BULGARIAN-SPEAKING MUSLIMS - Lalev

IDENTITY, NATIONALISM AND CULTURAL HERITAGE UNDER SIEGE: THE CASE OF POMAKS 

(BULGARIAN-SPEAKING MUSLIMS) IN BULGARIA 

Fatme M. Myuhtar-May 

A Dissertation presented to the faculty of Arkansas State University 

In partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Degree of 

DOCTOR OF HERITAGE STUDIES 

Arkansas State University 

August 2011 

Approved by 

Dr. Brady Banta, Dissertation Advisor 

Dr. Erik Gilbert, Committee Member 

Dr. Gregory Hansen, Committee Member

UMI Number: 3460680 

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ii

ABSTRACT 


IDENTITY, NATIONALISM AND CULTURAL HERITAGE UNDER SIEGE: THE CASE OF POMAKS 

(BULGARIAN-SPEAKING MUSLIMS) IN BULGARIA 

This research explores selected cultural traditions and histories associated with the Pomaks, 

a community inhabiting the Rhodope Mountains of southwestern Bulgaria. They speak Bulgarian as a 

mother tongue, but profess Islam as their religion unlike the country’s Orthodox Christian majority. 

Based on this linguistic unity, the Pomaks have been subjected to recurring forced assimilation since 

Bulgaria’s independence from Ottoman rule in 1878. Today, taking advantage of Bulgaria’s 

democratic rule, they are beginning to assert a heritage of their own making. Still, remnants of 

entrenched totalitarian mentality in the official cultural domain prevent any formal undertaking to 

that effect. 

With the Pomaks as my case study, this research links the concept of heritage to identity and 

the way dissenting voices negotiate a niche for themselves in public spaces already claimed by rigid 

master narratives. I advocate pluralistic interpretation of heritage in the public domain, where 

master and vernacular narratives exist and often collide. Insofar as cultural diversity serves to enrich 

the heritage discourse, heritage professionals ought to serve as educators in society, not as creators 

of exclusionary master narratives. Using fieldwork, archival research, and available literature to 

support a relevant theoretical framework, I strive for understanding of what constitutes (Pomak) 

heritage and what ways there are to promote and preserve alternative narratives. Five stories 

regarding Pomak identity serve as my analytical frame of reference and constitute a premeditated 

effort to identify, formulate, and preserve in writing fundamental aspects of a highly contested and 

threatened heritage. 

iii

A striking example of a Pomak tradition which merits preservation is the elaborate wedding 

of Ribnovo, a small village in the western Rhodope. The wedding’s most visible manifestation today is 

the elaborate and colorful mask of the bride, a ritual long gone extinct outside of Ribnovo. Four other 

case studies examine prominent aspects of Pomak heritage, including forced assimilation, 

nationalism, and historical narratives. 

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

When I started the Heritage Studies PhD program at Arkansas State University, my biggest 

dilemma was the choice of a dissertation topic. As the heritage studies field was new to me, it was not 

an easy undertaking to select a topic with which I would stick. Thus tormented by a dissertation 

predicament, I flew to Atlanta to meet with my former professor Dr. Abdullahi Ahmed An’Naim of the 

Emory Law School (he taught a class on Islam at the Central European University which I took). 

Professor An’Naim could not solve the dilemma for me, but he gave me the best piece of advice: 

“Whatever you do, choose something you feel passionate about.” I only fathomed the wisdom of his 

words two years into my research when I had grown frustrated with the whole dissertation writing 

business. Indeed, were it not for my passion to drive me further and deeper into my topic, I may have 

abandoned the whole idea of pursuing a PhD degree. 

I owe a debt of gratitude to my dissertation advisor, Dr. Brady Banta, who painstakingly 

scrutinized every paragraph I constructed, thus, pushing me to reflect on every sentence I wrote or I 

will ever write. As trying as it often was, this experience helped to boost my writing confidence 

tremendously. More importantly, Dr. Banta motivated me to stay true to myself throughout the 

process of conducting fieldwork, formulating ideas, and writing chapters. 

Many thanks to Dr. Erik Gilbert and Dr. Gregory Hansen, the two members of my dissertation 

committee, the former for introducing me to the concept of nationalism and its incredible influence 

on issues of heritage, and the latter for initiating me into the methodology of ethnographic research. 

I am deeply grateful to Dr. Clyde Milner II, Dr. Carol O’Connor, Dr. Deborah Chappel Traylor, 

Dr. Pamela Hronek, and Dr. Gina Hogue for boosting my confidence when I most needed it. 

I owe eternal gratitude to Ivan Terziev, Ramadan Runtov, Ismail Byalkov, Fikrie Topova, the 

Cesur family of Istanbul, the Raim family of Istanbul, Melike Belinska, Mehmed Buykli, Mehmed 

Dorsunski, and many others for making it possible for me to collect information and build my 

v

esearch. They served as my gracious hosts, invaluable informants, and tireless research partners, 

and without their help my dissertation experience would not have been as fulfilling as it was. 

I am especially indebted to my friends Terry Thomas, Malissa Davis, Simon Hosken (with 

whom we often went “to see the wizard”), Rose Ong’oa Morara, and many others for being a source of 

cheer and inspiration for me. 

Finally, but not lastly, I thank my husband Michael, my parents Mehmed and Sanie Myuhtar, 

and my in-laws Joe and Carolyn May for being the best support in life one could wish for. 

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

List of Tables .................................................................................................................................................................................. xii 

List of Figures ............................................................................................................................................................................... xiii 

FOREWORD ................................................................................................................................................................................... xvi 

Chapter 

I INTRODUCTION: Contested Identity and the Politics of Heritage .......................................................... 1 

Introduction................................................................................................................................................... 1 

Heritage as Discipline ................................................................................................................................ 3 

Heritage as Identity .................................................................................................................................... 3 

1. Vernacular (Dissenting) Identity ................................................................................... 3 

2. National (Dominant) Identity.......................................................................................... 7 

3. Pluralistic Approach to Interpretation Needed .................................................... 10 

Five Case Studies ...................................................................................................................................... 11 

II 

NATIONALISM OF COERSION: The Case of Pomak Christianization (Pokrastvane) in Bulgaria, 

1912-1913 .................................................................................................................................................................... 15 

The Thesis ................................................................................................................................................... 15 

The Pomaks................................................................................................................................................. 23 

War and Pokrastvane (Christianization) in 1912-1913 .......................................................... 32 

1. The Balkan Wars ................................................................................................................ 33 

vii

2. The Pokrastvane ................................................................................................................. 34 

2.1. The Killings in Oral History ...................................................................... 47 

2.2. The Killings Documented .......................................................................... 54 

2.3. Humanity and Survival along the Way ............................................... 58 

2.4. The Pokrastvane of Muslim Prisoners of War (POWs) ................ 64 

2.5. The Tide Is Turning ..................................................................................... 67 

3. War and Pokrastvane No More .................................................................................... 73 

Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................... 74 

III 

REVIVAL PROCESS: The Forced Renaming of Pomak Muslims in Communist Bulgaria 

(1944-1989) ................................................................................................................................................................. 78 

Introduction................................................................................................................................................ 78 

Policy and Ideology of the Revival Process .................................................................................... 80 

Bringing about Crisis .............................................................................................................................. 88 

A Gellnerian Model of National Sentiment .................................................................................... 93 

From Pokrastvane to Revival Process............................................................................................ 108 

1. The Rebirth of Rodina .................................................................................................... 108 

2. Mission: Revival ................................................................................................................ 118 

Turmoil in the (Western) Rhodopes ............................................................................................ 124 

Women in the Revival Process ......................................................................................................... 129 

Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................ 134 

1. External Pressure, Internal Turmoil, and the “Big Excursion” ................... 134 

2. The End Is Near or Is It? .............................................................................................. 137 

3. Implications for Pomak Heritage ............................................................................. 141 

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IV 

THE REVIVAL PROCESS: A Pomak (Bulgarian-Muslim) Life of Dissent amidst Cultural 

Oppression in Communist Bulgaria ................................................................................................................ 144 

Synopsis ..................................................................................................................................................... 144 

Meeting Ramadan ................................................................................................................................. 144 

The Revival Process Ordeal ................................................................................................................ 147 

Trouble in Kornitsa .............................................................................................................................. 151 

Trouble in Exile ...................................................................................................................................... 157 

Bloody Revival in the Rhodopes ..................................................................................................... 160 

Prison Tribulations............................................................................................................................... 166 

1. Arrest, Detention and Trial ........................................................................................ 166 

2. Tortured Prisoner........................................................................................................... 169 

3. Release and Re-Imprisonment ................................................................................. 173 

“Take the Passport or Die” ................................................................................................................ 176 

Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................ 177 

V THE RIBNOVO WEDDING: A Pomak Tradition .......................................................................................... 180 

Introduction............................................................................................................................................. 180 

Ribnovo: Place and People ................................................................................................................ 184 

Colorful Fairytale Ribnovo ................................................................................................................. 189 

From Ribnovo to the Delta ................................................................................................................ 210 

Marriage: “The Key Turning Point in … Adult Life” ............................................................... 214 

Asserting Identity through Custom ............................................................................................... 220 

VI 

PRESERVING HERITAGE THROUGH MICROHISTORY: The Case of Salih Aga of Paşmaklı, 

Pomak Governor of the Ahı Çelebi Kaaza of the Ottoman Empire (1798-1838)........................ 228 

Heritage as Microhistory ................................................................................................................... 228 

Finding My Own Good Story............................................................................................................. 231 

ix

Salih Aga and His Time ....................................................................................................................... 235 

Who Wrote about Salih Aga .............................................................................................................. 241 

Salih’s Family Tree ................................................................................................................................ 249 

Salih, the Family Man........................................................................................................................... 254 

1. Mustafa Adji Aga ............................................................................................................. 254 

2. Salihagovitsa (the Wife of Salih Aga) ..................................................................... 259 

Salih, the Public Man ............................................................................................................................ 265 

The Death of Salih Aga ........................................................................................................................ 270 

Conclusion: Salih Aga’s Heritage .................................................................................................... 275 

VII CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................................ 278 

Making Sense of the Past ................................................................................................................... 278 

The Role of the Heritage Broker ..................................................................................................... 281 

In Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................... 285 

APPENDICES ............................................................................................................................................................................... 290 

2.1: Pomak population in the Provinces Thrace and Macedonia during the Balkan Wars .... 290 

2.2: Report of Pazardjik activists for Pomak conversion to Archiship Maxim ............................ 291 

2.3: Excerpts from the Carnegie Report on the Balkan Wars, 1914 ................................................. 293 

3.1: Broken Tombstones ...................................................................................................................................... 295 

3.2A: Applications for emigration submitted by Pomaks ..................................................................... 297 

3.2B: Number of passports issued to Pomaks ............................................................................................ 298 

3.2C: Statistics on Pomak immigration ......................................................................................................... 299 

3.3: Statistics on Zagrajden Municipality ..................................................................................................... 300 

6.1: Ballad about the killing of Salih Aga ...................................................................................................... 305 

x

6.2: Salih Aga’s Seal ................................................................................................................................................ 307 

BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................................................................... 308 

xi

LIST OF TABLES 

Table 

3-1. Number of Pomaks with censored attire and changed names by villages and towns...................... 113 

xii

LIST OF FIGURES 

Figure 

2-1: Map of the Rhodope Mountains in Bulgaria ........................................................................................................... 38 

2-2: Pokrastvane in the village of Devin, 1912-1913 ................................................................................................... 44 

2-3: Pokrastvane in the village of Banya, 1912-1913 .................................................................................................. 45 

2-4: A pokrastvane wedding ................................................................................................................................................... 46 

2-5: A commemorative water fountain in Valkossel ................................................................................................... 50 

2-6: A commemorative marble plaque next to the fountain ................................................................................... 51 

3-1: National Sentiment Continuum ................................................................................................................................... 99 

3-2: National Sentiment Continuum in regard to the Pomaks in Bulgaria ....................................................... 99 

4-1: On the University of Marmara’s campus, Istanbul (Turkey) ....................................................................... 145 

4-2: Ramadan Runtov ............................................................................................................................................................. 148 

4-3: Ramadan with his family, circa 1959-1960 ......................................................................................................... 154 

4-4: A commemorative monument in the village of Kornitsa .............................................................................. 161 

4-5: Ismail Kalyuor of Breznitsa died as a result of the events of March 1973 ............................................ 162 

4-6: At Ismail’s ........................................................................................................................................................................... 164 

4-7: The happy, post-communist days ............................................................................................................................ 178 

5-1: Ribnovo .............................................................................................................................................................................. 185 

5-2: Ribnovo’s public square: horo dancing ................................................................................................................. 186 

5-3: Kadrie and Feim Hatip from Ribnovo as bride and groom in February 2005 ..................................... 187 

5-4: A happy bride .................................................................................................................................................................... 189 

5-5: Young women hold gifts at Kadrie and Feim’s wedding ............................................................................... 191 

5-6: The wedding begins ....................................................................................................................................................... 192 

5-7: Live music ........................................................................................................................................................................... 193 

5-8: Kardie’s father lifts the bayrak with one hand and drops a bill to the bearer with the other ...... 194 

5-9: Kadrie’s mother and father carefully assist her out on the way to her new life as a wife ............. 195 

5-10: Kadrie wearing full bridal make-up ..................................................................................................................... 195 

5-11: A Ribnovo bride fully arraigned in the traditional way .............................................................................. 196 

xiii

5-12: Bride Kadrie Kadieva .................................................................................................................................................. 196 

5-13: Sanie and Mehmed Myuhtar .................................................................................................................................... 199 

5-14: Wedding of Fatme Aguleva of Kornitsa, Western Rhodopes, 1967 ....................................................... 200 

5-15: Wedding photograph of Atie Hadjieva of Valkossel, 1971......................................................................... 200 

5-16: Wedding of Atidje and Mustafa Chavdarov of Valkossel, 1972 ............................................................... 201 

5-17: Wedding of Atidje and Mustafa Chavdarov of Valkossel, 1972 ............................................................... 201 

5-18: Wedding of Gyula and Mustafa Chavdarov of Valkossel, early 1970s .................................................. 201 

5-19: Wedding of Fatma and Mehmed Chavdarov of Valkossel, late 1960s .................................................. 202 

5-20: Ayshe and Mustafa Drelev of Valkossel, early 1970s ................................................................................... 202 

5-21: Wedding of Sadbera and Izir Chavdarov of Vakossel, 1968 ...................................................................... 202 

5-22: Wedding of Nadjibe and Natak Dermendjiev of Valkossel, early 1970s ............................................. 202 

5-23: The bride is about to be decorated ....................................................................................................................... 203 

5-24: Ribnovo women demonstrate a decoration ..................................................................................................... 203 

5-25: Fully decorate Kadrie is about to be dressed ................................................................................................... 204 

5-26: Veiling the bride - Step 1 ........................................................................................................................................... 205 



5-29: Cheiz I ................................................................................................................................................................................ 208 

5-30: Cheiz II ............................................................................................................................................................................... 208 

5-31: Cheiz III ............................................................................................................................................................................. 209 

5-32: Cheiz IV ............................................................................................................................................................................. 209 

6-1: The konak of Deli-Ali Bey in Smolyan .................................................................................................................... 233 

6-2: Melike Belinska ................................................................................................................................................................ 234 

6-3: The Smolyan Waterfall, also known as “The Gorge of Salih Aga,” postcard, c. 1960 ........................ 241 

6-4: The konak of Salih Aga in Paşmaklı, 1920 (copy of original photograph) ............................................. 246 

6-5: The konak of Salih Aga in Paşmaklı, undated ..................................................................................................... 247 

6-6: The konak of Salih Aga in Paşmaklı, 1921, gift from Todor Georgiev to Petar Marinov ................. 248 

6-7: Family Tree ........................................................................................................................................................................ 252 

xiv

6-8: Inscribed metal dish ...................................................................................................................................................... 253 

6-9: Inscribed metal dish, close view............................................................................................................................... 254 

6-10: Scene I ............................................................................................................................................................................... 262 

6-11: Scene II .............................................................................................................................................................................. 263 

6-12: Scene III ............................................................................................................................................................................ 264 

6-13: Scene IV............................................................................................................................................................................. 265 

6-14: The Sycamore in Smolyan ........................................................................................................................................ 267 

6-15: An arched bridge in Smolyan .................................................................................................................................. 268 

6-16: An arched bridge leading to Salih’s konak ........................................................................................................ 269 

xv

FOREWORD 

The collapse of the medieval Christian Kingdom of Bulgaria to the Muslim Turks in the late 

fourteenth century ushered in an era of Ottoman domination that lasted for nearly five centuries. 

Although during the half a millennium of Ottoman rule, a substantial part of the population converted 

to Islam, the millet system, introduced as early as the 1450s, provided for the religious autonomy of 

Jews, Roman Catholics, Greek- and Armenian Orthodox Christians. 1 Indeed, the Ottomans were not 

interested in the wholesale Islamization of their Christian subjects even though forced conversions 

sporadically occurred following outbreaks of unrest or to ensure Ottoman control of strategically 

vital regions of the empire, especially in the Balkans. 2 

Notwithstanding the system that facilitated religious tolerance, Shari’a, the normative 

Islamic law of the Ottoman Empire, discriminated against the rayah (non-Muslims) and burdened 

them with additional taxes, including cizie (per capita tax) and ispençe/haraç (land tax). Because the 

cizie contributed up to a half of the empire’s revenue, 3 any forced Islamization would have run 

counter to the Ottoman financial interests. In fact, abundant evidence suggests that voluntary 

acceptance of Islam was the prevalent mode of conversion among (Christian) peoples of the 

Balkans. 4 The change of religious affiliation stemmed from private ambitions to preserve or expand 

one’s property, to avoid special taxes, to receive benefits from the state (i.e. pensions), and to enjoy a 

range of privileges only available to Muslims in the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, Ottoman archives 

contain formal petitions for conversion (kisve bahası) attesting that whole communities collectively 

1 The Slavic-speaking Christians in the Turkish realm, including the Bulgarians, were under the jurisdiction of 

the Greek Church or the Orthodox milletbașı (milletbashi) (i.e. Greek Patriarch) in Constantinople (Istanbul). 

2 For a detailed history of Bulgaria, see R.J. Crampton, Bulgaria (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 

3 Ali Eminov, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), 37. 

4 For a detailed account of the conversion to Islam in the Balkans, see Anton Minkov, Conversion to Islam in the 

Balkans: Kisve Bahası Petitions and Ottoman Social Life, 1670-1730 (Boston: Brill, 2004). 

xvi

accepted Islam. 5 When communities in Bulgaria converted, they often continued to speak their 

mother tongue, thus becoming a group of their own. According to J.R. Crampton, this is how the 

Bulgarian-speaking Muslims, or Pomaks, appeared. 6 

Even though conversion to Islam in Bulgaria and throughout the Balkans was largely 

voluntary, religious tension abounded in the Ottoman Empire. Strife often occurred among Balkan 

co-religionists. Indeed, the Bulgarian national revival arose, in large part, as a response to 

confrontations during the 1830s and 1840s with the Greek Orthodox Church and religious 

dominance. The emerging Bulgarian intellectual and economic elite in the nineteenth century felt so 

utterly controlled by the Greek Patriarchate that in 1860 they pushed for declaration of ecclesiastical 

independence. It was this protracted struggle for religio-cultural autonomy from the Orthodox 

Greeks, J.R. Crampton contends, that “turned a number of powerful and influential Bulgarians in the 

direction of a political struggle aimed at the creation of independent nation-state” 7 by the later 

nineteenth century. 

After the unilateral secession from the Orthodox Patriarchate in 1860, the next vital step for 

the Bulgarians was to obtain Ottoman recognition of a separate Church. This effort, however, was 

fraught with frustration as the Ottoman government, confronting fierce opposition from the 

Orthodox Patriarchate in Constantinople which refused to accept the de facto separation, delayed a 

decision. Ultimately, Crampton argues, this difficult fight for religious independence helped define 

the emerging sense of Bulgarian nationalism. Whereas “the Church needed the nation to free it from 

Greek dominion,” the nation needed the Church for cultural leadership. 

In fact, the Bulgarians were so intent on ecclesiastical autonomy from the Greeks that, by 

February 1870, the Ottoman government felt compelled to issue a ferman (royal permission) 

decreeing the formation of a separate Bulgarian Orthodox Church. While the Bulgarian Exarchate 

8 

5 Minkov, passim. 

6 Crampton, 19-20. 

7 Ibid., 25. 

8 Ibid., 64. 

xvii

(religious leadership) was still subordinate to the Greek Patriarchate on matters of doctrine, all in all, 

the Bulgarian struggle for ecclesiastical independence set the foundation for developing a Bulgarian 

national consciousness. 9 In fact, in 1895, the Orthodox Exarch let the Catholic Prince Ferdinand of 

Bulgaria know that the Eastern Orthodox faith was inseparable from the Bulgarian people, and that 

only the Orthodox Bulgarian was “true Bulgarian.” 10 Thus, the Church played a pivotal role in the rise 

of Bulgarian nationalism, and the emergence of the Bulgarian nation-state during the late nineteenth 

century. 

In addition to the Greco-Bulgarian religious conflict, there was also political antagonism 

emerging within the Ottoman Empire. Gaining ecclesiastical independence from the Greeks in 1860 

only hastened the Bulgarians’ resolve to build a nation-state of their own. Their ambition was greatly 

facilitated by the marked decline of the Ottoman Empire occurring in the early 1800s. The Serbs and 

Greeks revolted against their Turkish overlords in 1803 and 1821 respectively to emerge as 

independent nation-states by the century’s third and fourth decades. This national awakening in the 

Balkans was largely in response to the popular Western European nationalism spreading eastwards 

from France, Italy, and Germany. As Richard C. Hall observes: 

A strong desire to achieve national unity motivated the Balkan states to confront their 

erstwhile Ottoman conquerors. Balkan leaders believed that only after the attainment of 

national unity could their states develop and prosper. In this regard the Balkan peoples 

sought to emulate the political and economic success of western Europe … by adopting the 

western European concept of nationalism as the model for their national development. 11 

Strongly influenced by the western ideal of nation-state, especially following the successful 

unifications of Italy and Germany by the early 1870s, the Christian populations of the nineteenthcentury 

Balkan Peninsula revolted against their imperial masters almost in common agreement. In 

the spirit of all-pervading agitation in the Ottoman realm, the Bulgarians rebelled in April 1876. The 

brutal suppression of the uprising generated international sympathy and support for the cause of 

Bulgarian independence. Taking advantage of the crisis, Tsarist Russia declared war on Ottoman 

9 Ibid., 63-80. 

10 Ibid., 146. 

11 Richard C. Hall, The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913: Prelude to the First World War (New York: Routledge, 2000), 1. 

xviii

Turkey in 1877, partially in support of its Orthodox Slavic brethren’s struggle for independence and 

partially in fulfillment of its own ambitions for dominance in the Balkans. The Treaty of San Stefano 

of March 1878 concluded the Russian-Turkish War and created a large Bulgarian nation-state in the 

heart of the Peninsula. 

The combination of a strong Bulgaria and potent Russian presence in the region, however, 

did not square well with the interests of Great Britain, France, Germany, Austro-Hungary, and Italy. 

This new nation-state, under profound Russian influence, incorporated territory that stretched from 

the Danube River to the north to the Aegean Sea to the south, dwarfing all its neighbors except 

Ottoman Turkey. Responding to a general sense of urgency, Otto von Bismarck, First Chancellor of 

Germany, convened a congress in Berlin in 1878, where the powerful of the day duly partitioned 

Bulgaria, reducing it to a hapless principality under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. Most of 

southern Bulgaria, better known as Eastern Rumelia, became a semi-independent province under 

Ottoman authority, while Macedonia (west of Eastern Rumelia) was restored to direct sultanic rule. 

By partitioning the country, the Berlin Congress portended disaster for Bulgaria. So powerful was the 

sense of loss among the Bulgarian nation that in coming years it stimulated the emergence of an 

aggressive nationalism. Bulgaria’s neighbors Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro felt similarly hurt by 

the standing Berlin Treaty. 12 

As the party most aggrieved by the Berlin agreement, Bulgaria was the first to act against it. 

In September 1885, the Bulgarian Principality unilaterally proclaimed its unification with Eastern 

Rumelia. Because none of the western Great Powers took direct action to enforce the Berlin decision, 

they implicitly validated the unification. Unable to reverse the course of events on its own, Turkey 

had formally recognized united Bulgaria by 1908. This development notwithstanding, the emerging 

Balkan nation-states still felt victimized by the Berlin Congress of 1878. They all had aspirations to 

territories remaining within the Ottoman Empire. The Bulgarians desired Thrace, the Greeks coveted 

Aegean islands, and the Serbs and Montenegrins aspired to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina and northern 

Albania respectively. All four, however, harbored ambitions to dominate Macedonia, a fertile region 

12 Hall, 1-21; Crampton, 23-95. 

xix

in the heart of Balkan Turkey. Thus, by the first decade of the twentieth century, Macedonia had 

become the pivot of territorial ambition for the most powerful Balkan nations. 13 

Concurrently, in 1903, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) – a proindependence 

movement with expressed Bulgarian leanings – organized a revolt in Macedonia 

against Ottoman authority. The rebellion, however, was promptly crushed. Thereafter, Bulgaria 

claimed the right to protect the territory’s Bulgarian population, but mostly it sought to realize its 

long-standing ambition to annex Macedonia. Aware of its inability to face the Ottomans alone, 

Bulgaria sought alliance and military support from Serbia. Russia, for its part, was simultaneously 

orchestrating an Orthodox coalition against Turkey. Although the initial cooperation between 

Bulgaria and Serbia collapsed due to conflicting interests in Macedonia, the possibility emerged of a 

Balkan alliance against the Ottoman Empire. 14 

Apart from common territorial interests, one particular political development, according to 

Hall, finally compelled Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro to work together against their 

common Muslim adversary. That spark came from the Young Turk revolution and the Ottoman 

Empire’s own attempt at espousing the ideology of nationalism. In July 1908, a cabal of junior officers 

staged a coup d’état in Constantinople, seizing control of government and immediately launching 

political reforms. The group called itself Committee for Unity and Progress, popularly known as the 

Young Turks (Jön Türkler), and their prime objective was to unify Turkey and to prevent further 

disintegration. In resonance with the Christian nationalists in the Balkans, the Young Turks sought to 

instill a sense of Ottoman identity among the various peoples of the empire. To prevent a further loss 

of territories to rebellious subjects, however, they set out to create a powerful, modern army. The 

Young Turk revolution had a ripple effect in the Balkans and beyond, causing nation-states and 

empires to be nervous about achieving their territorial ambitions at the expense of the Ottoman 

realm. Whereas Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece feared their ability to withstand a potentially more 

powerful Ottoman military, the Habsburg and Romanov dynasties had aspirations, respectively, to 

13 Hall, 1-21; Crampton, 97-188. 

14 Hall, 1-21; Crampton, 150-219. 

xx

control Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Straits of Bosphorus. As Hall aptly observes, “The Young Turk 

revolt and the celebration of Ottoman nationhood raised concerns in the Balkan capitals [and 

beyond] that the Balkan populations in a reformed Turkey would be less susceptible to their 

nationalistic blandishments.” 15 

Both Bulgaria and Serbia felt the need to act together in defense of their shared interests 

before the Young Turks’ reforms could produce any meaningful results. Russia, for its part, desired a 

Balkan alliance against the Austrians and the Ottomans in order to bolster its own position on the 

Peninsula. Thus, pressured by nationalist concerns on one side and by Russia on another, Bulgaria 

and Serbia finally signed an agreement in March 1912. In addition to providing for military 

cooperation against both Austria-Hungary and Turkey, it recognized Bulgarian interests in Thrace 

and Serbian interest in Kosovo and Albania, while also including provisions on Macedonia. The 

Macedonian question, however, was particularly difficult. The two nations nevertheless agreed that if 

independence could not be achieved, they would divide Macedonia between themselves. This 

arrangement satisfied the Bulgarian authorities because they believed that an initially autonomous 

Macedonia could be subsequently annexed. 16 

Serbia, on the other hand, was not very enthusiastic about the treaty since the country 

harbored its own aspirations for Macedonia. Thus, the agreement for military cooperation stood on 

shaky grounds from the start. Meanwhile Bulgaria responded positively to Greece’s overtures to join 

the pact. Since neither Bulgaria nor Serbia was a viable maritime power, the allies needed the Greek 

navy to police the waters of the Aegean and to hinder the Ottomans from provisioning their forces 

and from transferring more troops to Europe. Thus, a separate treaty of cooperation was signed 

between Bulgaria and Greece in May 1912. Whereas Bulgaria took care to formalize its alliance with 

Montenegro as with Serbia and Greece, the relationship among the later nations stood largely on oral 

15 Hall, 7. For details on the Young Turks and Turkish nationalism, see Erik Jan Zürcher, The Young Turk Legacy 

and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Ataturk's Turkey (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010). 

16 Hall, 1-21; Crampton, 150-219. 

xxi

agreement. This uncertain and complex political dealing, then, set the foundation for the Balkan 

League that would fight Ottoman Turkey in the First Balkan War. 17 

The First Balkan War began in September 1912, when Montenegro attacked Ottoman 

positions, invoking frontier disputes as an excuse. Later, in October 1912, the Balkan League 

collectively attacked the Ottoman Empire. According to preliminary arrangements, the largest and 

most powerful Bulgarian army focused its efforts on Thrace, the territory closest to Constantinople 

and most fiercely defended by the Ottomans. Serbia invaded Macedonia, while Greece attacked 

Salonika, effectively curbing the Ottoman supply line through the Aegean Sea. An armistice 

temporarily halted the war during December and January, and the belligerents signed a preliminary 

peace treaty in London on May 30, 1913. But as no compromise ensued, the conflict resumed in June. 

This was the beginning of the Second Balkan War, in which Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro jointly 

attacked Bulgaria. This dramatic turn of events resulted from the fact that the more powerful 

Bulgarian army had occupied the biggest share of Ottoman territories during the First Balkan War, 

much to the chagrin of its former allies. Taking advantage of the moment, Turkey and Romania 

declared war on Bulgaria, too. Squeezed from all sides, by the summer of 1913, the Bulgarian forces 

were exhausted from fighting, forced to cover multiple battlefronts simultaneously, and plagued by 

disease to top it all. Thus, the second Balkan alliance quickly overwhelmed Bulgaria, with Serbia and 

Montenegro advancing from the west, Greece and Turkey from the south, and Romania from the 

north. By the fall, Bulgaria was defeated. The peace treaties signed in Bucharest in August 1913 and 

Constantinople in September ended the Balkan Wars, but in less than a year the Peninsula was 

embroiled in another war, this time global. 18 

The Balkan Wars were a crucial period for Bulgaria. The nascent nation-state was still in the 

process of intensive territorial and cultural consolidation following five centuries of Ottoman 

domination. The enormous territorial expansion during the First Balkan War incorporated new and 

significant Muslim population into Bulgaria, most of which spoke Slavic (Bulgarian) language. Even 

17 Ibid. 

18 For a detail account of the Balkan Wars, see Hall’s The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913. 

xxii

after the loss of the Second Balkan War, Bulgaria still held on to most of the Rhodope Mountains, a 

territory compactly settled by Slavic-speaking Muslims (Pomaks). To legitimize its claim over the 

freshly acquired Ottoman territories, Bulgaria’s first order of business, following the conquest, was to 

proclaim the Pomaks “Bulgarian,” based on language commonality, and to attempt to convert them to 

Orthodox Christianity. The Balkan Wars’ pokrastvane – religious conversion through Orthodox 

baptism and name replacement – began a sustained assimilation of Pomaks in Bulgaria. It would set a 

precedent for further religious conversion, name changing, and systematic suppression of Pomak 

cultural traditions. Following the pokrastvane, Bulgarian historiography institutionalized the thesis 

that the Pomaks descended from “Bulgarians” forcibly Islamized sometime prior to the eighteenth 

century. Acting upon this thesis, Bulgarian nationalists launched another round of religious 

conversion in the Rhodopes in 1938, but it was promptly aborted by the communist takeover in 

September 1944. The final and most comprehensive assimilation took place in 1972-1974, when the 

communist regime substituted the traditional Turkish-Arab names of all Pomaks with ones of 

Bulgarian-Orthodox significance. This state of affairs only ended with the collapse of communism in 

Bulgaria, and across Eastern Europe, in late 1989. 

xxiii

CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTION: 

CONTESTED IDENTITY AND THE POLITICS OF HERITAGE 

Introduction 

“Heritage is everywhere,” David Lowenthal declares. People cherish their heritage and so it 

matters to them. 1 When individuals, communities, and nation-states assign narratives to places and 

the past, heritage comes to life and, in time, transpires as identity. As cultural identities are shaped, 

heritage becomes mandatory, and as national narratives are formed, heritage gets institutionalized. 

When master narratives dominate public spaces, dissenting voices inevitably challenge them by 

seeking inclusion or insisting on their separate versions of history. As the politics of heritage, thus, 

comes into play, it necessitates the existence of academic disciplines that study, promote, and 

educate on pluralistic approaches to brokering heritage. This Introduction suggests a working 

definition of heritage applicable to the case of the contested Pomak identity in Bulgaria. The Pomaks 

are a community of people that speak Bulgarian as a mother tongue, but profess Islam as their 

religion unlike the country’s Orthodox Christian majority. Based on the unity of language, the Pomaks 

have been historically subjected to recurring forced assimilation since Bulgaria’s independence from 

the Ottoman Empire in 1878. Already in the early twentieth century, the nascent and aggressive 

Bulgarian nationalism sought to convert the Pomaks to Orthodox Christianity as a way to consolidate 

territory and forge national identity. The underlying rationale for the assimilation rested on the 

claim that the Pomaks descend from Christian Bulgarians, whom the Ottomans converted to Islam at 

sword point sometime before the 1800s. Even as this narrative has taken deep roots in Bulgaria’s 

1 David Lowenthal, “The Heritage Crusade and Its Contradictions,” in Giving Preservation a History, ed. Max Page 

and Randall Mason (New York: Routelege, 2004), 19-43. 

1

historical discourse as the single, undisputable truth, there is an emerging recognition among 

Bulgarian scholars that conversions to Islam among the Slavic population of the Balkans between the 

fourteenth and nineteenth century were largely voluntary. 2 Nevertheless, the forced-assimilation 

thesis and the deeply seated anti-Ottoman/Turkish/Islamic nationalism in Bulgaria (and the Balkans 

as a whole) render it impossible for the Pomaks to stake a claim to Muslimness. In the vocabulary of 

Bulgarian nationalism, Muslim means “the Other,” “the Outsider,” “the Enemy.” The Bulgarianspeaking 

Muslims, therefore, cannot profess Islam or maintain a separate religious identity and still 

be “true” Bulgarians. Repeatedly harassed to renounce their faith and traditions, the Pomaks have 

resisted every attempt at conversion or forced assimilation by various regimes in Bulgaria. Today, 

taking advantage of the country’s democratic rule, they insist on being able to freely assert a Pomak 

heritage of their own making. 3 Still, remnants of entrenched totalitarian mentality in Bulgaria’s 

official nationalist ideology nip in the bud any formal undertaking to that effect. 4 

In view of the Pomak case, this introduction links heritage to identity and the way dissenting 

voices negotiate a niche for themselves in public spaces already claimed by rigid master narratives. 

Often these are the official, government-promoted, institutionalized versions of the past and present, 

which – to varying degrees – limit or deny access of vernacular (minority, dissenting) narratives to 

the public domain. Drawing from my own research and case studies furnished by others, I strive to 

understand of what constitutes heritage and how to promote and preserve dissenting narratives. 

Five stories regarding Pomak identity serve as my analytical frame of reference and constitute a 

premeditated effort to identify, formulate, and preserve in writing fundamental aspects of a highly 

2 For details, see Chapter II of this dissertation. 

3 In this dissertation, the terms Pomaks, Slavic/Bulgarian-speaking Muslims, Bulgarian Muslims are used 

interchangeably as synonymous. 

4 The latest, among many, scandals involves the attempt of the Bulgarian Statistical Institute to democratically 

respond to people’s demands for free self-identification by including “Bulgaro-Mohammedan” and “Macedonian” 

identities, among others, in the 2011 census forms. Even though “Bulgaro-Mohammedan” or “Bulgarian- 

Mohammedan” is the standard name of reference to the Pomaks in Bulgaria, the ultra-nationalist political 

formation VMRO immediately declared this act “monstrous,” “Stalinist” revisionism of Bulgarian history. The 

scandal generated a wave of resignations in the Bulgarian Statistical Institute as seasoned statisticians were 

accused of trying to create a “Bulgaro-Mohammedan ethnicity” in Bulgaria. Needless to say, the proposed 

changes to the census form were immediately dropped. Thus, during the forthcoming 2011 census, the Pomaks’s 

choice of identity is already restricted to “Bulgarians,” “Turks,” or “Others.” (Mihail Ivanov, “Prebroyavaneto 

dogodina veche e comprometirano” / “Next-Year’s Census Has Already Been Compromised”/ in Mediapool.bg of 

23 September 2010). 

2

contested, threatened heritage. By necessity, this work begins with discussion of what I perceive 

heritage to be and how it relates to identity. 

Heritage as Discipline 

Heritage as an academic concept has an amorphous character because it explores the overlapping 

sections of various disciplines such as history, ethnography, tourism, geography, literature, folklore, 

archeology, environmental science, and others. According to the Merriam-Webster Collegiate 

Dictionary’s definition, 5 heritage is “[p]roperty that descends to an heir, something transmitted by or 

acquired from a predecessor; a legacy, inheritance, tradition, something passed on as a result of one’s 

natural situation or birth.” 6 Thus, in addition to specifying that heritage is an entity that is passed on 

from one human generation to the next, the above definition suggests that heritage can be of both 

material (tangible) and symbolic (intangible) nature. Material things that constitute heritage may be 

family heirlooms (real estate, jewelry, china, furniture, art works, etc.), vintage cars, architectural 

buildings and monuments, heritage sites, historical records, natural environment, and wildlife. 

Heritage that is of intangible or symbolic nature, on the other hand, reflects people’s sense of 

identity, i.e. their understanding of who they are and their shared memories of the past as well as 

aspirations for the present and future. Although distinct, these two aspects of heritage are inherently 

connected through being claimed, preserved, and celebrated by people. While physical heritage 

requires conservation to endure as material anchors of community identity, spiritual heritage rests 

on commemoration as a way to preserve what cannot be rendered into objects: the sense of 

belonging together. Ultimately, both forms of heritage are essential for promoting identity as a vital 

component of people’s sense of self and place in society. 

Heritage as Identity 

1. Vernacular (Dissenting) Identity 

5 Also adopted by the Arkansas State University’s (ASU’s) Heritage Studies Ph.D. Program. Available from ASU, 

at: http://www2.astate.edu/a/heritage-studies/HSwhat-is-heritage.dot. Last accessed October 19, 2010. 

6 Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary, Eleventh edition (Merriam Webster Incorporated, 2004), 582. 

3

“[I]t has become conventional wisdom,” W. Fitzhugh Brundage posits, “that memory [as 

heritage] is inextricably bound up with group [community] identity.” 7 Both material and symbolic 

heritage is constructed by people to indicate their belonging to a community—town, neighborhood, 

minority group, nation, region—in a way that reflects their idealized perception of self. Heritage is 

always claimed by someone. In the process of appropriating it, people shape and transform heritage 

according to their need for an identity that is innocent, noble, virtuous, and glorious. Heritage, for its 

creator, is never vicious or fictitious, but always good and truthful. Whereas for the dominant group 

in society the validation of a noble identity is a statement of power, for the underprivileged 

communities it becomes a campaign to assert an acceptable identity. 8 

Identity, Peter Howard opines, is one of the central components of heritage. 9 In his book, 

Heritage, the author’s specifies that heritage always reflects (1) a person- or group’s search for 

identity; (2) it is people’s interpretation of the past; and, (3) once heritage has entered the public 

domain, 10 it requires management. 11 All humans, according to the author, share a drive to preserve 

things that are of value to them. Heritage is, therefore, the universal human quest for a comfortable 

sense of self whereby the members of a community negotiate their identity with the rest in society 

and among themselves. The community then affirms their constructed identity (1) through symbolic 

commemoration of selected events or heroic person(s) from the past, and (2) through material 

manifestations of heritage, including historic buildings and sites, monuments, written records, public 

festivities, rituals, and traditions. 

Accordingly, three fundamental techniques of constructing an acceptable sense of self can be 

gleaned from Brundage’s analytical account of Acadian culture in Louisiana: namely, (1) creating an 

idealized past by validating myths (idealization); (2) authenticating the past by identifying material 

7 W. Fitzhugh Brundage, ed., Where These Memories Grow: History, Memory, and Southern Identity (Chapel Hill: 

University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 3. 

8 Ibid., 1-28 & 271-98. 

9 Peter Howard, Heritage: Management, Interpretation, Identity (London: Continuum International Publishing 

Group, 2003), passim. 

10 The junction where heritage is being presented to the public via exhibits, battle reenactments, vintage car- or 

building restoration, heritage sites, and other activities. 

