knowledge. Up to now, the Coast Guard 

has not carried out real oil spill contingency 

operations. 

4.6. Lithuania 

The Ministries of the Environment and 

Transport share the responsibility for preparedness 

and response to oil pollution incidents 

in the Baltic Sea, the Curonian Lagoon 

and the Klaipeda Seaport water area. The 

Sea Rescue Coordination Centre has been 

given the operative responsibility at sea. 

Within port and terminal territories, the port 

and terminal authorities are responsible for 

combating oil spills. The Ministry of the 

Environment develops and implements the 

National Contingency Plan in Case of Oil 

Spills at Sea, which also includes the 

Nemunas river basin. The Fire and Rescue 

Services are involved in cleanup operations 

on land. Most of the oil spill response equipment 

is located in Klaipeda. 

Lithuania has bilateral agreements on 

transboundary cooperation with Poland (2002), 

Latvia (2001), Germany (1994) and Sweden 

(2003). Cooperation with the Kaliningrad 

Region is based on the Intergovernmental 

Long-Term Cooperation Agreement between 

Lithuania and Russia for the Regions of the 

Republic of Lithuania and the Kaliningrad 

Region of the Russian Federation. 

The main possibilities and areas for oil 

spills in Lithuania are: 

- Oil spills in the industrial or military 

establishments in the region of 

Kaliningrad; 

- Water pollution on the Lithuanian- 

Polish border caused by road and 

railway traffic; 

- Pollution of the Nemunas river basin 

caused by oil products spilled from 

industrial establishments in Belarus; 

- Pollution of the border river basins 

as well as inland waters; 

- Spills as a result of possible accidents 

and incidents at sea; 

- Spills as a result of possible accidents 

in oil pipelines or refineries; 

- Local oil spill accidents. 

A real challenge is the Butinge oil terminal 

on the Latvian border. On the pipeline 

leading to the terminal illegal connections are 

quite common. The control of these connections 

is a police matter, but the rescue services 

have to deal with the consequences of a 

breakdown. 

The transportation of oil products on railways 

and roads is also a risk for inland waters 

and rivers. In order to manage those risks, 

training, manuals, equipment and exercises 

are needed. During the past years a number 

of international and regional exercises have 

been arranged together with Poland and the 

Russian Federation (Kaliningrad region). 

Below some examples of exercises: 

24 

Presentations by Gunars Rugajs, State Fire and Rescue Service of Latvia, "Lesson learned from disasters, near accidents 

and exercises", September 2004, Trondheim and by Vladimirs Vetuhs, Latvian State Fire and Rescue Service, 

"Training Course for operational personnel in the field of oil spill response on land and in rivers and lakes" Karlskrona 13- 

14 September 2003.

20 

 

 

 

Galadusys in 2000 was the first international 

exercise, conducted in 

Lithuania. The JTF (joint task forces) 

of Lithuania and Poland were 

involved, and the main goal of exercise 

was to improve cooperation 

between Poland and Lithuania in 

case of oil spills on transboundary 

inland waters (lakes and rivers). 

Nemunas in 2001 was an exercise 

for the Lithuanian Fire and Rescue 

Services in order to improve mutual 

cooperation in dealing with oil spills 

in the basin of Nemunas River. 

Varniai in 2002, an exercise with a 

traffic accident involving oil spill. JTF 

of Lithuanian Fire and Rescue 

Services participated in order to 

improve mutual cooperation in dealing 

with oil spills on inland waters. 

The cross-border exercise in 

Kaliningrad in 2004 involved the 

Kaliningrad and Lithuanian Fire and 

Rescue Services. The main goal was 

to improve cooperation between 

Russia, Lithuania and other Baltic 

Countries in dealing with trans 

boundary oil spills. 

4.6.1. The Nemunas Oil Spills 

Exercise (NOSE) 

The international "NOSE" exercise was 

conducted on the River Nemunas on the border 

with Kaliningrad in 2004. 25 The worst-case 

scenario was used during the exercise. The 

NOSE exercise firstly aimed at increasing 

interaction and cooperation between the 

emergency services of Lithuania and the 

countries of the Baltic Sea Region in the field 

of oil spill accident. The second goal was to 

practice the rescuers' professional skills. 

