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Constitutionalism and Democratic Governance in Africa: - PULP

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3<br />

4<br />

9 A new (legitimate) constitution <strong>in</strong> Tanzania:<br />

A people’s appeal 44<br />

10 The constitutional review Act 2011: A knock at<br />

the door 47<br />

11 Conclusion 51<br />

From the ‘TPLF Constitution’ to the ‘Constitution<br />

of the people of Ethiopia’: <strong>Constitutionalism</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

proposals for constitutional reform<br />

Adem Kassie Abebe<br />

1 Introduction: The genesis of constitutionalisation<br />

<strong>in</strong> Ethiopia 51<br />

2 The mak<strong>in</strong>g of the Federal <strong>Democratic</strong> Republic of<br />

Ethiopia (FDRE) Constitution: Its <strong>in</strong>clusiveness<br />

<strong>and</strong> some implications 54<br />

3 <strong>Constitutionalism</strong>: Constitutional pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>and</strong><br />

compliance 57<br />

3.1 Decentralisation 58<br />

3.2 Sovereignty of the nations, nationalities <strong>and</strong><br />

peoples (ethnic groups) 60<br />

3.3 Human <strong>and</strong> democratic rights 62<br />

3.4 Transparent <strong>and</strong> accountable government 67<br />

3.5 Separation of state <strong>and</strong> religion 69<br />

4 Major factors that have hampered constitutionalism<br />

<strong>and</strong> constitutional development 70<br />

4.1 Increas<strong>in</strong>g authoritarianism <strong>and</strong> the party-state<br />

conflation 71<br />

4.2 Lack of <strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>and</strong> reliable constitutional<br />

adjudication system 74<br />

5 Proposals for a possible constitutional reform<br />

agenda 79<br />

5.1 Parliamentary versus presidential form of<br />

government 80<br />

5.2 The first-past-the-post electoral system 81<br />

5.3 Term limits on the position of the Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister 81<br />

5.4 Chang<strong>in</strong>g the constitutional adjudication system 83<br />

5.5 Public ownership of l<strong>and</strong> 83<br />

5.6 Abolish<strong>in</strong>g or empower<strong>in</strong>g the Office of the<br />

President? 84<br />

6 Conclud<strong>in</strong>g remarks 85<br />

Constitution-mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Eritrea<br />

Simon M Weldehaimanot<br />

1 Introduction: Higher law <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>e-tun<strong>in</strong>g 89<br />

2 Contestation <strong>in</strong> Eritrea: Amendment aga<strong>in</strong>st new<br />

constitution-mak<strong>in</strong>g 91<br />

3 Abrogation of the 1952 Constitution <strong>and</strong> the<br />

notion of a higher law 94<br />

3.1 The 1952 Constitution on amendments 94<br />

3.2 Amendments sought <strong>and</strong> their legality 96<br />

3.3 The federation: a delicate balance 100<br />

3.4 Lack of arbiter <strong>in</strong> the constitutional design 102<br />

4 The trash<strong>in</strong>g of the 1997 Constitution 104<br />

iv

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