Constitutionalism and Democratic Governance in Africa: - PULP

Introduction to and overview of constitutionalism and democratic governance in Africa 9
country returned to civilian governance in 1999 under a presidential
system of government. Regrettably, this system is founded on a militarilyconceived
Constitution lacking a fully enforceable bill of rights and clear
governmental functions. Since a strong bond links the process through
which constitutions are produced and their degree of acceptance and
effectiveness, questions over the Constitution’s legitimacy prompted
parliament to amend it in 2010.
In examining post-independence constitution-making in Nigeria,
Chima finds that military rule blighted Nigeria’s capacity to respond
appropriately to the challenges of federalism. He argues that, although
deficient in popular sovereignty, the Constitution’s legitimacy is moot
since it is the operative law that governs the country. He submits that the
problem with constitutionalism in Nigeria is poor leadership and poor
implementation of the Constitution. Chima therefore advocates good
governance and a participatory approach to constitutional review as the
foundations for strong constitutionalism in Nigeria.
In chapter 7, entitled ‘Constitution without constitutionalism: The
case of Cameroon’, Chofor Che Christian Aimé moots the idea that many
of Africa’s problems have been caused not because of the absence of
constitutions per se, but rather by the ease with which the provisions in
these constitutions were manipulated. It is on this premise that his chapter
examines constitutionalism in Cameroon from independence till 2012.
The central question is whether, although Cameroon has had constitutions
since 1961, there has been constitutionalism.
Aimé’s central argument is that since 1960, Cameroon has had
constitutions without constitutionalism as evidenced by the lack of
supremacy of the constitution, the absence of an independent judiciary, the
absence of a bill of rights, as well as lack of democracy. To him,
establishing constitutionalism in Cameroon would mean that the
constitution is not easily amendable, the constitution is supreme, there is
independence of the judiciary, there is an entrenchment of a bill of rights
in the constitution as well as a visible and generally accepted presence of
democracy. His chapter therefore first examines the colonial history of
Cameroon, which consisted of German, French and British rule. The
period leading to the independence and reunification of Cameroon in 1960
is also examined. The chapter then assesses the 1961, 1972 and 1996
constitutions with respect to various elements of constitutionalism.
Establishing that Cameroon has indeed had constitutions without
constitutionalism, the chapter finally recommends elements of constitutionalism
necessary for a democratic Cameroon.
In the eighth chapter of the book, Bonolo Ramadi Dinokopila adds his
voice to the debate on constitutionalism, constitution-making and
constitutional reform in Africa. Entitled ‘Pre-independence constitutions,
participatory constitution-making and constitutionalism in Africa: The