In the exercise report it was concluded 

that there is a need for "further training and 

exercises for rescue service personnel in the 

Baltic Sea Region". In most cases the same 

kind of equipment is used, and many rescuers 

have had their initial training in Sweden or 

Poland, which facilitates international cooperation. 

However, the need for "further development 

of the capacity for mutual cooperation 

and coordination in the future among the local 

rescue services in the Baltic Sea Region and 

for the exchange of information on experience 

and knowledge" was the conclusion. 

The exercise was in general considered to 

be successful. However, some areas of 

improvement were found. Aspects to be 

developed are the techniques of response to 

oil spills and the use of means of collecting oil. 

Also normative documents must be created in 

order to facilitate the operation managers' prioritisations 

and to include objects unattached 

to Seveso requirements. Legal acts in connection 

with the procedures must be improved 

and changed in order to facilitate the use of 

international assistance. 

4.7. Norway 

The Ministries of the Environment and of 

Fisheries are responsible for the laws related 

to acute oil pollution in Norway. The 

Norwegian Coastal Administration works with 

emergency spill response at sea and on 

shore, and has 15 depots along the coast. 

Private, municipal and governmental contingency 

plans have been developed and have 

been merged into a national emergency 

response plan by the Norwegian Coastal 

Administration. Among other things, the plans 

show sensitive objects and areas along the 

coast. In case of a major pollution, the state is 

responsible for the preparedness plans. 

The maritime municipalities have oil spill 

groups that include local parties, the harbourmaster 

and the fire/police chief. In case of a 

major accident, the government can provide 

equipment, material, vessels and personnel. 

Concerning pollution, the municipalities have 

to be prepared to handle smaller acute pollutions 

which take place within their borders and 

which are connected to normal activities. This 

preparedness also includes the shoreline. The 

local fire service has a central role in the operating 

phase. 

4.8. Poland 

The Ministry of Infrastructure is responsible 

for oil spill contingency plans and response. 

The Ministry of the Environment is responsible 

for contingency planning and oil spill response 

on land, including beaches and shorelines. 

The responsibility for maintaining preparedness 

for marine environmental threats and pollution 

combating activities is delegated to the 

Maritime Search and Rescue Service - SAR. 

The responsibility for organizing and supervising 

oil spill combating operations lies within the 

25 

Participating countries were Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Russian Federation and 

Sweden.

21 

Maritime Administration. Three Maritime 

Offices are located in Szczecin, Slupsk and 

Gdynia. Rescue operations at sea, on the 

seashore and in harbours are conducted 

according to the national contingency plan. 

The plan has been prepared and is updated by 

the SAR service, although the Chief- 

Commandant of Provincial Headquarters of 

State Fire Service must accept it. A map showing 

national parks and sensitive areas exists. 

In the event of a risk of seashore pollution, 

the Chief-Director of Maritime Office notifies 

the local authorities, which are responsible for 

the response activities. The governors of the 

province and the heads of the county administration 

in their capacity of the leading institution 

for combating any disaster on land use the 

resources of the State Fire Service. Also other 

entities involved in the National Fire Fighting 

and Rescue System can be used to reduce the 

consequences and to eliminate the effects of 

pollution. These entities include Voluntary Fire 

Service Units, the Harbour Rescue Service, 

the Coast Guard, Civil Protection and Crisis 

Management resources, the National 

Inspection of Environment Protection, human 

resources organized by municipal administrations, 

as well as bulldozers, lorries and tanks of 

business companies. The responsibility for 

rescue operations involving oil spills combated 

on land, in rivers and lakes, as well as on 

beaches and harbour waters, lies with the 

State Fire Service. Technical equipment for 

dealing with oil spills at sea is spread along the 

Polish Coast. It is stored on SAR vessels and 

in coastal SAR stations. Equipment for combating 

oil spills in harbour waters is available at 

the port and shipyard rescue service bases. 