11 I.e. the practical execution of heritage interpretation. 

4

anchors of memory (authentication); and (3) promoting heritage by selling it to tourists 

(commoditization). 12 What drove Louisiana’s Acadians into (re)imagining their identity during the 

“revivalist” movement of the 1920s-1960s was the unflattering Anglo-Saxon perceptions of them as 

rustic peasant folk. In this period, Acadian cultural enthusiasts revived and recreated a heritage that 

would evoke a sense of pride in the community. Consequently, they authenticated the romantic myth 

of a brave and devoted maiden, Evangeline, who spent a lifetime searching for her beloved Gabriel. 13 

In Evangeline, the “revivalists” found both (1) desirable identity traits – loyalty, determination, 

endurance, bravery – to stress in the construction of heritage, and (2) a suitable identity icon to 

epitomize the Acadian character. These narrative creators even provided the Evangeline myth with a 

“factual basis” in history by identifying locations in Louisiana, presumably of significance to 

Evangeline, including the very oak tree under which she cast a first glance at Gabriel. These physical 

entities then not only became the material anchors (authenticators) of the constructed Acadian 

identity, but subsequently they also emerged as great tourist attractions. Ultimately, the “revivalists” 

successfully imagined a culture of their liking that satisfied both Acadian people’s need of noble 

identity and Louisiana’s eagerness for tourist money. 14 

Nor is the invention of heritage an easy undertaking. In Southern Heritage on Display, ten 

splendidly narrated case studies reveal that the construction and promotion of cultural identity is a 

difficult process of negotiating, borrowing, and resisting cultural notions (stereotypes, contested 

identities) in a public domain with established dominant (majority) culture and a host of vernacular 

(minority) heritages. 15 Kathryn VanSpanckeren, for example, describes how the black Creoles of 

Louisiana assume the identity and costume of the Plains Indians when performing during Mardi Gras, 

thus, effectively authenticating a claim to Native American lineage. In analyzing the structure of the 

urban Indian Song Cycle, VanSpanckeren depicts two distinct types of performances – those of the 

12 Brundage, 271-98. 

13 The couple dramatically lost contact during the “Great Exile,” i.e. Acadian migration from Nova Scotia, Canada, 

to Louisiana. 

14 Brundage, 271-98. 

15 Celeste Ray, ed., Southern Heritage on Display: Public Rituals and Ethnic Diversity with Southern Regionalism 

(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2003). 

5

lack and white communities in Louisiana, clearly projecting both groups’ sense of identity. While the 

black performance conveys a symbolic defiance of a former condition of subjugation (slavery), the 

white one projects a sense of confidence in tradition (as the historically dominant race). Thus, the 

singing, dancing, and costuming of the black community are markedly warlike, heroic, and enacting 

mock battles that express rejection of white control, whereas the white performances are less 

concerned with emblems of oppression and resistance. This status quo highlights at least three 

crucial aspects of asserting heritage as identity: First, negotiating a desirable identity within the 

public space is important to previously marginalized groups (African Americans). Second, the 

process of constructing a desirable identity often involves defiance of the mainstream (white) culture 

and borrowing from other vernacular cultures (from Native Americans) to dignify one’s heritage. 

Third, the group negotiating their identity through defiance and borrowing feels the need to affirm 

this constructed self-image in the public domain (via Mardi Gras performance). 16 

In “Melungeons and the Politics of Heritage,” Melissa Schrift further elaborates on the 

complexities of negotiating a cultural identity. Similar to Brundage’s Acadian stipulation, she 

suggests that the term Melungeonness in eastern Tennessee constitutes an imposed identity that 

originally was rejected by the majority of those whom it concerns. For the Appalachian population, 

known to outsiders as Melungeon, the notion evoked popular racial slurs of “dark-skinned,” “dirty,” 

“untrustworthy” people – epithets originating in outside perceptions of the locals as being of mixed 

African American, Native American, and European American pedigree. Negotiating an acceptable 

Melungeon identity, therefore, becomes paramount for the community. It stems from their need to 

attain a heritage of their own making and find a safe niche within the mainstream cultural discourse, 

where Melungeonness can be both distinct and respectable. As local Melungeon enthusiasts put 

themselves to the task of constructing a desirable identity, Schrift observes how at reunions and 

through the World Wide Web lively discussions ensue about physical characteristics that set the 

Melungeons apart in a dignified way. Claiming Mediterranean ancestry – Portuguese and/or Turkish 

16 Kathryn VanSpanckeren, “The Mardi Gras Indian Song Cycle: A Heroic Tradition,” in Southern Heritage on 

Display: Public Rituals and Ethnic Diversity with Southern Regionalism, ed. Celeste Ray (Tuscaloosa: University of 

Alabama Press, 2003), 57-78. 

6

– these Melungeon activists have elaborated a whole list of traits, 17 purportedly typical of their Euro- 

Mediterranean forefathers. Thus, at Melungeon gatherings, members of the community meticulously 

examine their bodies in search of characteristics that unite them. The act of discovering shared 

physical features, then, provides the descendants with the comforting reassurance of clean origins, 

respectable identity, and sense of rootedness. 18 

2. National (Dominant) Identity 

Not only vernacular communities feel the need for dignified heritage. Nation-states, too – 

especially previously subjugated ones – aspire to venerable origins and claim glorious antiquities. 

States, moreover, seek to affirm narratives of “golden age” via aggressive nationalism. In Imagined 

Communities, Benedict Anderson brilliantly argues that nationness, nationality, and nationalism are 

not some pre-existing pillars of social order, but cultural construct, which ruling elites invented in 

response to pressing social needs. 19 Thus, the phenomenon of nation-state is an ideological construct 

that superseded the older feudal state structure once it became obsolete, rather than being a 

predetermined order of things. 20 The modern concept of the nation as a community of people sharing 

culture and territory, therefore, is not preordained. Rather, it is an imagined entity, which has been 

(re)invented by elites under critical socio-cultural and political circumstances. 

Following Anderson’s line of reasoning, Hugh Trevor-Roper convincingly stipulates that the 

“ancient” tartan-and-kilt costume of Scotland is an eighteenth-century invention. 

21 

Therefore, every 

time Scotsmen come together to celebrate their national heritage, imposingly dressed in patterned 

tartans and adorned by kilts and bagpipes, they are not re-enacting a tradition from antiquity, but a 

17 Among those are the “Anatolian bump,” the “sleepy eyes,” and the Familial Mediterranean Fever (FMF). 

18 Melissa Schrift, “Melungeons and the Politics of Heritage,” in Southern Heritage on Display: Public Rituals and 

Ethnic Diversity with Southern Regionalism, ed. Celeste Ray (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2003), 

106-29. 

19 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: 

Verso, 1991), 4. 

20 Ibid., passim. 

21 Hugh Trevor-Roper, “The Invention of Tradition: The Highland Tradition of Scotland,” in The Invention of 

Tradition, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 15-41. 

7

cultural construct from modernity. Shaped by the extreme political circumstances of the 1700s, the 

distinguishable tartan and kilt had come to epitomize the dignified Scottish identity by the late 

eighteenth century. Well into the 1700s, Scotland essentially existed as two detached portions, 

having very little in common: namely, the “civilized,” English-and-French-influenced Lowlands and 

the “barbarian,” “roguish” Highlands, as the author puts it. Whereas the Saxon Lowlanders followed 

European fashions of waistcoat and breeches, the Celtic Highlanders wore the tartan – attire highly 

adapted to the rocky and boggy terrain of the Scottish mountains, as well as cheap to obtain. Not only 

did the tartan 22 firmly connect the Highlanders to Ireland, whence they had come from, but the large 

majority of Scotchmen considered it “a sign of barbarism; a badge of roguish, idle, predatory 

Highlanders … a nuisance… to civilized, historic [Lowland] Scotland.” 23 

By the mid-eighteenth century, however, England had crushed the last of the Jacobite 

Rebellions in Scotland (1745), subdued the population, and outlawed the Highland dress with an act 

of Parliament (1746). Thereafter, the tense relationship between England and Scotland provoked 

many a Scottish nobility to adopt the tartan in symbolic resistance to English oppression. Ironically, 

while powerful Lowlanders elevated the Highland dress to an emblem of Scottishness, the 

Highlanders themselves substituted the tartan for breeches during the thirty-five-year-long English 

prohibition (the 1746 ban was later repealed) never to reconstitute its former omnipresence. 

Ultimately, it was the need of Scotland to resist subjugation and promote a dignified national identity 

that transformed the tartan-and-kilt dress from “a badge of barbarism” into a symbol of heroic 

heritage. Neither the tartan nor the kilt possessed the ancient pedigree they were purported to have, 

but rather sprang from the Scottish drive to assert a distinct, noble identity. In the end, Highlanders 

and Lowlanders forged their sense of belonging together, as Scotsmen, in opposition to English 

tyranny and adopted the tartan and kilt 24 as the national costume of Scotland. Simply stated, in the 

turbulent, modern age of nationalism, symbols of national identity have been abundantly, generously, 

22 Tartan is a cloth woven in geometric patterns of color (Trevor-Roper, 18-19). 

23 Trevor-Roper, 15. 

24 The kilt was invented by the Englishman Thomas Rawlinson, an ironsmith, to serve the practical purpose of 

holding the tartan of his Highland workmen in place while they operated his furnaces in the eighteenth century. 

8

and continuously (re)imagined as ancient in a manner of state prerogative and to the exclusion of 

many dissenting narratives. 

Extremely aggressive nationalisms are particularly visible in previously subjugated nationstates. 

Among these are most Southeast European states, including my native Bulgaria, which 

developed aspirations to nationhood only after the disintegration of the last surviving multiethnic 

empires – Habsburg Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Turkey in late nineteenth- and early twentieth 

century. Within these empires, the fledgling nations existed under a feudal social order and nationbuilding 

was a sudden and violent process for them. With no foundation of sovereign government or 

tradition in democratic rule, the newly independent Balkan peoples adopted the kind of romantic 

nationalism that imposed – what was perceived as – the collective will of the leading ethno-religious 

communities. 25 As nationalism equated aggressive dominance of the ethno-cultural majority, 

violence against diverging groups – especially those perceived as a threat to the nascent nation-state 

– was rife. Coercion, therefore, became an integral part of the process of nation-building and 

affirming national identity. In defiance of the Ottoman Islamic dominance, the young nation-states of 

Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro embarked on an ideology of nationalism meant to ensure 

the political dominance of the culturally prevalent Christian majority at all cost. 

All in all, the Balkan states at the turn of the twentieth century tended to be overly 

concerned with securing the dominance of the ethno-religious majority vis-à-vis the former 

oppressor. The politics of coercion these new nations often exerted took the forms of exclusion 

(expulsion), intimidation, and/or forced assimilation of religiously, ethnically, or linguistically 

differing groups within the national community. Whereas exclusion permanently placed certain 

segments of the population outside of the identity discourse, ruling elites also resorted to coercive 

assimilation to enforce, solidify, and maintain uniformity among the people of the nation-state they 

controlled. In the sense that assimilation of dichotomous groups proved crucial to the successful 

consolidation of the national state and to the continuing process of popular solidarity, ruling elites 

first attempted to assimilate diverging communities, including by force. When assimilation failed, 

25 Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1955), 87. 

9

exclusion and marginalization followed. This scenario certainly fits the treatment of the Pomaks in 

Bulgaria, whereby the authorities’ persistent attempts to assimilate this Muslim community have 

resulted in acceptance of those who embraced the assimilation, and marginalization of the majority 

who resisted it. 

3. Pluralistic Approach to Interpretation Needed 

Whereas the Acadian and Melungeon heritages may be cultural inventions, the process of 

constructing a dignified self-image is a legitimate way for both communities to contest identities that 

have been imposed on them by outsiders in a disparaging manner. The ability of vernacular cultures 

to reject demeaning notions as a matter of right becomes even more compelling when the imposer is 

the nation-state, or at least an entity endorsed by the establishment. Nation-states and national 

identities, too, have been forged in opposition to imperial master narratives as the case of Scotland 

illustrates. However, while no nation-state is immune to constructing and imposing master 

narratives in the shared cultural domain, it behooves a democratic society, at the very minimum, to 

foster a public space free from suppression of dissenting (minority) narratives. 

Arguing in favor of pluralistic heritage interpretation, this dissertation sets out to preserve 

in writing engaging aspects of the contested Pomak heritage and, so far as possible, bring it into the 

public domain. As no single issue of the Pomak narrative is more important than the rest, I felt 

justified in the freedom to select specific cases to study instead. In the process, I identified, 

researched, and narrated five separate stories with the help of archival papers, oral narratives, 

available literature, and compelling imagery. Each of these case studies, not only contains a 

fascinating storyline (independently of my storytelling abilities), but also belongs among the most 

prominent identifiers of Pomak history and culture. Specifically, they relate to (1) the Pomak 

Christianization (pokrastvane) of 1912-1913 (Chapter II); (2) the communist revival process of 1972- 

1974 (Chapter III); (3) Ramadan Runtov’s life of political dissent against the forced assimilation 

(Chapter IV); (4) the elaborate wedding rituals of Ribnovo (Chapter V); and (5) the forgotten legacy 

of the Ottoman governor of Pomak origin, Salih Aga of Paşmaklı (Chapter VI). While known only 

locally, the personalities of Ramadan Runtov and Salih Aga personify the composite image of 

10

numerous Pomaks who suffered political persecution during the communist regime for resisting the 

assimilation, on one side, and were written out of public history simply for being Ottoman 

administrators, on the other. All five narratives constitute a remarkable Pomak heritage in 

themselves, and the modest goal – as well as obligation – I have as a cultural insider and heritage 

scholar is to document and preserve them. 

Five Case Studies 

Chapters II, III, and IV deal with the most dramatic and visible part of the collective Pomak 

existence in Bulgaria: the various forced conversions/assimilations which ultimately defined the 

community’s sense of self. The pokrastvane of 1912-1913 was the first attempt at comprehensive 

religious conversion of the Pomak Muslims as citizens of the new Eastern Orthodox Christian nationstate 

of Bulgaria. As a divergent group, affiliated with the former Ottoman oppressor by religion, and 

as a Slavic (Bulgarian)-speaking minority, they were immediately singled out for assimilation within 

the broader context of territorial, political, and cultural consolidation of the country. The Balkan 

Wars of 1912-1914 26 provided the “opportune moment” for Bulgaria’s ruling elite to launch the 

brutal business of pokrastvane. 27 The plethora of surviving records reveal that not only all levels of 

state and church authorities were involved in the pokrastvane, but also insurgent bands which 

facilitated the conversion through violence and murder of Pomak civilians. Because the 

Christianization of 1912-1913 was driven by a powerful nationalist ideology, the chapter elaborates 

on the definition of nationalism and offers a model of coercive nationalism to help explain the 

pokrastvane. 

Chapter III explores the impact of the revival process on Pomak life during the communist 

period in Bulgaria (1944-1989). The revival process was the final chapter in the long history of 

26 See Chapter II for more details. 

27 This phrase is used by Jeromonk Pavel, Protosingel of the Plovdiv Diocese, in a letter to Stoyu Shishkov of 24 

November 1912. The excerpt reads: 

Can we count on a more or less en mass conversion of the Pomaks (in the Rhodopes)? What do you 

think would be the best time to start initiating them in the Christian faith and baptism: right now or 

after our relations with Turkey have been reestablished? I am afraid that if we wait until the conclusion 

of the peace treaty, this opportune moment would be irrevocably lost [emphasis added]. 

National Archives-Plovdiv, Fond 52к, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 818, pages 1-3. 

11

sustained forced assimilation of Pomaks in Bulgaria. However, while only Bulgarian-speaking 

Muslims had been singled out for Bulgarianization previously, the revivalist policies targeted the 

Turkish-speaking Muslims as well. Consequently, the final Pomak assimilation of 1972-1974, 

conclusively replacing the traditional Turkish-Arab names of the community with Orthodox- 

Christian ones, was obscured by the larger Turkish revival process of 1984-1985. The essential 

purpose of the renaming was to create a single, culturally uniform nation under the perpetual 

leadership of the Bulgarian Communist Party. The chapter has two prominent components: 

descriptive and theoretical. Descriptively, it examines (1) the ideology of the revival process; (2) the 

Pomak identity crisis it generated; and (3) the political resurrection of Rodina, a nationalist 

organization initially persecuted as “fascist” and subsequently redubbed “patriotic” to serve as the 

regime’s propaganda machine. Theoretically, the chapter interprets the revival process through – 

what I term – the anger-satisfaction continuum model premised on Ernest Gellner’s concept of 

nationalism as a shifting and deeply exploitable national sentiment. My argument is that the national 

sentiment—i.e. the cultural majority’s attitude toward a vernacular culture—ultimately determines 

what heritage becomes (un)acceptable in the public domain. 

Chapter IV narrates the life story of Ramadan Runtov, one of the most active Pomak antirevivalists 

in Bulgaria from the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. For over thirty years, Ramadan’s life had 

been a sequence of economic hardship, political persecution, imprisonment, and torture. Because of 

his vocal opposition to the revival process, the regime promptly arrested Ramadan and tried him on 

bogus treason charges (i.e. conspiring the overthrow the “people’s regime”), for which he faced the 

possibility of death penalty. The gravity of the charges, however, was largely a ploy to scare him into 

silence. Consequently, Ramadan spent over a decade behind bars as a political prisoner, where he 

endured a regimen of harassment, starvation, and sleep deprivation. 28 In the end, the regime 

rounded up Ramadan and his family and summarily expelled them from Bulgaria in May 1989, just 

six month before the collapse of communism in the country. The Runtovs eventually settled in 

Istanbul (Turkey), where I interviewed the seventy-seven-year-old Ramadan in the summer of 2007. 

28 Ramadan Runtov, interview by author, Istanbul, Turkey, May 21, 2007; Ismail Byalkov, interview by author, 

Istanbul, Turkey, May 20, 2007. 

12

The chapter argues that the life stories of exiles like Ramadan are not only an engaging narrative of 

dissent, but also an essential component of Pomak heritage. A direct concomitant of one of the pivotal 

episodes in the community’s existence—the revival process, 29 Ramadan’s experience reflects a life 

pattern common to thousands of Pomak expatriates, still permanently living abroad. 30 

Chapter V paints the portrait of a beautiful wedding ritual within the context of Pomak 

heritage. The event occurs seasonally in a remote corner of southwest Bulgaria, in the village of 

Ribnovo. The Ribnovo wedding is an age-old local tradition, typical of the Rhodopean Muslim 

community, which has all but disappeared elsewhere. The elaborate colorfulness of the bridal makeup 

not only has put Ribnovo on the map of Bulgarian national and international cultural phenomena, 

but also has raised questions of Pomak identity. Ribnovo is a Pomak community; identified by its 

members as Pomak and known by the outside world to be Pomak. I start the chapter by walking the 

reader through the village of Ribnovo as I saw it in 2004 and 2009 with its isolated location, narrow 

winding roads, and clustered layout. I also attempted to depict the Ribnovo inhabitants as curious, 

conservative, hospitable and friendly people who have special appreciation for bright and dazzling 

colors. Next, I embark on a detailed description of the traditional Ribnovo wedding as a two-day 

event in the course of which the entire community celebrates. In this part, I put particular emphasis 

on the way of bride’s adornment and cheiz arrangement. Third, I draw parallels between the wedding 

traditions in the Mississippi-Yazoo Delta of the 1920s and in Ribnovo today, because I discovered a 

number of similarities while reading Eudora Welty’s book Delta Wedding. Among the points of 

connection I analyze are: (a) the wedding as a family affair, (b) the wedding as a community 

celebration, and (c) the wedding as an arena for enacting moral and socio-cultural values. Fourth, I 

examined the ritual of marriage as a major rite of passage, in accordance with Arnold van Gennep’s 

classification and concept of schema. 31 Most importantly, however, I wish to project the Ribnovo 

29 Note: Revival process is the literal English translation from Bulgarian of the phrase “възродителен процес” 

that has become the accepted academic reference to the forced renaming of Muslims in Bulgaria by the 

communist regime in the 1970s and 1980s. The term revival process herein is strictly used in the above sense, 

without relevance to the standard usage of the the words “revival” and “process.” 

30 See Chapters III and IV for details. 

31 Arnold van Gennep, Rites of Passage (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960). 

13

wedding as distinctly Pomak tradition, i.e. typical of the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims of the 

Rhodopes. 

Chapter VI revives the memory of Salih Aga of Paşmaklı, the Pomak governor of the Ottoman 

kaaza of Ahı Çelebi between 1798 and 1838. He was a remarkable person who not only secured 

stability in Ahı Çelebi in turbulent times for the Ottoman Empire, but also established a social order 

of a new type – one based on equality between Muslims and Christians despite a discriminating 

Shari’a (the normative law of the Ottoman Empire). 32 As Nikolay Haytov – one of the most 

nationalistic Bulgarian writers – sums it up, the governor’s most remarkable legacy lies in “the fact 

that he elevated the status of the Christians to that of the Muslims in both civil and political 

aspect[.]” 33 To this day, however, the heritage of Salih Aga remains obscure and unrecognized in local 

public history, because he was a bureaucrat of the former Ottoman “oppressor,” and, moreover, a 

Pomak. This chapter utilizes the methodology of microhistory to recreate the life story of a 

remarkable person, whom the annals of Ottoman imperial history overlook as petty local governor 

and Bulgarian historiography neglects quite purposely as “Turkish tyrant.” 

32 See Chapter II and VI for details. 

33 Nikolay Haytov, “Smolyan: Tri vurha v srednorodopskata istoriq”/“Smolyan: Three Pinnacles in the History of 

the Middle Rhodopes”/ (Sofia: Izdatelstwo na Nacionalniq Suvet na Otechesvenia Front /National Council of the 

Fatherland Front Publisher, 1962), 27. 

14

CHAPTER II 

NATIONALISM OF COERSION: THE CASE OF POMAK CHRISTIANIZATION (POKRASTVANE ) IN 

BULGARIA, 1912-1913 

If the history of forced assimilation is the defining aspect of Pomak heritage in Bulgaria, it 

was the ideology of coercive nationalism that prompted it. After all, it was the young nation-state’s 

need to affirm sovereignty and forge respectable national identity that required the rejection of the 

Ottoman-Islamic past, as well as the purging of everything reminiscent of the former “oppressor’s” 

presence in the – now – Bulgarian “homeland.” In unison with that sentiment, the young nation-state 

immediately singled out the Bulgarian-speaking Pomaks for conversion to Orthodox Christianity 

because, as a sizable minority group, their assimilation would immediately fulfill two vital goals: 

First, it would enable Bulgaria’s claim to all territories settled by Pomaks, based on language 

commonality. Second, it would help diffuse the freshly forged Bulgarian-Christian national identity to 

newly conquered populations, notably to the Muslim Pomaks. Ultimately, various Bulgarian regimes 

– like many others – consistently and effectively exploited the ideology of nationalism to achieve 

political and cultural consolidation, including though practicing violence. How this happened in the 

context of the first comprehensive Pomak Christianization of 1912-1913 is the subject of analysis in 

this chapter. 

The Thesis 

What I have come to regard as the classical definition of nationalism, established by 

twentieth-century theoreticians, describes the phenomenon as eighteenth-century, Western- 

European popular struggle against dynastic absolutism and revolutionary drive for increased 

15

participation of the people in state government. 1 The early stages of nationalism were marked by 

civil revolutions in two of the most prominent Western European monarchies, England and France. 

While the English Civil War of mid-seventeenth century, whereby Parliament challenged and 

effectively curtailed the authority of King Charles I, in effect set the wheel of nationalism into motion, 

it was the French Revolution of 1789 that made it spin at its fullest capacity. In the sense that popular 

revolt in both England and France brought royal tyranny to its knees, Hans Kohn argues that 

nationalism was a sort of democratic movement projected at enhancing personal liberties and 

limiting the absolute powers of monarchal regimes. 2 At the same time Kohn – as one of the influential 

first theoreticians of nationalism – expertly elaborates that this initial meaning of nationalism as an 

engine of liberty became distorted as the phenomenon began to move eastward on the European 

continent and beyond. The countries of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe (henceforth, 

Eastern Europe), where nationalism – more or less – turned into totalitarian exclusionism and 

coercion during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, lacked English and French traditions in 

liberal government and statehood. 

One vital factor that determined the type of nationalism to develop outside Western Europe, 

particularly in the Balkans, was the movement of Romanticism that emerged in Germany during the 

late eighteenth century. The nations that embraced Romantic ideology were young for the most part, 

lacking in national pride, and in desperate need of dignified (if not glorious) collective identity. 

Because of the sort of “inferiority complex” that most of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 

had as previously subjugated nations, they embraced the Romantic concept of nationalism rather 

than its Enlightenment counterpart typical of England and France. 

Romanticism called for the celebration of vernacular (domestic) values as an alternative to 

the dominant Western ideology of Enlightenment. Whereas Enlightenment political philosophers 

1 For more details on the above definition of nationalism, as well as on its origins and spread from Europe to the 

rest of the world, read Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand 

Company, Inc., 1955); Carlton J. H. Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (New York: Richard R. 

Smith, Inc., 1931); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 

Nationalism (New York: Verso, 1991); and Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, MA: 

Harvard University Press, 1992). 

2 Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1955), passim. 

16

(such as John Locke) held the rights and happiness of the individual – viewed for the first time as the 

basic building block of society – paramount, their Romantic brethren (such as J. G. Herder) stressed 

on the preponderance of collective will in society. While the Enlightenment upheld universal truths, 

Romanticism proclaimed the supremacy of culture-specific ones. For example, unlike Enlightenment 

philosophers who expressed themselves in the classical languages of Latin and Greek or other 

“trendy” languages (such as French), Romantics underscored the importance of the native tongues 

and strove to preserve them. 3 

It was the “founding father” of Romantic nationalism Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) 

who most significantly influenced the Balkan form of nationalism which rejected the tenets of 

universality and individual freedoms in favor of the glorification of domestic values and the 

enforcement of collective (the cultural majority’s) will. Herder’s own ideas were shaped by the 

cultural status quo of his native Germany during the second half of eighteenth century. In that period, 

the local aristocratic and artistic circles chose to fashion themselves according to French perceptions 

of refinement, casting off the native language and folk traditions as crude, boorish, and embarrassing. 

To elevate the vernacular culture, Herder declared that the German-speaking peasants were the true 

keepers of ancient Germanic values. Putting ideology to practice, he undertook to record and 

preserve as much of the folklore as he personally could, charging other Germans with the same 

responsibility. For Herder, upholding the nation-state and preserving the national character went 

hand in hand and he turned that ideal into the patriotic duty of every member of the national German 

society. 4 Another factor that helped shift the focus of nationalism from its initial “Enlightened” 

version to the restrictive Romantic form in Eastern Europe, including in my native Bulgaria, was the 

fact that most states from the region developed aspirations to nationhood only after the 

3 George W. White, Nationalism and Territory: Constructing Group Identities in Southeastern Europe (Lanham, 

MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 52. 

While Enlightenment put emphasis on reason, Romanticism exalted in the irrational spontaneity of 

human nature. While “Enlightened” philosophers preferred the urban environment as the locus par excellence 

for scientific thought, the Romantics declared rural settings as the ideal of human existence (Ibid.). 

4 William A. Wilson, "Herder, Folklore, and Romantic Nationalism," Journal of Popular Culture 6 (1973): 819-35; 

White, 50-60. 

17

disintegration of the last surviving multiethnic empires – Habsburg Austria-Hungary and Ottoman 

Turkey – during the late nineteenth-early twentieth century. Within these empires, the fledgling 

nations existed under a feudal social order and nation-building was a sudden and violent process for 

them. With no foundation of sovereign government or tradition in democratic rule, these newly 

independent peoples altered the original meaning of nationalism from respect for individual liberties 

to patriotic imposition of – what was perceived as – the collective will of the leading ethno-religious 

communities. 5 

Several decades after Hans Kohn (and others 6 ) formulated the definition of nationalism, in 

the 1980s and 1990s, one of the most prominent modern theoreticians of nationalism, Benedict 

Anderson, continues to analyze the emergence of nationalism in predominantly positive terms as a 

unifying force within the nation-state. Anderson’s signature argument is that nationalism, “nationness,” 

and national state – taken as synonyms – are “cultural artifacts” 7 which ruling elites 

formulated in response to pressing socio-political needs at certain points in history to consolidate the 

masses under one leadership and under common ideology. Although Anderson’s analysis appears to 

be in line with Kohn’s positive idea of nationalism, his concept of the socially constructed nature of 

the phenomenon also condones the negative notion of nationalism as totalitarian, coercive, and 

violent ideology. On one hand, Anderson says, the very idea of nation-state evokes the image of 

(imagined) community, i.e. an entity of fraternity or comradeship based on equality among people 

from within. And it is this notion of imagined (socially constructed) egalitarian fraternity among the 

(majority) members of the national state that makes people willing to fight and die for an ideal. 8 On 

the other hand, the national ideal makes people willing to mutilate or kill for it. This proves to be 

particularly true for the people of those budding nation-states which have just emerged from 

oppressive foreign rule. For previously subjugated people, the ultimate goal of nationalism was the 

5 Kohn, 87. 

6 See footnote 1. 

7 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: 

Verso, 1991), 4. 

8 Ibid., passim. 

18

fulfillment of a national state of their own regardless of means. As a result, diverging cultural groups 

that remained within the territories claimed by nascent nations, particularly such groups affiliated 

with the former oppressors, became the first victims of a nationalism of forced assimilation or 

exclusion. For these fledgling entities, nationalism equated to aggressive dominance of the ethnocultural 

majority rather than respect for individual freedoms and democracy. 

Violence against diverging groups, especially those perceived as threats to the nascent 

nation-state, was rife. Coercion, consequently, became an integral part of the process of constructing 

and affirming the majority’s sense of collective self or cultural identity, within the nation-state. In his 

book, Nationalism and Territory, George W. White explains how the concept of national identity is 

defined by place and territory. On a basic level, territory as physical entity provides a group with 

natural resources for sustenance. But on a more symbolic level, territory becomes the embodiment of 

“motherland” (“fatherland”) that provides a collectivity of people with a sense of shared history and 

belonging. 9 

White further analyzes the significance of place and territory to national identity via three 

fundamental factors: (1) Site identification; 10 (2) Landscape description; 11 and (3) Tenacity 12 . 13 It is 

precisely the “tenacity factor” that measures the degree to which a people is prepared to exert 

violence in order to defend (or take) given territory. Whatever the intensity of aggression (violence), 

protecting the perceived “homeland” is always expressed in positive terms, i.e. protecting, liberating 

or fighting for “our” land, but never seizing, invading, or occupying it. Because place and territory, in a 

way, emerge as the essence of identity construction, the need to protect and exert control over the 

“homeland” often results in conflict between different communities having aspirations to the same 

9 White, passim. 

10 I.e. the location of national institutions such as seat of government, various religious and educational 

institutions, and historic sites (battlegrounds, places of birth and events related to revered national figures). 

11 I.e. natural formations such as mountains, rivers, valleys, lakes, and seas. 

12 I.e. the intensity or strength of a group’s determination to protect or seize a place they perceive as “homeland.” 

13 White, 6. 

19

territory. The conflict arises between the protectors of the territory and its invaders; and whether 

one is a protector or occupier depends on one’s affiliation. 

According to White, the strong attachment to “homeland,” and the proclivity to defend it, is 

particularly pronounced in the Balkans. “In southeastern Europe,” 14 he correctly assumes, “many 

nations feel that their identities have been violated because their territories have been continually 

transgressed by other nations. Not surprisingly, conflict has been persistent in this region.” 15 As a 

matter of fact, from the late nineteenth until mid-twentieth century, the Southeast-European nations 

were young, unstable, relatively small, and only semi-independent. On at least four occasions, 

following momentous regional (and global) conflicts – the Russian-Turkish War of 1876-1878, the 

Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, the First World War, and the Second World War – these nascent nationstates 

were reduced to hapless spectators of their own partitioning by the powerful of the day. 16 This 

was particularly true of the young Balkan nation-states, including Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and 

Turkey. All of these countries incurred heavy human losses while fighting for the territories they 

perceived as “homeland” only to have it redistributed at the will of the politically dominant nations. 17 

In this sense, White properly concludes that the nascent nation-states of southeastern Europe 

repeatedly felt their sense of identity and security violated because of the constant interference of 

outside forces. 

This reality of helplessness generated fear and mistrust within these new nation-states. 

Henceforth, they embarked on an ideology of nationalism meant to ensure the political dominance of 

the culturally prevalent majority – at least of those who ruled on the majority’s behalf – at all cost, 

without much regard for individual liberties. Thus, the original Western idea of liberal nationalism 

was gradually supplanted by an ideology of coercion as the nation-state phenomenon swept into the 

Balkans by the late nineteenth century. In the light of this coercive-nationalism idea, my argument is 

14 White’s notion of “southeast Europe” includes Hungary, Romania, and Serbia, while my own mostly refers to 

the Balkan nations which I associate with Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, (European) Turkey, and others. 

15 White, 6. 

16 The Western Powers (England, France, Germany, Italy, USA, etc.) and Russia – later, the Soviet Union – for the 

most part. 

17 For more details, read the main body of the chapter. 

20

that while the concept of nation-state and nationalism, notably in democratic regimes, may have been 

concerned with ensuring popular cohesion and loyalty to the nation based on the citizens’ integration 

rather than their exclusion, in the case of young and previously subjugated countries nationalism was 

by nature more antagonizing than unifying of its diverse body of people. The ultimate agenda of the 

nationalism of coercion was to consolidate territory and national identity in a union of congruence 

and indivisibility. The fledgling nations of the Balkans at the turn of twentieth century tended to be 

more concerned with securing the dominance of the ethno-religious majority vis-à-vis former 

oppressors and affiliated local segments of the nation, including through violence against the latter, 

rather than with observing democratic principles. The politics of coercion these new nations often 

exerted took many forms, including exclusion, intimidation, and/or forced assimilation of religiously, 

ethnically, or linguistically differing groups within the national community. As Anthony W. Marx 

effectively posits, nationalism as political process was initially rooted in exclusion regardless of 

where it occurred – Western or Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, or the Americas. 18 In other words, each 

nation-state began its nation-making by excluding (or coercing into assimilation) certain minorities 

from citizenship which they either could not or did not want to assimilate. 19 I extend this argument 

to accommodate my claim that, in addition to exclusion, ruling elites also resorted to coercive 

assimilation to enforce, solidify, and maintain uniformity among the people of the nation-state they 

controlled. Exclusion and integration (inclusive of coerced assimilation), therefore, were two sides of 

the same process of nation-making, wherein the two could operate independently or jointly. In the 

18 Anthony W. Marx, Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 

2003), passim. 

19 Marx constructs his argument about the earlier, exclusionary origins of nationalism on the basis of the 

political portrait he paints of the three leading European powers in the period between fifteenth and eighteenth 

century – Spain, France, and England. Thus, in order to consolidate Spain, in 1492 Queen Isabella and King 

Ferdinand resolved to drive out the Muslim Moors, dominating Southern Spain, beyond the shores of Europe, as 

well as to expel the Jewish population from their territories. Within less than a year, a consolidating Spanish 

state, unified by common religion, race, and language, emerged as the first true – albeit undeveloped – nationstate 

of Europe (Marx, 3 & 39). Enforcing state cohesion by exclusion ensued in France and England in the 

following centuries. The French Wars of Religion in the second half of sixteenth century culminated in The St. 

Bartholomew’s Day, whereby thousands of Huguenots (French Protestants) were massacred by the Catholic 

majority, and the country was destabilized by a violent conflict between two major contenders for the throne of 

France, the Catholic Valois and the Protestant Bourbons (Marx, 92). Queen Mary, for her part, plunged England 

into a bloody persecution of Protestants that ended only with her death in 1558. When Queen Elizabeth 

ascended on the throne, the long and bumpy road to national reconciliation began. The Pope, however, remained 

the “enemy” of the crown and the nation of England, inspiring the process of nation-building along the way 

(Marx, 95-103). 

21

sense that assimilation of dichotomous groups may prove crucial to the successful consolidation of 

every early nation-state, and subsequently to that nation’s continuing process of popular solidarity, 

ruling elites generally attempt assimilation of diverging communities, including by force. Where 

assimilation fails, exclusion and marginalization follows. Where partial assimilation is the end 

product, partial marginalization complements it. 20 Ultimately, the use of one or another form of 

coercion (violence) in achieving national cohesion seems to be a constant in the process of nationmaking. 

In the sense that nationalism often – if not always – operates through violence in the name of 

territorial and cultural consolidation, I propose the following model of nationalism that is likely to be 

operational within a previously subjugated nation like my native Bulgaria, in regard to one or more 

of its differing minorities like the Pomaks: (1) Nationalism in a previously subjugated nation 

originates in exclusion or forced assimilation of dichotomous minorities as a way to affirm 

sovereignty. (2) The policy of exclusion or assimilation is particularly directed at communities 

affiliated with the former oppressor in some way. (3) Nationalism in such a newly independent nation 

asserts identity that distinguishes it from the former oppressor in terms of religion, language, race, 

and/or ethnicity, whereby, (4) in the process of nation-making, the nation-state’s majority glorifies 

its own (imagined) identity and denigrates that of the oppressor. (5) If the divergent groups share 

identity traits with the dominant cultural community in the nation such as language, race, or religion, 

the efforts are directed toward assimilating these minorities rather than excluding them; and (6) the 

more closely shared such traits are, the more likely the attempted assimilation will be. As a rule, 

however, (7) divergent groups, affiliated with former oppressors in whatever ways, are generally 

kept in check and treated with a degree of suspicion at all times regardless of shared ties. 

In this chapter, I undertake a study of coercive nationalism through analyzing the 

pokrastvane (religious conversion through baptism and name replacement) of the Slavic (Bulgarian)- 

speaking Muslims (Pomaks) in Bulgaria at the height of the Balkan Wars of 1912-1914. It was a 

20 This has been the case with the Pomaks in Bulgaria – as it shall be seen – where the Bulgarian authorities’ 

persistent attempts to assimilate this Muslim community resulted in acceptance of those who have embraced 

the assimilation and marginalization of the majority who have resisted it. 

22

crucial period, when the nascent Bulgarian nation-state was still in the process of intensive territorial 

and cultural consolidation following five centuries of Ottoman-Islamic domination. In doing so, I will 

attempt to neither disclaim the classical definition of nationalism (above) nor denigrate nationalism’s 

consolidating power. Instead, I intend to point out that coercion (and its stronger connotation, 

violence) is inherent in the definition and essence of nationalism, particularly in the case of the young 

nation-states in the Balkans at the turn of twentieth century. Ruling elites generally pressured certain 

diverging segments of society into assimilation (and its milder connotation, integration) to 

strengthen national unity most of the time. However, when violence took place, the result was often 

the opposite of the intended: namely, antagonistic alienation and (self)exclusion replaced cohesive 

inclusion. The historical situation of the Pomaks in Bulgaria is markedly a case in point. There have 

been at least three major attempts to coerce the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims into religious and/or 

cultural assimilation since Bulgaria’s independence of 1878: the pokrastvane of 1912-1913, the 

pokrastvane of 1938-1944, and the revival process of the 1960s and 1970s. While the two 

pokrastvane affairs were in essence religious conversion, the revival process was religious 

suppression and involuntary substitution of the Pomak Turkish-Arab names with Christian- 

Bulgarian ones by the atheistic communist regime (1944-1989). 21 In this chapter, I specifically focus 

on the 1912-1913 Christianization as the first comprehensive and violent assimilation of Pomaks, 

which took place at the zenith of Bulgaria’s struggle for self-determination. 

The Pomaks 

Between the late fourteenth- and late nineteenth centuries modern Bulgaria’s territory 

constituted the heart of the European Ottoman Empire. In the course of five centuries, a significant 

number of the local population converted to Islam either voluntarily or by force. The Rhodope 

Mountains (southwest Bulgaria), within the Ottoman Empire throughout, remained a Muslim 

stronghold until 1908, when the Kingdom of Bulgaria’s declaration of independence from Sultanic 

rule was recognized by both Turkey and the European Powers. The Treaty of Constantinople of 

September 29, 1913, cemented this status quo by putting an end to the Balkan Wars and reaffirming 

21 For details on the pokrastvane of 1938-1944 and the revival process, see Chapters III and IV. 

23

the annexation of the (greater part of the) Rhodopes to Bulgaria. This was a turning point in the life 

of the prevalently Muslim Rhodopean population, the Pomaks, who changed citizenship almost 

overnight (from Ottoman to Bulgarian). They spoke Bulgarian as their mother tongue, but unlike 

Bulgaria’s majority, professed Islam rather than Orthodox Christianity as their religion. 

