DoD Responses to Transnational Threats - The Black Vault

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area hospitals. While no injuries occurred directly as a result of the package, had this been an actual release of anthrax, the outcome would have been vastly different. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory analyzed the incident and projected the outcome had there been an actual release of 150 grams (5 oz) of anthrax on the headquarters lawn from an aerosol can. Their estimates showed that based on prevailing winds, the cloud of anthrax would have contaminated the B'nai B'rith headquarters and dispersed to cover the White House and much of the Mall area, extending to an area over 30 square kilometers in size. Casualties would have been in the thousands, with fatality rates ranging from as much as 50 percent near the source of the release to 5 percent in outlying areas where concentration of the agent would have been lower. The successful execution of scenarios of this sort could substantially impact America’s sense of security, undermine public order, and instigate further incidents if the United States were unsuccessful in responding effectively. Furthermore, the consequences could extend internationally, eroding America’s leadership position in the world community, limiting its ability to achieve foreign policy objectives, and directly impacting performance of military missions. A Priority for DoD Today, most US experiences have, or appear to have, involved isolated events or limited campaigns. But around the world, cases of multiple events, some of them quite serious, are prevalent. At this level, the threat can serve to limit DoD options or constrain operations and can have a serious impact on the economy and national cohesion. But if a transnational actor or nation state successfully waged an orchestrated campaign of these sorts against the United States, it could lead to mission failure, disengagement from overseas missions, and possibly national upheaval. America’s position in the world could be altered. Figure 6 serves to illustrate the potential consequences of the evolving threat. The task force believes there is evidence that the transnational threat will escalate in the future and that the threat will be dealing with extensive campaigns and greater use of weapons of mass destruction. The Libya retaliation campaign, the World Trade Center bombing, and the Aum Shinrikyo subway sarin release are examples of incidents that were part of an orchestrated, longer-term “campaign” which went unrecognized at the time these events unfolded. US presence, policies, and leadership will remain a major stabilizing force in the world, which will require a range of credible offensive military capabilities, forward military presence, surge capabilities, and independent or coalition operations. A credible future global model depicts an environment that will require an activist foreign policy to sustain world stability, continuing foreign presence, and occasional military interventions in areas of conflict. This same model exacerbates stresses that traditionally motivate transnational threats. Thus, the transnational threat to the United States and its citizenry will become more significant over time. 20
Threat Escalation - Frequency and Magnitude Isolated Events Multiple Events An Orchestrated Campaign Impact on: Most U.S. Experience Significant Worldwide Experience The Potential DOD Mission Overseas Creates Casualties Limits Options Seriously Constrains Operations Erodes Coalition Support Mission Failure Disengagement Nations Localized Societal Trauma Serious Impact on Economy and National Cohesion Creates National Upheaval Figure 6. Threat Evolution At the same time, US military operations will be subject to a growing list of vulnerabilities. All phases of combat operations, mobilization, logistics, command and control, engagement, and cleanup have become more dependent on communication and information systems which are susceptible to threat information operations. There will be fewer logistic sea and air points of departure and delivery in support of major military operations, which will make departure points more attractive targets for attacks using weapons of mass destruction. Many future military operations will be in urban areas and require contact with host populations – conditions at odds with typical force protection practices and capabilities. Major military conflicts and transnational threats differ both in character and consequences, but do not differ substantially in the seriousness of the potential consequences, as Figure 7 depicts. It could be argued that many of the uncertainties associated with the transnational threat – the element of surprise, the difficulty of attribution, unclear purposes, and the possibility of attack on US soil – make it at least as challenging to counter as major theater war, and thus equally deserving of high priority within the Department of Defense. Moreover, the potential for significant casualties, in numbers far more than the public has experienced in recent regional military conflicts, demands that the problem be seriously addressed. 21
Page 1 and 2: The Defense Science Board 1997 Summ
Page 3 and 4: OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Page 5 and 6: 1997 DSB SUMMER STUDY DoD Responses
Page 7 and 8: VOLUME II - FORCE PROTECTION PREFAC
Page 9 and 10: PREFACE The Defense Science Board h
Page 11 and 12: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY With the change i
Page 13 and 14: to accomplish. An enhanced force pr
Page 15 and 16: crucial and thus the task force end
Page 17: CHAPTER 1. Setting the Stage “Thi
Page 20 and 21: At the request of the Chairman, Joi
Page 22 and 23: iological agents. Others involve ch
Page 24 and 25: In summary, DoD has many unique cap
Page 27: CHAPTER 2. Organizing a DoD Respons
Page 30 and 31: Further, they demonstrate that the
Page 32 and 33: coordinate activities, a member of
Page 34 and 35: Whether the successful execution of
Page 38 and 39: Major Military Conflicts Major Tran
Page 40 and 41: ability to project its forces abroa
Page 42 and 43: The Task Force recommends an initia
Page 44 and 45: Figure 11 shows the spectrum of new
Page 46 and 47: No New Organizations DoD can and sh
Page 48 and 49: Structuring the Operational and Tec
Page 51: CHAPTER 3. Technical Challenges “
Page 54 and 55: antibodies that might point to the
Page 56 and 57: Although it is important to continu
Page 58 and 59: detonated in a city, at a military
Page 60 and 61: headlines. With their often greater
Page 62 and 63: The Department of Energy, the Assis
Page 64 and 65: Union’s chemical and biological w
Page 66 and 67: among many users and suppliers to t
Page 68 and 69: The intended effects of an informat
Page 70 and 71: DoD must build the capability to im
Page 73: CHAPTER 4. Summary of Recommendatio
Page 76 and 77: − Define and develop an expanded
Page 78 and 79: THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 30 1
Page 80 and 81: ANNEX B. Task Force Organization an
Page 82 and 83: Task Force Membership Chair/Vice-Ch
Page 84 and 85: DoD Response Capabilities & Options
Page 86 and 87:
ANNEX C: Policy and Technology Reco
Page 88 and 89:
will facilitate development of sear
Page 90 and 91:
2. The Secretary of Defense should
Page 92 and 93:
• Assign the military services re
Page 94 and 95:
• The Department of Energy’s na
Page 96 and 97:
• DoD should continue, under Nunn
Page 98 and 99:
violet searchlights” might be use
Page 100 and 101:
implement defense information warfa
Page 102 and 103:
ANNEX D: Summary of Laws and Execut
Page 104 and 105:
In emergency situations, several ex
Page 106 and 107:
protection and training, for physic
Page 108:
6. Defense Against Weapons of Mass
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DoD Responses to Transnational Threats - The Black Vault

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