Every County Headquarters of the State 

Fire Service has its own resources for dealing 

with oil spills. There are trained personnel who 

operate the equipment and take an active part 

during an oil spill combat operation. The 

Province Centre for the Coordination of 

Rescue has the authority to dispose of needed 

rescue equipment from fire brigades all over 

the province. Although the State Fire Service 

has at its disposal large numbers of materials 

and equipment, this does not meet its needs 

fully. The equipment consists of hand tools and 

protective clothing, boats, booms, pumps, 

skimmers, transport equipment, reservoirs for 

collected oil, and also natural and synthetic 

absorbers. 26 There are operational agreements 

with the pollution combating services of 

Germany and the port of Kaliningrad. 

Ships transporting dangerous substances, 

e.g. crude oil, should be inspected 

for safety. Every ship should be equipped 

with technical protection systems to eliminate 

emergency situations, including oil spills 

and chemical hazards. 

In case of oil spills at sea, the Director of 

Maritime Office is responsible for providing an 

environmental protection team on site to investigate 

it. If the pollution reaches the seashore, 

the Director of Maritime Office has to inform 

the Provincial Inspectorate of Environmental 

Protection to react. 

A number of exercises and seminars have 

been arranged in Poland in 2003 and 2004 in 

order to recognise and prevent possible disasters. 

It is important to include local level and 

cross-border cooperation when it comes to 

improving the protection of the population from 

accidents or disasters. An exchange of information 

is also important. By analysing information 

gathered from various hazards and exercises, 

it is possible to improve the response 

from authorities and to involve the public. 

Additionally, it helps defining the necessary 

equipment. Information exchange between 

countries is significant. It is also important not 

to forget the local level, since this is the level 

that is affected by and in many cases has to 

deal with hazards. A conclusion from the performed 

exercises is that all response systems 

need to be improved continuously. Concerning 

international cooperation, a development of 

common operational methods and uniform 

forms is needed. The development of a better 

warning and information system for the public 

is also important. Regular performance of 

transboundary exercises is a prerequisite for 

the development of international cooperation. 27 

4.9. The Russian Federation 

The State Marine Pollution Control, 

Salvage and Rescue Administration (SMPC- 

SRA) (the Ministry of Transportation) is the 

main responsible body for the response to 

marine pollution incidents. The response at 

sea in the Baltic region has been delegated to 

the Baltic Salvage & Towage Company by the 

SMPCSRA. The concerned local administration 

is responsible for shoreline cleanup. 

Ports, oil terminals and harbours possess oil 

recovery equipment. In Kaliningrad, students 

are taught to work with the cleanup of oil spills. 

26 

Presentation by Andrzej Kapustynski, Provincial Head Quarter of the State Fire Service , "Training Course for operational 

personnel in the field of oil spill response on land and in rivers and lakes" Karlskrona 13-14 September 2003. 

27 

Presentation by Rafal Porowski, The National Headquarters of the State Fire Service of Poland, "Lesson learned from 

disasters, near accidents and exercises", September 2004, Trondheim.

22 

The skills are regularly trained during exercises. 

Examples of incidents are Antonio 

Gramsci in 1987 and Volgoneft 263 in 1990. 

4.10. Sweden 

According to the Civil Protection Act 

(2003:778) the Coast Guard is responsible for 

oil spills at sea. When the oil reaches the land 

or an oil spill happens on land, the municipality 

(Rescue and Fire Service) is responsible. 

The Coast Guard alerts municipalities when 

there is a great oil spill at sea. In Sweden, the 

municipality is responsible for the cleanup, 

and the coastal municipalities are supposed to 

develop oil spill protection plans. 

In the Baltic Sea, the Swedish Coast 

Guard cooperates with the Finnish Coast 

Guard and the Finnish Environment Institute. 

There is also cooperation with Estonian, 

Russian and Lithuanian counterparts. In its 

work the Coast Guard uses vessels and aircraft. 