Since the pokrastvane of 1912-1913, the state-endorsed historiography has maintained that 

the Pomaks are descended from Christian Bulgarians, forcibly converted to Islam by the Ottoman 

Turks somewhere between the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. Involuntary 

Islamization – if indeed it happened – could have been the result of residual Muslim grudge against 

the Ottoman Christians following the inauspicious Turkish-Venetian and Russian-Turkish wars in the 

same period. 22 Powerful religious ideologies drove these wars, whereby the Islam of the Ottoman 

Empire and the Christianity of the Vatican, Venice, Poland, Austria, and – later – Russia crossed 

swords in a violent struggle for hegemony over the Holy Land, the eastern Mediterranean, as well as 

parts of Europe, Asia, and Africa dominated by the Turks. It is very likely that these Christian-Muslim 

hostilities had heavy repercussions for the Christian population within the Islamic Ottoman Empire, 

segments of which must have converted at a sword point or for fear of retribution. In five centuries of 

Ottoman rule in the Balkans, however, many adopted Islam voluntarily for both personal conviction 

and socio-political gains. Still, historians are yet to determine authoritatively and conclusively how or 

when the Pomaks of the Rhodope Mountains became Muslims. 23 

The dispute over Pomak cultural identity continues to pose problems for the community. 

The official political discourse is one of actively discouraging the Muslim Rhodopeans from pursuing 

22 Bulgarska Akademiya na Naoukite (BAN) /Bulgarian Academy of Science/, Iz minaloto na balgaritemohamedani 

v Rodopite /On the Past of the Bulgarian Mohammedans in the Rhodopes/ (Sofia: BAN, 1958). 

23 For evidence of (voluntary) conversion to Islam, see Anton Minkov, Conversion to Islam in the Balkans (Leiden: 

Brill, 2004). See also Maria Todorova, “Conversion to Islam as a Trope in Bulgarian Historiography,” in Balkan 

Identities: Nation and Memory, ed. Maria Todorova (New York: New York University Press, 2004), 129-57; Maria 

Todorova, “Identity (Trans)formation among Bulgarian Muslims” (Location: Global, Area, and International 

Archive, 1998), at: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/8k7168bs. Last accessed 30 November 2009; Ulf 

Brunnbauer, “Histories and Identities: Nation State and Minority Discourses – The case of the Bulgarian 

Pomaks”, (Karl-Franzens-University of Graz, 1997), at: http://wwwgewi.kfunigraz.ac.at/csbsc/ulf/pomak_identities.htm. 

Last accessed 30 November 2009; Antonina Zhelyazkova , 

Bozhidar Aleksiev, and Zhorzheta Nazurska, Myusyulmanskite obshtnosti na Balkanite i v Bulgarija /Muslim 

Communities in the Balkans and in Bulgaria/ (Sofia: IMIR, 1997); Vera Mutafchieva, “The Turk, the Jew and the 

Gypsy,” in Relations of Compatibility and Incompatibility between Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria, ed. Antonina 

Zhelyazkova (Sofia: PHARE, 1994). 

24

a cultural image of their own because of the presumption that, as offspring of converted Bulgarians, 

they are part of the Bulgarian ethnicity and, hence, cannot have a separate heritage. The double 

standard of publicly commemorating the nation’s triumph over the “dark” Ottoman past, while 

altogether hushing the nation-state’s own violence against its Muslim population has helped enhance 

the Pomaks’ (and Turks’) sense of cultural dispossession in Bulgaria. The status quo is further 

exacerbated by the strongly subjective and divisive language of the official historiography, describing 

everything Bulgarian (hence Orthodox Christian) as “sacred” and “inherently good,” and most things 

Muslim (hence Ottoman and Turkish) as “immoral” and “backward.” Consequently, the academic 

credibility of some works treating Pomak issues, especially from the communist era (1944-1989), is 

seriously undermined by the high degree of politization and nationalistic propaganda in the 

analysis. 24 

24 Thus, for instance, the statement about the Pomak forced conversion to Islam is extensively grounded on the 

chronicle of one Priest Methody Draginov, who authored it sometime during the late seventeenth century, when 

alleged mass Islamization was taking place. However, some of Bulgaria’s most renowned writers such as Nikolay 

Haytov, who makes references to the document, recognize that the so-called “Historical Diary” has been long lost 

to history, and that the only evidence of its existence are surviving passages, which dedicated patriots reportedly 

copied from it. (Nikolay Haytov, “Smolyan: Tri vurha v srednorodopskata istoriya. /“Smolyan: Three Pinnacles in 

the History of the Middle Rhodopes”/ (Sofia: Izdatelstvo na Nacionalnia Suvet na Otechestvenia Front /National 

Council of the Fatherland Front Publisher, 1962), 6-13.) 

Ulf Brunnbauer, Assistant Professor at the Karl-Franzens-University of Graz (Austria), directly 

dismisses the chronicle as “a fake” and goes on to specify that “it was a common practice [in communist 

Bulgaria] not to quote original sources, but to take them uncritically from other authors[,] [whereby] [o]ne 

author after the other perpetuated the quotation of the source without the slightest attempt at verification.” (Ulf 

Brunnbauer. “Histories and Identities: Nation State and Minority Discourses – The case of the Bulgarian 

Pomaks”, (Karl-Franzens-University of Graz, 1997), available at: http://wwwgewi.kfunigraz.ac.at/csbsc/ulf/pomak_identities.htm. 

Last accessed 4 December 2007.) 

Most importantly, Maria Todorova, Professor of History at the University of Illinois at Urbana- 

Campaign, authoritatively announces that the chronicle is a nineteenth-century “creation” of Stefan Zakhariev, 

with possible basis in some earlier works. In support of her statement, she cites the careful authenticity analysis 

of the linguistic historian Iliya Todorov, (Maria Todorova, “Conversion to Islam as a Trope in Bulgarian 

Historiography, Fiction and Film,” in Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory, ed. Maria Todorova (New York: New 

York University Press, 2004), 129-57.) 

Iliya Todorov judges the chronicle to be inauthentic for the following reasons: 

1. The language of the document “was too remote from the language of seventeenth century 

documents, and that it [the language] reflected nineteenth century forms and conventions.” 

2. There are apparent factological discrepancies between the chronicle and documentation of the 

Ottoman government from the same period. According to the Ottoman sources, the Chepino Valley villages--the 

arena of purported Islamization--were part of a vakuf property (charitable religious foundation in Islam)” from 

the mid-1500s onwards, not a “voynuk ([communities of] peasants, serving as soldiers in an auxiliary military 

corps of the Ottoman army, usually recruited from among the Bulgarians),” as the chronicle describes them. 

3. There is a clear anachronism in the chronicle, according to Todorov, stemming from the strong “anti- 

Greek feeling emanating from the document.” The Bulgarian struggle for religious independence from the Greek 

Orthodox Church and the fervent anti-Greek sentiment, he stipulates, only date back to the middle of the 

nineteenth century, and certainly not to any period of the eighteenth century, when the supposed conversion 

took place. (Todorova, 134.) 

In conjecture to Zakhariev’s motives to create a forgery like that, Maria Todorova observes: 

25

Officially, the Pomaks are largely referred to as “Bulgarian Mohammedans” or “Bulgarian 

Muslims” to reflect the institutionalized viewpoint that they are descendants of Bulgarian Christians, 

whom the Ottomans did Islamize. The term “Islamization” has two important connotations in the 

language of Bulgarian nationalism: “forced” and “voluntary.” The “forced Islamization” thesis 

promotes the idea that the formerly Christian population of the Rhodopes accepted Islam during 

different periods between 1400s and 1800s through various forms of coercion. One way of 

conversion to Islam reportedly occurred through the institution of slavery whereby the invading 

Ottomans turned part of the subjugated indigenous population into slaves, who were subsequently 

emancipated and given land upon becoming Muslims (the atik/muatik practice). 25 Another form was 

by taking local women for wives, who were then converted to Islam. A third yet way, much touted by 

Bulgarian historians, was the forced recruitment of Christian boys for training and service in the 

yeniçeri (janissary) institution (from Turkish “yeni çeri”, “new soldier”), elite Ottoman military units 

(the devşirme practice). 26 Only in the last decade have some Bulgarian academics conceded the 

possibility that many Christian families volunteered their sons to the Ottoman army, because 

conversion to Islam was the only way to secure a lucrative military career, generally off limits to non- 

Muslims. 27 As the Bulgarian historian Vera Mutafchieva posits, the violence-ridden “forced 

Islamization” thesis has played a prominent role in the national history and folklore, being the 

The motives of Stefan Zakhariev were obvious. He was working in a period when the cultural struggle 

for emancipation among the Bulgarians had reached a critical degree, and he was totally engrossed in 

this struggle. The 1860s, in particular, saw the culmination of the ecclesiastical conflict with the Greek 

Constantinople Patriarchate, and all intellectual efforts were directed at proving the ‘rights’ of the 

Bulgarians to an independent church. …[An] independent church for the Bulgarians meant 

independent national existence. … It was also a time when history was the foremost legitimizer of 

nationhood in terms of ‘historic’ versus ‘non-historic’ nations. Zakhariev himself lamented in 1860s ‘we 

do not have antiquities from which we can explore our bygone deeds so as to put together a detailed 

and true history of our past life. 

This was [also] the height of romanticism which in the eighteenth and nineteenth century produced 

famous ‘mystifications’ or outright ‘forgeries’ in many European states including France, Spain, 

Germany, Scotland, Italy and Russia [(Ibid., 134-35)]. 

25 Mutafchieva, 9-10. 

26 Ibid. 

27 Mutafchieva, 10; Ali Eminov, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria (London: Hurst & Company, 

1997), 43-44. 

26

subject of rather emotional interpretations by generations of Bulgarian historians. 28 Nevertheless, 

the strongly negative “forced Islamization” thesis is still prevalent in the national historic narrative, 

including in textbooks. 

The milder, “voluntary” side of the “Islamization” theory, only recently endorsed by scholars 

in Bulgaria – as briefly noted above – recognizes that private ambitions to escape from poverty and 

move to a higher social status were compelling reasons to adopt Islam. To fully appreciate this 

argument, one has to account for the fact that under Shari’a (the public law of Islam), operative 

within the multi-ethnic Ottoman state, Muslims and non-Muslims were not equal. Shari’a not only 

barred the latter from social and political advancement, but also burdened the non-Muslim 

communities with additional taxes such as ispençe (land tax), haraç (in-kind tax), or cizya (cizie, jizya) 

(per capita tax) 29 for land-owning and being provided with military protection. According to the 

historian Ali Eminov, the cizya was a significant tax burden since it contributed from one-third to 

one-half of the Empire’s revenue. 30 Considering these sizeable returns to the royal coffers, the 

assumption is that any forced Islamization would have run counter to the imperial financial interests. 

Undoubtedly, the Ottoman rulers (Sultans) – as the caliphs of Islam, were initially spreading the faith 

through both sword and persuasion as they advanced their conquest into the Balkans. But the 

preservation of property and social status, as well as the desire to acquire new privileges, was the 

fundamental driving force behind the conversion to Islam of both Bulgarian commoners and former 

ruling elites since early on. 31 

This is not to say, however, that all conversion was entirely voluntary 

or en mass. Whatever the case regarding Pomak passage into Islam, the Bulgarian authorities and the 

Bulgarian Orthodox Church effectively used the “forced Islamization” claim to impose another 

28 Mutafchieva, 10. 

29 A tax imposed on all non-Muslim adult males, who were not allowed to serve in the army. 

30 Eminov, 37. 

31 For instance, the conversion of the son of the last Bulgarian king Ivan-Shishman, Alexander Shishman 

(fourteenth century), is a well-known case, kept under tight lid in Bulgarian history books until recently. 

Alexander Shishman voluntarily converted to Islam to retain his privileged position. He was promoted governor 

of the Ottoman province of Aidan under the name Süleyman Pasha. (For more details, see Ibrahim Yalamov, 

Istoria na Turskata Obsjtnost v Bulgaria /History of the Turkish Community in Bulgaria/ (Sofia: Kragozor, 2002), 

11-65). 

27

conversion on the community – this time to Christianity – under the cover of the Balkan Wars of 

1912-1914. Even though the proclaimed aspiration of the pokrastvane was to bring the Pomaks back 

to the religion of their forefathers, most certainly its real objective was to consolidate the fledgling 

Bulgarian nation both territorially and culturally, thereby affirming the state’s sovereignty and its 

claim over the newly acquired territories of Thrace, the Rhodopes, and eastern Macedonia – all with 

sizeable Pomak population. 

Thus, in accordance with the nation-building model I propose, the act of pokrastvane was 

essentially a way to assert sovereignty by the forced assimilation of the Pomaks as a dichotomous 

minority in the fledgling nation-state of Bulgaria for two fundamental reasons: 

1) Of all minority groups within the new state, the elites perceived the Pomaks to be the 

most closely associated with the national majority by language and ethnicity; 32 

2) At the same time, however, the Pomaks also were affiliated with the former Ottoman- 

Turkish “oppressor” by the religion of Islam. 

Thus, the nation’s ruling elite not only considered the assimilation of the Pomaks desirable 

and necessary, but also possible based on the shared-language claims. The resolve to action by the 

young country was additionally bolstered by the Romantic perception of language as the defining 

characteristic of national identity. Although in the multiethnic Ottoman Empire language was not of 

essence to identity, in the era of Romanticism language became a major driving force in the 

subjugated people’s struggle to define themselves, along with ethnicity, religion, and shared history. 

When Romantic ideology began to take hold in the Balkans in the early nineteenth century, 

developing well into the twentieth century, vernacular languages indeed became a prominent factor 

in claiming territories and building identities among the new nations. 33 It was on the premise of 

shared language that Bulgaria was able to validate its claim over most of the Rhodope Mountains 

32 For example, the ethnic Turks, who commonly speak Turkish language, were not to be directly assimilated, 

according to the internal instructions of the pokrastvane. A letter of Maxim, Archbishop of the Plovdiv Diocese, to 

the Orthodox clergy, in charge of the pokrastvane of Haskovo, Stanimaka, Pazardjik, Panagyurishte, and 

Peshtera, reads: 

The conversion of pure Turks is not absolutely prohibited. But they can only be baptized if they have 

wished to do so, and only after they have partly learnt the [Bulgarian] language. 

National Archives-Plovdiv, Fond 67к, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 115, page 464. 

33 White, 180. 

28

after the Balkan Wars. Complicit with Romantic nationalism, the Slavic-speaking Pomaks were recast 

as “pure-blood” Bulgarians who spoke the “purest” Bulgarian language and preserved the “truest” 

Bulgarian traditions. Initially, Bulgaria’s Christian majority perceived the Pomaks merely as “Turks.” 

In confirmation of this, the historian Maria Todorova writes: 

The social context for this [the promotion of the “forced Islamization” thesis] was the 

process of nation-building, specifically the attempts at integration and homogenization of 

the population. It concerned first the Bulgarian-speaking Muslim population (Bulgarian 

Muslims, or the so-called Pomaks), and its place in the newly independent state which at first 

did not attempt to integrate it but treated it as indistinguishable from the larger Muslim 

group. In all censuses in the late nineteenth century (1880, 1885, 1888) the Bulgarianspeaking 

Muslims were entered under the heading ‘Turks.’ It was only in the 1905 census 

that a separate group – Pomaks – appeared. Beginning with the 1890s but especially during 

the 1920s and 1930s a sustained campaign in the press urged public opinion to discriminate 

between religious and ethnic allegiance, and to accept the Pomaks as part of the Bulgarian 

nation. This idea was most intensely espoused by small educated elite among the Pomaks... 34 

Indeed, within the Ottoman Empire, prior to the rise of nationalism, language and ethnicity 

were factors with little meaning. The existing millet system in the empire categorized all Ottoman 

subjects into semi-autonomous religious communities (millets) which were free to organize and 

carry out their religious, educational, and legal affairs with their own resources. This status quo 

enabled the millets to preserve their religious and/or ethnic identities under the leadership of their 

established religious institutions. Thus, all Eastern Orthodox Christians – Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs, 

and others - were categorized as Millet-i-Rum, i.e. people belonging to the Eastern Orthodox Church. 

The Muslim millet (Umma), on the other hand, consisted of the totality of Muslims in the Ottoman 

Empire (and beyond) with no reference to defined territory, language, or race. The latter held a 

status of superiority over the non-Muslim millets, the rayah (or raya). 35 

Since language in the Ottoman Empire was not a basis for identity prior to the rise of 

Romantic nationalism, the young Balkan nations, freshly out of sultanic grip, struggled to define 

themselves. In Bulgaria, patriotic literati such as Georgi Rakovsky, Petko Slaveykov, Lyuben 

34 Todorova, 138-39. 

35 White, 180. 

White, for instance, writes: 

All Eastern Orthodox Christians were the same to the Ottomans. The Ottomans made no attempts to 

distinguish one Orthodox Christian from another, whether they were Russians, Bulgarians, Serbian, 

Greek, or others. Ethnicity was irrelevant, and modern nationhood had no meaning. (Ibid.) 

Also Christopher Cviic, Remaking the Balkans (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1991), 7. 

29

Karavelov, and the Miladinov Brothers, similar to Herder in Germany earlier, “began to study the 

history of the Slavic languages, to compile bibliographies, to write grammars, to collect archeological 

remnants and medieval manuscripts, to publish folksongs and fairy tales, to collect artifacts with 

ethnographic value and exhibit them in museums.” In the period 1850-1900, these intellectuals 

helped establish universities where a range of academic disciplines were taught, including political 

history, “philology (the historical study of language and literature), ‘national’ folklore (its literary and 

linguistic history), and traditional culture (clothing, architecture, food, holidays)[.]” 36 

Nor were the Bulgarian patriots alone in promoting language commonality as a cause for 

territorial and cultural consolidation. In fact, their Slavic brethren from already independent Serbia 

first immersed into Herderian activism towards strengthening Serbian nationalism. Like Herder in 

Germany, the intellectual Vuk Stefanoviċ Karadžiċ (1787-1864) laid the foundations of national 

identity in Serbia. He classified everyone who used the štokavian dialect (spoken by the Serbs as 

well) as a Serb by applying the Romantic notion that nations were defined by language. 37 “Because 

some štokavian speakers were Roman Catholic,” White notes, “Karadžic labeled them as Roman 

Catholic Serbs, and because some štokavian speakers were Muslims, Karadžic classified them as 

Muslim Serbs [largely Bosnians]. Significantly many of these people whom Karadžic classified as 

36 Alexander Kiossev, “The Dark Intimacy: Maps, Identities, Acts of Identification,” in Balkan as Metaphor: 

Between Globalization and Fragmentation, ed. Dusan I. Bjelic and Obrad Savic (Cambridge: Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology, 2002), 175. 

Alexander Kiossev is the author and/or editor of the following works: 

Alexander Kiossev, “Opiti vurhu kulturnata istoria na prokhoda” / “Writing on the Cultural History of the 

Transition”/ in Alexander Kiossev, ed., Post-Theory, Games and Discursive Resistance (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 

1995); Budgarskiat kanon: Krizata na liternaturnovo nasledstvo /The Bulgarian Canon: The Crisis of the Literary 

Heritage/, ed. (Sofia, 1998); “Homo Scriptor und Homo academicus. Zwei Arten von 

Literaturgeschichtsschreibung” in Die Bulgarische Literatur in alter und neuer Sicht (Harrassovitz Verlag, 1997); 

“The Real City in an Imagined Territory (The Case of Plovdiv),” in Sofia Academic Nexus - How to Think About the 

Balkans: Culture, Religion, Identity, Issue 1 of CAS Working Papers Series (Sofia: Center for Advanced Studies 

Sofia (CAS), 2007), 3-24; 

Publications by Alexander Kiossev in Eurozine (a leading European cultural magazine): 

“The Oxymoron of Normality,” Eurozine, Published on 4 January 2008, at: 

http://www.eurozine.com/authors/kiossev.html; “Gaze and Acknowledgement,” Eurozine, Published on 12 

December 2006, at: http://www.eurozine.com/authors/kiossev.html; “The university between Facts and 

Norms,” Eurozine, Published on 3 November 2003, at: http://www.eurozine.com/authors/kiossev.html; “The 

Dark Intimacy: Maps, Identities, Acts of Identifications,” Eurozine, Published on 19 March 2003, at: 

http://www.eurozine.com/authors/kiossev.html. Eurozine publications last accessed 30 November 2009. 

37 White, 180. 

30

Serbs did not consider themselves to be Serbs.” 38 Just as Karadžic in Serbia classified the Slavicspeaking 

Bosnians as “Serbs,” the patriotic intelligentsia in Bulgaria, including some Pomaks, 

promoted the community of Slavic-speaking Muslims as “forcibly Islamized Bulgarians.” 39 Unlike the 

Slavic-speaking Muslims in former Yugoslavia today, however, who have clearly set themselves apart 

as Bosnians (or Bosniaks), largely following the bloody conflicts of the 1990s, the Pomak identity in 

Bulgaria continues to be hotly debated. 

As the Christianization of 1912-1913 is my case study, I shall demonstrate that, in the course 

of its enfolding, the pokrastvane displayed all characteristics of the nationalism-of-coercion model 

proposed herein, including the assertion of identity which distinguished the new Bulgarian nation 

from its former “Turkish oppressor” in the strongest terms possible. The language of nationalism, 

giving expression to this freshly constructed self-image, described everything “Christian” and 

“Bulgarian” as “glorious” and “liberating,” while everything “Islamic” and “Turkish” as “barbaric” and 

“oppressive.” The Pomaks, as newly imagined Bulgarians, therefore, could have nothing to do with 

Islam, so their conversion to Christianity became a pressing concern for the Bulgarian authorities, 

consolidating a nation-state amidst war. Despite the fervent proclamations of kinship and 

brotherhood, though, the ruling elites continued to discriminate against the Pomaks and treat them 

in such a way that alienated, rather than integrated, them into the Bulgarian nation-state. My 

objective henceforth is to reveal the Christianization of the Slavic-speaking Muslims during the 

Balkan Wars of 1912-1914 as an expression of coercive nationalism. To that end, I enfold the 

historical picture of the pokrastvane based on two primary sources: (1) original documents dating 

back to the time of occurrence, and (2) surviving oral history. Much of the first-hand evidence I draw 

38 Ibid., 182. 

39 The parallel is supported by the statement of Karl Popper in an interview with Giancarlo Bosetti (author of 

The Lessons of This Century: With Two Talks on Freedom and the Democratic State) in 1993: 

Bosetti: “Why has this [the Bosnian war] happened?” 

Popper: “[Because] [c]ommunism has been replaced by this ridiculous nationalism. I say ridiculous, because it 

sets against each other people who are virtually all Slavs. The Serbs are Slavs, the Croats are Slavs, and the 

Bosnians are also Slavs, converted to Islam [emphasis added].” 

(Giancarlo Bosetti, The Lessons of This Century: With Two Talks on Freedom and the Democratic State (London: 

Routledge, 1997), 53.) 

31

from the valuable collection of archival records published under the editorship of the Bulgarian 

scholars Velichko Georgiev and Stayko Trifonov, as well as from the Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace’s Report on the Balkan Wars of 1914. Organized in chronological order, Georgiev 

and Trifonov’s volume effectively reveals the pokrastvane as a premeditated and hushed affair in 

which ecclesiastical and state authorities directly participated. 40 The Carnegie Report, on the other 

hand, illuminates the broader Balkan conflict. 41 Surviving oral stories, for their part, attest to the 

widespread murder of Pomaks in the (Western) Rhodopes, committed mostly by insurgent Christian 

bands – a fact that is conspicuously absent from the communication exchange and documented 

meetings of ecclesiastical authorities, missionaries, and military officials. 42 

War and Pokrastvane (Conversion) in 1912-1913 

The pokrastvane was one of the hardest moments for the Pomak Muslims as citizens of the 

new Christian state of Bulgaria. As a divergent group, affiliated with the former Ottoman oppressor 

by religion and as a Bulgarian-speaking minority, they were immediately singled out for assimilation 

within the broader context of territorial, political, and cultural consolidation of the country. The 

Balkan Wars provided an “opportune moment,” in the words of one church official, for the brutal 

business of religious conversion, which the state authorities intended to explain, if post-war 

implicated, as a sad concomitant of war. 43 The multitude of available records from the 1912-1913 

Christianization of the Pomaks include protocols from regular and ad-hoc sessions of the Holy Synod 

(the highest ecclesiastical authority) of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, reports of missionaries, 

40 See Velichko Georgiev and Stayko Trifonov, eds., Pokrastvaneto na Bulgarite Mohamedani 1912-1913 /The 

Christianization of the Bulgarian Mohammedans 1912-1913/ (Sofia: Prof. Marin Drinov Publ., 1995), passim. 

41 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the 

Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars” (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1914), 

49-70. 

42 See Georgiev and Trifonov’s volume. 

43 Ibid., Georgiev and Trifonov, eds., 13. This phrase is used by Jeromonk Pavel, Protosingel of the Plovdiv 

Diocese, in a letter to Stoyu Shishkov from 24 November 1912. The excerpt reads: 

Can we count on a more or less en mass conversion of the Pomaks (in the Rhodopes)? What do you 

think would be the best time to start proclaiming them in the Christian faith and baptism: right now or 

after our relations with Turkey have been reestablished? I am afraid that if we wait until the conclusion 

of the peace treaty, this opportune moment would be irrevocably lost [emphasis added]. 

National Archives-Plovdiv, Fond 52к, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 818, pages 1-3. 

32

priest, and teachers who were part of the regular conversion missions, as well as letters and reports 

of private individuals, or religious- and state officials who directly enforced the pokrastvane. 44 The 

combination of written evidence, photographic imagery, and surviving oral histories unequivocally 

reveal that not only all levels of state and church authorities implicated in the pokrastvane, but also 

that insurgent bands “facilitated” the conversion through abuse and killing of Pomak civilians. 

According to a document, at least 150,000 Pomaks in the Rhodopes alone were affected by 

the Christianization. 45 The total number, however, is perhaps more than double, because a sizeable 

Muslim population resided in the Rhodopes, Thrace, and Macedonia--territories which Bulgaria held 

between the fall of 1912 and the fall of 1913. It was precisely at this time when the authorities 

carried out the pokrastvane. 46 Although the exact number of affected population remains unknown, it 

is safe to conclude that about 300,000 Slavic-speaking Muslims suffered the abuse of regular troops, 

church authorities, and civilian bands for the duration of the conversion. Records set the beginning of 

the campaign around October 1912, which peaked in the first three months of 1913, and gradually 

subsided by the fall of 1913 when Bulgaria conclusively lost the Second Balkan War. 

1. The Balkan Wars 

In the fall of 1912, shared interests of territorial expansion induced four nascent Balkan 

nations - Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece – to sign a pact to fight their common enemy, 

Turkey – the natural successor of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire. On October 4, 1912, the socalled 

Balkan Alliance declared war on Turkey, beginning the First Balkan War. The alliance – albeit 

an uneasy one – soon paid off, and by the spring of 1913 Turkey was defeated. As a result, most of the 

44 Georgiev and Trifonov, eds., passim. 

45 Ibid., Georgiev and Trifonov, eds., 157-71. Confidential report sent to Maxim, Archbishop of Plovdiv, and to 

several ministers of the Bulgarian government of by a civilian committee from Pazarjik engaged in the 

conversion of Pomaks in the Chepino valley, 22 February 1913. National Archives-Plovdiv, Fond 67 к, Inventory 

2, Archival Unit 107, pages 79-85. 

46 According to Stoyu Shishkov, who was directly involved in the conversion and later published a book about 

them, the Pomaks inhabiting European Turkey on the eve of the Balkan Wars (the early fall of 1912) numbered 

400,000 people and were distributed in 500 towns and villages. By regions, the distribution was the following: 

Edirne (Odrin) - 131,455 people in 207 towns/villages; Thessalonica (Solun) - 98,297 people in 190 

towns/villages; Bitolya - 36,669 people in 93 towns/villages; Skopje - 13,114 people in 23 towns/villages. Stoyu 

Shishkov, Balgaro-mohamedanite (Pomatsite) /The Bulgarian Mohammedans (Pomaks)/ (Plovdiv, 1936), 34. 

33

European territories of the former Ottoman Empire passed into the hands of the victorious foursome. 

Quarrels over territorial distribution, however, soon broke out among Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, 

and Greece. Bulgaria harbored ambitions to annex the former Ottoman provinces of Macedonia and 

Thrace, where significant Bulgarian-speaking population lived. But this did not square well with the 

aspirations of the other three countries, particularly Serbia and Greece which sought the same lands. 

As the territorial disagreement escalated, Bulgaria invaded Thrace, eastern Macedonia, and the 

Rhodopes, immediately imposing military control over them. 47 

By the summer of 1913, Bulgarian troops occupied the better part of the former Ottoman 

territories on the Balkan Peninsula. Unwilling to accept this dominion, on June 16, Serbia, 

Montenegro, and Greece declared war on Bulgaria, thus, initiating the Second Balkan War. While 

Greece attacked from the south, Serbia and Montenegro advanced from the west. Completing the vice 

that squeezed Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey opened fronts to the north and southeast respectively. 

Even though Bulgaria did not hold the provinces of Macedonia and Thrace for more than a 

few months, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, actively assisted by the army and paramilitary 

formations, succeeded in launching a massive and violent conversion of the Pomak population within 

these territories. 48 These provinces (Thrace and Macedonia) were home to a sizeable Pomak 

population (Appendix 2.1) who soon found themselves a part of a brand new nation. The Pomak 

stronghold, the Rhodope Mountains, fell into Bulgarian hands as well. 

2. The Pokrastvane 

All areas with heavily concentrated Pomak population were violent combat zones for the 

duration of the Balkan Wars. The civilian population consisting mainly of women, children, and 

elderly men (the Turkish army had conscripted the younger males), bore not only the brunt of war 

and an unusually cold winter, but also suffered the abuse of religious conversion. Between October 

47 R.J. Crampton, Bulgaria (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 190-219. 

See also, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Report of the International Commission to Inquire into 

the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars” (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 

1914), 49-70. 

48 Crampton, 190-219. 

34

1912 and September 1913, the advancing and retreating Bulgarian troops and paramilitary bands 

plundered and burnt hundreds of Pomak villages, turning thousands of people into destitute 

refugees. Waves of Muslim civilians pressed southward, following the withdrawing Ottoman army, 

after having abandoned all their earthly possessions. The constant swap of territories between the 

warring parties, however, threw the civilian population into utter confusion and rendered it unable 

to decide whether to permanently stay or leave. Many of the Rhodopean Pomaks, who had originally 

fled, returned to their villages only to find themselves homeless and robbed of all food and livestock, 

in the middle of severe winter. Dispossessed, malnourished, and without basic medication, people 

soon succumbed to epidemics of typhoid, cholera, and scarlet fever. By January 1913, the new 

Bulgarian regime had launched a large-scale Christianization in the Rhodopes. 

In a letter to his friend Ivan Shishmanov of January 26, 1913, Stoyu Shishkov – a patriotic 

writer and fervent pokrastvane crusader – attested to the dismal position of the Pomak population: 49 

It has been a week since I am in this untamed and beautiful Tamrush region [Middle 

Rhodopes]. I serve in the commission for aid distribution, and while I am witnessing 

exceptional and glorious historical events [the pokrastvane], I am also faced with 

unspeakable misery. Semi-clad, famished, and emaciated families of five to ten members live 

in cramped, half-destroyed shacks, with not even a tin box in sight for water and cooking. 

But they line before the cross, the gospel, and the holy water en mass, in acceptance of Christ, 

which should provide them with relief from fear and torment. I took a photographer with 

me. As missioners, we try to instill peace and comfort in this unfortunate population. 50 

In his capacity as a police commandant in the village of Ustovo (Middle Rhodopes), Shishkov 

stood at the core of Pomak Christianization in the Smolyan area. While his official function was to 

ensure that an orderly assumption of power was taking place in the region, his personal mission was 

to see to the successful conversion of the local Muslim population. Instead of merely applying brute 

force to that end, however – as it would usually happen - Shishkov was also concerned about the 

lasting impact of the conversion. Thus, in a statement of December 2, 1912, he expressed anxiety that 

the complete devastation of the region, after Bulgarian troops and Christian civilians swept through 

49 Note: When so indicated (in brackets), the information stems from the volume of original documents edited 

by Dr. Velichko Georgiev and Dr. Stayko Trifonov and titled Pokrastvaneto na Bulgarite Mohamedani 1912-1913 

/The Christianization of the Bulgarian Mohammedans 1912-1913/ (Sofia: Prof. Marin Drinov Publ., 1995), passim. 

50 National Archives-Bulgarian Academy of Science, Fond 11к, Inventory 3, Archival Unit 1676, pages 2-3. 

(Georgiev and Trifonov, eds., 65.) 

Note: All Bulgarian sources, including archival documents, used in this chapter – and throughout the dissertation 

– are translated from Bulgarian by the author. 

35

it, would adversely affect the pokrastvane. “Hungry and ragged women [refugees] are coming back to 

their torched villages,” he wrote. “All food, livestock, and movable property have already been stolen 

from them. ... Since war and army mobilization prevented harvest, the crops are rotting under the 

rains. ... The winter in the mountain is harsh, and … starvation is present in all its horror, wreaking 

sickness and death.” Quite apart from starvation, Shishkov worried that the rampant corruption and 

arbitrary violence against Muslim civilians would obstruct the conversion effort as well as the 

prospect of effectively administering control over the territory. “The whole country [here] is in a 

state of complete lawlessness,” he lamented in the same report. “Banditry and looting have reached 

unprecedented levels. The need for troops and administrative authority to intercept the situation is 

eminent.” As police commandant of Ustovo, Shishkov felt responsible for what was happening, yet, he 

did not have the resources to prevent it. Thus, the purpose of his report – just one of many – was to 

convince the higher authorities of the dire necessity to amend the situation in order to ensure the 

lasting effect of the pokrastvane and efficient government in the region. “The [Christian] posses and 

various such thugs roaming the area with the sole purpose to plunder must be disbanded, disarmed, 

and ordered back to their places of residence,” he proposed. “All Bulgarian [Christian] villages in the 

vicinity 51 must be thoroughly searched, for even the women there have partaken in the plunder of 

Pomak villages. … [Also,] a doctor is urgently needed to help prevent the outbreak of disease 

epidemics due to the horrific famine and poverty.” 52 

As one of the chief local executives of the pokrastvane, Stoyu Shishkov accounted for every 

development on the matter to the higher church authorities, among others. In one of his 

communications with Archbishop Maxim of Plovdiv, dated January 30, 1913, he reported how “out of 

the 33 villages [in the Smolyan region], 3,970 homes have been torched,” and how “several families 

are [now] crowding in a single room.” Shishkov’s biggest concern, however, continued to be that 

corrupt officials and marauding Christian bands could hamper “our holy mission” in the Rhodopes: 

51 “… of Stanimaka, Ahı Çelebi, Darıdere, and Skeçe, and – above all – Chepelare, Shiroka Laka, Alamidere, 

Turyan, Arda, Raykovo, and Pashmaklı …”. (Ibid.) 

52 Report On the Situation in the Districts of Ahı-Çelebi, Egridere, and Skeçe after the Bulgarian Troops Passed 

through the Region from 2 December 1912. National Archives-Plovdiv, Fond 67 к, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 

121, pages 12-13. (Georgiev and Trifonov, eds., 17-18.) 

36

[T]he Pomak population continues to be victimized by various thugs who arrive here from 

different places, go from village to village, attack the population in their homes and rob them 

of the last piece of clothing, implement or livestock; many engage in ugly acts of violating 

people’s dignity and honor. The terrified population takes everything timidly with no 

courage to complain, and there is no one to complain to anyway. Self-appointed tax 

collectors have plagued the villages of Beden, Trigrad, and some others, tormenting the 

population terribly. The very war government in Dövlen, on all levels, has been appallingly 

violating this population. I fear that after the relief commission leaves, the authorities 

themselves would rob the people of the little aid they’ve received. The state must not only 

stop these practices, but also must order an investigation into them, and punish those 

responsible with all the severity of the law. The state needs to appoint as regional 

administrators persons of moral integrity to take control of the anarchy. Without such 

measures our holy mission of bringing the Pomak population into the Christian faith is 

doomed to fail; the national prestige would be irreparably compromised, and the results 

would be devastating [emphasis added]. 53 

Nor was Stoyu Shishkov alone in his reportage of misery, corruption, and abuse in the 

Rhodopes during the Balkan Wars. Orthodox Church clergy, sent to baptize the Pomak population, 

painted a picture in the same gloomy colors. Priest Dimitar Kutuev, a member of the conversion 

mission in the village of Yakoruda, delivered a particularly poignant message of children’s suffering 

to Archbishop Maxim of May 9, 1913: 

The village of Babek has been burnt by the bands... 

The population … is utterly poor, sick and famished. The epidemics of disease have hit 

this area harder than any other. Small children are forced to travel to distant villages to beg; 

they come back to their sick families bringing them a meager something to eat. A number of 

starving and ragged children surrounded me here, one day, and with tears in their eyes, they 

begged, ‘Give us some bread, grandpa priest!’ The picture of small, hungry, and tattered 

children with prematurely withered faces is horrible to behold. This one child told me, ‘Give 

me some bread, grandpa priest, because I am hungry from earth to heaven.’ Since this village 

was completely destroyed, no livestock and food has been left for this famished population. 

... In Babek, as well as in the neighboring hamlets, people die every day. 54 

Because of the heavy winter, lack of roads, and naturally difficult terrain, the Pomak villages 

in the Rhodopes were largely cut off from access by humanitarian agencies such as the Red Cross that 

distributed life-saving food and medical supplies. The Bulgarian authorities and the Bulgarian 

Orthodox Church, which channeled the supplies, used the aid provided by humanitarian 

organizations and foreign embassies in Bulgaria as a method of inducing conversion. Thus, much of 

53 National Archives-Plovdiv, Fond 67к, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 123, pages 145-9. (Ibid., 88-91.) 

54 National Archives-Plovdiv, Fond 67к, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 116, pages 239-241. (Ibid., 289.) 

37

the initially declared “success” of the pokrastvane stemmed from the fact that the famished Pomak 

population was given food rations, some cash, and basic clothing in exchange of formal baptism. 55 

Figure 2-1: 

Map of the Rhodope Mountains in Bulgaria 56 

Whereas the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was formally in charge of the pokrastvane, the 

army, paramilitary formations, patriotic civilian organizations, local military governments, and 

private individuals rendered support to the conversion effort. The church dispatched special 

missions composed of church-appointed clergy and state-appointed educators to all the Pomak areas 


56 This map was specifically created to illustrate the Rhodope Mountains in southwest Bulgaria in general. For 

the purpose of this chapter, the Middle Rhodopes lie along the River Vacha and roughly incorporates the towns 

(from north to south) Krichim, Devin, Dospat, Chepelare, Smolyan, and Madan. The Arda River is unmarked on 

the map, but it is the blue line that runs between the towns Smolyan and Madan, and the village of Smilyan. (This 

map was created for the basic purposes of this dissertation, but it is by no means comprehensive.) 

38

in the Rhodopes, Thrace, and Macedonia. Their task was twofold: (1) to turn the Pomaks into 

Christians and (2) to educate them in patriotism and national loyalty (Appendix 2.2). Whenever and 

wherever eloquence failed, the “crusaders” administered brute force to achieve the desired effect. 

From the volume of documents published under the editorship of Velichko Georgiev and Stayko 

Trifonov, it is clear that the Plovdiv Diocese of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, headed by Archbishop 

Maxim, played a pivotal role in the pokrastvane. This is understandable, since the territories most 

densely populated by Pomaks – the Rhodope Mountains, Thrace, and part of Macedonia – were under 

the jurisdiction of the Diocese of Plovdiv and Archbishop Maxim. 57 

Neither did the Bulgarian military authorities delay supporting the “holy mission.” As soon 

as Thrace, Macedonia, and the Rhodopes came under Bulgarian control, the pokrastvane began. While 

the campaign started in the fall 1912 and continued through the summer, it peaked during the 

harshest winter months of January, February, and March, when the population was most vulnerable. 

Usually, conversions took place en mass. Soldiers would round up entire village populations and 

huddle them together in an open space, because there were no buildings sufficiently large to 

accommodate hundreds of people at once. Men, women, and children – by family – were forced to 

stand in line before one or more Orthodox priests for baptism. After receiving the sign of the cross 

from the priest(s), the (male) adults of each family would have their heads immersed in water while 

the children would be quickly sprinkled only for reasons of efficiency. If their time and resources 

allowed, the “crusaders” would force Pomak converts – particularly elderly male heads of family – to 

bite into a piece of pork as a final act of denouncing Islam, following which the baptizing priest(s) 

would formally proclaim them Christian. The Pomaks would next be required to make verbal 

declaration of rejecting Islam and accepting Christianity, whereafter they received new Bulgarian- 

Christian names (Figures 2-2, 2-3, and 2-4, pp.44-46). To complete the humiliation, men were forced 

to surrender their fezzes (headdress) and put on hats with crucifixes affixed to them as a blatant 

reminder of their pokrastvane. Women, for their part, had to substitute the yashmak (a type of veil) 


39

for simple headscarves. 58 With the population thus formally converted, each village mosque and 

mekteb (Muslim school) – provided they had survived the burning – would reopen as a church and 

Sunday school respectively. These two institutions, then, indoctrinated “the new Christians,” from 

children to adults, in “Christian virtues” and patriotic loyalty. 59 

In large part, the pokrastvane was conducted by Christian civilians from the Rhodopes or 

surrounding areas. This is abundantly clear from the lengthy “confidential” report of civilian patriots 

from Pazardjik to the Holy Synod and Archbishop Maxim of Plovdiv, informing the latter of “the 

citizens’” forthcoming “initiative” to convert the Chepino Valley’s population (Middle Rhodopes, see 

Figure 2-1, p. 38). 60 The document is particularly valuable because it sheds a detailed light on how 

the pokrastvane was carried out by civilian zealots with the blessing of the Bulgarian Orthodox 

Church and the active support of high-ranking military and political officials. Thus, the general 

pattern of the affair, as gleaned out from the report, appears to be the following: having decided to 

Christianize the local Muslim population, Christian civilians from Pazardjik and its vicinity proceeded 

to organize a “Committee for Assistance of the Newly-Converted Christians” even before the 

conversion took place. This committee’s purpose “[wa]s to promulgate the idea about Christianizing 

the [local] Pomaks.” To implement their plan, these Bulgarian patriots organized themselves in 

“committees for conversion,” each assigned to specific Pomak village in the Chepino Valley. As the 

document stipulates, the pokrastvane initiative was to be first announced to the Pomaks, then 

publicized among the broader Christian population in the region, and finally enforced, “village by 

[Pomak] village,” starting on an appointed date. Thus, on December 29, 1912, conversion activists 

“marched into [the village of] Ladjene where [they] encountered a convention of local mayors and 

58 In another letter to Ivan Shishmanov from 10 February 1913, Stoyu Shsishkov, writes: 

It has been a week already since the Pomaks in Chepelare have been converted as well, and they are so 

enthusiastic as if they’ve never been Mohammedans. The men wear hats with crucifixes on them – a 

sign testifying to the fact that they are no longer Mohammed’s followers – and the women, who have 

thrown the veil, are lighting candles, kissing the icons, and crossing themselves admirably. 

