DoD Responses to Transnational Threats - The Black Vault

These early assessments have shown that, despite efforts to elevate the importance of force
protection, some apathy remains. Further risk mitigation measures may at times come at the
expense of mission requirements and/or quality of life. Deficiencies exist in training and equipping
security personnel, and in some situations, in physical security and protection against blast.
Notable shortfalls also exist in capabilities for chemical and biological attack detection,
characterization, warning, and mitigation. Personnel are particularly vulnerable in transit from one
installation or post to another. In addition, in many posts overseas, US personnel are heavily
reliant on host nation, third country, and contract labor which can raise unique security concerns.
Moreover, overseas rules of engagement can be restrictive, thus limiting the influence of US
forces outside the base perimeter. There is a need for local, organic, tactical intelligence collection
and fusion capabilities that bring together information specifically relevant to addressing unique
force protection challenges in specific locations.
The Secretary of Defense should reemphasize force protection as a mission responsibility by
elevating its priority in departmental strategy and guidance. The task force believes that DoD in
general, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in particular, deserve high marks for the
force protection efforts to date. But the problem has not yet been fully addressed, and there is
still much to do. An enhanced force protection program demands: an end-to-end mission
orientation, expanded vulnerability assessments, patching the “seams” created by diverse
responsibilities, focusing intelligence programs and capabilities, and exploiting promising
technologies, including the creation of a test bed focused on force protection.
The Department can further exploit current and emerging technologies to reduce force
protection vulnerabilities. The task force believes that there are a substantial number of
unexploited technologies that can be employed to enhance force protection capabilities both in
the near-term using commercial, off-the-shelf products and in the long-term as various new
technologies mature.
One promising new technology is the force protection “associate” – a collection of integrated
software tools for facility vulnerability analysis and risk management modeling that can be used
by local commanders. This tool could aid in deconflicting intelligence data and relating such data
to that drawn from local monitoring sources. It could also manage a local area intelligence/
surveillance system and provide for information sharing among different people in different
situations. DARPA is examining this concept for possible development.
With the many ideas available from both DoD labs and private industry, an issue is how to
prioritize and exploit these technologies to ensure that they make a difference. A screening
process is needed to help evaluate the technology options and accelerate the deployment of
promising technologies. A force protection test bed that involves the users in the evaluation
process would serve such a function and have the added benefit of sustaining the necessary focus
on force protection as a continuing effort. The task force recommends that the force protection
test bed initiative be assigned to the Joint Forces Command, as proposed in the Report of the
National Defense Panel, or should DoD not establish this organization, to the Atlantic Command.
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