28 The SRSA has five depots storing 

combat equipment for oil spill accidents in 

Sweden. Two of the depots have equipment 

for international assistance. 

A tool in oil combating is the environmental 

atlas. This atlas has existed over 20 years 

and covers the coastal areas in Sweden. In 

the atlas it is possible to display different phenomena, 

e.g. Natura 2000 areas and other 

sensitive areas. In addition, methods on conducting 

a cleanup are presented. Additional 

information is also connected to the map, for 

instance photos and text describing the shoreline. 

The atlas is used at national, regional and 

local levels. The atlas aims to help the municipalities 

to increase their planning and emergency 

preparedness and is to be used when a 

municipality is faced with an oil spill or chemical 

pollution. During an oil spill, data can be 

used to get an overview of an area, to facilitate 

the allocation of the resources and to help in 

the prioritisation process. Another project has 

been to create a cleanup manual, which was 

ready for distribution to the municipalities in 

September 2005. This manual includes lessons 

learned from earlier incidents. 29 

4.10.1. "Prestige-Accident" in the 

Stockholm Archipelago 

The aim of the tabletop exercise "Prestige- 

Accident" in the Stockholm archipelago was to 

promote discussion on the capacity of cooperation 

and the coordination of information and 

resources during a major oil spill accident in 

the Baltic Sea Region. In the exercise, a fictive 

ship collision caused an oil spill of 20,000 tons 

in December in the Baltic Sea. The oil threatened 

the Stockholm archipelago and was so 

enormous that the cleanup was estimated to 

take more than a year. If such an incident 

would happen, international assistance would 

be needed. There would be a great demand 

for information, both from media and the 

neighbouring countries, and therefore communication 

between the Head of Operations and 

the Head of Information would be important. 

The conclusions from the exercise were, 

firstly, that preparation and planning are necessary. 

Secondly, knowledge and information 

are crucial elements, for instance it is important 

to ensure that geographical information, 

i.e. the environmental atlas, is available for all 

stakeholders. Finally, international cooperation 

and networks are needed. It is also necessary 

to develop the knowledge on how to receive 

and use international assistance. In addition, 

future work with oil spills in the Baltic Sea 

Region should focus on building a network for 

the exchange of knowledge and experience; 

on making preparations for international assistance, 

through seminars, workshops, and 

exercises around the Baltic Sea; and, finally, 

on disseminating "Lessons Learned" from incidents, 

e.g. by creating an Internet platform 

where data from incidents can be located. 

5. Conclusions: Lessons to 

be Learned 

This report has clearly indicated that the 

risk of an oil spill is the highest cross-border 

factor among the civil protection authorities 

of the Baltic Sea Countries. The oil spill risk 

is seen not only as potential, but also as 

unavoidable, which makes it one of the crucial 

elements of sustainable community 

planning within the region. For instance, during 

the oil spill exercise in the Stockholm 

archipelago it became obvious that the oil 

spill management systems differ between 

the Baltic Sea states and that the structure 

mainly depends on whether there is a centralised 

or a decentralised organisation of 

the Fire and Rescue Services. Also the role 

of other bodies, e.g. the Coast Guard, differs. 

In Russia, Estonia and Latvia, centralised 

crisis or emergency commissions 

28 

Presentation by Karl-Erik Kulander, SRSA and Kjell Larsson & Robert Primus, Swedish Coast Guard. 

29 

Jonas Fejes, Swedish Environmental Research Institute

23 

are established. In Finland, the Fire and 

Rescue Service is responsible on land, while 

the Finnish Environment Institute is responsible 

at sea. In Germany, the Central 

Command for Maritime Emergencies 

Germany (Havariekommando) of five 

Länder and the Federal State is responsible 

in a case of a collision at sea and also for oil 

spills at sea and on shore. 