National Archives-Bulgarian Academy of Science, Fond 11, Inventory 3, Archival Unit 1676, pages 6-11. 

(Georgiev and Trifonov, eds., 135-6.) 

59 Ibid. Also, see Figures 2-2, 2-3, and 2-4. 

60 For further reference, a slightly abridged version of the above document is enclosed in Appendix 2.2. 

40

Pomak dignitaries from neighboring villages gathered to hear [them].” 61 Henceforth, a succession of 

“patriotic citizens” took turns to deliver fiery speeches about the virtues of Christianity and the 

decadence of Islam, to be only occasionally interrupted by the nervous attempt at dissent of a 

beleaguered Pomak population. Below is a telling excerpt from the report: 

... Mumdjiev spoke first. ... [He told the gathered Pomak elders] ... that the Quran 

obstructs their progress, that their forefathers had been Islamized by force, ... that the faith 

of Mohammed resembles a tattered coat which cannot warm the soul or soften the heart; 

that Christianity brings high moral virtues and gives freedom of conscience; that they are a 

compact mass of about 300,000 who speak the pure Bulgarian language so dear to us; that 

their folklore is ours, and so on. ... 

Molla Mustafa Kara-Mehmedov from Rakitovo spoke on behalf of the Pomaks – a 

wealthy, intelligent, sixty-year old person, who had served as a district councilor and who 

can read Bulgarian excellently. He literally said the following, ‘Gentlemen, what the people 

from Pazardjik said is just; but what can be done when there are 2,000 behind us (speaking 

of his village) who are simple and ignorant people and they do not understand how they 

could change their faith? It all seems to us like impenetrable forest, how can we find our way 

out of it? Anything is possible, but we ask to be allowed some time?’ To that, the citizens … 

objected: ‘...You must convert now.’ [emphasis added]. 62 

So, the pokrastvane of the Chepino Valley proceeded accordingly. On the appointed day, 

gendarmerie and soldiers – “stationed in these villages from mobilization time to disarm the 

Pomaks” – drove together the entire population of Ladjene and Kamenitsa to facilitate the baptism. 

According to the document, more than 1,300 Pomak Muslims were formally converted the same day. 

In the villages of Rakitovo, especially recruited photographers “captured the moments when the 

converts were sprinkled with water, and when they were kissing the cross and the priest’s hand.” 

After the formal baptism, “[t]he crowd, including the new converts, saluted the general, the local 

governor, and shouted three times, ‘Long live the King and Great Bulgaria.’ [emphasis added].” 63 Just 

like that, the civilian Pazardjik “crusaders” – with the blessing and support of the Bulgarian state and 

61 Confidential report of the Pazardjik activists on Pomak conversion to the Holy Synod, to Archbishop Maxim of 

Plovdiv, and to several Ministries, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture and 

Forestry, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice, The Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of War, and 

others from 22 February 1913. National Archives-Plovdiv, Fond 67 к, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 107, pages 79- 

85. (Georgiev and Trifonov, eds., 157-71.) 

62 Ibid. 

63 Ibid. 

41

church – delivered “a population of about 150,000 [Pomak] people … to the Bulgarian Orthodox 

Church, and to the Bulgarian nation,” boasted the report. 64 

Even euphemistic, the wording of the above document is clearly the language of coercion 

(Appendix 2.2). The ultimate goal of the pokrastvane was not to “warm the soul” or “soften the heart” 

of the Pomak population, as phrased in the report, but to “deliver” “to the Bulgarian nation” a 

compact mass of “300,000” people in order to consolidate national sovereignty. The “soldiers,” “the 

general,” and “the local governor” were there to ensure that full control over the newly acquired 

territories, a fundamental part of which was the Chepino Valley of the Rhodopes, would be achieved 

absolutely and definitively via the forced conversion of the local Muslims. The recurring stipulation 

that the Pomaks “speak the pure Bulgarian language” was, in effect, a legitimization of Bulgaria’s 

claim over the Rhodopes, as well as over all territories settled by Pomaks (Appendix 2.2). 

The report’s authors, however, similar to the communiqués of many other pokrastvane 

enforcers, took special care to avoid direct reference to violence. But, as one might conclude from 

Figures 2-2, 2-3, and 2-4 (pp.44-46), the motley crowd of Pomak men, women, and children were 

hardly the willing participants in an affair that forced them out in the bitter cold, in the middle of 

severe winter, to accept the faith of their wartime enemy. Were the pokrastvane truly “voluntary,” as 

alleged in much of the archival evidence, at least a portion of the Pomaks would have certainly opted 

out of swearing allegiance to symbols – the cross and pork meat – totally foreign and even repugnant 

to them as Muslims. In fact, the Rhodopean Pomaks were just emerging as Bulgarian subjects during 

and following the Balkan Wars of 1912-1914, and they still perceived themselves as Ottoman 

Muslims. Moreover, when the Turkish empire broke down, the Pomaks’ Islamic religion became the 

sole anchor of palpable identity for them. Thus, they were even more likely to adhere to their 

Muslimness (Arab-Turkish names, conservative attire, and Muslim traditions) in the midst of political 

chaos than ever before. In effect, for the first time, the pokrastvane threatened to annihilate the 

deeply-rooted sense of Muslim self of the Pomaks, while seeking to replace it with customs new and 

hostile to them. 

64 Ibid. 

42

Ultimately, the Christianization of 1912-1913 emerged as the beginning of an end to many 

prominent Pomak traditions, which would be consistently suppressed by subsequent Bulgarian 

regimes. Figure 2-4 (p. 46) provides an example of just such suppressed cultural practice. It depicts a 

Pomak wedding performed in the Christian tradition during the pokrastvane. Instead of the 

customary (red) veil draped over her face, 65 however, the bride is crowned by a wreath, branching 

over her head in the form of cross. Noticeable also is the groom’s lack of fezz, broadly targeted for 

replacement with hats during the pokrastvane. Still, the bride’s and groom’s “crossed” wreaths are 

the sole observable indicators that this Pomak couple has been baptized since the rest of their attire 

remains in typically Pomak style, observable to this day on many elderly women and men in the 

Rhodopes. The same photo also reveals another, more intimate aspect of the Balkan Wars 

pokrastvane. According to the archival description of the photograph, Hristo Karamadjukov (back 

row, in the middle) served as the best man of the newlyweds. Considering that he was one of the most 

notorious campaigners for the second Pomak pokrastvane of 1938-1944, 66 Karamandjukov appears 

to have been quite involved in the Christianization of the Rhodopes since the beginning. One can only 

speculate how he might have appointed himself as the “best man” in this particular – and perhaps 

other – wedding(s) in much the same way in which other “crusaders” became the loathed 

“godmothers” and “godfathers” to freshly baptized Pomak families (see Appendix 2.2, middle of the 

document). 

65 It should be noted, however, that not all Pomak women traditionally wore the veil. The bridal veil – as far as it 

existed – has been gradually substituted for a peculiar makeup, covering the bride’s face like a mask, which is 

still practiced in the village of Ribnovo (Western Rhodopes, see Figure 2-1, p.38). For details on Pomak wedding 

traditions, read in Chapter V. 

66 See Chapter III, especially the sections concerning Organization Rodina. 

43

Figure 2-2: Pokrastvane in the village of Devin, 1912-1913 

Priest Iliya Djodjev sprinkles water over the head of an elderly looking Pomak person before 

proclaiming him “Christian.” The whole village is gathered in an open area to witness the 

baptism and endure the humiliation collectively. 67 (Courtesy of National Archives-Plovdiv) 

67National Archives-Plovdiv, Fond 959 k, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 902, page 3. Photography Collection 

no.15532 (date unspecified). 

44

Figure 2-3: Pokrastvane in the village of Banya, 1912-1913 

The same priest Iliya Djodjev (left), and another one, Hariton Nikolov, are baptizing the 

population of Banya. There is a table with kupel (vessel containing water) on it. Each of the 

Muslims, waiting in the background (left), would pass before the kupel to have his or her head 

sprinkled with water, thus, being formally baptized and reborn as “Christian.” The woman in 

the left (as well as the man with fezz) is readily identifiable as Muslim, because she is trying to 

cover her face. A Bulgarian gendarme in uniform, likely there to ensure an orderly 

pokrastvane, is clearly visible in the right, behind one of the priests. The thick blanket of snow 

in the photograph is a vivid reminder of the severely cold winter that year. The ceremony of 

baptism in this particular photograph was probably done at the beginning of 1913. 68 (Courtesy 

of National Archives-Plovdiv) 

68 National Archives-Plovdiv, Fond 959 k, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 902, page 2. Photography Collection 


45

Figure 2-4: A pokrastvane wedding 

A snapshot from the wedding of a newly converted Pomak couple in the village of Kestendjik, 

conducted in the Christian tradition by the same priest Iliya Djodjev, 1912-1913. A witness to 

this ceremony is Hristo Karamandjukov, a fervent pokrastvane activist (back row, in the 

middle). 69 The writer and historian Vassil Dechov, who collected the earliest oral history 

about Salih Aga, is also captured in this photograph (back of the picture, right upper corner, 

next to an elderly, bearded man). (Courtesy of National Archives-Plovdiv) 

69 National Archives-Plovdiv, Fond 959 k, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 902, page 1. Photography Collection 


46

2.1. The Killings in Oral History 

Clearly, the purpose of the pokrastvane was to consolidate state sovereignty by ensuring 

national and territorial unity. The Pomaks, closely related ethnically and linguistically to Bulgaria’s 

majority, were the most obvious candidate for assimilation. What stood between the dream of 

building a strong nation-state and reality was the Pomaks’ problematic religious affiliation with 

Islam, the faith of the former Ottoman “oppressor.” To Bulgaria’s ruling and religious authorities it 

was a surmountable obstacle that could be overcome by conversion, both religious and national. 

Undoubtedly, the authorities intended to implement the pokrastvane as bloodlessly as possible 

because violence would neither nurture Bulgarian patriotism among the Pomaks nor enhance 

Bulgaria’s international image after the war. On the unsettling road to nation-making, however, 

violence not only took place, but much blood was spilt as well. 

The scores of original documents, though, only hint at the killings that took place in many 

Pomak villages during the pokrastvane. This was in consequence of the purposeful misinformation 

policy applied by state and church authorities alike. 70 The Bulgarian government was concerned 

about the country’s image abroad, since much of the current war’s outcome depended on the 

favorable disposition of the Great Powers, which would certainly condemn any atrocities committed 

against Muslim – or other – minorities. 71 Similarly, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church did not wish to 

attract any criticism – in the words of Archbishop Maxim – for “resort[ing] to uncharacteristic to its 

nature means” in making converts. 72 Whereas the torture and killings were not necessarily 


71 The United Kingdom, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the other Western Christian Powers were 

sympathetic to the self-determination cause of the newly emerging Christian nation-states on the Balkan 

Peninsula after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, as suggested in a document cited in this chapter. 

However, the Great Powers were also concerned with the humanitarian situation of the Muslim population that 

remained within these nation-states. For instance, there were special provisions in a number of peace treaties 

signed between Bulgaria and the Great Powers that guaranteed certain minority rights, including religious 

freedom (See 3.3. War and Pokrastvane No More). The pokrastvane, a clear breach of these provisions, was 

unwelcome by the Western Powers. 

72 Words of Maxim, Archbishop of Plovdiv, on the margins of a report sent to him by Sv. V. Iliev from 30 January 

1913. National Archives-Plovdiv, Fond 67, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 123, page 39. (Georgiev and Trifonov, eds., 

87.) 

Note: In the document, Maxim wrote: “Съобщи му се устно ... да не ходи с войници ни със стражари, за да не 

се петни св. Дело и се дава повод за обвинения, че църквата си служи с несвойствени ней средства.” 

(Ibid.) / Author’s translation: “He was orally told … not to go around with soldiers and gendarmes for that would 

47

committed by the Bulgarian ecclesiastical or military authorities, their inability or reluctance to stop 

the Christian bands’ pogroms against the Muslims makes both parties complicit in the atrocities. 

Because the surviving Bulgarian sources are at best suggestive of the cases of murder that 

accompanied the pokrastvane of 1912-1913, it is all too easy to dismiss it as conjecture. Clues, 

however, can still be found and verified with vernacular history, preserving vivid memories of 

bloodshed. For instance, a coded telegram of the Bulgarian regional governor in Drama (now in 

Greece), Mr. Dobrev, to Bulgaria’s Prime Minister Ivan E. Geshov of November 26, 1912, reads: 

With a posse of fifteen (15) people, [Hristo] Chernopeev departed for the Pomak villages to 

the north—north-west of Drama to Christianize the Pomaks. 73 

The Burning of Valkossel 

Posses committed the worst atrocities. Under a sycamore tree in the village of Valkossel, 

Western Rhodopes, there is a water fountain. A marble plaque dedicates this fountain “to our 95 

Muslim brothers who gave their lives for their faith.” According to the story I heard from Mehmed 

Shehov in the summer of 2007, a learned seventy-six-year-old retiree, on February 22, 1913, 

Bulgarian troops, accompanied by irregular militiamen, arrived in Valkossel after burning the 

neighboring village of Zhizhevo. At first they wanted the village elders, gathered in the mosque for 

their regular prayer, to turn over someone by the name of Salyu Mizinev, apparently a 

“troublemaker” for the Bulgarian authorities. The person in question was hiding under the floor, 

inside the mosque. “Tell Salyu to come out, or all of you will go in frames!,” the men were told. 

“[Salyu] was a maverick, a rebel of sort,” Mehmed told me. “[And] [w]hen he heard that the 

mosque and the people in it were going to be burnt because of him, he came out on his own.” 

Thereafter, two gendarmes rounded up Salyu – one in front of him and one behind him – and led him 

into a narrow side street, by the mosque. It was winter time and there was a lot of snow on the 

ground. Salyu, according to my interviewee, had a good pair of shoes on. So while the posses were 

taking him way to shoot him, he made a daring bid to escape. Pretending to be tying his shoe strings, 

sully our holy mission [of pokrastvane] with accusations that the church resorts to uncharacteristic to its nature 

means [to convert the Pomaks].” 

73 Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 568, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 766, page 4. (Ibid., 14.) 

48

he dealt a kick to the face of the hind gendarme and to the head of the front one, and darted downhill, 

running toward the south. Apparently, the posses could not open fire immediately, because their own 

people were standing in the way. “They were shooting at Salyu from two sides,” Mehmed said, “but 

he made a zigzag run to avoid the bullets. ... Then a small cloud of fog hid him. He never came back, 

this man. He fled to Turkey.” 74 

The very same day, the Christian posse drove all village elders out of the mosque, lined them 

up, and marched them a short distance toward –what is today – the Vilievs’ house, While being led 

away, the men were calling tekbir (prayer). When the tobacco pipe of one of the Muslim man, with 

last name Halachev, fell to the ground, he bent down to pick it up and lagged a little behind from the 

group. A nearby Bulgarian gendarme used the moment to whisper in his ear, “’Run, run while you 

can!’ ‘No, I won’t!’ replied Halachev stubbornly, ‘Wherever everybody goes – I go.’” This man would 

come to regret his foolhardiness soon enough. A few moments later the men reached the Vilievs’ 

house and the posses began to pierce them with bayonets. Whoever fell was quickly picked up by the 

hands and legs and thrown inside. According to Mehmed Shehov, there were 106 men who were 

stabbed and pushed into the Viliev’s house. The Christians then poured gasoline on the building and 

set it on fire. Ninety-five men perished in the flames, many still alive from the stabbing. Seven or 

eight of the total, however, managed to crawl out of the inferno and lived. Among the survivors was 

Mehmed’s step-mother’s father, Assan Kalvichev. “One day, while he and I were tending the sheep 

together,” Mehmed recounted, “he lifted his shirt and showed me seven scars left by the bayonets. 

How he survived such horrific wounds, I have no idea!” 

Mehmed’s own grandfather, Mustafa Shehov, burnt in the fire. He was hodja (hoca) or 

religious teacher who had graduated from the medresse (madrassa, a Muslim school of higher 

learning) in Thessalonica, now in Greece. Mehmed related to me a story about his grandfather’s last 

living moments: 

All men wore fezzes [at the time], and while they were marched toward the Vilievs’ house, 

the comitas [civilian posse] knocked their fezzes down and tramped them in the mud. When 

my grandfather’s fezz fell, my grandmother – his wife – tried to pass her apron on to him so 

he may cover his head. One comita snatched the apron from my grandmother and hit her. 

74 Mehmed Shehov, interview by author, Valkossel, Bulgaria, June24, 2007. 

49

Pushing her aside, they dragged my grandfather, bareheaded, with the rest of the group. 

Exactly how he died, we don’t know. But obviously the same happened to him as to all the 

others; he was stabbed and pushed into the house, where he died from his wounds, burning 

or suffocation. 75 

After looting Valkossel and killing the village elders, the posses set the village ablaze and 

proceeded for the next Pomak village, Ablanitsa. 

Figure 2-5: A commemorative water fountain in Valkossel 

A simple water fountain in Valkossel, which dries out in the hottest summer days, is dedicated 

to the 95 souls who perished on a cold February day in 1913, because they refused to convert 

to Christianity. A combined force of civilian militias and troops rounded up all Muslim men 

they found in the mosque for prayer that day, marched them a short distance down to a 

wooden house, where they butchered them with bayonets before pushing them into the house 

and torching them. (Photograph by the author, June 2007) 

75 Ibid. 

50

Figure 2-6: A commemorative marble plaque next to the fountain 

It reads: “In memory of our 95 Muslim brothers who gave their lives for their faith on 22 

February 1913, Valkossel.” (Photograph by the author, June 2007) 

The Killings in Ablanitsa 

Ibrahim Imam and Senem Konedareva offer a rare glimpse at the events that took place in 

nearby Ablanitsa in their concise history of the village, Ablanitsa through the Centuries. 76 Relying on 

surviving testimonies, most transmitted through the descendants of survivors, the authors provide a 

detailed description of what happened in mid-February 1912, and again in 1913. “Upon cleansing the 

Struma River valley and crossing the Ali Botush Mountain between the villages Laki and Teshovo,” 

the authors write, “the band of Munyo Voyvoda (his real name is unknown …) reached Ilinden[.] 

[F]illing his band with volunteers from Singartiya (now Handjidimivo) and the nearby [Christian] 

villages, he took the road to Ablanitsa reaching the village around 4-5 pm … on February 12, 

76 Ibrahim Imam and Senem Konedareva, Ablanitsa prez vekovete /Ablanitsa through the Centuries/ (Ablanitsa, 

2008). 

51

1912[.]” 77 Knowing beforehand that the village was Muslim, the band surrounded it. In the eve of 

February 13, Munyo Voyvoda’s posse rounded up forty-six of the most prominent residents of 

Ablanitsa, tied them together, and dragged the men in the direction of Singartiya. Among the captives 

was Hadjiyata, a wealthy and respected member of the community. On the way out of Ablanitsa, “one 

of the chetniks [comitas, the Christian militias] had a mind for spoils and told Hadjiyata to go home 

and bring all valuables he could find in order to ransom his life.” 78 After refusing to do so, however, 

Hadjiyata was crucified on a wild pear tree along the trek to teach the others a lesson. According to 

the authors, he was the first victim of the Balkan Wars pokrastvane from Ablanitsa. One of the 

survivors from the same group of captives, Mehmed Konadov, later recounted that Hadjiyata was 

nailed alive to the pear tree, where he died. This terrified the rest of the Muslim men who, thereafter, 

put their resourcefulness to the task of escaping. 

Imam and Konedareva describe how Mehmed Konadov remembered the pocketknife he 

usually kept in his woolen waistband, and, under the cover of darkness, he managed to cut the cord of 

the person tied in front of him, Yusuf Shamov. Thus freed, Yusuf in turn cut Mehmed loose and 

passed the knife on to the Lapantov brothers, roped before them. Aided by darkness and the thicket 

along the trail, several people managed to escape. As they were tied at the rear end of the rope, their 

absence went unnoticed by the chetniks for a while. The posse men only realized that the number of 

captives had dwindled after checking the line upon getting ready to cross the bridge over Mesta River 

into Singartiya. As the discovery was made, one of the chetniks proceeded to strike the rearmost 

prisoner, who promptly jumped into the river dragging the posse along. In the ensuing chaos, two 

other Pomak men broke loose and survived by jumping into the water. After that, the remaining 

prisoners were most carefully guarded. Once in Singartiya, they were locked in a barn near the mill in 

the outskirts of the village. There, the chetniks butchered them one by one, discarding the bodies into 

the open sewer by the mill. Ibrahim Havalyov and Ibrahim Kambin, however, miraculously survived 

the ordeal to tell the story. Despite the horrific wounds both sustained, they managed to drag 

77 Ibid., 42. 

78 Ibid., 43. 

52

themselves out of the ditch and to crawl near the road in the hope of being discovered and rescued. 

This was the first attack by Christian bands on the village during the tumultuous Balkan Wars, 

according to the authors, but it was not going to be the last one. 79 

The second raid on the village by the chetniks of Mihail Markov took place within days of the 

first one. Markov’s band “was a collection of civilian volunteers from Garmen and the neighboring 

[Christian] villages,” Imam and Konedareva claim. These “revolutionaries” embarked on a deliberate 

march through the Muslim villages in the area whilst pillaging, burning, and murdering people along 

the way. Markov’s comitas arrived in Ablanitsa on February 13, 1913, after ravaging Kribul and 

Valkossel. Upon entering the village, coming from Valkossel (eastwards), they posted sentinels at all 

entry points to prevent anyone from passing in or out of Ablanitsa. The villagers somewhat naïvely 

thought that they would escape the worst if they welcomed the chetniks. They could not be more 

wrong. By the time people realized their precarious situation, it was too late. No one could exit the 

besieged village any longer. Ibraim Bektash, who first tried to break through the blockade, was shot 

dead at the site Prèoda. Thereafter, the chetniks entered Ablanitsa and, going from house to house, 

they rounded up the men and locked them in the village mosque. It was then that Markov made his 

notorious offer, still seared in the collective memory of Ablanitsa and the neighboring communities: 

“Do you choose the cross or the cannon?” (“Do you choose conversion or death?”). While the village 

elders desperately attempted to negotiate some deal with the leader, the chetniks went about 

plundering the houses and terrorizing the population. After the men refused to accept conversion, 

the comitas selected thirty-five of the youngest and strongest Pomaks among those detained in the 

mosque and told them they would be released. Instead, they roped the men together and led them 

away, to “Ra[v]no Livade [Flat Meadows],” a site outside the village, “with large, water-filled pits, 

created by landslides.” They were all killed and cast off in those pits. 80 

The remaining group of about fifty – mostly elderly and feeble – persons, still locked in the 

mosque, was convoyed to Garmen (a Christian village near Ablanitsa) the next morning. Two of them, 

79 Ibid., 42-44. 

80 Ibid., 45. 

53

Yussein Mustafa Hassanov and Mustafa Ibrahim Hassanov, according to Imam and Konedareva, were 

killed as they marched, because they could not keep up with the rest. Relatives later retrieved the 

bodies from a ditch and buried the men on the site. The other men were driven some distance 

further, butchered in a gully near the old village of Debren (adjacent to Garmen), and abandoned 

there. People from the nearby Pomak villages of Debren, Krushevo, and Oreshe later interred the 

remains in a common grave, naming the site the Ablanitsa gully. 81 

2.2. The Killings Documented 

Oral history is not the sole source of knowledge about the murders that occurred during 

Bulgaria’s attempt to convert the Pomaks. Although it is difficult to find direct confirmation of the 

killings in the surviving Bulgarian records, an important and authoritative foreign source of 

information does exist. It is the “Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes 

and Conduct of the Balkan Wars” published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 

1914. The Carnegie Report resulted from the Great Powers’ post-war investigation into the conduct 

of the warring parties in the Balkan Wars. The investigation was entrusted to several prominent 

individuals acting as the Balkan Commission of Inquiry (BCI). 82 

The Carnegie Report is very useful in highlighting the complexities of a war which left no 

Balkan people unscathed, including the warring nation-states’ majority groups. In the mayhem of the 

Balkan Wars initially the victims of abuse and murder were predominantly Muslim. The allied 

Christian Greeks, Serbs, Montenegrins, and Bulgarians were slaughtering Muslims and ravaging their 

towns and villages almost in common agreement, but when the Second Balkan War began, the former 

allies became enemies and their respective populations turned on each other. Now the Bulgarians 

were equally violating Muslims, Greeks, and Serbs. The Serbs, on the other hand, were attacking 

Bulgarians and Muslims with the same ferocity, and the Greeks were victimizing Muslims as well as 

81 Ibid., 46-47. 

82 Among the members of the BCI were: Dr. Joseph Redlich, Professor of Public Law in the University of Vienna, 

(Austria), Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, Senator, and M. Justin Godart, lawyer and Member of the Chamber 

of Deputies (France), Dr. Walter Schuecking, Professor of Law at the University of Marburg, (Germany), Francis 

W. Hirst, Esq., Editor of The Economist, Dr. H. N. Brailsford, journalist, (Great Britain), Professor Paul Milioukov, 

Member of the Douma (Russia), and Dr. Samuel T. Dutton, Professor in Teacher's College, Columbia University 

(United States). 

54

Christians of Slavic (Bulgarian) descent. Often Slavic-Christian bands of Bulgarians and Serbs 

operated together against the Turkish-Muslim- and Greek populations, while common interests 

temporarily united Bulgarians and Muslims against Greeks. Ultimately, however, the Muslims 

remained the main target of violence due to their affiliation with the former Ottoman “oppressor” in 

the eyes of all Bulgarian-, Serbian-, Montenegrin-, and Greek Christians. 

Attached as Appendices to the Carnegie Report, under heading “The Plight of the 

Macedonian Moslems during the First War,” are many testimonies given to the BCI commissioners by 

witnesses, direct participants, and survivors of the atrocities of diverse ethnic and religious 

background. 83 Thus, Rahni Effendi of Strumnitsa, a Muslim, described what took place within the 

former Province of Macedonia under Bulgarian and Serbian occupation: 

The Bulgarian army arrived on Monday, November 4, 1912. … On entering the town, the 

Bulgarians disarmed the Moslem inhabitants, but behaved well and did not loot. Next day, a 

Bulgarian civil authority was established, but the Ser[b]ians had the military control. The 

Bulgarian army marched on to Doiran; on its departure looting and slaughter began. I saw an 

old man of eighty lying in the street with his head split open, and the dead body of a boy of 

thirteen. About thirty Moslems were killed that day in the streets — I believe by the 

Bulgarian bands. On Wednesday evening, an order was issued that no Moslem might leave 

his house day or night until further notice. A commission was then formed from the 

Bulgarian notables of the town; the Ser[b]ian military commander presided, and the 

Bulgarian Civil Governor also sat upon it. A local gendarmerie was appointed and a 

gendarme and a soldier were told to go round from house to house, summoning the 

Moslems, one by one, to attend the commission. I was summoned myself with the rest. 

The procedure was as follows: The Ser[b]ian commandant would inquire, "What kind of 

a man is this?" The answer was simply either "good" or "bad." … if one member of the 

commission said "bad," that sufficed to condemn the prisoner. Each member of the 

commission had his own enemies whom he wished to destroy, and therefore did not oppose 

the wishes of his fellow members. When sentence was pronounced the prisoner was 

stripped of his outer clothes and bound, and his money was taken by the Ser[b]ian 

commander. I was pronounced "good," and so perhaps were one-tenth of the prisoners. 

Those sentenced were bound together by threes, and taken to the slaughter house; their ears 

and noses were often cut off before they were killed. This slaughter went on for a month; I 

believe that from three to four thousand Moslems were killed in the town and the 

neighboring villages. 84 

Rahni Effendi’s testimony, according to the Carnegie Report, was confirmed by Abdul Kerim 

Aga (a Muslim) of Strumnitsa, who described to the commissioners how he lost his own son. That 

man’s son was apparently held hostage by someone called “Toma, the chief of the Bulgarian bands,” 

83 Note: For further testimonies see Appendix 2.3. 

84 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 278 (Appendix 2.3: Appendix A, No.1). 

55

who demanded ransom from Kerim Aga. “Toma demanded a hundred pounds;” according to the 

report, “he [Kerim Aga] had previously paid on two different occasions £50 and [£]170 to save this 

same son. He told Toma that he had not the money ready, but would try to sell a shop if the 

Bulgarians would wait until evening. Toma refused to wait and his son was shot.” 85 

As the Carnegie commissioners visited the Muslim refugee camp outside Thessalonica (now 

in Greece), they learnt from the refugees that the Bulgarian bands arrived in Yedna-Kuk, a village 

near Strumnitsa, before the regular army. Thereafter, they “ordered the whole male population to 

assemble in the mosque,” had them shut in and robbed of all money (about ₤300 in total). Then they 

selected “[e]ighteen of the wealthier villagers”, tied them up, and took them to Bossilovo, “where they 

were killed and buried.” The commissioners recorded that the villagers could recall the names of 

nine of the murdered people. 86 

The Carnegie Commission further registered the report of the Catholic priest Gustave Michel, 

“superior of the mission at Kukush,” given to a Le Temps correspondent about the gruesome events in 

Kukush and its vicinity (now in Macedonia). The account reads: 

A Bulgarian band led by Donchev shut all the men of the place in the mosque, and gathered 

the women round it, in order to oblige them to witness the spectacle. The comitadjis 

[comitas, chetniks] then threw three bombs' at the mosque but it was not blown up; they 

then set fire to it, and all who were shut up in it, to the number of about 700 men, were burnt 

alive. Those who attempted to flee were shot down by comitadjis posted round the mosque, 

and Pere Michel found human heads, arms, and legs lying about half burned in the streets. At 

Planitsa, Donchev's band … first drove all the men to the mosque and burnt them alive; it 

then gathered the women and burnt them in their turn in the public square. At Rayonovo a 

number of men and women were massacred; the Bulgarians filled a well with their corpses. 

At Kukush the Moslems were massacred by the Bulgarian population of the town and their 

mosque destroyed. All the Turkish soldiers who fled without arms and arrived in groups 

from [The]Salonica were massacred. 87 

It was not simply Muslims and occasional foreign observers who testified before the 

commissioners about the atrocities against Muslims during the Balkan Wars. Christian Bulgarians, 

frequently mortified by what was happening, provided their accounts as well. Vassil Smilev, a 

Bulgarian Christian teacher at Uskub, for example, stated before the Carnegie inquirers that upon 

85 Ibid., 278-79 (Appendix 2.3: Appendix A, No.2). 

86 Ibid., 279 (Appendix 2.3: Appendix A, No.4). 

87 Ibid., 279-280 (Appendix 2.3: Appendix A, No.6). 

56

entering the village, the Serbian army attempted “to persuade all the Bulgarian teachers to join the 

bands which they were forming in order to pursue the Turkish bands.” After going with the band “for 

twenty or thirty days,” however, Smilev left because “it was continually engaged in burning, torturing 

and killing.” Thus, he “witnessed the slaughter of eighteen Turks [Muslims] who had been collected in 

the Bulgarian school of the Tchair quarter of the town. They were killed in the open and their bodies 

thrown into a well near the brickworks.” He was able to name four of the murdered persons. Smilev 

also testified that it was the Serbian chief of police, Lazar Ilyts, who had been responsible for the 

massacre in Uskub and for the pillage of the village Butel. The Bulgarian teacher recounted how near 

Butel they met a number of Albanian villagers fleeing from the bands. “A Ser[b]ian major unveiled 

and kissed a young girl among them. Her father killed him on the spot. Thereupon the Ser[b]ian band 

massacred the whole body of fugitives, men and women, to the number of sixty.” After witnessing 

this massacre, which he subsequently reported to the Russian consulate, Vassil Smilev “refused to 

have anything further to do with the Ser[b]ian bands. He was expelled afterwards from Uskub with 

the other Bulgarian teachers.” 88 

That the massacre of Muslims by Bulgarian (as well as Serbian and Greek) troops and 

irregulars during the Balkan Wars and pokrastvane occurred is beyond any doubt. But the question 

why insurgent Christian bands targeted their Muslim neighbors so fanatically is important and not 

easy to answer. Part of the reason may be attributed to the fact that thirty-five years earlier, in 1876- 

1878 (as mentioned in Appendix 2.2), the Bulgarian Christian population rose against the Ottomans in 

a wave of organized revolts for independence. When the uprising was quashed, however, scores of 

civilian Christians, including in the Rhodopes, were killed. Many civilian Muslims, among them 

Pomaks, partook in the violence against Christian “rebels” ostensibly in defense of the “mother 

country.” Consequently, even as Bulgaria committed equal (and often worse) atrocities against 

Muslims, the official historiography proceeded to interpret these events as “proof” of Bulgarian- 

Christian heroism and virtue and of Islamic-Turkish cruelty and barbarism. 89 Undoubtedly, assigning 

88 Ibid., 282 (Appendix 2.3: Appendix A, No. 11). 

89 See Ali Eminov, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria (New York: Routledge, 1997). 

Conclusions to the same effect may be gleaned from the following works, among others: 

57

a collective guilt to all Muslims, the insurgent bands felt justified in punishing them not only for the 

brutal Ottoman suppression of the Bulgarian rebellion, but for the five centuries of “Turkish yoke” – 

to use a Bulgarian customary expression – as well. 

2.3. Humanity and Survival along the Way 

The massacre narrative of the pokrastvane, however, would not be complete without the 

other half of the story: namely, the testimony to human decency and compassion, not only to cruelty 

and murder. My informant Mehmed Shehov recounted a celebrated local story about a Bulgarian 

officer, Ivan Tikvarev, who was stationed some distance down south from Valkossel, in Seress and 

Kavala (now in northern Greece). He came just in time to stop the bands and perhaps save from 

certain devastation the remaining Pomak villages in the area (Western Rhodopes). This happened for 

a reason. Ivan Tikvarev was the husband (or son?) of a Christian woman by the name Maria. When 

the Bulgarians rebelled against the Ottomans in 1876, the Muslims retaliated by killing a large 

number of Christians from Batak (see Figure 2-1, p.38) and the surrounding villages. Likely as a 

result of these events, three girls – Maria, Elena, and an unnamed third – were orphaned and living in 

the woods around Batak. As it happened, a party of Pomak men was passing through the area and 

stumbled across the children. Eventually, these people took the orphans under their wing. The 

Barutev family from Ablanitsa adopted Maria, a family from Dryanovo took Elena, and the third 

orphan went to a family from Ossina. 90 What happened with the other two girls, Mehmed Shehov 

could not tell me, but when Maria became of marriageable age, her foster parents decided it was best 

to try to reunite her with surviving kin in Batak. Maria was a Christian and the Barutevs believed she 

should marry a man of her own faith. One day, her foster-father told Maria: “‘Listen, you are old 

enough to marry now. I think it is time for you to go back to Batak; to your own people. Do you 

Nikolay Haytov, “Smolyan: Tri vurha v srednorodopskata istoria /“Smolyan: Three Pinnacles in the History of 

the Middle Rhodopes”/ (Sofia: Izdatelstvo na Nacionalnia Suvet na Otechesvenia Front /National Council of the 

Fatherland Front Publisher/, 1962) and Rodopski Vlastelini /Rhodopean Lords/ (Sofia: Fatherland Front Pbl., 

1976); Petar Marinov, Salih Aga, Rodopski voyvoda i deribey: Cherti iz jivota i upravlenieto mu – Dramatizatsia po 

ustni predaniq i legendi v pet deystvia /Salih Aga, Rhodopean Lord and Governor: Features of His Life and 

Governorship – Dramatization Based on Oral History and Legends in Five Acts/ (Collection Rodina, 1940); Salih 

Bozov, V imeto na imeto / In the Name of the Name/ (Sofia: Fondatsia Liberalna Integratsia, 2005); Ibrahim 

Imam and Senem Konedareva. Ablanitsa prez vekovete /Ablanitsa through the Centuries/ (Ablanitsa, 2008). 

90 Three nearby villages. 

58

emember where you lived?’ ‘I do,” she said.” Then her foster-father loaded her dowry onto a mule, 

and Maria, herself, onto another, and successfully escorted her back to Batak. In time she (either) 

married a man by the name Ivan Tikvarev (or that was her son). He was a military man, according to 

my informant Mehmed. Maria told her husband (or son) the story of how she had grown up in 

Ablanitsa and got a promise from him: “If you should happen to pass through Ablanitsa, I have some 

very dear people there, the Barutevs. Be good to them as they had been to me.” When Bulgaria took 

these lands from Turkey in 1912, bands of Christian chetniks plagued the (Western) Rhodopes killing 

scores of civilians and torching village after Muslim villages. 91 

In Mehmed Shehov’s account, Tikvarev was “the officer who ordered the withdrawal [from 

Valkossel, Ablanitsa, Satovcha and the other neighboring villages] of the başibozuk [civilian militias]. 

He was stationed somewhere in – what is now – northern Greece. And when he heard that Zhizhevo 

and Valkossel were burning and the population was being murdered, he jumped on his horse, and 

rode, and rode ... The horse dropped dead with fatigue somewhere near Hadjidimovo [formerly, 

Singartiya], but he found another one and continued to gallop.” Finally, Tikvarev arrived in Ablanitsa. 

Fully armed, he walked in the mosque, and asked: “Who is Ismen Barutev?” When people pointed at 

Ismen, the latter was frightened to death thinking that this Bulgarian, armed to the teeth, was looking 

for him to no good end. Ultimately, Tikvarev tipped off the population about the approaching bands, 

so they were able to evacuate the village and avoid the killing for the time being. 92 

Ibrahim Imam and Senem Konedareva, however, paint a very different – far less heroic – 

picture of Ivan Tikvarev. While the general storyline remains the same, essential elements of it 

diverge significantly from Mehmed’s narrative. The two authors’ account appears to offer a more 

accurate representation of Tikvarev and the events surrounding him for two reasons. First, the 

source of Imam and Konedareva’s knowledge is more closely based on the eyewitness testimony of 

immediate descendants than that of Mehmed Shehov. Moreover, as Ablanitsa natives, the authors 

must have had the opportunity to do a more thorough research of the story by talking to more people 

91 Mehmed Shehov, interview. 

92 Ibid. 

59

over a period of time. In any event, they provide the following narrative of how Mustafa Barutev 

found the young girl Maria (apparently called Fatme while in Ablanitsa) and how Tikvarev came to 

be associated with Ablanitsa, and the Western Rhodopes, during the Balkan Wars of 1912-1914: 

The person we would like to tell you about is Mustafa Mehmedali Barut[ev] and the story 

happened in the immediate aftermath of the Batak events [the Batak massacre, above][.] [A]s 

we explained earlier, Batak stood at a crossroad of a major international trade and 

transportation artery that connected the plains of the Danube River with the Aegean coastal 

region, as well as the valley of Thrace and the city of Plovdiv[.] Mustafa Barut[ev] was a 

youth of about 19-20 years of age at the time. [He] was returning home [to Ablanitsa], 

through Batak, from Tatarpazardjik [Tatar Pazarcik], where he attended the medresse 

[madrassa] and studied the Quran to become hodja [hoca.] [T]o stay out of harm’s way in 

those tumultuous times, he decided to bypass Batak 93 and skirt through the woods around 

it[.] [I]n the forest, he stumbled across a little girl of 4-5 years of age who seemed scared, 

alone and crying, with no adult to be seen around. Mustafa assumed [correctly] that the girl 

must be from Batak, but he could neither venture into the [Christian] village to look for her 

parents, nor leave her alone in the forest at the mercy of predatory animals[.] [I]nstead, he 

decided to take her with him. Thus, Mustafa brought the girl home to Ablanitsa, much to his 

young wife’s delight at the sight of this living gift. The Barut[ev] family [re]named her Fatme 

and raised her as their own. 

