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the use that is being made of them. The latter might not be a total guarantee against
proliferation, but is more reassuring than the attitude of countries that would insist on
extensive or total national control.
In fact, local conditions (social and environmental) for nuclear energy deployment
in the GCC countries are ideal, and permit very rapid implementation. The complex
authorization phase that is so long and cumbersome in most industrialized countries is
likely to be greatly simplified in the GCC countries, especially the smaller ones.
Construction times may well turn out to be shorter than in most other countries that are
developing their nuclear energy capacity.
It is unfortunate that the Gulf countries’ interest in nuclear energy is frequently
interpreted as little more than a cover for – sooner or later – establishing a military
capability. Obviously, the Iranian insistence on controlling fuel enrichment even before
they have a single nuclear power plant functioning has created substantial distrust in the
region. Similarly, Israel’s covert nuclear weapons programme and overt hostility to any
uptake of nuclear energy in neighbouring Arab countries complicate things. It is not
difficult to see how the difficult political climate in the region might interfere with the
logic of providing energy from a diversified array of sources, including nuclear.
However, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was designed not only to prevent
proliferation, but also to offer, in exchange for renouncing proliferation, a guarantee of
access to nuclear technology for civilian and peaceful purposes. The NPT regime will
stand or fall as a whole: preventing proliferation is already such a difficult task that it
cannot be pursued successfully if countries are denied access to nuclear technology for
civilian uses. In this respect, the GCC interest in nuclear energy also has the potential of
offering to the region and the world a model of civilian nuclear development which is
accompanied by guarantees of non-proliferation. Abu Dhabi, indeed, has signed up to
every conceivable non-proliferation and monitoring mechanism for its nuclear projects,
arguably to offer a counter-example to its nuclearized neighbours. It is almost certain that
Israel would object to Gulf nuclear energy nevertheless, but would probably find itself
isolated in its opposition.
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