There are not many agreements for combating 

oil spills on land. However, here the 

EU mechanism is available. Concerning pollution 

at open sea, there are agreements 

that are working, e.g. HELCOM's Response 

Group's activities concern cross-border 

cooperation. HELCOM is considered to be 

successful, cooperation is practiced every 

year and its functioning has been tested in 

real accidents. Also the Copenhagen 

Agreement is available for the Nordic 

Countries. Within this agreement also exercises 

are carried out. A dilemma for combating 

oil spills at sea may be that there are too 

many agreements at play and their aims and 

tasks are not coordinated. A few, or preferably 

one main authority or actor, would be 

more ideal, but traditions, differences in culture 

and the principles by which the countries 

are run, will make this a long and cumbersome 

job. 

To facilitate international assistance, the 

importance of using similar techniques and 

methods or at least knowing about each 

other's techniques is stressed. It will, for 

instance, be difficult to implement new technologies 

in an emergency situation. HEL- 

COM has, as previously mentioned, agreed 

upon recommendations on oil combat. In 

addition, this cooperation is regularly tested. 

Today, it is rather unclear how equipment 

can be found and borrowed from other Baltic 

Sea States, and how this can be done quickly 

in an emergency situation. As for techniques 

and principles on the actual cleaning 

process, money plays a central role and the 

motivation of each country depends on the 

numbers and the seriousness of accidents 

that they have faced in the recent years. 

There is also a need to define and create 

normative documents / manuals for emergency 

situations. But here also the HEL- 

COM manuals are a resource. The Espoo 

Convention on Environmental Impact 

Assessment in a Transboundary Context is 

also a tool for preparing for the management 

of accidents that may have transboundary 

effects. There is a need to perform separate 

risk analyses in the Baltic Sea Region. 

However, the study displays that tools needed 

in emergency situations, i.e. environmental 

atlases, are available in most countries. 

Most of the presented emergency situations 

or exercises clearly show that many 

accidents have cross-border effects. This in 

turn implies a need for international cooperation 

during emergency situations. In addition, 

the severe consequences of an emergency 

situation may require international 

assistance. Consequently, there is a great 

demand for different kinds of exercises to 

continue and to improve international cooperation 

in connection with emergency situations. 

Not only tabletop exercises are needed, 

even if they may be the most cost-effective, 

but full-scale exercises with the actual 

partners participating are necessary. 

Studies show the important role exercises 

have, a fact revealed for instance by the 

good experiences received from the NOSE 

exercise. The importance of training is also 

highlighted by examples of what happens if 

rescue personnel are not properly trained: 

they can be a threat for themselves and the 

society. Exercises are also a way for the 

national systems to plan and prepare themselves 

to be able to give and receive international 

assistance. However, one should 

investigate further how many of these activities 

are already available, in order to avoid 

duplication of the work. 

Also the need of cross-sectoral work is 

displayed. Jointly performed training and 

exercises is one way to improve the horizontal 

and vertical integration between different 

sectors and levels. It is also important to 

include the local level, since it is at this level 

that emergency situations take place, even if 

the responsibility is on another level. 

During the tabletop exercise "Prestige- 

Accident" in Stockholm, the importance of 

establishing personal relations to make an 

organisation work in a sufficient way during 

emergency situations was stressed. The 

establishment of "personal" networks are 

facilitated by jointly performed exercises, 

seminars and workshops, where an 

exchange of experience and knowledge can 

take place. These events also have a social 

function, since they bring people together 

and give faces to the persons you are suppose 

to cooperate with in case of a real 

emergency situation. The study clearly

24 

shows that during emergency situations one 

has to be prepared for unexpected development. 

It is a challenge to include this aspect 

in training or exercises. 

During emergency situations there is a 

great need for information. Therefore media 

training is crucial for the persons responsible 

for communicating the events of the incident. 

Lack of information or distribution of 

incorrect information can have severe consequences 

and also cause additional problems, 

i.e. distrust. 

Another challenge is to train volunteers, 

so they can be used as a resource. In 

Kaliningrad and Finland volunteers are 

trained. Other countries around the Baltic 

Sea can learn from their experiences. 