When she reached young adulthood, Mustafa told Fatme how he had found her and let her 

decide whether to remain in Ablanitsa or search for her roots in Batak. She said she wished to find 

93 Batak was a Christian village standing on the main artery that connected the Rhodope Mountains with 

Plovdiv, a large provincial center. According to Pomak oral history, many Muslims who would pass through the 

village on their way to the Pomak heartland during the 1870s (and possibly earlier) often disappeared without a 

trace. These were mostly students attending schools of higher learning in Plovdiv and Tatarpazardjik (now 

Pazardjik) who traveled regularly – alone or in small groups, on foot or horseback – through Batak on the way to 

their native villages in the Western Rhodopes or back. Ahmed Aga of Barutin – the person whom Bulgaria’s 

history ascribes atrocious acts of massacre in Batak – had two sons who studied in Plovdiv. One day, they 

embarked on a trip to Barutin (Western Rhodopes) from Plovdiv, through Batak, and were never seen again. 

When his sons failed to return home, Ahmed Aga began an investigation into their disappearance. Eventually, he 

heard the story of someone who had recently traveled through Batak with a party of two men. What he learnt, 

according to local lore, was the following: Three young men from Barutin (or the broader area) traveled on foot 

through Batak, where they decided to stop for the night and continue on the following morning. Some local 

Christians offered to rent them a room. They agreed and received an accommodation with no windows or other 

outlets to the outside, except the door. After leading them into the room, the landlords immediately locked the 

door behind them. The Pomak men soon realized that they had walked into a trap. Believing to be in mortal 

danger, they started tearing a hole in one of the walls by loosening the mortar and chipping away rocks. Luckily, 

it was an outside wall to the house. Soon, the opening was wide enough to try to get through it. By the time the 

first youth squeezed out, the “landlords” – apparently Bulgarian “revolutionaries” – had returned for them. 

Ultimately, the two young men still inside were murdered, but the third one escaped. He later reported the case 

to Ahmed Aga, the chief Ottoman official in the region. Thus, Ahmed Aga concluded that his two sons were 

probably murdered in the same way. When no one in Batak answered his call for information about them, he 

laid siege on the mutinous village, taking many lives as a result. Moreover, as the local administrator (Aga), he 

was under orders to quell the 1876 Christian rebellion in the area, especially strong in Batak. Unfortunately, 

Ahmed Aga mixed duty and personal vendetta in dealing with Batak. Because Batak was a village of a few 

hundred at the time, the victims could not have been more than that even if everybody was killed in the village, 

which was not the case. Nonetheless, later Bulgarian historiography inflated the number of killed to thousands, a 

historically unsustainable count. Moreover, it demonized Ahmed Aga, hence all Muslims, while transforming the 

Batak massacre into the ultimate symbol of Bulgarian martyrdom and Turkish barbarity. The scores of Muslims 

who died during and following the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878, on the other hand, were never 

mentioned. (Mehmed Shehov, interview; Mehmed Myuhtar, interview by author, Valkossel, Bulgaria, June 2007.) 

60

her family, but all she remembered from her former life was one name – Tikvarev. Respecting 

Fatme’s wishes, Mustafa Barutev determined to locate her kin. The next morning, he loaded her 

belongings onto a mule, and they set off for Batak. Upon arriving, Mustafa inquired about the name 

Tikvarev. After a confirmation that such a family indeed existed, he was directed to a house. When an 

elderly woman answered his call, Mustafa found out that the same family had lost a little girl fifteen 

years prior, whom they thought long dead. He was happy to tell the woman that he had found the 

little girl in the woods, and – not knowing what else to do – he had taken her with him. With tears of 

gratitude in her eyes, the woman quickly spread the news to neighbors and relatives. Subsequently, 

the family invited Mustafa Barutev into their home, where he safely spent the night. In those tense 

times of religious antagonism (late nineteenth century), however, the family had to guard the house 

through the night to prevent hostile Christian neighbors from harming their Muslim guest. Early the 

next morning, they speedily escorted Mustafa out of Batak. The two families – the Barutevs of 

Ablanitsa and the Tikvarevs of Batak – kept close friendship ties for many years afterwards. 94 

Decades later, in early 1913, when the bands of Munyo Voyvoda and Mihail Markov were 

plundering the Western Rhodopean villages and decimating their population, a third band headed by 

Ivan Tikvarev set out for the Pomak villages to the south, from Batak. Driven by bitter vengefulness 

since the 1876 Batak massacre, 95 according to Imam and Konedareva, Tikvarev’s band destroyed the 

small Muslim village of Yenimale, just above Batak, before moving toward Dospat, Zmeitsa, Lyubcha, 

94 Imam and Konedareva, 34-35. 

95 According to the official version of the events, hundreds or thousands of Bulgarian Christians were massacred 

by Muslims during a wave of rebellion in 1876 – known as the April Uprising – in and around Batak, including 

children, women, and men. The main responsibility for the massacre is laid on Ahmed Aga of Barutin, a local 

Ottoman administrator and supposed leader of the başibozuk (Muslim civilian bands) that largely carried out the 

murders (details in a footnote above). 

Today, the skeletal remains of the victims are prominently displayed in the church of Batak, where they 

reportedly met their end. In the years after Bulgaria’s independence of 1878 – what came to be known as – the 

Batak massacre transpired as the quintessential symbol of Muslim savagery and Bulgarian heroism. There is one 

serious problem, however. It is not yet clear how many exactly died and whether or not all skeletal remains 

preserved in the church belong to actual victims. In 2006, the Austrian academic Ulf Brunnbauer and his 

Bulgarian colleague Martina Baleva made an effort to initiate a public discourse in Bulgaria about the Batak 

massacre. Their attempt to re-evaluate the scope of this tragedy by stating that it was not as significant at the 

time of occurrence as it was later portrayed exploded in such a nationalistic frenzy in the Bulgarian public space 

that the scholars were forced to terminate their project. Moreover, patriotic organizations and media accused 

them of being “paid agents” of some external “enemy” seeking to re-write Bulgarian history. Baleva, an Orthodox 

Bulgarian, was declared “a national traitor.” The affair also resulted in the resignations of museum curators and 

Cultural Ministry’s officials who initially collaborated with Brunnbauer and Baleva’s work. 

61

and Brashten. Ravaging these villages, they unleashed a veritable hell in Barutin (Ahmed Aga’s 

former stronghold, footnote above) looting everything, killing indiscriminately and ultimately setting 

the whole village ablaze. After similar fate befell Kochan, the chetniks besieged Zhizhevo (east of 

Valkossel), where they lined the captured Muslims along a stone wall and offered them to be 

Christianized. As the villagers refused to convert, the chetniks demanded gold or whatever valuables 

they might have in exchange for their lives. When people gave them all the gold they could find, 

Tikvarev’s comitas executed all the men. An eyewitness, Ressim Zhizhevski, who was a small child at 

the time, reminisced how they spared no one but old women and children and that they torched the 

village at the end. This account, according to Imam and Konedareva, was further confirmed by an 

elderly woman from Zhizhevo – affectionately known in Ablanitsa as Nene [Grandmother] Zhizhka – 

who witnessed these events as a child and later married into the Mollov family of Ablanitsa. From 

Zhizhevo, Tikvarev’s chetniks passed through Valkossel, partially destroying it before withdrawing 

hastily. On February 14, 1913, just two days after Munyo Voyvoda’s band had despoiled the village, 

they surrounded Ablanitsa. 96 

Hereafter, Imam and Konedareva revive the story of Mustafa Barutev, his foster daughter 

Fatme (Maria), and Tikvarev: 

As it turned out, the leader of the band, Ivan Tikvarev, was that girl’s (Fatme’s) son, and 

when his chetniks came south to cleanse the area of ‘Turks, Pomaks, and fezzes,’ she had him 

promise not to harm the Baltachitsa neighborhood of Ablanitsa, where she had grown up in 

the Barutev’s household. Consequently, although most of the population had already fled 

Ablanitsa after seeing Valkossel in flames, Tikvarev’s band did not ravage the village in the 

usual chetniks’ fashion. He had instructed his chetniks not to touch any place where his white 

horse would be stabled. Thus, during the last and final raid on Ablanitsa by the [Christian] 

bands, Baltachitsa was spared because of the white horse of Tikvarev stabled in the 

courtyard of the Barutev’s house. The rest of Ablanitsa, however, was scoured for valuables 

by the chetniks, and after finding nothing and no one, save for a few elderly women and 

children, they torched several houses in the center of the village, including the home of 

Mehmed Djinaliyata [italics added]. 97 

Thus, according to Imam and Konedareva’s sources, Tikvarev was not an army officer at all, 

but a chetniks’ leader who – like many others – engaged in looting Pomak villages, forcing people into 

conversion and killing many others in the chaos of the Balkan Wars of 1912-1914. Tikvarev, 

96 Imam and Konedareva, 48-49. 

97 Ibid., 49-50. 

62

however, spared Mustafa Barutev’s descendants from harm on account of his mother’s wishes. The 

disparity in oral history’s accounts about him only demonstrates people’s profound appreciation of 

his singular act of clemency by choosing to remember him as a hero rather than a villain. 

While narratives of heroism might largely be the product of faulty or exaggerated memory 

today, acts of common human decency were certainly not. The stories of Christians who risked much 

to help their Muslim friends and neighbors during the dark days of early 1913 abound. When the 

chetniks of Munyo Voyvoda rounded up the men of Ablanitsa and brought them to Singartiya 

(Western Rhodopes) in ropes, the very Christian inhabitants of the village did not venture out of their 

homes for fear of the bands’ lawlessness. But not all of them cowered. Imam and Konedareva recount 

how, upon hearing rumors that Munyo Voyvoda had slaughtered Pomak prisoners somewhere 

around the mill in the outskirts of Singartiya, the wealthy Christian Tasso Chorbadji went out of his 

way to investigate the matter. When he arrived at the mill, he stumbled upon the bloody bodies of the 

two survivors who had crept out of the sewage and onto the road hoping to be rescued. One of the 

wounded, Tasso Chorbadji recognized his long-time friend from Ablanitsa, Mehmed Havalyov. 

Subsequently, he took both men to his home and nursed them back to health. As Mehmed had 

sustained more severe injuries, Tasso Chorbadji kept him hidden for nearly a month before sending 

him back home. The second wounded man, Mehmed Kambin, was smuggled back to Ablanitsa on the 

following day. Later in the Balkan Wars, when Greek forces briefly occupied the valley of Nevrokop 

(now Gotse Delchev, map above), they killed the notorious Munyo Voyvoda. 98 

Another survivor of the Ablanitsa massacres of 1913 was Ibrahim Yusseinov Hassanov, 

nicknamed Kabadaiyata. The story of his survival, retold by Imam and Konedareva, is a remarkable 

testimony to the human will to live and resourcefulness. Having survived Munyo Voyvoda’s raid, 

Kabadaiyata was weary of Markov and his band, so he did not go out to greet them as most people 

did. Moreover, he had already noticed that Markov was positioning his comitas at all entry points to 

the village. But, Kabadaiyata, a young man at the time, was determined to escape with his life again. 

Putting a plan to action, he draped a veil over his face, slipped on a fereje, and, chasing after a few 

98 Ibid., 42-47. 

63

sheep, he hurried toward the streams of Studeneka. The chetnik, on guard at Studeneka, paid little 

attention to the drab Muslim shepherdess, apparently on a business of watering her herd. As the girl 

reached the shallow brook, however, she suddenly darted right past it and made a run for the nearby 

river. By the time the comita reacted, the supposed shepherdess – now racing full speed downhill – 

had put a considerable distance between them. Before long, the thicket of the river bank swallowed 

her. Reluctant to abandon his position in pursuit of a harmless girl, the chetnik let her escape. The 

Kabadayata eventually found shelter in a cavern overlooking the river, where he hid for three days. 

By then the bands had withdrawn and his life was saved. 99 

2.4. The Pokrastvane of Muslim prisoners of war (POWs) 

As the bands’ brutality yielded few results for the pokrastvane effort, the Bulgarian military 

and church authorities sought other ways to Christianize the Pomaks. One efficient way of inducing 

bloodless conversion was the compulsory baptism of Pomak POWs. During the Balkan Wars, Turkey 

conscripted most able-bodied Pomak men. But in consequence of the country’s defeat in May of 1913, 

the Bulgarian army took Muslim prisoners of war by the thousands. The Slavic-speaking Muslims 

were immediately separated from their Turkish-speaking comrades, and transported to camps deep 

inside Bulgaria so they could be converted to Orthodox Christianity and given Bulgarian names. The 

capture of Pomak soldiers proved very useful to the pokrastvane, because it allowed for the 

conversion not only of the POWs, but also their families. When younger Pomak men were drafted in 

the Ottoman army, many left behind vulnerable wives, children, young siblings and elderly parents. 

In captivity, the Bulgarian military gave these soldiers the choice to accept Christianity or never see 

their loved ones. At the same time, the POWs’ families were told that solely on their conversion 

depended the life and speedy release of their husbands, fathers, sons, and brothers. Thus pressured, 

whole households accepted Christian baptism in exchange for their family members. Before setting 

Pomak captives free, however, the Bulgarian authorities properly supplied them with identity papers 

indicating the men’s new Christian names and religion. 100 

99 Ibid., 47-48. 

100 Inferred from the totality of records published in Georgiev and Trifonov’s volume. 

64

To obtain release, Muslim POWs petitioned the Bulgarian Orthodox Church for conversion 

by the hundreds. The Bulgarian government and ecclesiastical authorities insisted on the submission 

of formal petitions to make the conversions appear voluntary. Below is an example of an individual 

petition, filed by the POW Eyub Syuliev, and addressed to Archbishop Maxim of Plovdiv of January 

25, 1913: 

Through the Commanding Officer 

of Second Division of Thrace 

To His Holiness 

The Archbishop of Plovdiv 

Your Holiness, 

PETITION 

From Eyub Mustafov Syuliev [a POW] 

Bearing in mind that only the Gospel can uplift the human spirit and lead it to progress and 

culture, I obediently beg permission to join the [Bulgarian] Orthodox Church and, by so 

doing, to set an example for other Muslims to follow. 

The Town of Pazardjik 

With Reverence, 

25 Jan. 1913 Eyub Syuliev 101 

Petitions of such nature were frequently signed by hundreds and even thousands of Muslim 

prisoners of war. As with the en mass baptism of villages, the collective conversion of Pomak captives 

saved time, effort, and resources. As a result, group petitions among the available records outnumber 

individual ones. The highly partisan language of these petitions, however, strongly suggests that they 

were neither voluntary nor authored by the POWs themselves. In all likelihood, patriotic officers, 

priests, or civilians prepared those in advance and presented them for signatures to the POWs. To be 

sure, military staff itself initiated the conversion of Pomak captives. For example, the commandant of 

Panagyurishte, Sapundjiev, sent the following telegram to Archbishop Maxim on 30 January 1913, 

thereby arranging the conversion of hundreds of prisoners: 

There are 550 prisoners of war in the town [Panagyurishte] and its vicinity. They wish to 

voluntarily pass into the midst of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, to which their forefathers 

belonged but were torn from in consequence of the Turkish barbarism. ... Hereby I ask Your 

Holiness to announce their baptism [emphasis added]. 102 

101 National Archives-Plovdiv, Fond 67 k, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 123, page 32. (Georgiev and Trifonov, eds., 

58.) 

102 National Archives-Plovdiv, Fond 67к, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 123, page 10. (Ibid., 85-86.) 

65

No matter how carefully the state and church authorities phrased their communiqués, or 

how often they used “voluntary,” the coercive nature of the pokrastvane is plainly visible in the 

records. In a telegram to the mayor of Kaloffer, Archbishop Maxim instructed, “The valley of 

Chepelare has been Christianized; the valley of Rupcha - half-way. The Pomak prisoners of war in 

Kuklen, Perushtitsa, Brestovo, Bratsigovo, Panagyurishte, and Golyamo Konare, exceeding 1,000 in 

number, have accepted the faith. It is now time that you, the citizens of Kaloffer, fulfill your sacred 

duty to faith and fatherland.” 103 The “sacred duty” that Maxim conferred on the government and 

citizens of Kaloffer was nothing short of command to convert the Muslim prisoners in town by any 

means necessary. Although Maxim’s language is intentionally elusive, the meaning is apparent within 

the broader context of pokrastvane. In yet another telegram, Maxim triumphantly announced that 

another group of “[a]round 1,000 prisoners of war within the Plovdiv Diocese have been converted 

and set free to return to their families.” 104 

Formal conversion to Christianity not only shielded Muslim prisoners from torture, but in 

most cases it was the key to their release and safe return home. Converts were not only treated 

differently, but also provided with basic clothing and food. The report of priest Pavel Dimitrov to 

Archbishop Maxim from February 14, 1913, describes the special attitude towards prisoners of war 

who had converted or petitioned for conversion. Upon arriving in Pazardjik under convoy, 

they are accommodated in a hotel specifically appropriated for that purpose, given bread, 

and – those who need – shoes as well. The [pokrastvane] committee provides the new 

converts with the necessary food rations and, under the protection of the military 

authorities, they are sent home to their families. 105 

But Pomak prisoners and their families only accepted conversion out of desperation, and as 

a measure of last resort. On January 15, 1913, for instance, one pokrastvane mission informed 

Archbishop Maxim that the populations of Nastan, Breze, Beden, and Dövlen were only inclined to 

103 Telegram of Maxim, Archbishop of Plovdiv, to the mayor of the town of Kaloffer from 3 February 1913. 

National Archives-Plovdiv, Fond 67к, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 123, page 57. (Ibid., 110.) 

104 Telegram of Maxim, Archbishop of Plovdiv, to Yossiff, Bishop of Darıdere, from 3 February 1913. National 

Archives-Plovdiv, Fond 67к, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 123, page 62. (Ibid., 111.) 

105 National Archives-Plovdiv, Fond 67, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 124, pages 137-38. (Ibid., 142.) 

66

convert if “their sons, husbands, fathers, and grandsons would be release from captivity[.] [W]ithout 

the prisoners’ release,” the missioners pointed to Maxim, “their families are reluctant to accept 

Christianity.” Thus, they “implore[d]” “[His] Holiness” 

to order the release of all prisoners from the district of Dövlen …; [and] to speed up the 

supply of material aid in the form of food and clothing, for these are the greatest incentives 

for conversion among this devastated population. 106 

2.5. The Tide Is Turning 

The official Bulgarian position on the forced Christianization of the Slavic-speaking Muslims 

was one of complete denial or insistence that the whole affair was voluntary. Indeed, the language of 

available primary records tends to be euphemistic and defensive, carefully avoiding admissions of 

wrongdoings, and suspiciously overstating the “voluntary” nature of the conversion. Bulgaria’s 

government, for one, was not interested in attracting foreign criticism, when a new peace treaty and 

another territorial redistribution in the Balkans were about to happen. Despite all efforts to keep the 

act of pokrastvane secret, however, news of the violence committed against the Muslims began to 

leak out by the spring of 1913 and to raise international concerns. Thus, the London-based Balkan 

Committee addressed the then Bulgarian Prime Minister, Ivan Geshov, on May 1, 1913, in the 

following manner (originally in English): 

We feel it our duty to direct your attention to certain rumours that are being spread in 

this country as to forcible conversion of Moslem inhabitants in the districts conquered by the 

Allied armies – rumours which, we have reason to know, tend to alienate sympathy from the 

Balkan cause and peoples, and render more difficult the task of those who, like us, are anxious 

to assist in healing the grievous wounds which this terrible war has inflicted upon the country. 

We beg you, Sir, to believe that our sole motive in drawing your attention to this matter 

is solicitude for the future welfare and happiness of your nation, and we would be glad to 

receive from you assurances that would enable us to contradict and refute the charges to 

which we have alluded [emphasis added]. 107 

The leaking of “rumours” about the conversion was due in large part to the growing 

resistance of Pomaks, lodging complaints of brutality against them to both foreign embassies and 

internal government institutions. From Protocol no. 11 of the Holy Synod 108 it emerges that by mid- 

106 National Archives-Plovdiv, Fond 67к, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 125, pages 22-23. (Ibid., 35.) 

107 Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 586, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 1014, Page 1. (Ibid., 278.) 

108 The Bulgarian Orthodox Church’s highest authority. 

67

February 1913, the frightened Muslims had begun to recuperate and to fight back. In particular, the 

pokrastvane missions in Seress and Nevrokop were reporting to the ecclesiastical authorities that 

“Pomak villages in Nevrokop have returned to the Muslim faith,” and that “instructors were going 

among the Pomaks to instigate them to rebel.” 109 As the conversion violence escalated during the 

first three months of 1913, Pomak resistance intensified. Indeed, in the same Protocol no.11, the 

Bulgarian Orthodox Church expressed fear that “the holy mission” might fail due to two reasons: (1) 

the bitter winter that hampered the missionaries’ ability to move about; and (2) the growing defiance 

of the Muslims. 110 For the first time since the beginning of the pokrastvane, the church went on the 

defensive by denying all “allegations” of violence and by continuing to insist that “the conversion of 

the Pomaks was voluntary.” As the number of complaints grew, however, it became increasingly 

difficult to dismiss them as “rumours.” Consequently, Bulgaria’s political and military regime began 

to distance itself from the religious authorities. Henceforth, fending for themselves, church officials 

proceeded to blame the noxious “rumours” on Protestant jealousy of the Orthodox Church’s success 

in gaining converts. 111 

Meanwhile the Muslim protests against the pokrastvane continued. In a telegram to the 

Bulgarian Legation in London of January 7, 1913, Prime Minister Geshov complained: 

Today, the English Consul handed me a memorandum, turning my attention to some alleged 

abuse against Muslims, and hoping that we would take all measures to stop it and punish the 

culprits. In response, I said that a month earlier I had talked to General Savov [deputycommander 

in chief of the Bulgarian army] about the situation and he had authorized … an 

investigation of these crimes and punishment for the perpetrators. 112 

109 Protocol no.11 of the Holy Synod from the session of 12 February 1913. Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 

791, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 24, pages 114-121. (Georgiev and Trifonov, eds., 137-40.) 

110 Ibid. 

111 Ibid. Western Protestant missions were also active in the conversion of Muslims in the Balkans, so there was 

a kind of competition for converts between them and the Eastern Orthodoxy, dominating most Christian nations 

on the Peninsula. 

112 Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 568, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 757, page 1. (Georgiev and Trifonov, 

eds., 28.) 

68

Further, a protocol of the Holy Synod refers to a letter of the Ministry of Denominations 113 

from January 18, 1913, which clearly points to the state’s complicity in the pokrastvane. Apparently, 

the letter in question was intended to alert the church officials to the fact that Pomak delegations had 

been lodging complaints of “abuses and forced Christianization” not only to foreign consuls, but to 

the Ministry itself and even King Ferdinand of Bulgaria. “His Majesty’s Chief of Staff informed the 

King,” a quotation goes, “that the same delegation [which had complained to the Ministry of 

Denominations] appeared in the royal palace to complain of abuses during the Christianization of the 

Pomaks.” 114 

As evident from the communication of St. Kostov, secretary of the Holy Synod, to Stoyu 

Shishkov, the Muslims were taking action against the pokrastvane as early as December 1912. In the 

letter, Kostov notified Shishkov, a participant in the conversion missions (above), that Archbishop 

Maxim had been aware of “some Pomaks from the Peshtera district” complaining of torture and 

forced conversion to the Turkish mufti (the regional Muslim religious leader). Then, joined by the 

mufti himself, these Pomaks even brought their case before “the Police Commandant in Plovdiv.” 

“The Commandant [, however,] issued them with warning to produce factual evidence before 

complaining of torture or else they would be prosecuted for slander.” 115 

Nor did threat and intimidation discourage the Muslims. Voicing their collective protest, on 

February 4, 1913, the population of three Rhodopean villages addressed the chairman of the 

Bulgarian Parliament in the following letter: 

Mr. Dr. Danev, 

We are Bulgarian Mohammedans from the villages of Dryanovo, Er-Küpria, and 

Bogutevo, Stanimaka District[.] [T]he terror, violence, and sword over our heads to become 

Christians has reached its highest point[.]. [W]e truly believe that our sacred Constitution 

permits not that we be humiliated and beaten in order to abandon our religion. We are born 

in it, and we want to remain in it. If you could only bear witness to the sobs and suffering of 

us, the defenseless, you would know that the conversions are not voluntary, but produced by 

violence[.] To this speaks the fact – known to the whole world – that if we wanted to convert, 

113 The state organ in charge of religious affairs. 

114 See Protocol 2 of the Holy Synod from its session on 19 January 1913. Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 

791, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 24, pages 11-14. (Georgiev and Trifonov, eds., 62.) 

115 The letters is dated 31 December 1912. Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 568, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 

800, page 16. (Ibid., 21.) 

69

we would have done so 35 years ago when Russia came, 116 not now, when we should enjoy 

freedom in the embrace of Great Bulgaria. 

We place our faith in you[;] in your ability to … put an end to our suffering, so that we, 

and our whole nation, may see that the hopes we had vested in You, upon electing You to 

that Titanic office, to work for Bulgaria’s greatness, have not been betrayed. 

02/04/1913 Reverentially, 

The citizens of Er-Küpria, Dryanovo, and Bogutevo 

[The letter is anonymous.] 117 

Effective Pomak protest was often enabled by sympathetic Christian Bulgarians. For 

instance, the teacher in the village of Oreshets, Mr. Kodjabashov, apparently loathing the whole 

conversion affair, encouraged the people of Er-Küprü to resist the conversion. Moreover, he admitted 

“a Pomak deputation from Er-Küprü to his home” and advised them “how to file a complaint.” This 

information was transmitted to the Holy Synod by Archbishop Maxim, who warned this supreme 

body of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church that “other teachers and clerks are telling the Bulgarian- 

Mohammedans not to accept baptism, advise them how to complain from abuse, submit protest 

notes, and even write those for them.” In conclusion, Maxim asked of the Holy Synod to take 

measures against individuals who thus thwarted “the holy mission” and went against the interests of 

“the church and the fatherland.” 118 

By the spring of 1913, the Pomak community had been actively engaged in systematic acts of 

defiance, both individually and collectively. Entire villages, for instance, refused to attend church or 

further submit to Orthodox Christian baptisms, burials, and weddings. Much of this courage stemmed 

from the realization that, scared by the growing publicity, the Bulgarian government was 

withdrawing its support for the pokrastvane. Thus, the church stood fending for itself. Also, by the fall 

1913, Bulgaria had already been losing the Second Balkan War. With defeat came demoralization, as 

well as waning of the national zeal to Christianize the Pomaks. The religious missions and their 

116 Referring to the Russian-Turkish War of 1876-1878 as a result of which Bulgaria gained its independence. 

The Russian imperial troops invaded the Ottoman Empire and fought most of the war within modern-day 

Bulgaria. 

117 Protest-letter from the population of Er-Küprü, Dryanovo, and Bogutevo to the Chairperson of the Parliament 

from 4 February 1913. National Library-Bulgarian Historical Archives. Fond 15, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 1832, 

page 22. (Georgiev and Trifonov, eds., 113.) 

118 Letter of Archbishop Maxim of Plovdiv to the Holy Synod from 5 February 1913. National Archives-Plovdiv, 

Fond 67к, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 123, page 117. (Ibid., 289.) 

70

civilian aides carried out the pokrastvane for a while longer, but without the intimidating presence of 

the military, their efforts soon failed. By September 1913, the missionaries were transmitting 

discouraging news to Archbishop Maxim and the Holy Synod. Priest Nikola Stamenov, a missionary in 

the village of Dorkovo, included the following news in his report to Maxim: 

During the last three weeks – 15, 22, 29 September – everyone, men as well as women, 

refuse to come to church. On Sundays the men plow their fields and the women do their 

laundry, while you can rarely see a man plowing or a woman washing any other day. Since 

September 25 [1913] there is commotion among them; 5-6 new Christians from other 

villages come here every day under the pretext of visiting relatives, but they gather together 

for counsel; they put a deliberate person on watch for when I approach; in my presence, they 

switch to talking about other, insignificant matters. The coffee shops are full of people these 

days and stay open through the night[.] I’ve tried to tell them many times to close the shops 

and go home, but they don’t listen to me[.] I informed the police about all that already. There 

are seven (7) newborns due for baptizing[.] I’ve warned the parents four times already to 

bring them [to the church] for baptizing, but they refuse[.] I reported it to the municipal 

authorities, but no cooperation from there so far. Everyone is selling goats, sheep, cattle, 

houses, whatever property they have, saying they’ll be leaving soon for Asia [Turkey], where 

they’ve purchased land already. They don’t let me call them by their new names. Boys 15-16 

years of age wear fezzes again, telling me they’ve worn out their hats already. Women started 

covering their face a hundred times harder than they did in Ottoman times. 119 

From Er-Küprü, priest B. Hristov reported nearly the same story, “For two weeks already 

there is great excitement among the new converts[.]… [T]heir insubordination is growing, too[.] 

[T]hey respect nothing related to the church anymore; and no one listens to my counsel. ... Already, 

some of them are openly saying, ‘We are Turks [Muslims], and we’ll remain Turks, because our rights 

will be restored.” 120 Such tales of frustration for the missionaries and of emerging hope for the 

Muslims were abounding by the fall of 1913. In a report of October 1 st , Atanass Zlatkov, priest in 

Banya-Chepino, related to Archbishop Maxim that “[o]ne of the old Christians, Miko Akev, had said to 

the new convert Miladin Tumbev, ‘Good evening, Miladine!’ to which the latter remarked, ‘Don’t call 

me Miladin! I have a name.’” The same priest also reported how he asked the “convert Assen Trenov, 

‘Why aren’t you coming to church?’ He said he didn’t have any money to light a candle in the church. I 

119 The report is dated 30 September 1913. National Archives-Plovdiv, Fond 67к, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 117, 

pages 69-70. (Ibid., 415.) 

120 Report of B. Hristov, priest in Er-Küprü, to Archbishop Maxim from 14 October 1913. National Archives- 

Plovdiv, Fond 67к, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 117, pages 83-84. (Ibid., 419-20.) 

71

told him that … if he had money for cigarettes, he should have for candles, too. ... [T]o this he replied 

he was an ‘European’ and he does not need to go to church.” 121 

Another missionary, Toma Belchev, serving in the Pomak village of Chepelare, wrote to 

Archbishop Maxim on December 24, 1913: 

I saw this person from Güzdünitsa wearing fezz: 

‘Where are you from?,’ I asked. 

‘From Güzdünitsa.’ 

‘What’s your name?’ 

‘Hassan.’ 

‘Aren’t you baptized?’ 

‘Yes, you baptized me, but with baptizing alone, you can’t take my faith away.” 

‘You must know that once you’ve been baptized, you can’t wear the fezz anymore? 

‘That time is over. It used to be dark, but now it’s light again,’ he said to me. 122 

Indeed, by the end of 1913 the pokrastvane was a dead affair and the Pomak Muslims were 

free to restore their Muslim faith and identity. However, the excesses and killing that accompanied 

the conversion went unpunished. Moreover, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church took steps to reward the 

leaders of insurgent bands who carried some of the bloodiest pogroms against the Pomak population. 

For example, in Protocol no. 44 of the Holy Synod from October 24, 1913, one reads: 

[During this session, the Holy Synod] dealt with the matter of rewarding Tane Nikolov 

and his comrades for their contribution to our mission of converting the Pomaks from the 

Gümürcina district. ... 

Wherever he acted on this holy mission with his 22 comrades, Tane Nikolov had shown 

great diligence, loyalty, tact, wisdom, and unquestionable selflessness from the moment of 

his arrival in Gümürcina. 

Tane Nikolov and his group had been dispatched [there] by the district government, and 

[had acted] with the consent of the Chief Army Quarters, to assist the church missions [in 

converting the Pomaks] ... 

For this, the Holy Synod will plead with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Religious 

Denominations to award Tane Nikolov and his comrades the amount of 20,000 leva for their 

selfless- and very valuable to the State, Nation, and Church contribution. ... 123 

In the course of the same session, the Holy Synod formally aborted the pokrastvane 

campaign after having lost the support of the army and state authorities. Accordingly, the session’s 

protocol reads: “It has been decided that the missions for conversion of the Pomaks are henceforth 

121 National Archives-Plovdiv, Fond 67к, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 117, pages 74-78. (Ibid., 416-17.) 

122 Ibid., pages 207-8. (Ibid., 456.) 

123 Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 791, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 24, pages 579, 581-82, 587-88, 598. 

(Ibid., 421-22.) 

72

evoked and relieved of their duties until further notice when our work could resume ...” 124 And the 

next forced Christianization of Pomak Muslims would not take place until three decades later. 

3. War and Pokrastvane No More 

As early as July 1913, Bulgaria was losing the Second Balkan War. While Greek troops were 

taking away Macedonia from the south, Turkey was recapturing Thrace from the southeast. That 

same month, the coalition government of Stoyan Danev, which carried out part of the pokrastvane, 

fell and King Ferdinand appointed a new cabinet headed by Vassil Radoslavov as Prime Minister. 

Bulgaria’s conclusive defeat in the Second Balkan War forced the Radoslavov government to accept 

the terms of the Bucharest Peace Treaty (August 10, 1913), followed by the Treaty of Constantinople 

a month and a half later. The Treaty of Constantinople allowed Bulgaria to retain control over most 

of the Rhodope Mountains (the rest remained in Greece), a territory densely populated by Pomaks. 

However, Bulgaria was also bound to honour a number of provisions related to the protection of 

Muslim rights and freedoms. Article 7 of the treaty established that all Muslim (and other) persons 

living on former Ottoman territories, presently annexed to Bulgaria, were to become full-fledged 

Bulgarian citizens. Those wishing to retain their Ottoman citizenship, however, could immigrate to 

Turkey within next four years with all their movable property. Article 8 of the treaty guaranteed to 

all Muslims living in Bulgaria the right to equality before the law, freedom of conscience, and freedom 

to profess and practice their religion. It further mandated that Bulgaria recognized and respected the 

right of Muslim parishes to own property, as well as to maintain and regulate their own hierarchical 

structure. Articles 9 and 10 of the Treaty of Constantinople additionally decreed that all rights and 

privileges – including property rights – acquired by persons and/or entities, established under valid 

Ottoman laws, were to be retained and respected likewise. A separate provision, binding to Bulgaria 

and Turkey alike, guaranteed that Christian and Muslim burial grounds would be respected. Article 

124 Ibid. 

73

16 established the right to free movement of nationals of both countries within the territory of the 

other. 125 Following the Balkan Wars, Bulgaria embarked on a process of restoring its relationship 

with Turkey and improving the treatment of its Muslim minorities. The Cabinet of Vassil Radoslavov 

played a pivotal role in the post-war healing. On October 16, 1913, for example, the government 

published a deliberate “Manifesto to the Population from the Newly Liberated Territories,” 

proclaiming its commitment to respect the rights and freedoms of the Bulgarian citizens from the 

new territories. 126 Consequently, the Rhodopean Pomaks expressed their appreciation for the 

government’s reversal of the conversion by voting en mass for Radoslavov’s Liberal party, effectively 

aiding his re-election on February 23, 1914. 

Conclusion 

The brutal pokrastvane of 1912-1913 was a move towards territorial, political, and cultural 

consolidation of the Bulgarian state and nation. Bulgarian authorities, supported by the church, 

hoped for a quick and efficient national unification through conversion of a significant segment of the 

population – a step deemed necessary to thwart potential territorial claims by Turkey. Dictated by 

national ideals, fashioned by the ruling elites and the intelligentsia and fed to the masses, the politics 

of coercive assimilation inspired the dominant ethno-religious group to accept and execute the 

pokrastvane. 

The spirit and letter of Bulgarian nationalism was one of a nascent nation-state. The 

previously subjugated population, which lacked traditions of self-government, sought to build a 

sovereign national state. Harboring no respect for individual freedom or cultural difference, the new 

nation’s goal was to substitute the formerly subjugated status of the prevalent ethno-religious group 

with one of undisputed domination over all other communities within the claimed territories. The 

strategy was to enforce cohesion through coercion rather than through integration of dichotomous 

125 Fatme Myuhtar, “The Human Rights of the Muslims in Bulgaria in Law and Politics since 1878”, Report of the 

Bulgarian Helsinki Committee (Sofia: Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, November 2003), 16-17. 

126 “Manifesto to the Population from the Newly-Liberated Territories,” Official Gazette no. 329 of October 1913. 

74

groups; and the more closely affiliated these groups were with the former oppressor, the more likely 

target of coercion they became. 

The language typical of Bulgaria’s nationalism echoes from the letter of a group of patriotic 

activists from Pazardzhik – who would eventually carry out the conversion of Pomaks in the central 

Rhodopes – to the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, to Prime Minister Ivan Geshov, and 

to the Minister of Internal Affairs Al. Lyutskanov, of December 1, 1912: 

The Bulgarian soldiery fulfilled the trust laid upon them by the King and the People ... 

The victorious Bulgarian troops gave freedom to our subjugated brothers beyond Rila and 

the Rhodope [Mountains]. Bulgaria is great, whole and strong. But with this comes big 

responsibility: in future united Bulgaria, we will have many foreign peoples and faiths. And 

foreign faiths bring about foreign ideals. ... One people, one society will be easier to rule and 

better off because unity of creed would enable that society to prevail. Even philanthropists 

dream of a mankind guided by the same moral principles – by one ideal. 

And what loftier, brighter ideal could mankind have than Christianity? 

We led a war not of conquest, but of freedom; a war of the Cross – the creator of all 

culture and civilization. 

This is why, one of our goals must be to spread Christianity among all our future 

subjects. To enlighten and educate these citizens, we must inculcate Christianity in their 

minds. ... 

Only Christianity will elevate his [the Pomak] mind and soften his heart. Only by 

embracing Christianity, will he be equal to us in the shared love for our country. 127 

Thus, all typical characteristics of the Romantic nationalism of coercion are identifiable in this 

excerpt: Bulgaria moved to affirm sovereignty and control over the new territories by coercing the 

local Pomak population into religious conversion. The nation-state’s prevalent majority desperately 

sought sovereignty as means to change their previous status of a subjugated people. For the ruling 

elites, the fastest and most efficient way to enforce territorial and cultural sovereignty was through 

forced assimilation. 

The Pomaks were an obvious target for assimilation from the start because they shared 

language with the nation’s dominant ethno-religious group. Their Islamic religion, however, posed 

two problems to Bulgaria’s ruling elite: First, Islam was the faith of the former Ottoman oppressor. 

Therefore, Islam constituted a religio-cultural identity against which the new Bulgarian nation 

sought to define itself by glorifying its Christian heritage and denigrating that of the “oppressor.” 

127 Letter of a group of patriotic activists from Pazardzhik to the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, 

to Prime Minister Ivan Geshov and to the Minister of Internal Affairs Al. Lyutskanov of 1 December 1912. Central 

National Archives-Sofia, Fond 568, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 404, pages 1-3. (Georgiev and Trifonov, eds., 15.) 

75

Thus, according to the formula of the coercive nationalism, the Pomaks could not be Muslim and 

Ottoman. They had to be Orthodox Christians and Bulgarians. The 1912-1913 act of pokrastvane 

against them applied that formula. The resulting violence, however, failed to win the Pomaks for the 

Bulgarian nation as might have democratic respect for their difference. 

This first comprehensive conversion had a lasting impact on Pomak identity and cultural 

heritage. The effect was twofold: First, the pokrastvane set a precedent for subsequent Bulgarian 

regimes to embark on brutal assimilations of their own of the Rhodopean Muslims (and Muslims in 

general). Second, for the first time, the relatively stable until then sense of Ottoman-Muslim identity 

of the Pomaks was shaken to its core by the label “descendants of forcibly converted Bulgarian 

Christians,” imposed on the community by force. Henceforth, this ideology would become the core 

value of Bulgarian nationalism in respect to the Pomaks and their “proper” place within the 

(Christian) nation-state of Bulgaria. 

*** 

Following the pokrastvane of 1912-1913, a series of patchy attempts to convert the Pomaks 

to Christianity took place before the communist takeover of 1944 in Bulgaria. While unsuccessful in 

terms of lasting impact, however, these further pokrastvanes kept alive the spirit of coercive 

nationalism and the sense of alienation among the Pomaks. When the communist regime 

permanently supplanted the Bulgarian monarchy in the mid-1940s, the new atheistic leadership 

immediately denounced the latest Christianization of 1938-1944 as “fascist” and promptly aborted it, 

much to the Pomak people’s relief. Yet, this gesture of communist magnanimity was solely a political 

necessity which, once fulfilled, would unleash the most enduring assimilation venture yet – the 

revival process – with lasting implications for Pomak heritage. The next two chapters discuss the 

nature and long-term consequences of the communist name changing, including policy, political 

persecution, Pomak resistance, and dissenters’ exile. 

76

The revival process was the last forced assimilation of Pomaks in Bulgaria, and, for the first 

time, it targeted the Turkish-speaking Muslims, too. Because the Turkish revival process of 1984- 

1985 was much larger in scale, it ultimately obscured the Pomak name changing of 1972-1974. The 

the following two chapters deal exclusively with the Pomak revival process, limiting the Turks’s 

assimilation to contextual reference only. Nevertheless, it is my hope that the revivalist campaign 

against the Turkish Muslims at least receives an adequate introduction in the next two narratives. 