For training and exercises it is also important 

to consider how to use "lessons learned" 

from emergency situations in the Baltic Sea 

Region. One suggestion here is to establish a 

web portal on Internet, where experiences 

could be gathered. To be able to learn from 

previous emergency situations it is also 

important to document the incident. In the 

future, it must be discussed and decided 

which requirements are necessary for documentation 

of actions and their evaluation. 

6. Recommendations 

 

The already staggering monetary 

losses from disasters are still 

increasing. This should be seen as a 

possibility of convincing policymakers 

and planners of the need to base 

community planning on comprehensive 

risk assessment and to establish 

cross-sectoral and cross-border 

risk management mechanisms. 

 

 

 

In many cross-border risks, the mitigation 

activities mean simply postponing 

losses that will be more catastrophic 

when they finally occur. 

There should be more focus on the 

effects of prevention and mitigation 

activities, not their magnitude and visibility 

(such as costly but politically 

visible awareness raising campaigns). 

The Baltic Sea Region should be 

seen as a potential area for the 

European-scale pilot project for efficient 

112-cross-border cooperation. 

The pilot project should include a 

feasibility study of the benefits of 

establishing a single 112-control 

centre to clear the 112-calls from various 

countries, and to optimise the 

national emergency response 

capacities to each particular accident 

and emergency in an appropriate 

manner. The aim of the project would 

be to serve the BSR citizens with 

their own language regardless of 

where they are located. 

Flooding: A lesson learned from flooing 

was that electric power systems 

must always be protected from flooding, 

i.e. there needs to be a plan 

where to locate transformer stations. 

Also the construction of water 

pipelines must be adapted to the risk 

of flooding. An increased cooperation 

between water companies at local, 

district and regional scale is also 

needed. Also a well developed crisis 

management and planning is necessary.

25 

References: 

Danish Emergency Management Agency, 

2001: The oil pollution from the "Baltic Carrier" 

incident. Cross-body evaluation and report of 

experience. 

Eurobaltic, 2004, Report: "Prestige-Accident" in 

the Stockholm Archipelago, Oil Spill Tabletop 

Exercise, Botkyrka/Stockholm, Sweden, 2-4 

December 2004. 

Eurobaltic, 2004, Memorandum: Lessons 

learned from disasters, near accidents and 

exercises, Trondheim, Norway, 9 September 

2004. 

Eurobaltic, 2004, Report: NOSE - Neumans Oil 

Spills Exercise 2004, 8-10 June 2004. 

Eurobaltic, 2003, Report: BSR INTERREG III B 

Eurobaltic Civil Protection Project, Training 

Course for operational personnel in the field of 

oil spill response on land and in rivers and lakes 

held in Karlskrona and to be followed by a corresponding 

joint Eurobaltic exercise to be held 

in Lithuania, 13-14 September 2003, 

Karlskrona, Sweden. 

European Commission, 2001, Accident of the 

Oil Tanker "Baltic Carrier" off the Danish 

Coastline, Final report from the European Task 

Force in Denmark from 1 st to 5 th April 2001. 

Internet: 

Admiral Danish Fleet 

http://forsvaret.dk/SOK/eng/ 

Bonn Agreement 

http://www.bonnagreement.org/eng/html/welcome.html 

Copenhagen agreement 

http://www.copenhagenagreement.org 

Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact 

Assessment in a Transboundary Context 

http://www.unece.org/env/eia/eia.htm 

EU Civil Protection Handbook 

http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/enlarg 

/handbook/civil.pdf 

European Community Mechanism 

http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/civil/pr 

ote/cp12_en.htm 

Helsinki Commission, Baltic Marine 

Environment Protection Commission 

http://www.helcom.fi/helcom/en_GB/aboutus/ 

International Convention on Oil Pollution 

Preparedness, Response and Cooperation of 

1990 

http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.a 

sptopic_id=258&doc_id=682 

International Tanker Owners Pollution 

Federation Limited, Country profiles 

http://www.itopf.com 

Ministry of the Environment, Finland 

http://www.environment.fi/default.aspcontentid=120659&lan=EN

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