While the nature and methods of both assimilations are identical, there is one significant difference. 

The first campaign targeted a relatively small and ethnically ambiguous community in comparison– 

the Pomak Muslims, who share linguistic ties with Bulgaria’s majority. The second one was directed 

against a highly defined and substantially larger minority culture within Bulgaria, with strongly 

developed ethnic self-identity – the Turkish Muslims. Whereas Chapter III is preoccupied with the 

revival process as totalitarian policy, political persecution, and Pomak resistance on a scale of 

collective experience, Chapter IV focuses of the life and struggle of Ramadan Runtov, a vocal antirevivalist, 

political prisoner, and Pomak exile to Turkey. 

77

CHAPTER III 

REVIVAL PROCESS: THE FORCED RENAMING OF THE POMAK MUSLIMS IN COMMUNIST 

BULGARIA (1944-1989) 

Introduction 

With the formal renaming of the Turkish minority in 1984-1985, the communist regime in 

Bulgaria finally realized its revivalist ideals, conceived as early as the 1956 April Plenum of the 

communist party. The essential purpose of the revival process was to create a single, culturally 

uniform nation under the perpetual leadership of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP). As Ali 

Eminov—a Bulgaria-born scholar of ethnic Turkish descent—effectively sums it, the communist 

objective was trifold. First, to claim all Muslims in the country as “the descendants of Bulgarians who 

had been forced to convert to Islam during the Ottoman period.” Second, to build their case on the 

premise that, over time, these “descendants” had become aware of their true identity and sought to 

reclaim it “by voluntarily and spontaneously replacing their Muslim names with conventional 

Bulgarian ones.” Third, to altogether deny the existence of any culturally different group within the 

nation-state. 1 

Unlike with the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims (Pomaks), however, the communist authorities 

were especially apprehensive – and justifiably so – about “reviving” the Turkish-speaking minority. 

Undoubtedly, it was imperative for them to assimilate the ethnic Turks because the latter constituted 

the largest (Muslim) sub-group within the nation-state. 2 However, using Turkish – rather than 

Bulgarian – language as their mother tongue clearly set them apart from the national majority. So, 

1 Ali Eminov, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria, (New York: Routledge, 1997), vii. 

Ali Eminov is Emeritus Professor at Wayne State College in Nebraska. 

2 The Turkish minority constitutes about twenty percent of the total population, or as many as 800,000 people 

(footnote below). 

78

this distinctiveness alone was going to make it extremely difficult for the regime to stake a claim to 

the Turks’s Bulgarianness. Moreover, the authorities feared that the sheer magnitude of an eventual 

assimilation undertaking against the Turkish-speaking Bulgarian citizens would be liable to attract 

unwanted international attention. After all, as a group, they constituted as much as 20 percent of the 

country’s population, or nearly 800,000 people. 3 Additionally, the communist leaders were 

concerned that Turkey, the “mother country,” might react aggressively to acts of violence against the 

Turks in Bulgaria. Ultimately, the regime feared that a large-scale revival process could generate 

enormous and potentially fatal political backlash. Consequently, the leadership would postpone the 

“revival” of the ethnic Turks until the mid-1980s; a full decade after the Pomak renaming took place. 4 

The regime, however, harbored no such qualms in regard to assimilating the Bulgarianspeaking 

Muslims. Beginning with sporadic pressure in the 1950s and 1960s, the government 

formally and comprehensively “revived” the Pomaks in the period 1972-1974 with surprisingly little 

international notice. From that point onward, they would begin to consider a move against the ethnic 

Turks without the initial apprehension. Thus, eleven years later in full villains’ style – with troops, 

police, and guns against unarmed civilian population – the regime proceeded to rename the Turkishspeaking 

citizens of Bulgaria. The assimilation happened in much the same fashion as against the 

Pomak Muslims, but on a considerably larger scale and against a minority group that had not 

previously been targeted in such a way. As the violence escalated, however, Turkey raised the alarm 

and created an international uproar. Even as international pressure mounted, though, the regime 

remained stupendously defiant until the year it crumbled in, 1989. 

This chapter explores the impact of the revival process on Pomak life during the communist 

period in Bulgaria (1944-1989). In particular, I provide an overview of the last significant 

3 According to Bulgaria’s population censuses from 1992 and 2001, the total number of Muslims (based on 

“religious belonging”) was 1,110,295 (out of 8,887,317 total population) in 1992, and 966,978 (out of 7,928,901) 

in 2001. As the prevalent Muslim minority, the ethnic Turks numbered 800,052 and 746,664 persons in 1992 

and 2001 respectively. Although there is no formal statistics for the Pomak Muslims, experts estimate the 

number at 200,000 people. Thus, while the Turks have comprised between 15 to 20 percent of the total 

Bulgaria’s population, the Pomaks have barely accounted for 3 to 5 percent. (See Fatme Myuhtar, “The Human 

Rights of the Muslims in Bulgaria in Law and Politics since 1878”, Report of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee 

(Sofia: Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, November 2003), 3-4; National Statistics Institute, at: 

http://www.nsi.bg/Census/Census-i.htm.) 

4 Refer to Central National Archives-Sofia documents used below. 

79

Bulgarianization of Pomak culture using archival documents as well as first-hand witness accounts. 

The composite evidence suggests that the revival process was not a sudden and chaotic affair as 

popularly believed. Rather, it was a meticulously planned and coldly executed strategy that faltered 

at times upon encountering resistance, but never paused – whatever the cost – until coming to full 

fruition in 1985 with the renaming of the Turkish minority. 

This and the following chapter, as noted earlier, elaborate on the less-known Pomak revival 

process only discussing the ethnic-Turkish assimilation within the context of the former. Although the 

term revival process is generally associated with the communist campaign against the Turks, the 

ordeal of the Pomaks is no less significant. In fact, because the violence against them drew 

surprisingly little international attention in comparison to that against the Turks, studying the 

Pomak revival process seems even more compelling. The interviews I conducted with former victims 

– moderately used in this chapter and extensively in the next 5 – serve as powerful, direct testimony 

to what occurred during the 1960s and 1970s. This chapter has two prominent components, 

descriptive and theoretical. Descriptively, I examine (1) the policy and ideology of the revival process, 

(2) the Pomak identity crisis it created; (3) and the political resurrection of Rodina it caused. 6 

Theoretically, I interpret the revival process through –what I term – the anger-satisfaction continuum 

model premised on Ernest Gellner’s concept of nationalism as a shifting and deeply exploitable 

national sentiment. My argument is that the national sentiment—i.e. the cultural majority’s attitude 

toward a societal sub-group—ultimately determines what identity discourse becomes 

(un)acceptable in the public domain. In conclusion, I synthesize the most relevant post-revivalism 

and post-communism developments germane to the present status of Pomak cultural heritage. 

Policy and Ideology of the Revival Process 

5 For details, see the next chapter, where interviews are extensively used to tell the story of Ramadan Runtov, a 

Pomak dissenter. 

6 Rodina was a nationalist organization initially persecuted as “fascist” and subsequently redubbed “patriotic” to 

serve as the regime’s propaganda machine. 

80

Pre-communist Bulgaria was a turbulent place for the Rhodopean Muslims. After the 

grueling pokrastvane of 1912-1913, 7 the Pomak hopes for a peaceful existence within their new 

country vanished completely. For a brief while, however, there were no forced conversions. In fact, 

during the Agrarian government of Alexander Stamboliyski, the Muslims of Bulgaria, and particularly 

the Pomaks, came to enjoy a substantial freedom of religion and cultural expression. But this period 

was short-lived and ended with the overthrow of Stamboliyski’s cabinet in June 1923. The situation 

became especially critical after 1934, when a military junta came to power. Toward the end of the 

1930s and until 1944, a new humiliating pokrastvane of the Pomaks was underway. Unlike the tightly 

organized and sweeping Christianization of 1912-1913, this one was sporadic, patchy, and more 

propaganda-oriented. As a result, many Muslims were able to avoid the renaming altogether simply 

by going into hiding or learning to quickly slip away every time pokrastvane operatives showed up in 

their villages. A number of Muslims also fled to Turkey to permanently evade the conversion. 8 After 

the communist takeover in Bulgaria of 1944-1945, the pokrastvane stopped. Moreover, within the 

first few years of the new regime, the political situation of the Pomaks improved significantly. 

In the first decade of their rule, the communist authorities were politically and culturally 

accommodating to the Muslims. “The Party,” as the regime came to identify itself, needed all support 

it could get to consolidate its grip on power. The Pomaks, like most Muslims, were a relatively easy 

win. Any regime willing to be tolerant of them would have had their backing given the history of 

oppression under previous governments. Understandably, the communists seized the opportunity of 

that crucial moment. They took care to expressly incorporate provisions for the freedom of 

conscience and religion in the new constitution, adopted by the National Assembly in 1947. It became 

known as the Dimitrov Constitution, named after the then supreme communist leader Georgi 

Dimitrov. 

9 

Ironically, while these constitutional guarantees were reaffirmed in the Law on Religious 

Denominations of 1949, all religious schools – until then the traditional form of schooling for all 

7 See Chapter III. 

8 Eminov, 49. 

9 Ibid., 51-52. 

81

Muslims – were being shut down the very same year. Moreover, the second constitution adopted by 

the communists in 1971 – at the zenith of the Pomak revival process – restated the freedom-ofconscience-and-creed 

guarantees (Article 53). Article 35(2) of this constitution specifically stipulated 

that “no privileges or limitation of rights based on nationality, origin, creed, sex, education, social and 

material status is allowed.” 10 Simultaneously, the Bulgarian Penal Code criminalized the instigation 

of hatred on religious grounds. 11 Constitutional guarantees and criminal liability notwithstanding, 

laws amounted to nothing once the regime had determined to pursue the revival process. 

As early as the mid-1950s, the communist politics in Bulgaria began to change. By then, “The 

Party” had stabilized its grip on power and could comfortably consider a reversal of minority policy, 

especially in regard to the Muslims. The emerging communist nationalism saw the large number of 

people professing Islam (roughly a fifth of about seven million) in the country as a malignant growth 

within – what had to be – the healthy, ethnically uniform body of the nation. To achieve a 

homogenous and compliant nation, the regime put forward a suitable ideology, calculated to appeal 

to the patriotic sentiments of the ethnic majority. As the Bulgarian historian Vera Mutafchieva 

explains: 

the Bulgarians began to be brainwashed en mass with fresh arguments about the ‘otherness’ 

of Turks and Pomaks. Compared to the ‘internationalism’ [approach of relative freedom until 

then], a new conception developed: they were not only ‘the others’, they were moreover 

dangerous for our state because they strove to cut off a part of the national territory and to 

annex it to Turkey. 12 

This sudden recasting of Muslims as “the others” also sprang out of a troubling—for the 

communists—tendency among the Pomaks to identify as ethnic Turks, essentially synonymizing 

Muslim with Turkish. 13 This presented a serious obstacle to the regime’s emerging ambitions to 

homogenize the nation by “reviving” all the country’s Muslims as “ethnic” Bulgarians. 

10 Ibid., 52. 

11 Ibid. 

12 Mutafchieva in Eminov, 6. 

13 Eminov, 5-6. 

82

Apparently, the government first entertained the idea of ethnic homogenization, specifically 

via Muslim assimilation, during a plenum of the central committee (CC) of the Bulgarian Communist 

Party (BCP) in April 1956. The same year, the CC came up with a special directive “to raise the 

political and cultural level of the Bulgarians with Mohammedan faith in order to fully develop their 

sense of being inseparable from the Bulgarian nation and to actively engage them in the building of 

communism.” 14 It was the authorities’ plan to build a unitary and tightly controlled nation in order to 

bolster and perpetuate their own rule of the country. The regime, however, did not immediately 

embark on the assimilation project. It was not until six years later – on April 5, 1962 – that the 

Politburo resolved to follow through with the “cultural revolution,” as they originally termed the 

revival process. They were to start with the Pomaks—another Pomak assimilation would not be 

anything new—as well as with the smaller communities of Muslim Tatars and Gypsies who were also 

prone to cultivate a “distasteful” ethnic Turkish consciousness. They were to deal with the Turks 

later, when the time was right for the final and largest stage of the revival process. 

But the so-called Measures against the Self-Turkification of Gypsies, Tatars, and Bulgarians 

[Pomaks] Professing the Mohammedan Faith of 1962, seemingly with broader application, were 

intended mostly for the Pomaks. As “ethnic Bulgarians,” the Pomaks – above all others – could not be 

allowed to develop a “Turkish” self-consciousness. Thus, the 1962 directive promulgated the 

following “measures” to that effect: First, it barred the local “people’s councils” from allowing Pomaks 

and Gypsies to move into villages with ethnic Turkish population so as to prevent their cultural 

integration. Second, it enabled the Ministry of Education and Culture and the local councils (a) to 

forbid instruction in the Turkish language at schools where Pomak (Tatar or Gypsy) children 

attended; (b) to refuse appointment of ethnic Turkish teachers to schools with predominantly Pomak 

(Tatar or Gypsy) students; and (c) to prevent Pomak (and Gypsy) children from sharing living 

quarters, within the full-board dormitories, with Turkish children. Third, it obligated the Bulgarian 

14 Decision of Politburo of the Bulgarian Communist Party to Improve the Work on Cultivating National and 

Patriotic Awareness among the Bulgarians with Mohammedan Faith of 1973. Central National Archives-Sofia, 

Fond 1, Inventory 40, Archival Unit 446, page 1. 

83

Academy of Science to organize “expeditions of historians, ethnographers, [and] philologists” 15 to the 

Rhodopes, traditionally inhabited by Muslims, in search of evidence for the Pomaks’ Bulgarian 

ancestry. Fourth, it created a special entity, an “Institute” at the Academy of Science, instructed to 

“study” the historical past of the Pomaks. 16 

To ensure the success of the revival enterprise, the authorities indeed relied on academics to 

scientifically establish the “pure” Bulgarian pedigree, initially, of the Pomaks and, later, of the Turks. 

As Eminov points out, most of those summoned to the task, “readily obliged and found the required 

‘evidence’ everywhere they looked.” Thus, in the course of the 1960s and 1970s, the communist 

scholarship effectively proved the Bulgarian origins of the Pomaks by expanding “partial truth[s]” 

“into sweeping generalizations” and by producing “volumes of pseudo-scientific” literature. Thus, 

with a simple decision of “the Party,” a select body of compliant and self-gratifying “scientists” was 

able to rewrite history. 17 

With the past effectively falsified, the pressure began on Pomak men and women (a) to rid 

themselves of the traditional attire in favor of more modern dress style, (b) to substitute their 

traditional Turkish-Arab names with Bulgarian-Orthodox ones, and (c) to abandon any and all 

religious customs. In the course of implementing the “cultural revolution” in the Rhodopes in the 

early 1960s, many of the local communist apparatchiks (bureaucrats), supported by law enforcement 

and Christian civilians, engaged in premeditated acts of cruelty and debasement of the population. 

Subsequently, on many occasions the population resisted and clashed with the authorities. To 

downplay the rising resistance, the communist regime came up with its third directive about the 

revival process on May 12, 1964. While acknowledging the violence against civilian Muslims, this 

directive was more concerned with portraying it as a necessary reaction to thuggish behavior. 18 

15 Eminov, 105. 

16 Ibid., 105-6. 

17 Ibid., 9-10. 

18 This is in accordance with summary information, included in the Politburo’s Decision to step up with the 

assimilation of 1973, quoted below. 

84

The communist leadership’s last formal resolution on the Pomak assimilation came out on 

July 17, 1970. This document marked an important shift in the implementation of the revival process. 

From a low-key undertaking by then, the assimilation effort was to become openly aggressive. This 

fourth directive no longer sought to conceal the renaming, but to speed it up and transform it into a 

nationwide campaign. Once in the open with the revival process by the 1970, the regime expressed 

impatience with its progress, describing it as “slacking lately and causing the negative processes of 

self-Turkifization among the Bulgarians with Mohammedan faith to become worse.” 19 In the 

communist vocabulary, this meant stepping up with the violence. Thus, by the early 1970s, and 

especially “[a]fter the approval of the 1971 Constitution, the creation of a nation-state with a single 

language and homogenous culture became an explicit government policy.” 20 After the 1974 Plenum 

of the Bulgarian Communist Party – and once the Pomaks were formally renamed – the term “unified 

Bulgarian socialist nation” officially entered the regime’s terminology in live speeches, in the printing 

press and electronic media. 21 

From the start, the underlying rationale for the revival process was of the following nature: 

The Muslims – Pomaks and Turks – within the nation were the culturally opposite other, because they 

were intimately associated with Bulgaria’s historical “enemy” – Turkey, the political successor of the 

former Ottoman “oppressor.” As such, they presented a danger to the integrity and stability of the 

Bulgarian nation. Therefore, they had to understand that they could not express an identity – Muslim 

or Muslim-Turkish – that went against the Bulgarian(-Christian) values. The Pomaks, in particular, 

were not to be allowed to join forces with the Turks. They were not Turks and they were not to be 

allowed to become Turks. They were to be assimilated, no matter what. And forced to assimilate the 

Pomaks were. 22 

19 Decision of Politburo of the Bulgarian Communist Party to Improve the Work on Cultivating National and 

Patriotic Awareness among the Bulgarians with Mohammedan Faith of 1973. Central National Archives-Sofia, 

Fond 1, Inventory 40, Archival Unit 446, page 3. 

20 Eminov, 7. 

21 Ibid., 8. 

22 Ramadan Runtov, interview by author, Istanbul, Turkey, May 21, 2007. (Translated from Bulgarian by the 

author.) 

85

In a lengthy speech of 1985, Politburo member Milko Balev proudly called the revival process 

a “national rebirth,” initiated with the renaming of the Pomaks and successfully completed with the 

“revival” of the ethnic Turks. “Recognizing historic[al] truth,” he elaborated, “a large number of the 

descendants of forcibly Islamized Bulgarians … reconstituted their Bulgarian names. … [And by doing 

so, they] shed their fanaticism, freed themselves from the influence of conservatism … and 

strengthened their patriotic consciousness.” The high official made these statements before the 

ethnically mixed population of Haskovo, following the vicious conclusion of the Turkish renaming in 

1985. Adding insult to injury, he declared the affair “a striking expression of a new historical 

awareness” among the ethnic Turks who—just like the Pomaks a decade earlier—had suddenly 

decided to take on Bulgarian names to acknowledge their true identity. As a finale, Balev clearly 

articulated the fundamental purpose of the revival process: “The People’s Republic of Bulgaria is one 

nation, her border incorporates no foreign territory, and not a single part of the Bulgarian people 

belongs to any other people or nation.” 23 

The regime threw this sort of nationalist rhetoric in the public sphere not only to remind the 

citizenry that “the Party” expected complete obedience from them, but also to manipulate the 

prevalent national sentiment. To achieve it, the majority population needed to believe the following: 

First, the assimilation was the will of the Bulgarian people, or at least carried out on behalf of the 

people – that is, the ethno-cultural majority. Second, the targeted communities – Pomaks and Turks – 

not only consented to the assimilation, but also “spontaneously” denounced their traditional cultural 

identity to “enthusiastically” embrace a new one. The reason for it was their “sudden” realization of 

the “pure” origins they shared with the Bulgarian nation. Third, in post-factum perspective, Balev 

clarified, the revival process was a “good thing,” because: (a) it brought economic development to 

traditionally depressed areas (the Rhodopes was the case in point); (b) it opened a fanaticism-free 

environment for everyone; and (c) it helped instill patriotic consciousness within the Pomaks (and 

the Turks). Finally, the revival process fostered the achievement of the foremost national objective. 

There was now a unitary, strong and indivisible nation-state for the Bulgarian people under the 

23 Eminov, 13-14, (quoting original document). 

86

shrewd leadership of the communist party. As hard as it is to imagine that the regime truly believed 

in its own absurd ideology of ethnic purity and untainted origins, they certainly had their minds set 

on imposing artificial homogeneity. To accomplish this feat, however, they needed the support of the 

ethno-cultural majority. The very purpose of invoking nationalist ideology was precisely to 

manipulate the prevalent national sentiment as a form of political control. 

Manipulate it they did, especially by feeding unsightly propaganda to a largely Christian 

nation that had been previously dominated by discriminating Muslim rulers. Consequently, the 

previously conventional feelings of national dislike and suspicion toward anything Ottoman, Turkish, 

or Muslim escalated to hatred and xenophobia during the communist period (1944-1989). However, 

as the Ottoman Empire had been long gone, the communist propaganda concentrated on attacking 

the Islamic faith and culture instead as the unpalatable surviving heritage of the former oppressor. 

And they did so in a particularly vicious way. Four points became the cornerstone of that ideological 

assault. First, Islam was a backward, barbaric religion that had been imposed on the Bulgarian people 

(Pomaks being the “living testimony” to that) by force for centuries. Second, Islam impeded the 

ethno-cultural and scientific renaissance of the Bulgarian people in the five centuries of “Ottoman 

yoke.” Third, foreign reactionary forces (notably Turkey and the West) used Islam to slander the 

Bulgarian socialist state by promoting nationalism and religious fanaticism among its Muslim 

population. Fourth, Islam was altogether obstructive to the integration of Muslims into the Bulgarian 

nation. 24 In the spirit of this propaganda, a range of prominent Muslim rites were disparaged, 

condemned, and prohibited under penalty of criminal prosecution. Accordingly, the regime outlawed 

circumcision as “a barbaric and pagan rite, a handover from the stone age.” Likewise, they forbade 

Ramazan (the Muslim month of fasting) because it allegedly “lowered one’s immunity to disease.” 

Moreover, it was economically detrimental to the country as it physically weakened the Muslim labor 

force – employed largely in agriculture – and, thus, lowered its productivity. Even the sacrificial 

slaughtering of lambs during Kurban Bayram (the Festival of Sacrifice) was banned for allegedly 


87

causing gastrointestinal disorders and for depriving the nation of much-needed foreign currency via 

the meat export. The conservative way in which Muslim women traditionally dressed was also 

problematic, because it symbolized their oppression by men. Finally, Muslim burial rites were 

altogether improper simply for being contrary to the “socialist practice.” Eminov aptly describes 

what constituted a “socialist burial”: 

Party officials were sent to Muslim funerals to make sure that the proper ‘socialist’ ritual was 

carried out and that prayers were said in Bulgarian only. Muslims were not allowed to bury 

their dead in their own cemeteries [the cemeteries had to be mixed]. Turks and other 

Muslims were sent letters ordering them to cover with cement the tombstones of their close 

relatives with any Turkish or Arabic inscriptions or any Islamic symbols on them. 25 

The “socialist ritual,” it turns out, was actually a Bulgarian-Christian one, minus the most 

overt symbols of the faith such as the cross or the presence of Orthodox priests. But because Marxism 

and Leninism promoted atheism, the Bulgarian communism had to oblige. Although prayers were 

permitted during burials, they were in Bulgarian--a practice particularly offensive to the Pomaks who 

traditionally associated it with the pokrastvane. 26 In addition, the conventional fezz-shaped 

tombstones (Appendix 3.1) were entirely banned. In particular, the regime prohibited the carving of 

any and all Islamic symbols – including inscriptions in the Arabic or Turkish languages or alphabets, 

engravings of the crescent moon or six-ray star (better known as the Star of David), and others – on 

the tombstones, instructing further that the existing such be cemented over or disposed of 

completely. Consequently, old Muslim cemeteries were changed beyond recognition or altogether 

wiped out. (See photographs of broken tombstones from the old cemetery in Valkossel – no longer 

existing – which, in 2007, I found piled up in a forgotten corner of the current eastern cemetery of the 

village, Appendix 3.1). 

Bringing about Crisis 

The revival process was a deeply bureaucratic and thorough affair indeed. After 1974, the 

conventional Bulgarian-Christian names forced on the Pomaks had to appear on their passports, 

birth certificates, property deeds, savings account papers, court certificates, and every other 

25 Ibid., 60. 

26 See Chapter II. 

88

conceivable document. Those lacking the proper documentation, indicating Bulgarian identity, could 

not access their salaries, pensions, and bank accounts. In addition, they could not apply for a change 

of residence or job. Failure to produce new papers during frequent check-ups resulted in job loss, 

fines, and imprisonment. In order to acquire these papers, however, people had to attend especially 

organized public ceremonies during which they were handed the new passports with much pomp 

and ostentation. According to Eminov, in the Rhodopean town of Rudozem, with largely Pomak 

population, “the person whose name has been ‘restored’ would be asked to walk up to a ceremonial 

rostrum set up in the town square, where the applicant had to hand in his/her ‘old’ passport and 

receive a ‘new’ one.” 27 

Thus, with a simple change of papers, not only the living – adults, children, and newborns – 

but also their long-departed predecessors received new identities overnight. The revival affair, 

brandishing the banner of communist nationalism, imposed the sort of treatment that humiliated, 

traumatized, and ultimately alienated the Pomak community from the Bulgarian nation more than 

anything else. The events in the village of Lutovo, entirely inhabited by Pomaks, are indicative of 

what generally took place during the revival process in most Pomak communities: 

The mosque was closed, residents were forced to adopt Christian names, and overnight 

the village – originally called Lutovo – was re-dubbed Sveta Petka, after the medieval patron 

saint of the Bulgarian nation. 

For almost two decades, circumcision was forbidden in Sveta Petka, as was the 

celebration of Muslim holidays. Soldiers and militiamen patrolled the streets to ensure that 

prohibitions were enforced, and in neighboring villages protesters were shot. Women were 

forbidden to wear their traditional dress of loose-fitting pantaloons under skirts or 

embroidered aprons; those refusing to abandon traditional attire were ejected from rural 

busses. Many chose to walk 10 or 20 kilometers [six to twelve miles] to and from work or 

school each day rather than compromise Muslim codes of modest dress. 28 

The closing of mosques and the prohibition of worship was a traumatic experience across 

the Pomak villages. As Eminov points out, the mosque served several fundamental purposes. It was 

the house of worship, the “focus of ceremonies associated with core events in the Pomak Muslim life 

– birth, circumcision, marriage and death,” and the place where the elders of the community gathered 

27 Eminov, 107. 

28 Steven Lewis, “Muslims in Bulgaria,” Aramco World 45 (1994): 26-27. 

89

to discuss, counsel, and act on important community affairs. 29 Cutting the populace off from the 

source of their spiritual guidance, upon which they had historically depended, threw entire 

communities in turmoil. The revival process seemed like spiritual suicide to many Pomaks (and 

Muslims in general), because it demanded the negation of the very sense of self and identity they 

cherished. More specifically, it translated into accepting names – for oneself and one’s community – 

and subscribing to creeds that many perceived as belonging to the “enemy.” In addition, it 

commanded the acceptance of clothing style which defiled basic precepts of Muslim modesty. Overall, 

the revival process dictated the abandonment of age-old traditions constituting the very fabric of 

Pomak life, including circumcision, religious holidays, as well as marriage-, birth-, and burial rites 

(above). 

Not only was this communist revivalism a traumatic disruption of life as people knew it, but 

also a factor that deepened the identity crisis among the community. Pomak insecurities over “Who 

we are?” began with Bulgaria’s independence from Ottoman rule in 1878, when their relatively stable 

identity as Ottoman Muslims was shaken to its core upon very quickly becoming Bulgarian subjects. 

Henceforth, the brutal push on the Pomaks to convert to the new dominant religion – Eastern 

Orthodox Christianity – was almost immediate. Whereas the pokrastvanes of 1912-1913 and 1938- 

1944 attempted to shift their sense of identity from Ottoman-Muslim to Bulgarian-Christian, the 

communist revival process proceeded to do the same on an atheist note, i.e. with emphasis of 

ethnicity rather than religion. The essence and purpose of the pokrastvane and the revival process, 

however, were the same. The systematic pressure on the community to assimilate not only 

destabilized Pomak identity over time, but it also created an enduring state of psychological 

uncertainly as to who they were. As Tatjana Seypel effectively puts it, “[the] [s]everal historic 

‘interruptions’ have driven the Pomaks into a state of confusion in respect to their identity. The 

question put to them: ‘Who are you?’, forces them to all kinds of reactions, to taking this and that 

position, to optioning in this and that way, to either resistance or opportunism, depending on the 


90

assumed purpose of the question or the questioner.” 30 “When they are asked as to their identity,” 

Yulian Konstantinov, Gulbrand Alhaug, and Birgit Igla contend, “Pomaks practically always tend to 

hesitate. Some people prefer to utter the word ‘Pomak’ only in a subdued manner, just like the word 

‘Gypsy’ or ‘Jew’ elsewhere.” 31 

Indeed, the matter of Pomaks’ own sense of identity has been a complex one. Generally 

speaking, the question ‘Who are you?’ directed at the Pomak community will receive a variety of 

answers largely depending on who asks the question, on one side, and who responds to it, on the 

other. If a markedly nationalistic Christian Bulgarian inquires, he or she is most likely to receive a 

defiant answer of the sort: ‘I am Muslim/Turkish!’ or ‘I am Pomak!’ To a discernibly friendly 

interviewer, the answer will likely be more analytical as the respondent will feel more at ease: ‘The 

Bulgarians [Christians] believe us to be Bulgarians. We are Muslims by faith, but we speak the 

Bulgarian language. So we are Bulgarian citizens and Muslims.’ To a trust-inspiring insider – I have 

been perceived as one – the answer will be earnestly straightforward: ‘Well, you know that we are 

Pomaks! I don’t know if we descend from Christians who converted to Islam, as the Bulgarians claim, 

or we have always been Muslims? 32 But one thing is certain: We are Pomaks.’ What might follow 

afterwards would likely be some intimate musings over who the Pomaks “truly” are, contingent upon 

the respondent’s personal leanings (pro-Bulgarian, pro-Turkish, or neither). However, whereas this 

scenario may apply to the majority of Pomaks who firmly establish themselves as Muslims, there is 

still a small segment of the community who has either converted to Orthodox Christianity through 

30 Tatjana Seyppel, “The Pomaks of Northeastern Greece: an endangered Balkan population,” Journal of Muslim 

Minority Affairs 10 (January 1989): 43. Also in Eminov, 108. 

31 Yulian Konstantinov, Gulbrand Alhaug and Birgit Igla, “Names of the Bulgarian Pomaks,” Nordlyd: Tromso 

University Working Papers and Language and Linguistics 17 (1991): 46. Also in Eminov, 108. 

32 Many amateur Pomak historians as well as some scholars, including Mehmed Dorsunski and Salih Bozov, 

argue – largely on the basis of old Muslim tombstones inscribed in Arabic – that the Pomak population of the 

Rhodopes had professed the Islamic faith prior to the Ottoman conquest in the Balkans during the late 

fourteenth century (which argument defies the official Bulgarian historiography’s claim about the Pomak forced 

Islamization by the Ottoman Turks). Although claims of old Muslim tombstones have independently been made 

across the Rhodopes - most of them reportedly destroyed by the communist regime or hidden away for safekeeping 

- I have encountered no clear evidence of such to date. (See Mehmed Dorsunski, interview by author, 

Madan, Bulgaria, June15, 2007; Salih Bozov, V imeto na imeto /In the Name of the Name/ (Sofia: Liberal 

Integration Foundation, 2005), passim; Ibrahim Imam and Senem Konedareva, Ablanitsa prez vekovete 

/Ablanitsa through the Centuries/ (Ablanitsa, 2008), passim). 

91

the years or altogether avoids any Muslim self-reference. This latter group may demonstrate affinity 

for the forcibly Islamized-Christians theory of Pomak origins, because it justifies their own 

conversion to Christianity and/or it commands an instant approval and acceptance by the national 

Christian majority. Pomak converts to Christianity, for their part, would directly reject the 

designation “Pomak” and fully identify as ethnic Bulgarians of the Orthodox Christian faith. 

In the light of such ambiguity, Yulian Konstantinov, Gulbrand Alhaug and Birgit Igla have 

come up with a two-level identity structure predicated on religious and ethnic affiliation in an 

attempt to shed light on the Pomak complex sense of self: 33 

TWO-LEVEL IDENTITY STRUCTURE AMONG MUSLIMS 

Pomak Turk Bulgarian 

First (Islamic) level Pomak = Muslim Turk = Muslim Bulgarian = non-Muslim 

Second (ethnic) level Pomak = not-pure Turk Turk Bulgarian 

Thus, according to Konstantinov, Alhaug, and Igla, the Pomaks have two major levels of identity 

affiliation: religious-Muslim and ethnic-Turkish/Bulgarian. On the level of Muslim identification, the 

notions Pomak and Turk equal Muslim, while Bulgarian means non-Muslim (i.e. Christian). In this 

sense, Pomaks with firmly established Muslim identity could identify equally well as Pomaks or 

Turks, but not as Bulgarians, because to identify as Bulgarians would mean identifying as Christians, 

too. The root-cause of this bitter sentiment can be traced directly back to the pokrastvane and the 

revival process, whereupon Eastern Orthodox Christianity, as well as Bulgarian Christian names and 

traditions were forced upon the Muslim Pomaks while their own culture was violently suppressed. 

On the level of ethnic identification, according to the authors, Pomak connotes impure Turk, 

while Turk and Bulgarian remain pure concepts. However, even when the name Pomak equals impure 

Turk, the ethnic self-identification Pomak remains more prevalent than the Bulgarian(-Christian) 

33 Konstantinov, Alhaug and Igla, 27. Also in Eminov, 109. 

92

one. In other words, more members of the Pomak community are likely to identify as Pomaks, even if 

the appellation connoted impurity, than as ethnic Bulgarians even if it guaranteed clean origins. 

Ultimately, Konstantinov, Alhaug, and Igla stipulate – and rightly so – that in a formal context, the 

Pomaks insist on being Muslims – i.e. identify on religious level – while in an in-group setting, there is 

a sincere discussion of a more nuanced ethnic identity that is neither entirely pro-Turkish, nor 

entirely anti-Bulgarian. As the authors put it: 

In a formal, out-group context – such as an official discussion of identity problems at a 

meeting , when reading and discussing what the papers write about the issue, or in 

conversation with Bulgarians [Christians] – the religious level seems to be activated. 

Consequently Pomaks find it difficult to believe that they are Bulgarians since that will mean 

that they are non-Mohammedans [Muslims]. An ‘ethnic’ interpretation of the identity issue is 

only possible therefore in an in-group context of discussion, but even then, it has to be borne 

in mind, a popular description such as ‘impure Turk’ does not automatically lead to 

identifying with the Bulgarian majority. 34 

In his book Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria, Eminov seems to capture the 

general state of the complex Pomak self-identification: “In the Western Rhodopes, where Bulgarian 

Muslims live among Christian Bulgarians, they refer to themselves as Turks; in the Eastern Rhodopes, 

where they are surrounded by ethnic Turks, they stress their identity as Bulgarians.” 35 However, 

there is one extra nuance in the whole picture: one that lies between the pro-Turkish and pro- 

Bulgarian affiliations – the sense of being Pomak. As Konstantinov at al. say, “[c]aught in [the] 

traditional nationalistic conflict between Bulgarians and Turks, … the Pomaks find it difficult to say 

who they are in any consistent terms beyond the label ‘Pomak.’” 36 Lately, a growing number of 

Rhodopean Muslims find it increasingly acceptable—indeed, desirable—to identify as Pomaks, i.e. 

Bulgarian-speaking Muslims, occupying the border-zone between the ethnic Bulgarian and the ethnic 

Turkish identity. Being and feeling fully neither, the community has been gradually carving an 

identity of its own out of the crisis generated by the pokrastvane and the revival process. 

A Gellnerian Model of National Sentiment 

34 Konstantinov, Alhaug and Igla, 46. Also in Eminov, 108-9. 

35 Lewis, 27. 

36 Konstantinov, Alhaug and Igla, 26. Also in Eminov, 109. 

93

To understand how an identity niche may be carved out in any national(ist) bedrock— 

especially one deemed problematic—one has to analyze the prevalent national sentiment towards 

that identity or the people who claim it. It is the intensity of the national majority’s attitude toward a 

minority group or its heritage that ultimately defines that group’s claim to a cultural identity within 

the public domain. In Bulgaria, it has become customary, as Ali Eminov suggests, not to leave 

definitions of cultural identity to personal choice, but to create them as a matter of state policy, 

contingent upon the changing notions of what constitutes the state. 37 Aggressive nationalism has 

historically played an important role in determining cultural identities in Bulgaria. The particular 

definition of nationalism espoused in the country has tended to equate the concepts of nation, state, 

territory, and language. Consequently, it has enabled the belief that “[b]ecause the territory is 

Bulgarian, … the people who inhabit it are [italics added] Bulgarian. Because they are Bulgarians, they 

must speak Bulgarian language and should be in a single nation-state.” 38 This narrow definition of 

nationalism, aided by a predominantly negative national sentiment, was fully applied in “reviving” 

the Pomak Muslims during the communism period. As Bulgarian-speaking people, the Pomaks – 

above all cultural minorities – were expected to act and feel Bulgarian, i.e. in conformity with the 

cultural (ethno-religious) majority. In Bulgaria, as well as in the Balkans at large, the “national 

sentiment has always engendered egoistic or chauvinistic nationalism,” 39 precisely because of the 

failure to distinguish between what constitutes people and nation. Indeed, in the South-Slavic 

languages of Bulgarian, Macedonians, Serbo-Croat and Slovene, the word narod means both people 

and nation. 40 

These stipulations are very much in line with Ernest Gellner’s definition of nationalism. In 

his acclaimed work Nations and Nationalism, the author observes that ours is the age of nationalism, 

where “[m]odern man is not loyal to a monarch or a land or faith, whatever he may say, but to a 

37 Bette Denich, “Unmaking Multi-Ethnicity in Yugoslavia: Metamorphosis Observed,” The Antropology of East 

Europe Review 11 (1993): 45-47. 

38 Horace Lunt, “On Macedonian Nationality,” Slavic Review 45 (1986): 729. 

39 Eminov, 2. 

40 Denich, ibid. 

94

culture.” 41 That is why culture matters immensely. In fact, it matters so much that culture has 

become “the necessary shared medium, the life-blood … the minimal shared atmosphere, within 

which alone the members of the society can breathe and survive and produce. For a given society, it 

must be one in which they can all breathe and speak and produce; so it must be the same culture.” 42 

Culture then defines nationalism in such vital ways that it brings about the very nation-state as “its 

own political roof” 43 to thrive and endure. Consequently, as people increasingly develop a high 

culture, i.e. a culture they identify with as a defined group, the nation-state solidifies its position as 

the normative form of government worldwide. And because it is the norm, many carry it to extremes 

by treating it as the only norm: the God-ordained law. Thus, nationalism has transpired as an 

ideology, across nation-states – including in (communist) Bulgaria, defined exclusively in terms of 

the prevalent national sentiment. 

Gellner offers a masterful definition of nationalism and the national sentiment that resonate 

fittingly with the nature of the revival process. He argues that nationalism is “a theory of political 

legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and, in 

particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state … should not separate the power-holders from 

the rest.” 44 Put differently, nationalism is (1) a political principle calling for congruence or 

overlapping of the political and national unit for any given nation-state. Furthermore, it is (2) a 

sentiment or “the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle [of congruence], or the 

feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfillment.” 45 Nationalism as ideology thereby holds that the 

political-territorial boundary of a nation-state should coincide with the ethnic-territorial boundary of 

the ruling national majority. In an ideal situation, the nation-state should be comprised of (1) a single 

ethno-cultural people; (2) all people belonging to the same ethno-cultural group should be included 

in the same nation-state; (3) no alien cultural groups should be allowed in the same nation-state; (4) 

41 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 36. 

42 Ibid., 37-38. 

43 Ibid., 43-44. 

44 Ibid., 1. 

45 Ibid. 

95

ut if such minority groups already exist within the physical borders of the given nation-state, they 

must be willing to assimilate in the dominant culture. The minimum requirement, in accordance with 

the boundary-congruence principle, would be that any given nation-state is to be ruled by the 

culturally dominant majority and, under no circumstances, is it to be controlled – or even 

significantly influenced – by a culturally diverging minority. Any outcome contrary to the above 

condition(s) is, thus, likely to violate – what I shall refer to as – Gellner’s congruence principle of 

nationalism, henceforth, causing the anger level of the national sentiment to escalate. As Gellner 

effectively sums it: 

if the rulers of the political unit belong to a nation other than that of the majority of the 

ruled; this, for nationalists, constitutes a quite outstandingly intolerable breech of political 

propriety. 46 

An “outstandingly intolerable breech” can occur two ways: once, “through the incorporation 

of the national territory in a larger empire” and, a second time, “by the local domination of an alien 

group.” 47 Thus, by implication, Gellner may effectively be limiting his definition of nationalism to only 

two scenarios where the national sentiment becomes anger and not satisfaction: Namely, to (1) the 

incorporated-into-an-empire (federation) nation-state and (2) to the minority-governed nation-state. 

In the first scenario, examples of such involuntary imperial incorporation could be former Yugoslavia 

or the Soviet Union. In former Yugoslavia, the more or less defined and culturally differing nations of 

Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia were involuntarily 

brought together in a highly centralized federation under the communist leadership of Josip Broz 

Tito and under the ethnic-cultural domination of Serbia. Once communism was no more in Eastern 

Europe by the early 1990s, however, the artificial entity of Yugoslavia disintegrated. Whereas the 

preference of autonomous government was self-evident for most of the former Yugoslav republics, it 

was not so for Serbia. Naturally, these republics resented the complete political and cultural 

hegemony of Serbia and wished to break away from it. Serbia, on the other hand, was accustomed to 

having control over territories and peoples that went beyond the traditional boundaries of its 

46 Ibid. 

47 Ibid. 

96

political and national unit. During the communist period, Serbia had perceived itself as Yugoslavia 

and viewed the extended territory and resources of the former federation as its own. The 

disintegration of the federal state and the assumption of control by Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro over their own respective territories was a blow to Serbia’s 

sense of entitlement. Serbia’s nationalistic sentiment, therefore, aroused out of the “feeling of anger” 

with the loss of congruence of what they perceived as their political and national unit – namely, that 

of former Yugoslavia. Consequently, Serbia vented its anger into the devastating 1990s Yugoslav 

wars – fought mainly between Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina – for what its leadership 

and people perceived as “rightfully theirs.” Ultimately, Serbia not only failed to regain its former 

dominant position, but also faced NATO bombardment and lasting loss of international prestige. The 

disintegration of the Soviet Union followed a somewhat similar pattern. But the sheer territorial 

enormity of the Soviet empire enabled most of the geographically remote former republics to quietly 

and effectively secede with virtually no punitive consequence. At the same time, those in close 

proximity to Russia, or with strategic significance to it – such as Ukraine, Georgia, and the Caucasus 

region – have not been able to achieve full sovereignty from Moscow to this day. 

In the second scenario, where Gellner speaks of anger as the dominant national sentiment, a 

culturally, ethnically and/or religiously differing minority group effectively controls the nation-state. 

This is a particularly intolerable form of government for any national majority, as Gellner notes, and 

so it rarely survives beyond a limited period of time. Among the few cases of modern nation-states in 

which minority groups have effectively ruled a country were South Africa under the Apartheid and 

Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Both regimes are now defunct, but they are both examples of extreme 

circumstances, where small racial and religious minorities respectively managed to successfully 

subjugate and control the prevalent majority groups, including by denying them equal rights (the 

blacks in South Africa and the Shia Muslims in Iraq) and even by targeting them for extermination 

(the Shia Muslims in Iraq). 

Neither of the above conditions, however, is a particularly frequent form of political and 

cultural existence of a country nowadays. Yet, (a form of) the anger--rather than the satisfaction-- 

emotion in the national sentiment prevails in the nation-state as I shall argue. If the nation-state has 

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een the most replicated and successful form of government, as many authorities on nationalism 

suggest, then it must be true that the nation-state is the dominant form of statehood worldwide. 48 

Considering Gellner’s argument that the existence of nationalism is contingent upon the existence of 

the state – as an organized entity with “specialized order-enforcing agencies” 49 – it is quite obvious 

that the nation-state is even more deeply linked to nationalism. Moreover, the nation-state is the 

chief determinant of how the national sentiment moves on the anger-satisfaction continuum (below). 

According to Gellner’s definition of nationalism as a sentiment, if the principle of congruence within a 

given nation-state is violated, it arouses the anger aspect of the national sentiment. If, on the other 

hand, the principle of congruence is preserved – at least in its minimum stipulation of a majority rule 

– the satisfaction aspect is likely to dominate the national sentiment; at least in theory. However, as 

satisfaction in the national sentiment is infinitely more difficult to attain as a lasting condition than 

anger, especially in times of socio-economic and political upheaval, the concept of nationalism is 

more readily associated with negative emotions such as displeasure, anger, hatred, and violence. 

Thus, individuals or groups of them thereof acting upon the sentiment of anger when the basic 

national principle of majority rule over the nation-state is violated can be defined as nationalists and 

the ideology driving their actions as nationalism. 

By building upon Gellner’s premise of nationalism as a sentiment defined by anger and/or 

satisfaction depending on the failure and/or fulfillment of the congruence principle, I devise the 

anger-satisfaction continuum concept (Figure 3-1 and 3-2) to help promote the idea of a third, more 

stable condition of the national sentiment, comfortably positioned between Gellner’s positive and 

negative emotional extremes. This is the condition of mildly (covertly) negative or politically correct 

national sentiment in a democratic, relatively prosperous and stable nation-state of a Western type, 

as we know it. I argue that the politically correct or mildly (covertly) negative attitude of the national 

majority toward one or more significant national minorities is possibly the most common and, hence, 

enduring, condition in our modern nation-state society. In other words, a state of permanent, 

48 See the introductory part of Chapter II for sources and theory of nationalism. 

49 Gellner, 4. 

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concealed, negative attitude of the dominant majority toward minorities (racial, religious, or ethnic) 

is always present in the democratic nation-state even under ideal socio-economic and political 

conditions. Generally, this form of--what I argue to be the--conventional national sentiment sits 

closer to anger on the anger-satisfaction continuum, but may periodically turn into satisfaction, or 

escalate to violence under certain circumstances. In this model, the nation-state is neither a part of an 

empire, nor a minority-ruled entity. Rather, it reflects the likely most classical definition of the 

national state as a body of people, within a defined territory, who share a “system of ideas and signs 

and associations and ways of behaving and communicating” and “recognize each other as belonging 

to the same nation.” 50 

Figure 3-1: National Sentiment Continuum 

Prominent (ruling) majority 

(1) Prominent (influential) minority 

(2) Obscure (compliant) minority 

Anger Negative Covertly Negative 0 Positive Satisfaction 

A. Prosperous economy: Conventional mode Positive mode toward 1? No 

Positive mode toward 2? Very likely. 

B. Economic crisis: Negative to aggressive mode Positive-1? No; Aggressive-1? Likely. 

Positive-2? Likely; Indifferent-2? Yes. 

Figure 3-2: National Sentiment Continuum in regard to the Pomaks in Bulgaria 

Prominent (dominant) majority 

Obscure (compliant) minority 

Anger Negative Covertly Negative 0 Positive Satisfaction 

Negative mode when: 

Turks + Pomaks = Muslims 

Pomaks = Muslims 

Pomaks = Turks 

Positive mode when: 

Pomaks = ethnic Bulgarians 

Pomaks = non-Muslim 

Pomaks = non-Turks 

50 Ibid., 7. 

99

The model above presupposes that the ethno-cultural majority is the ruling group within the 

nation-state, but there is one or more cultural minorities alongside that are very prominent (or 

conspicuous) to the point where their position – at least sporadically – displeases, angers or provokes 

aggression amidst the prevalent majority. Prominent in this case means at least three things: (1) 

Prominent as influential due to the large membership of the minority group(s), (2) Prominent as 

culturally (ethnically and/or religiously) opposite to the dominant majority; (3) Prominent as 

politically empowered due to both numerical size and cultural distinctiveness. Figure 3-1 presents a 

generalization of the national-sentiment condition where the ruling majority in any democratic 

nation-state conceals its negative attitude toward a prominent minority out of political propriety in 

times of prosperity and may potentially express anger and/or violence in times of crisis. Through 

both prosperity and crisis, I argue, the majority’s negative, but concealed (politically correct) attitude 

toward a prominent group remains a constant. In the case of obscure or compliant minorities, on the 

other hand, the majority’s sentiment may be indifferent and even rise to satisfaction during crisis and 

prosperity respectively, especially when measured against the demands for cultural accommodation 

by prominent minorities. Figure 3-2 refers to the specific case of the Pomak Muslims of Bulgaria as a 

minority group within a nation-state of the conventional, Western type. 

The Pomaks, as a cultural minority, have generally been of the compliant type. In any event, 

they are not prominent in the above sense of the word. Rather, they are prominent by association. 

Whereas the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria are prominent both as an influential and culturally opposite (in 

terms of religion and language) minority group in respect to the national majority, the Pomaks 

become prominent within the context of religious association with the former. As far as shared 

religion – Islam – furnishes grounds for affiliation between the Pomak and Turkish Muslims of 

Bulgaria, the Pomaks are both culturally opposite and influential in respect to the national majority. In 

other words, the Pomaks are only prominent or conspicuous on the anger-satisfaction continuum in 

conjunction with the Turks. 51 However, on their own, the Pomaks 52 are neither large enough as a 

51 The Turks comprise more than 15 percent of the total Bulgaria’s population, (Ibid., footnote 3). 

52 The Pomaks constitute only 3 to 5 percent of the total country’s population, (Ibid.). 

100

group, nor sufficiently different as a cultural community from the national majority to qualify as a 

prominent minority. 

Thus, the anger-satisfaction continuum may register the following fluctuations of the 

national sentiment in respect to the Pomaks: As pointed out above, the national sentiment is, by no 

means, a fixed phenomenon. It can fluctuate widely when measured as an attitude toward a national 

minority. This attitude varies according to two types of identifiable circumstance: On one side, the 

social-economic and political conditions of the nation-state and, on the other, the cultural “otherness” 

of the minority group in respect to the national majority. The influence of these circumstances on the 

national sentiment can be analyzed on their own or in combination with the other group. Within 

their own group, these factors may account for a strongly negative national sentiment, whereas in 

conjunction with the other group, they may intensify the former’s negativity. In this model, however, 

the assumption is that the most stable attitude measured on the anger-satisfaction continuum in 

respect to a prominent and culturally opposite minority – under the most optimal of circumstances – 

is always mildly negative, i.e. partial attitude curtailed by the rules of political propriety. This is so, 

because even under the best of socio-economic and political circumstances in a stable democratic 

society, dominant cultural groups express irritation at the demands of culturally (racially, ethnically, 

and/or religiously) opposite minorities for various accommodations. That is, those who dictate the 

social rules maintain a hegemony that resists changing them on behalf of a diverging minority 

culture. 

Thus, depending on social circumstances in the nation-state and on potential cultural 

demands – or lack of such – by a cultural minority, the national sentiment may swing from 

satisfaction, through toleration and irritation, to overt aggression. The more receptive a minority to 

the majority values, the greater the national sentiment’s leaning toward the satisfaction end of the 

continuum. The less compliant and more demanding a minority is, the closer the national sentiment 

gets to anger. Cultural discrepancy and economic and/or political upheaval would only intensify the 

anger sentiment, often to the point of violence. In this sense, the more the Pomaks associate 

themselves with the ethnic Turks, the more expressly negative the national sentiment toward them 

101

is. Likewise, the more they insist on their distinct Pomak identity, the greater the anger of the 

national majority toward them. The more receptive of the majority’s claim they are of being ethnic 

Bulgarians, the more positive the national sentiment is toward the Pomaks. The less they emphasize 

their Muslimness, the less conspicuous the Pomaks are as a minority group and the closer the national 

sentiment is to the satisfaction axis. In other words, the more the Pomaks consent to the majority’s 

prescriptions of them, the deeper the satisfaction of the national sentiment becomes. However, as no 

minority group--always and under all circumstances--accepts someone else’s will over one’s own, 

given the choice, the assumption is that no national sentiment is ever fully tipped toward the 

satisfaction axis or points to that end continuously. Moreover, it seems that even under the most 

optimal of conditions, there are always areas of disagreement between the majority and minority 

groups, which generally causes displeasure, if not outright anger, among the dominant ethno-cultural 

community. 

In any stable and relatively well-to-do democratic nation-state (inclusive of Bulgaria), there 

is a dominant majority and a host of cultural minorities. The dominant group, more or less, has a 

sense of hegemony and entitlement over the national heritage. So they are often disinterested in 

accommodating vernacular (minority) demands. When subcultures insist on the accommodation 

they feel is rightfully owed to them, the national sentiment grows negative toward them (inclusive of 

the Pomaks). Accordingly, as a completely neutral attitude is virtually unattainable, my argument is 

that the most conventional mode of the national sentiment on the anger-satisfaction continuum is 

mildly negative even under the best minority’s behavior. As the Pomaks are a traditionally compliant 

group, they are less targeted by anger and/or aggression as compared to the ethnic Turks. When 

driven into crisis by such policies as the revival process, however, the Rhodopean Muslims become 

less accepting of the majority’s prescriptions of them and more determined to stand on what 

distinguishes them from the majority, essentially, in defiance to what unites them with the majority. 

Henceforth, the prominence of the anger axis of the anger-satisfaction continuum intensifies. 

Ultimately, aggressive nationalistic policies such as the revival process engender attitudes ranging 

from alienation to active resistance by the targeted group(s). Such resistance, albeit often justified, 

102

only pushes the national sentiment closer to the anger axis of the continuum, because the majority’s 

dislike for the non-complying minority grows stronger. 

As culturally dominant majorities perceive entitlement to order the affairs of the nationstate 

– to the extent the national government acts on their behalf – they would likely endorse any 

measure presumed to strengthen the majority’s position of dominance. In this sense, the revival 

process against the Bulgarian Muslims was no less the doing of the ethno-religious majority than it 

was of the communist regime. In fact, it was the civilian organization Rodina – forcing majority 

values on the Pomaks – that carried out both the 1938-1944 pokrastvane and the communist 

“cultural revolution” (the early phase of the revival process). Both communist and pre-communist 

regimes counted on manipulating the national sentiment in favor of their policies to justify the 

Pomak assimilation. Evidently, they succeeded since the cultural majority was overwhelmingly 

supportive of both the pokrastvane and revival process; at least to the extent to which people 

accepted that the forced assimilation of Muslims served the national interest. 53 

Ultimately, the problem of coercion lies not in nationalism per se, but in the way a nationstate 

is ruled with the approval of the dominant ethno-cultural majority; in other words, the violence 

stems from the fickle and exploitable nature of the national sentiment. Under no circumstances 

should the national majority be absolved of responsibility when minority groups are being politically 

and culturally repressed. Why? Because even the worst of regimes would not endure without the 

tacit endorsement of the dominant cultural group. In fact, the revival process took place without 

consequences for the ruling elites, because it was explained in terms of national security and 

patriotic responsibility, to which the majority acquiesced. After all, a successful national 

government— from, for, and by the people—would have to cater, first and foremost, to the prevalent 

majority, and far less to the cultural minorities if it is to survive. To do otherwise would be to work 

towards its own undoing. 

No regime can prosper, much less a democratic one--as the model above presupposes-- 

which depends on the mandate of the people, without appealing to the sensibilities of the culturally 

53 Read Chapter II about the pokrastvane; read the current chapter about the revival process. 

103

dominant group. And the nation-state is a nation-state precisely because it is composed of likeminded 

people (at least in their majority) within the context of shared ethnic, linguistic and/or 

religious identity. Indeed, as a paraphrased (by Gellner) Emanuel Kant observes, partiality or “the 

tendency to make exceptions on one’s own behalf or one’s own case, is the central human weakness 

from which all others flows; and … it infects [the] national sentiment as it does all else.” 54 Each 

government’s first order of business is to cater to the interests of the nation-state, and in a 

democratic society of western type, these interests usually coincide with the majority’s ones. 

Otherwise, there is likely to be a brand new government after the next elections. 

This self-centered tendency of the nation-state is naturally amplified by the state’s acting as 

the “agency within society which possesses the monopoly of legitimate violence.” 

this [definition],” Gellner elaborates, “is simple and seductive:” 

in well-ordered societies, such as most of us live in or aspire to live in, private or sectional 

violence is illegitimate. Conflict as such is not illegitimate, but it cannot rightfully be resolved 

by private or sectional violence. Violence may be applied only by the central political 

authority, and those to whom it delegates this right. Among the various sanctions of the 

maintenance of order, the ultimate one – force – may be applied only by one special, clearly 

identified, and well organized, disciplined agency within society. That agency or group of 

agencies is the state. 56 

55 

“The idea behind 

In Gellner’s view, any democratic and relatively prosperous state, as we know it, legitimizes 

the violence exerted by “the central political authority, and those to whom it delegates this right,” 

justifying it with the necessity to maintain public order. At the same time, the state deems any 

“private or sectional violence” as illegitimate and, hence, punishable by law. According to Gellner, 

when “private or sectional violence” in society occurs, it is quelled through force and punishment. 

The use of force and punishment is, thus, legitimate against illegal private or sectional violence. 

“Private and sectional” violence, on the other hand, is illegitimate because its occurrence disrupts the 

established social order. The state, hereby, emerges as the supreme authority within the nation-state 

to punish and preserve the social order. While in a democratic society, the agencies of state are 


55 Gellner referencing Max Weber, 3. 


104

equired by law to look after the interests of every member of society, the general tendency even 

then is that the prevalent majority has a greater say in making the rules applicable to all. 

Consequently, the dominant cultural group benefits the most from them. Alternatively, the state 

legitimization of violence, although principally directed at all perpetrators, often – but not always – 

tends to be applied with least severity toward the members of the majority groups. In the very least, 

the assumption is that the rules of conduct are more advantageous to the national majority than to 

any national minority within the context of the existing social norms, ultimately replicating the 

values of the dominant culture. 

Because culture is the shared medium of existence within society, according to Gellner, the 

national sentiment is predicated on high culture – i.e. the culture of the powerful majority within a 

nation-state. 57 It was the emergence of high culture in the industrial age – built upon the accessibility 

of education to the broader population – that ultimately strengthened the national sentiment amidst 

a body of people who shared that culture and occupied a defined (claimed) territory. High culture, in 

a way, is the modus operandi of nationalism in Gellner’s view. It is precisely on high-culture grounds – 

already highly defined and deeply cultivated in Western Europe by the nineteenth century – that the 

original liberal nationalism of the late eighteen century developed. However, as nationalist ideas 

spread eastward into the Balkans in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, a new, more 

oppressive variety of nationalism emerged out of the original liberal ideology (with Western 

nationalism itself becoming more egocentric by the twentieth century as well). 58 For the purpose of 

this analysis, one of the most useful typologies of nationalism that Gellner offers (he could name as 

many types of nationalism as there are high cultures) is the division of nationalism into Western and 

Eastern type, contingent upon the part of Europe it occurred. To explain this typology, the author 

heavily relies on John Plamenatz who had originally made the distinction. From Gellner’ 

interpretation of Plamenatz, it appears that the Western nationalism, which shared “deep links to 

liberal ideas” was “relatively benign and nice,” while its Eastern counterpart was “nasty, and doomed 

57 Ibid., 88-107. 

58 Read Chapter II about the emergence and spread of nationalism. 

105

to nastiness by the conditions which gave rise to it.” While Plamenatz based his perceptions of the 

Western nationalism on the “enlightened” cultures of Western Europe, he saw the Eastern one 

exemplified by “the kind of nationalism he knew to exist in his [Plamenatz’s] native Balkans.” 59 

Gellner describes Plamentanz’s dual concept of nationalism in the following terms: 

[Whereas] [t]he relatively benign Western nationalisms were acting on behalf of welldeveloped 

high cultures, normatively centralized and endowed with a fairly well-defined 

folk clientele, … Eastern nationalism did not operate on behalf of an existing, well-defined 

and codified high culture, which had … [developed] since the early Renaissance or since the 

Reformation… This [Eastern] nationalism was active on behalf of a high culture, as yet not 

properly crystallized, a merely aspirant or in-the-making high culture. It presided, or strove 

to preside, in ferocious rivalry of similar competitors, over a chaotic ethnographic map of 

many dialects, with ambiguous historical or ethno-linguistic allegiances, and containing 

populations which had only just begun to identify with these emergent national high 

cultures. Objective conditions of the modern world were bound, in due course, to oblige 

them to identify with one of them. But till this occurred, they lacked the clearly defined 

cultural basis enjoyed by their German and [or] Italian counterparts. 60 

Gellner’s interpretation of Plamenatz clearly predicates the diverging forms of nationalism 

which occurred in Western and Eastern Europe on the pre-existence of an autonomous, recognizable, 

and advanced culture in countries like Italy and Germany. These developments shaped during and 

after the Italian Renaissance and the German Reformation respectively which had taken place in the 

sixteenth century. By the late nineteenth century, these cultures had been promoting liberal ideas in 

print literature, arts and science for more than two centuries. Moreover, this liberal ideology was 

already shared by highly defined groups of people that knew to be Italians and/or Germans and 

actively partook in promulgating, benefiting from or otherwise affecting this ideology. In short, by the 

time ideas of nationalism reached Eastern Europe, the Balkans in particular, most Western cultures 

had history. Italian, German, British, and French cultures were already high cultures by the 1800s, i.e. 

cultures identified with the nation-state. By contrast, the Eastern-European nationalism not only 

took shape much later, but it also happened at an accelerated rate and under more extreme 

circumstances. By the late nineteenth- and the early twentieth century, the Balkan nations were still 

struggling for independence from Hapsburg and Ottoman rule. In Bulgaria, most of the Bulgarianspeaking 

Christian population, whose culture became the fundament of the Bulgarian nation-state, 


60 Gellner interpreting Plamenatz, 100. 

106

was overwhelmingly peasant. There was not a great deal of cultural development prior to the 

national independence of 1878. The Bulgarian nation – as well as most others in the region – had to 

be forged overnight out of the existing vernacular culture of the most populous group that spoke 

Bulgarian language and professed Eastern Orthodox Christianity. Bulgarian culture at the turn of the 

last century truly was a culture “in-the-making” which, “in ferocious rivalry of similar competitors, 

over a chaotic ethnographic map of many dialects, with ambiguous historical or ethno-linguistic 

allegiances,” 61 managed to take the upper hand as the shared medium of the prevalent ethnoreligious 

group. Henceforth, it gradually established itself as the dominant high culture of the new 

nation-state of Bulgaria. 

Through Gellner, Plamenatz explains it: 

These populations of [South]eastern Europe, were still locked into the complex multiple 

loyalties of kinship, territory and religion. To make them conform to the nationalist 

imperative was bound to take more than a few battles and some diplomacy. It was bound to 

take a great deal of very forceful cultural engineering. In many cases, it was also bound to 

involve population exchange or expulsion, more or less forcible assimilation, and sometimes 

liquidation, in order to attain that close relation between state and culture which is the 

essence of nationalism. And all these consequences flowed, not from some unusual brutality 

of the nationalists who in the end employed these measures (they were probably no worse 

and no better than anyone else), but from the inescapable logic of the situation [emphasis 

added]. 62 

Indeed, if the nationalist imperative of congruence between state and culture was to be 

implemented in what Plamenatz designated as the Eastern condition—notably the Balkans, coercive 

means, including forced assimilation, became a matter of necessity. As Gellner fairly points out, the 

“nasty” nature of the Eastern nationalism was not due to “some unusual brutality of the nationalists” 

who implemented it the way they did: by forcing diverging populations like to Pomaks into religious 

and cultural conversion. A number of factors defined the aggressive character of the Eastern – 

including Bulgarian – nationalism. Among these were the lack of stable and developed high culture; 

history of previous oppression of the new ethno-cultural majorities; and the need for rapid transition 

of those communities from formerly subjugated minorities within an empire (Ottoman and 

Habsburg) to ruling majorities within a nation-state of their own. Thus, the pokrastvane and the 


62 Gellner interpreting Plamenatz, 100-1. 

107

evival process against the Pomaks (and Turks) in Bulgaria did not stem from some inherent evil 

inclinations of the national majority, but rather from an unfortunate combination of circumstances. 

Consequently, the young and previously subjugated nation-state of Bulgaria, lacking the self-respect 

of an established high culture, sought to ensure its own existence by fortifying its own “political roof” 

that had just come into being. Perceiving the Muslims as threatening the vital prospect of security – 

because of their cultural affiliation with the former “Ottoman master” and the proximity of Turkey as 

its natural successor – successive Bulgarian regimes sought to forge a uniform nation via involuntary 

assimilation. To achieve a feat so momentous, however, the regimes needed the support of the 

cultural majority. To that end, they manipulated the majority’s sentiment into approval for the 

coercive practices against the cultural “others,” thereby legitimizing the use of force with political 

necessity. In this sense, appropriate nationalist ideology and adept exploitation of the national 

sentiment helped the communist regime to “Bulgarianize” the Pomaks and Turks in the country – i.e. 

forced them to conform to the dominant values. But “the Party” went a step further in manipulating 

the national sentiment. It used civilian agents—largely members of the dominant majority—to carry 

out the revival process. Civilian crusaders, Pomaks prominently featuring among them, comprised the 

membership of the ultra-nationalist Organization Rodina, which had been effectively initiated during 

the 1938-1944 Pomak pokrastvane. 

From Pokrastvane to Revival Process 

1. The Rebirth of Organization Rodina 

That the pokrastvane and the revival process were one and the same policy pursued by 

different national regimes is evident from the fact that it was executed by the same agent, the 

Organization Rodina – a most hated entity among the Pomaks. Rodina emerged on March 3, 1937, in 

Smolyan (Eastern Rhodopes) as a mixed organization of Bulgarian-Christian patriots and some 

Pomak zealots who preached the idea of conversion among the Rhodopean Muslims. Actively 

supported by the Axis-allied monarchic regime of Bulgaria during the Second World War, they 

literally carried out the pre-communist pokrastvane of the Pomaks in 1938-1944. The communist 

108

party’s stance about Organization Rodina, 63 as (one of) the chief pokrastvane perpetrator, upon 

taking power in 1944 was one of condemnation. That attitude remained unchanged for the next 

decade or so largely because it served the regime’s interest in holding on to Pomak (and Muslim) 

loyalty. At a propaganda conference in Gotse Delchev – one of the many which the regime had begun 

to routinely initiate to address Pomak issues – on January 5, 1961, the scholar Kiril Vassilev 

unequivocally described Rodina as “fascist”: 

The intimidation of the Bulgarian Mohammedans during the Second World War was 

extremely violent. The fascist regime created the Bulgarian-Mohammedan organization 

Rodina in the Rhodopes which they used to oppress that population. They willfully tore the 

ferejes of the women and mistreated the population. The most appalling abuse over this 

people’s conscience took place under the banner “For culture.” The bourgeoisie was not in 

the least concerned about the well-being of the Bulgarian Mohammedans. They were only 

interested in completing a new pokrastvane [emphasis added]. [A newspaper clipping from 

Pirinsko Delo, Issue 3, 11 January 1961]. 64 

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, the communist authorities began a slow, 

cautious, and painstaking process of restoring Rodina’s reputation. During the April Plenum of 1956, 

the communist party had secretly decided to launch its own ‘pokrastvane’ of the Pomaks – as well as 

of all Bulgarian Muslims in due course – and it needed a Rodina-type agency with Pomak 

membership to provide legitimacy for the move. The party leadership decided that the best way to 

pursue this goal was to resurrect Rodina by gradually revamping its tainted image and by recasting 

its former activities as patriotic rather than fascist. Thereafter, former leaders of the organization like 

Hristo Karamandjukov, Petar Marinov, and Svetoslav Duhovnikov (the renamed Pomak Mehmed 

Dervishev), previously denounced as “fascists,” were urged to praise Rodina’s former mandate as a 

“fight” against the religious fanaticism and for “the cultural growth of the Bulgarians of 

Mohammedan faith.” 65 

63 See Report on Verifying the Activities of the Former Bulgarian-Mohammedan Organization Rodina of August 

1, 1960. Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 1, Inventory 40, Archival Unit 475, page 9. 

64 Included in the Expose of Alexander Karamandjukov, former member of Organization Rodina, against the 

claims of Kiril Vassilev Rodina of January 25, 1961. Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 1, Inventory 40, 

Archival Unit 476, page 2. (Translated by the author.) 

65 Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 1, Inventory 40, Archival Unit 476, page 5. 

109

During the Gotse Delchev conference, Svetoslav Duhovnikov – one of the chief Pomak 

activists of Rodina and former mufti (Muslim religious leader) of the Smolyan Region – issued the 

following proclamation: 

We, the Bulgarian Mohammedans – who have been burning with the fire of our /the 

Bulgarian Mohamedans’/ revival – approve and completely support this campaign. We are 

happy, because we see in it the ideal we had fought so hard to achieve [in the past] through 

the work of the Bulgarian Mohammedan cultural-educational and charitable organization 

Rodina[.] [A]nd we are convinced that it [the revival process] will contribute to the resolution 

of the Bulgarian-Mohammedan question in the Rhodopes once and for all [italics added]. 66 

Rhetoric of this kind, uttered by Pomaks, was all the justification the Bulgarian communists 

needed to carry out the planned assimilation through the same means – coercion – and via the same 

agent – Rodina, previously condemned as fascist. The ideology and rogue methods used by the 

Christian members of Rodina and their Pomak recruits in pursuing conversion had become such a 

constant in the lives of the Rhodopean Muslims during the 1940s that they learnt to cope with the 

precarious circumstance and even laugh at it. In an archival document of 1960, when Rodina was 

slowly coming back, Petar Marinov – one of the chief ideologists of the organization – describes a 

routine pokrastvane assault in the following way: 

... [W]hen Rodina activists would start jumping out from various directions [onto the 

unsuspecting population to tear ferejes and fezzes], people would begin shouting: ‘Run, run! 

The Culture is coming! Hide! Quickly! The damn Culture will get you ...’[italics added] 67 

By “culture,” the Rhodopean Muslims sarcastically referred to the Rodina’s proclaimed 

objective to work for the “cultural growth” of the “Bulgarian Mohammedans” – quite frankly – by 

Christianizing them. However, the Rodina tactics of instilling “culture” resembled a medieval ambush 

more than any sensible effort at the cultural advancement of the population. Nor did the Pomaks 

believe any part of the “cultural growth” propaganda. Rodina’s actions defied any such believing. An 

entry of Marinov’s diary from June 1, 1940, provides the following account of the Rodina’s brigand 

style of pokrastvane, which, moreover, acted on government instructions: 

66 Expose of Svetoslav Duhovnikov of February 13, 196. Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 1, Inventory 40, 

Archival Unit 476, page 8. (Translated by the author.) 

67 Report on Verifying the Activities of the Former Bulgarian-Mohammedan Organization Rodina of August 1, 

1960. Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 1, Inventory 40, Archival Unit 475, page 14. (Translated from 

Bulgarian by the author.) 

110

Last night we organized groups with the mission to rip ferejes[.] [T]hat action will start 

tomorrow. Husko [most likely a Rodina member] hosted our meeting. The members present 

were divided into three groups: the first was assigned to go around the Chokovska mahala 

[neighborhood], the second – to the Chilingirska mahala and Sredok, the third – to the Gorna 

mahala. Yurdan, the plain-clothed secret agent from Smolyan, was there to provide 

[government] instructions. 

We are planning an action for tomorrow. Around ten people would block the crossroads 

to tear ferejes and veils [italics added]. 68 

In another entry, Marinov continues: 

Yesterday, the members of Rodina ripped 3-4 fezzes and they’ve decided to continue doing 

that tomorrow. They’ve each got their assigned neighborhoods and hamlets to go to and 

remove fezzes [italics added]. 69 

As Marinov’s diary continues, an entry of May 4, 1940, clearly shows the government’s direct 

involvement in the pokrastvane. “Interesting news is coming from Zlatograd [Eastern Rhodopes, 

formerly Darıdere],” Marinov wrote, “The military authorities and the police there had undertaken an 

action to remove the ferejes which work is nearing completion. … Every gendarme and soldier, armed 

with scissors, has been going around town cutting ferejes. … and pulling down yashmaks [female 

cover garment].” Because of the flagrantly “Muslim” female garment, the Rodina crusaders were 

especially concerned with Pomak women. “They have finally started to put on dresses,” Marinov 

continued, “but underneath those they still wear shalvars [broad trousers]. So the soldiers … began to 

stop [the] women and cut out their [shalvars’] leggings, or anything else hanging down from under 

their dresses. The same is being done in the villages around Zlatograd.” As “some of the local Muslim 

dignitaries tried to complain above [to the government],” Marinov explained, “they were told that 

whatever the local authorities decided – went. So they had to obey and nothing else … [italics 

added]” 70 Alexander Karamandjukov was one of the staunchest crusaders of the pokrastvane in the 

1940s and a prominent agent of the Axis-allied monarchic regime of Bulgaria. He was among those 

68 Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 1, Inventory 39, Archival Unit 40, page 18. (Translated from Bulgarian 

by the author.) 




70 Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 1, Inventory 39, Archival Unit 40, pages 17-18. (Translated from 

Bulgarian by the author.) Also, Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 1, Inventory 40, Archival Unit 488, page 17. 

111

whom the communist authorities immediately branded “fascist” and treated as “the people’s enemy” 

of the most “reactionary” kind upon takeover in 1944. In the early 1960s, however, Karamandjukov, 

along with other former Rodina activists, reemerged in the limelight as “patriot.” Ironically, it was 

this former communist “enemy” – turned “comrade” – who most appropriately verbalized the 

common nature of the pokrastvane and – what was to be – the revival process: 

Were we to juxtapose the objectives and activities of the Organization Rodina with the 

fundamental line of the [Communist] Party and state politics in the Rhodopes, we will see 

that they coincide. 71 

Prior to the 1960s, to compare the communist politics regarding the Pomaks to the former 

activities of Rodina would have been extremely dangerous for anyone venturing to make such a 

statement. By the year 1960, however, former members of Rodina were not only coming back into 

favor of the new regime already, but they were also encouraged to praise Rodina publicly. In the 

initial decade of communist rule, a political approval of Rodina would have been unthinkable, largely 

because the Muslim support for the regime rested exclusively on its condemnation of the 

organization and reversal of the pokrastvane. But only a decade later, the communist party was 

contemplating the resurrection of Rodina. The organization and its members – seasoned 

assimilationists – were going to be instrumental in the latest ‘pokrastvane’ of the Pomaks, 

euphemistically termed the revival process. 

Although, it is generally assumed that the Pomak revival happened in the period 1972-1974, 

the actual assimilation had begun at least a decade earlier and it was formally concluded in 1974. A 

plethora of archival documentation attests to the early start of the affair (including those discussing 

plans to bring back Rodina). For example, as early as November 1962, the municipal party committee 

of the “largely Bulgarian-Mohammedan” municipality of Ladja sent their superiors in Smolyan the 

following statistics: (1) Of a population totaling over 4,000, “[m]ore than 99% of the men wear hats 

or go bear-head,” and just under one percent wearing to the fezz; (2) “Around 75-80% of the women 

…. put the new attire /dresses/. … Almost no fereje could be seen in our area. No more than 2% of the 




112

women /mostly old ones/ still stick to the fereje. The remaining 98% of the women in the 

municipality no longer wear the fereje.” In addition to censoring male and female garment, the 

authorities were also targeting the Pomak names. The same archival document reports that “170 

individuals from our area [the Ladja municipality] have already restored their Slavic [Bulgarian 

Christian] names [as of 1962].” 72 

In summary, as evident from the report, the primary targets of this early “cultural 

revolution” were: (a) the women’s clothing, particularly the over-garment, fereje; (b) the men’s 

Ottoman-style fezz; and (c) the conventional Arab-Turkish names of the Pomaks. Thus, an important 

region-wide statistics of Smolyan as of November 15, 1962, shows the number of Rhodopean 

Muslims with censored attire and changed names by villages and towns: 

Table 3-1 

Number of Pomaks with censored attire and changed names by villages and towns 

Village/Town 

Population 

Men 

women* 

Number of people 

without the old 

attire 

Number of 

people with new 

names 

Smolyan 3,978 3,832 3,760 122 

Madan - - 920 186 

Rudozem - 1.400 700 170 

Zlatograd - - 1,480 557 

Devin 2,875 3,085 1,366 829 

Varbina - - 40% [handwritten] 61 

Davidkovo - - 480 58 

Dospat - - ... [illegible] 24 [handwritten] 

Zagrajden - - 1,500 450 

Zmeitsa - - 25% [handwritten] 82 

Ladja - - 98% [handwritten] 170 

Laki - 1,700 1,660 639 

Mihalkovo - - 487 579 

Mogilitsa - - ... [illegible] 457 

Mugla - 400 200 75 

Nedelino - 2,535 890 806 

Smilyan - 610 540 174 

Slaveynovo - - 60% [handwritten] 233 

Trigrad - - 180 55 

Hvoyna - - 1,050 810 

Chepelare - - 1,800 50 

72 A report of the municipal committee of the communist party in Ladja to the regional party committee in 

Smolyan of 13 November 1962. Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 1Б, Inventory 38, Archival Unit 20, page 7. 

(Translated from Bulgarian by the author.) 

113

*Note: The statistics concerning women refer to those under 40-years of age. 73 

Albeit incomplete and likely inflated for propaganda purposes, this statistics nevertheless 

clearly establish that the revival process was taking place as early as 1962 and on a considerable 

scale. Whereas the early emphasis of the assimilation was apparently on garment, with a success rate 

consistently over 50 percent, the more difficult renaming was taking place as well. In Pomak villages 

like Devin, Nedelino, and Hvoyna, the share of people with “restored” names in 1962 ranged from a 

fourth to a third of the total population, according to rough estimates based on the above chart. This 

is a significant percentage considering the early stage of the revival process and the staunch Pomak 

opposition to the total renaming a decade later. From the very beginning, however, the communist 

party tried to portray the revivalism as en-mass, “spontaneous,” and “voluntary” movement of the 

Pomak population toward reclaiming their Bulgarianness. In spite of personal risks, though, people 

were protesting the assimilation before the highest communist authorities. There are examples of 

individual and group complaints filed with the communist party leadership by parents whose 

newborns were registered with Bulgarian-Christian names without their consent. Alish Husseinov 

Bantov of Rakitovo, Pazardjik Region, for example, petitioned the Presidium of the People’s 

Parliament of Bulgaria to have his newborn son registered with a Muslim name. “I am a Muslim,” he 

wrote, “and my wish was that my son [born on December 23, 1961] bore a Muslim name, too. But the 

midwife [in the hospital] refused to respect my wishes. The same midwife registered my child with 

the local [people’s] council on her own accord, including by signing the certificate of live birth in my 

stead, while completely neglecting to consider the name I had chosen for my son.” When a few days 

later, Alish inquired about the birth certificate in the people’s council in Rakitovo, he was informed 

that he would have to register his son with a Bulgarian-Christian name in order to receive the 

document. “When I refused to do so,” Alish goes on, “the comrades from the council threatened to 

pick a name [for my child] themselves. [They told me] they could do that without my consent. I 

[hereby] decisively protest against the willful act of the comrades from the council [to name my child 

73 “Information about Those Emancipated from the Old Bulgarian-Mohammedan Attire and Those Reviving 

Their Bulgarian Names in the Smolyan Region as of 15.IX.1962.” Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 1Б, 

Inventory 38, Archival Unit 20, page 16. 

114

for me]. I believe that every citizen is equal before the law and that coercion of the above kind cannot 

be exerted against anyone. I also believe that changing one’s name is a matter of personal choice, not 

of intimidation.” 74 

In another instance, Emin Ahmedov Kutsosmanov and Azmina Mehmedova Kutsosmanova, 

husband and wife from the village of Djurkovo, Smolyan Region, write to the Presidium of the 

People’s Parliament: 

Comrade Chairman, 

On July 13 th , 1962, a child of male gender was born to us /we are spouses/ in the 

hospital in the village of Laki, Smolyan Region. 

We both wish that our son bears the name Shaban. However, in the course of 40 days 

now, the people’s municipal council in Laki prevents us from registering the child with the 

above name by refusing to issue a birth certificate for him[.] I have been working in an 

underground mine for 8 years and the council prevents me from collecting my benefits 

under the family incentive plan by not issuing a birth certificate for my child. 

I hereby implore you to order that a certificate of live birth be issued for my son with the 

name we desire for him, [Shaban]. 

Please, let us know of any development on the matter of our request. 

August 21 st , 1962. 

V.[illage of] Laki 

Parents: Respectfully: 

1/ [Husband’s signature] 

2/ [Wife’s signature] 75 

Ordinary people, whose newborns were registered with Bulgarian names or not registered 

at all when parents refused to accept the imposed names, addressed their petitions directly to the top 

communist leadership. Apparently, this early in the revival process, many still believed that the willful 

abuse of their basic civil rights were solely the act of partial local bureaucrats. Once the central 

authorities received these complaints, however, they forwarded them back to the same people’s 

councils of which the parents were complaining. The returned petitions were usually accompanied 

by brief instructions for the latter on how to proceed with the complaints. The format and content of 

the instructional letters are fairly standard and of the kind below: 

To the Regional Committee of BCP 

74 A letter of 21 August 1962. Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 1, Inventory 28, Archival Unit 29, page 2. 

(Translated from Bulgarian by the author.) 

75 Ibid., 18. (Translated from Bulgarian by the author.) 

115

[The Bulgarian Communist Party] – Pazardjik 

Comrades, 

We are sending you the complaints of Musa Yuseinov Utev, Alish Yuseinov Bantsov, 

Kezim Yuseinov Drikov, Ahmed Mustafov Tronov and Shefket Abdula Serbezov, all from the 

village of Rakitovo[.] [T]hese people complain that their newborns have been registered 

with [Bulgarian-Christian] names to which they did not consent. 

It is necessary that the Regional Committee investigates those cases and takes measures 

to prevent such acts from happening. [At the same time, they must] continue the masspolitical 

and ideological work on raising the national awareness and the communist nurturing 

of those Bulgarians professing the Mohammedan faith [emphasis added]. 

Head of “Propaganda and Persuasion” department of central committee of BCP: 

/V. Ivanov/ 76 

Seemingly harmless, these instructional letters are important for two basic reasons. First, 

they are revealing of the communist leadership’s care to produce “evidence” to be used to absolve 

them from responsibility should the revival process escalate into violence. In other words, by 

seemingly instructing the local councils to investigate the complaints, the top bureaucrats were 

simply making sure that they would be able to wash their hands of a potentially bloody affair and 

squarely blame it on their regional puppets. Second, these instructional letters highlight the reality of 

secrecy, in which the revival process was supposed to take place, at least initially. “The Party” 

formally directed the lower bureaucrats to prevent excesses simply to be able to say, if need be, that 

they took people’s complaints to heart, and that the abuse was unbeknown to them. Thus, in the very 

same letters, the communist leaders were simultaneously instructing their local agents to carry on 

with the assimilation by means of propaganda and persuasion. In a sense, the only purpose of these 

instructing letters was to cover up the leadership’s direct involvement in the affair. 

In his report to the Politburo of the Communist Party, Angel Spasov – a local Smolyan 

revivalist – plainly speaks of the regime’s intentions to assimilate the “Bulgarian Mohamedans.” The 

document specifies that the decision to “revive” the Pomaks (as well as all Turks) was taken during 

the April Plenum of the communist party in 1956. Quite obviously, even at this early date, “The Party” 

had several clear objectives: 

‣ to “enhance their [the Pomaks’] national consciousness”; 


116

‣ to persuade the Pomaks of an ancestry rooted in “forced Islamization” claims; 

‣ to remove the women’s ferejes and men’s fezzes; 

‣ to organize sewing and cooking classes for women as assimilation incentives; 

‣ to “restore” the Bulgarian-Christian names of the Pomak Muslims. 77 

The same report explains why the regime regarded the revitalization of Rodina of critical 

importance to the revival process against the Pomaks. First, for the communist party, the organization 

had already proven its efficiency by having converted more than 80,000 “Bulgarian Mohamedans” in 

the period 1938-1944. Second, in its pre-communist existence, Rodina had functioned as a well-oiled 

pokrastvane machine for several crucial reasons: (a) it had Muslim clerics in its ranks, including 

Mehmed Dervishev, aka Svetoslav Duhovnikov, once the chief mufti of the Smolyan Region; (b) it had 

an well-established propaganda apparatus; (c) it had a print medium of its own, Collection Rodina; 

(d) it was served by seasoned ideological activists, including the writer Petar Marinov; (e) it had 

efficiently disseminated propaganda before, including via such initiatives as luncheons, books 

reading activities, and formal conferences; (f) above all, however, Rodina had proven successful in 

recruiting Pomak members. 78 

Thus, the efforts of bringing Rodina back to life began in earnest early in the 1960s. The regime, 

which formerly persecuted the organization as “fascist” and “anti-communist” was now chanting: 

“Bring back Rodina – history will judge us less severely if we rehabilitate a progressive organization 

like Rodina. … [W]e will remove the insult we dealt to the Rodina members by calling them fascist. 

We will win them over and help them – and with renewed self-confidence, they will be able to 

resume their mission.” 79 And there was no doubt what Rodina’s “mission” was. An official expose of 

January 1963 makes a somber evaluation of the long history of Pomak assimilation: 

Bulgarianizing the names [of the Pomaks] will be very difficult now, because in the course of 

50 years, the same people were made to change their names four times. In 1912 their names 

77 Expose on Raising the National Awareness of Bulgarian Mohammedans and on the Organization Rodina of 

January 5, 1963, by Angel Spasov of Smolyan, Raykovo Neighborhood. The Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 

1, Inventory 40, Archival Unit 478, pages 1-17. 

78 Ibid. (Translated from Bulgarian by the author.) 

79 Ibid., 16. 

117

were forcedly replaced with Bulgarian ones[.] [I]n 1914, [Vassil] Radoslavov [then Bulgaria’s 

prime minister] restored their Turkish names[.] [I]n 1940-1944, Rodina Bulgarianized their 

names for a second time, and after September 9, 1944 [the official date of communist 

takeover], we ‘restored’ their Turkish names yet again. Now we want to change their names 

for the fifth time. 80 

Indeed, surviving evidence leaves no doubt that the communist government planed the resurrection 

of Rodina – after having purposely destroyed it just a decade earlier – precisely to carry out the fifth 

forced assimilation of the Pomaks since 1912. 

2. Mission: “Revival” 

Soon after the regime’s dramatic change of heart regarding Rodina, reports of intimidation 

and violence against the Pomak population began pouring into “the Party’s” headquarters in Sofia. An 

extensive report--labeled “classified”--of the regional party committee’ secretary in Smolyan, N. 

Palagachev of October 1963, details the ill-treatment that occurred in Dospat, Kasaka, Trigrad, and 

Nedelino. 81 What follows is a summary of the coercive acts against the Pomak population of those 

villages, as reported in the above and related documents, which were designed to force people to 

renounce their traditional names and attire: 

First, men with fezzes (Ottoman-style headdress) and women in fereje (light outer-garment) 

or shalvars (traditional broad trousers) were prohibited from entering stores to buy basic groceries 

unless they put on hats and dresses. In Dospat (Western Rhodopes), the action of barring people 

from access to goods went on for nearly two weeks. During this time two shop clerks were sacked 

from work and two others were dismissed as members of the communist party for servicing the 

population in violation of the prohibition. 

Second, women were constantly harassed by orders to report to the local “people’s councils,” 

where communist apparatchiks methodically pressured them to replace the shalvars with dresses. 

Those refusing to comply were fined, further harassed, and/or had essential family property 

confiscated, including beds, mattresses, covers, and clothes. Furthermore, the authorities staged 

80 Ibid. 

81 Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 1, Inventory 39, Archival Unit 40, pages 128-145. (Translated from 


118

mock court trials to frighten the women into submission. For example, in the village of Kasaka, the 

revivalists turned a classroom into a makeshift courtroom, while an adjacent room became a clothing 

store, outfitted with a changing room. While the intimidation of women happened in the first 

classroom, where mock judges ordered them to change their clothing, the actual transformation took 

place in the second classroom. After being “sentenced,” each Pomak woman was directed into the 

clothing store next door, where two female school teachers (possibly Christian?) would sell her a 

dress, make sure she put it on and carefully record the price of the dress into accounting ledger. The 

thus “revived” woman would finally sign the account, thereby “agreeing” to pay for the dress. The 

cost of the new attire, which the woman neither wanted nor could afford, would be automatically 

withheld from her paycheck at the local agricultural cooperative. This way, the cooperative which 

had itself provided the clothes for the makeshift store would retain a portion of the woman’s future 

earnings. As the same archival document specifies, the dress-reviving action in Kasaka lasted for two 

days. Meanwhile, machine guns were fired on purpose during the intervening night (most probably 

with blanks or in the air?) “to scare the most stubborn of the women.” 82 

Third, the regime formed special commissions of revivalists—usually local party bureaucrats 

and all sorts of salaried individuals, including school teachers—for the purpose of making surprise 

visits to Pomak neighborhoods and households to further harass the population. These 

“commissioners” had the discretionary powers to use force and remove ferejes, shalvars, black 

headscarves, or anything they deemed un-Bulgarian. 

Fourth, members of the communist party in some position of authority were under 

obligation to inspect the homes of their subordinates to make sure that the latter’s wives were 

properly clad in dresses. If they were not, the “culprits” were to be promptly fired from work. 

Fifth, all salaried members of the communist party--including those employed in agriculture- 

-whose wives did not wear dresses either lost their jobs or were altogether dismissed from the party. 

Sixth, women not wearing the dress could not go to work and receive pay, including those 

who performed the lowest menial labor in the local agricultural cooperatives. 

82 Ibid., 129. 

119

Seventh, those of the women who refused to change to the dress had their basic clothing 

confiscated or destroyed. The following is reported from the village of Bukovo (Western Rhodopes) 

to that effect: 

The most stubborn women like Fatma Shukrieva, Safie Zaleva and Fatma Kassapchieva 

… had their clothes taken away. This act of the commissioners had offended the women, who 

began to call them [the commissioners] criminals, thieves, and so on. The commissioners 

have also been threatened by the said women’s husbands. Zaim Kassapchiev, for example, 

had threatened that when his son came back from Madan, he would kill the commissioners 

and then go to prison[.] Karim Zalev [further threatened] that the commissioners’ ‘heads 

would fly off by his son’s hand.’ 83 

To eliminate the danger, those two [Zaim Kassapchiev and Karim Zalev], as well as two 

others, Softov and Djaferov, will have to be “filtrated.” 84 * 

Eight, people who refused to conform to the communist policy regarding the change of 

names or clothing were routinely ill-treated, physically and psychologically. As one available record 

puts it, a “typical example” of commonplace abuse against Pomaks constituted the “conduct of the 

deputy chairman of the Rakitovo municipal council, who was also in charge of [the revival process in 

the village of] Kostandovo.” “Two years ago,” the document reports in 1963, “he was removed from 

his office, because he struck the local teacher – a Bulgarian-Mohammedan – for refusing to change his 

name. Within six months, however, he had been reinstated and had immediately exacted revenge 

against the said teacher by refusing to sign the college application form of that teacher’s nephew. I 

[Prof. Georgi Galabov who reports the case to the authorities] advised the aggrieved party to file a 

complaint with the [party’s] central committee, which he did, only to be threatened with worse 

punishment should he complain any further.” 85 

83 Note: People made such threats out of utter frustration, not because they really ever considered acting upon 

such “promises.” Were there such occurrences, they would have been broadly reported in the archival 

documents, but I found no evidence to that effect. 

84 Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 1, Inventory 39, Archival Unit 40, page 134. (Translated from Bulgarian 


*The word “filtrated” (in Bulgarian “филтрирани”) is used in quotation marks in the original document. Taking 

into consideration the totalitarian character of the regime and the seriousness of the revival process, the word may 

be interpreted to mean any action on the part of the regime against these individuals ranging from mistreatment, 

through labor camp and imprisonment, to death. It is not recorded what happened to the people in question. 

85 Report of Prof. Georgi Galabov, chairing the committee in charge of implementing the revival process to the 

“Propaganda and Persuasion” department of the central committee of the communist party, circa 1963. Central 

National Archives-Sofia, Fond 1, Inventory 40, Archival Unit 12, page 4. (Translated from Bulgarian by the 

author.) 

120

Ninth, whereas Pomaks who resisted the revival process became political and social outcasts, 

those who willingly accepted Bulgarian names were appointed to various salaried positions. 

Tenth, the communist regime discriminated against Pomak youths by overwhelmingly 

assigning them to labor units in the armed forces. Thus, Muslim conscripts spent the three-year 

mandatory military service not as soldiers, but as construction workers and common laborers. The 

following quote from the above report testifies to that policy: 

The greater part of them [young Pomaks] is not admitted to the regular armed forces, but in 

labor units. This automatically places them in that category of young people who are not 

trusted [by the party]. 86 

Ramadan Runtov, whom I interviewed in May of 2007, confirms this information. Between 1951 and 

1954, he was in a labor unit of the armed forces himself. Ramadan went through intensive 

construction training in the army and rose to the rank of sergeant, who led a construction brigade. He 

had some telling recollections: 

In 1951, I went to do my military service – in the labor forces. They never took any of us 

[Muslims] in the regular army; we all served in the labor forces. We constructed buildings, 

tunnels ... I started construction training classes. I was in the army for three years and I 

worked in construction all that time…. Then one day, they brought to me 36 boys, all [ethnic] 

Turks. ... One major brought them. ‘Sergeant,’ he said [to me], ‘these are Turks. Five hundred 

years they’d oppressed us. Now, you’ve got to bleed them dry with work.’… That night, I 

introduced myself to the guys. ‘My name is Ramadan. Fear not. … [W]e’ll cope with 

everything together.’ They looked at me in disbelief at first, but then went all at once: ‘Hey, 

brother, they’ve wasted us with work already. We’ve been cutting paving stones in a quarry 

day and night. By night, they made us build fires to keep working.’ … [W]e started working 

on a building in Sofia. …It was 180 meters long and the boys worked with much enthusiasm, 

because they were going to become certified stonemasons. In a short time we completed the 

project and we were commended for it. A general from the headquarters came down to talk 

to us on that occasion. He said to me: ‘How did you make these guys work!? They had been 

transferred here for refusing to work on orders. … You know, you’ve done a miracle with 

them!’ 87 

Eleventh, Pomak parents from remote villages were under obligation to send their children 

to schools in larger towns or villages, where they were accommodated in special full-board 

dormitories. The objective was to separate the youngsters from their families so as to indoctrinate 

them in revivalist ideology along with teaching them science. “There is almost no village in the 

Rhodopes without a school now,” one document reads, “and almost no central settlement without a 


87 Ramadan Runtov, interview (Ibid). 

121

oarding school for the children from remote villages and hamlets. More than 5,000 pupils live in the 

total of 70 boarding houses. Moreover, after-school activities with free lunches are provided for more 

than 7,000 pupils.” 88 “The Ministry of Education,” the report continues, “has issued special 

instructions to teachers of history, literature and Bulgarian language in these [Pomak] areas to 

change the curriculum according to the goals of the Cultural Revolution [i.e. revival process].” 89 

Twelfth, to further the assimilation of Pomak youth already graduating from boarding 

schools, the communist regime instituted a preferential-treatment policy for their admission to 

technical schools and colleges. According to the above report, the college graduates of Pomak origin 

in Smolyan region alone, as of (circa) 1963-1964, were 380 compared to almost none previously. 90 

Thirteenth, the authorities routinely organized public meetings, lectures, and conferences – 

with mandatory attendance for all party members, state employees, and the general Pomak 

population – to instruct the public “about the origins, culture, and past of the Bulgarian 

Mohammedans,” claimed to be “the descendants” of forcibly Islamized Bulgarians. 91 

With these policies in place throughout the 1960s, the revival process was well underway by 

the early 1970s. In a speech published in Rodopski Ustrem (a Smolyan-based newspaper) in January 

1971, the secretary of the municipal party committee in Oreshets, Georgi Staykov, recaps the 

overnight transformation of the Pomak village of Mostovo, with a population of 1,300. “In less than a 

year, the Turkish-Arab names [of the Mostovo population] had been replaced by beautiful Bulgarian 

names. How joyous everybody was, especially the young people, [who] already knew from school 

what savage Turkish Islamization had taken place in the Rhodope.” In the ostentatious language of 

communist propaganda, Staykov proceeds to elaborate on what transpired in Mostovo during the 

prolonged revival process. The picture is reflective of the politics that swept across the Rhodopes by 

1974, when the assimilation of Pomaks formally ended. For over a decade prior to 1974, in Mostovo, 

88 Report on the Work among the Bulgarian Mohammedans, circa 1963. Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 1, 

Inventory 40, Archival Unit 12, page 13. (Translated from Bulgarian by the author.) 

89 Ibid., 15-16. 

90 Ibid., 13-14. 

91 Ibid., 14. 

122

and in most Pomak villages, the communist regime had been slowly carrying out the following 

revivalist strategies, designed to convince the population of their Bulgarian heritage and the need to 

revert back to it: 

‣ The authorities recruited scholars to research the names of local sites and the genealogy of local 

family names; prove their “purely Bulgarian character;” and present “a detailed report of their 

findings ... before the entire village.” 

‣ They organized exhibits “showcasing the barbarity of the Turkish enslavers” against the 

Bulgarian (Christian) population 

‣ There were country-fair “reenactments” of the way “barbaric Turks” burnt Christian villages and 

kidnapped local girls to satisfy their lust. 

‣ Lectures containing incendiary propaganda about the “reactionary nature” of Islam were 

delivered on a regular basis. 

‣ The regime constantly evoked improving economic conditions in the traditionally impoverished 

Rhodopes to validate the revival process as progressive: “We have now created a local 

intelligentsia. There are 48 high-school- and college graduates in Mostovo. Of the total of 15 

school teachers, 9 are from the village [i.e. Pomaks]. Also local are the nurse and the veterinary 

technician. In addition, a comfortable road now connects the village with the outside world. 

Trucks are used to haul cargo in and out of the village, and comfortable busses – to transport 

people. ... There are stores and a school in the village, as well as electricity and sewage.” 

‣ The leadership was always mindful of placing the revival process in the context of women’s 

emancipation in order to project it as liberating rather than oppressive policy: “The women, 

routinely ignored in the past because of Quran’s prescriptions, are now equal-rights citizens 

taking jobs in the administrative, agricultural and political life [of the area]. For instance, Sofka 

Roynova serves as secretary of the secondary party organization [in Mostovo]. Nina Roynova is a 

member of the municipal party committee, and Violeta Badeva is a secretary of the youth’s 

municipal committee. ... Women are everywhere. They stand shoulder to shoulder with their 

husbands at party meetings, at banquets, and as initiators of things new and progressive.” 

123

‣ The regime systematically targeted religion and religious practices: “For more than eight years 

now,” Staykov boasts, “there has not been a hodja [hoca] in Mostovo and people do not want one. 

The mosque had been leased to the local agricultural cooperative for storage facility. The 

religious holidays of the past – Kurban Bayram and Ramazan Bayram – are prohibited. The 

mevlid [ceremonial prayer accompanied by communal meal] has been abandoned, too.” 

‣ To break Muslim conventions completely, communist bureaucrats even forced people, though 

the agricultural cooperatives, to raise pigs and encouraged them to eat pork: “When, six years 

ago, Iliya Sandanski first raised a pig in the village, it was a scandal. He was particularly ridiculed 

by the elders for eating pork. Now everybody in the village eats pork.” 

‣ Mandatory school attendance was strictly enforced in regard to Pomak children: “From day one 

of each school year, every child of school age goes to school. It is all parents’ objective now to see 

their offspring graduate from primary and secondary school, as well as from high school and 

even college.” 

‣ Forcing women to abandon the conservative Muslim garment was common practice: “Women 

have discarded the fereje and now they all wear modern new dress.” 

‣ The regime also introduced mandatory civil marriages and formal name-giving (christening) 

ceremonies for newborns: “The newly instituted civil marriages and name-giving ceremonies of 

newborns are widely practiced [in Mostovo].” 

‣ Finally, by 1974, the complete and total renaming of the Pomak population had taken place: 

“Everybody, regardless of age, has new identification papers now. The population is deeply 

convinced of their purely Bulgarian origin.” 92 

Turmoil in the (Western) Rhodopes 

Despite all propaganda, not everyone—the Pomaks least of all—subscribed to the 

communist claims of “voluntary” assimilation. In fact, Pomak communities across the Rhodopes 

were in turmoil, and they did not take the abuse meekly. As Ali Eminov remarks, the Pomaks offered 

92 Georgi Staykov, “Patriotichnoto vazpitanie – postoyanna zadacha” /Raising the Patriotic Awareness [of the 

Pomaks] – a Constant Objective”/, Rodopski Ustrem of 7 January 1971, Issue 2. (Translated from Bulgarian by the 

author.) 

124

a fierce resistance to the revival process. Unrest broke in a number of villages in the Western 

Rhodopes, among others, most notably in Kornitsa, Ribnovo, Lajnitsa and Breznitsa. “Scores were 

killed [in the Rhodopes],” Eminov sums up, “and hundreds were arrested and sentenced to long years 

of incarceration and hard labor.” 93 

Indeed, my interviewees Ramadan Ahmedov Runtov (Kurucu) and Ismail Bekirov Byalkov 

experienced the full blow of the revival process not only as direct participants, but also as long-term 

exiles and political prisoners. I met them during a research trip to Turkey in the summer of 2007. 

Ramadan and Ismail – sixteen years apart in age – were born and grew up in Kornitsa, but after years 

of communist persecution and suffering, they left Bulgaria in the late 1980s and early 1990s 

respectively to permanently settle in Turkey. Currently, they are both residents of the Istanbul 

suburb of Güneşli, where I interviewed them independently. 

Ramadan, born in 1929, became a member of the communist party while serving in the army 

between 1951 and 1954. As soon at the intimidation started several years later, however, he 

renounced his membership and became one of the most outspoken opponents of the regime. He was 

subsequently arrested, imprisoned, tortured while incarcerated, exiled from the Rhodopes, and 

finally expelled from Bulgaria in May 1989. He reminisced about what happened in the close-by 

Lajnitsa, Kornitsa, and Breznitsa during the late 1950s, when the authorities first attempted to force 

the women into dresses in those villages. “It was 1957/58,” he recalls, when a group of revivalists 

“tried to sneak into Lajnitsa, disguised as medics and, going from house to house, to presumably 

spray for fleas[.] They actually wanted to catch the women without ferejes and headscarves to get 

them used to not having them on [women wore no ferejes in their homes or in the presence of their 

Pomak neighbors]. Well, they managed to get into a house or two like that, but then some women 

realized what was going on. These women then came together and beat them up. After that, they [the 

revivalists] ran from Lajnitsa and into Kornitsa.” Later the same day, the unlucky apparatchiks, having 

miserably failed the reconnaissance mission to Lajnitsa, were already fueling the passions of their 

Christian audience in Kornitsa. They were telling the crowd how they had been attacked in Lajnitsa, 

93 Eminov, 106. 

125

“narrowly escap[ing] with our lives.” In reaction to the alleged revolt in Lajnitsa, “a posse of about 

15-16 individuals” got ready to depart for the mutinous village to exact revenge. A forest guard, a 

mild man known to Ramadan Runtov and nicknamed Upana, joined the group, but only (as it would 

transpire) as a curious spectator. Because the original group of revivalists—all men—had been 

beaten by women, there was an element of amusement in the overall bleakness of the episode. As 

Ramadan reports, he jokingly asked Upana: 

Ramadan: Bay Georgi, where’re you going? 

Upana: There’s been a mutiny in Lajnitsa. Some of our folks [Christians] got beaten there. So 

we are going that way. 

Ramadan: Listen, behave yourself there. You wouldn’t want to end up being kicked by them, 

women, would you! 

Upana: Yeah, yeah! I know! 

The group returned “two-three hours” later, and Upana with it. Ramadan was there, when 

they showed up on the public square in Kornitsa. He approached Upana and half-jokingly, halfanxiously 

inquired: 

Ramadan: What happened [in Lajnitsa], bay Georgi? 

Upana: You know, I didn’t get beaten. But everybody else did. 

Ramadan: How come? 

Upana: Well, them, women, apparently knew we’re coming, so they’re waiting for us already. 

Before we knew it, they were all ‘round us. Somehow, though, I stayed out of trouble. Then, 

these women started throwing rocks at us, and everyone darted to the mosque for hiding. 

At this point I had to ask for clarification. “So, the women of Lajnitsa beat the militsioners, 

right?” The communist police, that is! “Well, most in the group were civilians, but they had guns. And 

the police lieutenant Shopov was with them, too.” So, most of the revivalists were Christian civilians 

with some militsioners in the mix, armed. Ironically, to escape the barrage of rocks pelted their way, 

the group ran for the mosque—the closest shelter they could locate, and barricaded themselves in. 

Meanwhile, Upana, who had stayed out of the mess, “was watching from away.” “They thought they 

would be safe in there,” Ramadan narrates, but rocks the women kept hurling at the intruders 

smashed right through the windows. When the beleaguered posse men realized they could not hide 

in the mosque much longer, they flung the door open and bolted out. But two of the women, 

according to the (now) popular story, already stood guard before the door with bludgeons. So they 

managed to thrash the notorious police lieutenant Shopov so badly that he had to be carried back to 

126

Kornitsa on an impromptu stretcher made out of a blanket. Thus, in “1957/58” the “cultural 

revolution” in Lajnitsa ended before it had begun. Kornitsa’s turn was yet to come. 

As Ramadan recalls, one day he and other local party members were told to prepare to meet 

a group of regional communist dignitaries in Kornitsa. The same evening, seven or eight of them 

arrived from Gotse Delchev, the nearby town. Meanwhile Kornitsa’s Pomak majority, fully aware of 

the revivalist intent of the visit, had prepared wooden boards, properly reinforced with iron nails, to 

resist if provoked, as in Lajnitsa. To avoid escalation of potential conflict, the village men decided to 

stay out of sight, assuming that no one would attack defenseless women and children. The boards 

with spiky nails, however, were kept close at hand if need for defense did arise. Having been warned 

of the general village mood by snitches, the delegation of revivalists arrived in Kornitsa, but remained 

safely behind locked doors in the mayor’s office. Only after Kornitsa’s women gathered on the public 

square and taunted them with shouts: “Dogs! Get out! What do you want from us?” did Shopov, the 

lieutenant, and Nanchev, the mayor, venture out. In a spur of bravado, Shopov drew his pistol out and 

fired into the air to disperse the crowd, but only managed to enrage the women. When a teenage girl 

took her board out and began walking toward the pair, the women collectively pressed forward 

causing Nanchev to jump over the railing in a frantic, beeline flight homewards. Meanwhile Shopov 

disappeared back into the building. Ramadan, who had taken cover behind the stairwell of a nearby 

house to monitor the situation, witnessed everything as it unfolded. No one came out again that day. 

It was not until three-four o’clock in the morning when the population finally dispersed that the 

revivalists could leave the village. Thus, it was quickly over in Kornitsa, too. The subsequent attempt 

to force Breznitsa’s women into the dress also failed. This time, a formidable female force not only 

prevented the militsioners from entering the village, but also wrestled the young village hodja (hoca) 

out of their grip. The militsia (communist police) had arrested him earlier with the intent to use him 

in proselytizing women to accept the dress. The ruse not only failed to produce results, but also 

forged a collective women’s resistance that quickly aborted the assimilation move on Breznitsa. 94 

94 Ramadan Runtov, interview. (Ibid.) 

127

Whereas the faltering attempts to re-attire Pomak women in the late 1950s promptly 

crumbled having met resistance, the renewed revival pressure in the 1960s and onwards became 

more determined and violent. Ismal Byalkov, a young man at the time, was able to shed light on what 

happened in Kornitsa in 1964, and especially during the final throes of the revival process in 1973. “I 

was born in Kornitsa … in 1945.” Ismail begins, “My occupation was agricultural – crop growing, 

shepherding. I have no specific profession. … [I was 19] when in 1964, they first came to change our 

names. [P]eople fled to the woods. It was March. Very cold! There was nothing and no one in the 

woods that early in season. Neither grass was growing, nor could any food be gathered in the forest. 

The name changing in 1964 continued for four days. Most people who had fled into the woods to 

avoid it couldn’t make it beyond the second or third day in the open. … It was raining all the time. … 

People were cold and starving. … If they happened on a shepherd, out with his herd, they’d take his 

bread and let him go. But those in the woods were so overwhelmed with hunger that many came 

back to their houses and had their names changed.” To everybody’s surprise, however, the renaming 

abruptly stopped four days after it had begun. “What we heard subsequently was that Turkey spoke 

on our behalf and that’s why the name changing halted,” Ismail reminisces. “Then those who had 

signed paperwork agreeing to change their names wanted it back.” The regime, however, stalled. As 

the population converged on the public square in Kornitsa to demand annulment of the renaming, 

the authorities returned the declarations, containing individual’s signatures, which “people then tore 

up.” “Four persons were exiled from the village as a result [of the events in 1964],”Ismail says, 

“Among them was my father, Bekir Bekirov Byalkov.” 95 

Then came 1973, and with it, the final and most brutal stage of the revival process against the 

Pomaks. In Kornitsa, the population was astir once more. “[B]ecause of the extreme conditions [in 

1964],” Ismail continues, “people decided not to flee to the woods again in 1973, but to gather on the 

public square. So on January 23, [1973], we’re all assembled on the village square.” A revivalist force 

of bureaucrats, troops, militsia (police), fire fighters, and armed civilians arrived in Kornitsa. The 

entire population, “[having] congregated on the public square, held tight and determined to let 

95 Ismail Byalkov, interview by author, Istanbul, Turkey, May 20, 2007. (Translated from Bulgarian by the 

author.) Also, for more on Ramadan Runtov and the revival process, see the next chapter. 

128

nobody rename us.” This tense state of affairs continued from January 23 to March 28 of 1973. “We 

stayed there day and night, in snow and rain, small children and adults. We were building big fires to 

keep warm. We slept in shifts: some would go to their houses to get some sleep while the rest kept 

vigil. We rotated like that. It went on like that until March 28. On the morning of March 28 the village 

was surrounded …” 96 

To my inquiry whether or not it was the military or police who descended on the village, 

Ismail explained that most of the revivalists were dressed in civilian clothes. “There were no troops,” 

he explains, “At least I did not see any uniformed soldiers. There was a small horseback force and the 

rest were plainclothes. … They were all dressed in plain clothes: fire fighters … everyone. Now, 

whether they were civilians from the neighboring [Christian] villages or troops, I couldn’t tell. There 

were very few individuals in military uniforms, and those in uniforms were on horses. But the ones 

that did the beating wore plain clothes. … [And] there were loads of them. The whole village was 

blocked.” On March 28, 1973, after more than two months of nerve-racking suspense on both sides, 

the regime started shooting at the multitude gathered on the Kornitsa’s public square. “The whole 

square was smeared in blood that day,” Ismail concludes. Among the numerous wounded and 

severely beaten people, five lay dead. Ismail Byalkov was arrested, among many others, for having 

participated in the supply of firewood and for maintaining the fires on the public square during the 

long resistance vigil of Kortnitsa. Ismail would spend the next decade in prison, where he 

encountered Ramadan Runtov. The latter had been exiled from Kornitsa in the early 1960s. By the 

time Ismail encountered him in prison, Ramadan had been systematically starved and in and out of 

solitary confinement for months. 97 

Women in the Revival Process 

In spite of the bloodshed, the revival process was not implemented solely by brutality. What 

won many Pomaks to the communist cause was economic opportunity. The conditions of utter 

poverty typical of the Rhodopes in pre-communist times, as well as during the first two decades of 

96 Ibid. 

97 Ibid. Also, for a detailed account of Ramadan’s life and anti-revivalism, read Chapter IV. 

129

communist government, began to slowly improve by the early 1970s. The literacy rate among the 

Pomak population also rose as a result of the mandatory school attendance for children. Many young 

people were given the opportunity – through affirmative action – to continue their education beyond 

primary and secondary school into high school, technical school, and college. The population as a 

whole experienced a general improvement of the infrastructure and living standards. The regime 

encouraged the building of roads, sewage and water-supply systems, as well as initiating the 

electrification of traditionally Pomak areas. 98 

A collection of data, compiled by the regime, reveals the following revival process-generated 

picture of the Zagrajden Municipality in late 1971—a situation generally representative of much of 

the Rhodopes. An overwhelmingly Pomak municipality, 79 percent of Zagrajden’s inhabitants were 

Bulgarian-speaking Muslims (Appendix 3.3.1). Of the 2,807 Pomaks, 1,099 were already “revived” as 

of October 1971 largely by having their traditional names replaced with Bulgarian ones (Appendix 

3.3.2A). Through the years 1969-1971, 127 infants were born to Pomak parents and more than 60 

percent of them (80 newborns) were registered with Bulgarian names (Appendix 3.3.2B). Ninetythree 

Pomaks were forcibly removed from the municipality and resettled elsewhere in the country – 

usually in central or northern Bulgaria, among Christians (Appendix 3.3.3). The most common reason 

for exiling people from the Rhodopes during communism was their staunch opposition to the revival 

process. As a rule, the regime relocated those perceived as “troublemakers,” because they refused to 

change their names and/or influenced others to resist. 99 While the data reveals that the Pomaks 

remained overwhelmingly agrarian, their children were being prepared for other occupational 

opportunities as well, including in the education and health-care sectors (Appendix 3.3.4). Further 

statistics report that from none to negligibly small, the average number of Pomak students 

graduating from secondary school, high school, technical school, college, and university respectively 

rose to 82.6 percent during the academic years of 1969-1970, 1970-1971, and 1971-1972. The 

largest share of those completed secondary- and technical-school education (Appendix 3.3.5). 

98 See section From Pokrastvane to Revival Process in this chapter. 

99 Ramadan Runtov, interview; Ismail Byalkov, interview. (Ibid.) 

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However, the majority of Pomak students—especially those—enrolled in technical school and college 

were able to do so because of affirmative action. Surviving documents highlight that the affirmative 

action policy was designed with the view to accelerate the revival process and possibly encourage 

revivalists from within the Pomak community. The so-created “local intelligentsia” was henceforth 

expected to take part in all revivalist activities, including destroying old tombstones and minarets, 

interfering with traditional burial rites and holidays, ripping ferejes and shalvars, changing names, 

and sacking incompliant employees from work. Nevertheless, along with frustration, the revival 

process brought about relative economic prosperity as well. To that effect, further statistics illustrate 

that by the early 1970s a growing number of Pomak households in the Zagrajden Municipality (and 

elsewhere in the Rhodopes) began purchasing items previously inaccessible such as television and 

radio sets, refrigerators, cassette players, electrical and gas stoves, motorcycles, mopeds, cars, 

furniture, and homes (Appendix 3.3.6). 

As Mehmed Myuhtar, among others, attests, the village of Valkossel and most of the Western 

Rhodopes were electrified in 1964 with the help of conscripted local labor. Thus, it was the village 

population who mixed concrete and poured in into molds to make electric poles, dug holes to plant 

those in the ground, and pulled electric wire for most of 1961, 1962, and 1963. With electric outlets 

in place, the Myuhtar family was able to purchase their first television set in 1970, and they were 

only the third household in Valkossel to do so. Further, most of the existing dirt or gravel roads were 

asphalt-coated between 1967 and 1976, when the major traffic arteries connecting the villages 

Ablanitsa, Valkossel, Slashten, and Satovcha were completed. Thereafter, regular public bus 

transportation developed, linking the villages with each other, with the nearest town Gotse Delchev, 

and from there—with the rest of the country. A public bakery in Valkossel also opened in 1966 when 

several local persons completed vocational training. 100 

Thus, economic opportunity and assimilation in the Rhodopes went hand in hand. By mid- 

1972, more than 50 percent of the Muslims in the entire Smolyan Region had received Bulgarian 

names with Christian significance, and carried new identification papers (Appendix 3.3.7). Although 

100 Mehmed Myuhtar, telephone-interview by author, January 12, 2010. 

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the revival process was--by and large--forced on the Pomaks, many voluntarily adopted the new 

names and attire. Especially enthusiastic were some women, whose situation was particularly 

difficult due to the strongly patriarchal culture in the Rhodopes. A letter of complaint by a Pomak 

woman to the local authorities in this respect is noteworthy. The letter reveals intimidation of a 

different kind: one exerted by Pomaks against other Pomaks, particularly of women against women, 

largely to dissuade them from accepting Bulgarian names by way of mockery and rejection. However, 

the letter also points to the type of reaction the communist regime encouraged—indeed, actively 

pursued, particularly among women—to validate the revival process as voluntary. Thus, “evidence” 

like the example below would have been carefully copied and broadly distributed for propaganda 

purposes. The preserved archival copy is a typewriter-produced replica of an original handwritten 

letter, which could have been fabricated. With no direct evidence to that effect, however, it shall be 

treated as authentic: 

May 1972 

Dear Comrade Chairman of the R[egional Party] Committee – Smolyan, 

I have a request and I hope that you could help me. We already restored our Bulgarian 

names and, having thrown our Arab [Muslim] names, we [women] are happy. But there is 

something else: Do we need to wear the headscarves[?] I am a young woman and I do not 

want to wear the headscarf, but we have many gossipers here. Let me tell you about this 

case: I went on vacation at the Narechen spa resort and, while there, I did not wear the 

headscarf[.] [B]ut when other women from my village saw me like that, they told my 

husband about it. Because he [my husband] is religious, they [these women] caused such 

problems for me that I was going to commit a suicide. 

So my opinion [i.e. question] to you, comrade chairman is this[:] Are we building 

communism here [in this country] or fascism[?] 

I want a reply to this question[:] [A]re these headscarves going to be removed from our 

heads so that I could enjoy my life? Because, when they [other women] say that rejecting the 

headscarf is sinful, I get mad and I have problems afterwards. 

If you could make my family life scarf-free, the treat will be on me. 

There is more: The women in our villages wear shalvars or pants to cover their legs 

since they believe that it is sinful to expose them[.] So they laugh at me and say to me: 

‘Where do you think you’ll be going with these naked legs after you die?’ I tell them: ‘You 

mind your own business!’ 

That’s my opinion [i.e. complaint] to you and I ask you to consider it. 

My address is: 

V[illage of] Treve, Smolyan Region – Svetla Silkova Surova 

I’m looking forward to your reply. 101 

101 Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 1Б, Inventory 38, Archival Unit 6, page 125. (Translated from Bulgarian 


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If the letter is authentic, it posits an interesting scenario. The woman who authored it must 

have been unusually courageous or foolhardy to challenge a staunchly patriarchal society that way. 

Because she speaks of herself in the first person singular, one ought to assume that she was the sole 

female rebel in the village, facing not only a conservative husband and society, but also fellow women 

who openly ridiculed her. Because it is difficult to imagine that any woman would willingly place 

herself in a position of isolation, vulnerability, and mockery within her community, it is possible that 

the letter may be a fake. According to evidence furnished by Ramadan Runtov, there were regularly 

scheduled propaganda conferences organized for Pomaks after 1956, when the regime first moved to 

re-attire Pomak women. During these conferences veiled women—supposedly Pomak—would come 

forward, before the audience and theatrically discard the veil declaring: “I desire this black veil no 

more.” As she would throw down the headscarf, other women would help her to put a dress on, thus, 

symbolically delivering her from “the black veil,” i.e. male oppression. Among the largely Pomak 

audience, however, who were forced to attend these events, there was a great deal of suppressed 

mockery and doubt as to the true identity of these women. It is very likely, as Ramadan suggests, that 

some were paid actresses, Christian women posing as Muslim ones, or even female relations of 

previously converted and/or voluntarily revived Pomaks. These events, however, based on 

Ramadan’s information, were frequently organized, followed the same basic format, and smacked of 

forgery. 102 

Reluctantly or not, the revival process against the Rhodopean Muslims formally concluded in 

1974. Nevertheless, a number of Pomaks managed to evade renaming even after that date. Indeed, in 

March 1977, a government report estimated that 6,718 individuals had remained un-revived 

(Appendix 3.3.8). 103 The majority of those escaped the revival process by taking refuge in areas with 

significant Turkish-speaking population and feigning “Turkish” identity. This subterfuge worked 

102 Ramadan Runtov, interview. (Ibid.) 

103 Assessment on the Implementation of the Decision of the Secretariat of the Bulgarian Communist Party’s 

central committee from July 17, 1970, concerning the Pomak revival process. The document is dated May 8, 

1978, and numbered 005805, pages 60-80. Central National Archives-Sofia. (There is no archival reference on the 

document). 

133

ecause Bulgaria, fearing an international incident with Turkey, excluded the Turkish minority from 

forced assimilation during the 1970s. 

No matter how successful the renaming, as soon as the communist regime eased up the 

pressure on the Pomak community, the majority resumed the practice of their religious traditions 

and the use of their Turkish-Arab appellations, albeit privately. 104 Much of the Muslim unwillingness 

to submit to the new identity stemmed from the abusive and debasing nature of the assimilation. The 

Pomak population, which had overwhelmingly supported the regime’s initial ascent to power, felt 

betrayed, beaten down, and humiliated by the revival process. Just as the earlier pokrastvane, the 

revival process was committed in the name of nationalism. It was purposed to perpetuate the 

communist control over a unitary nation-state without regard to the dignity of the Muslim 

communities. While working towards its goal, the regime skillfully manipulated the national 

majority’s sentiment by synonymizing the revival process with advancing the national interest. 

Conclusion 

1. External Pressure, Internal Turmoil and the “Big Excursion” 

With the national sentiment firmly swayed in favor of the assimilation, the communist 

regime revived all Muslims in Bulgaria by the beginning of 1987. Whereas the final Pomak revival of 

1972-1974 remained largely unnoticed by the international community, the campaign against the 

104 A government assessment of the implementation of the Pomak revival process reads: 

…After the mass revival of their names, the individual work with the [Pomak] people started 

slacking[.] [A]s a result, in some regions there are still hundreds of Bulgarians [Pomaks] bearing 

Turkish-Arab names and there is a general tendency of reverting back to old-fashion Turkish style of 

dressing [among the Pomaks]. … 

A considerable part of the descendants [of Islamized Bulgarians] accepted the new, Bulgarian 

names only nominally. They continue to use their Turkish-Arab names among themselves and in the 

privacy of their homes. Although, all newborns are registered with Bulgarian names, in many parts of 

the country the parents privately give them Turkish-Arab names and use those at home. Most of the 

children in the towns and villages of the Kardjali, Blagoevgrad and Pazardjik Regions unofficially bear 

[Turkish-]Arab names. 

Some reactionary elements are instilling the belief in people that their [Muslim] names will be 

restored soon since the same had happened many times before. 

…In many [Pomak] areas, the women and girls still wear shalvars, yashmaks [cover garment] 

and ferejes. Despite the prohibition, many boys are still being circumcised... [italics added]. 

(Assessment on the Implementation of the Decision of the Secretariat of the Bulgarian Communist Party’s 


1978, and numbered 005805, pages 60-80. Central National Archives-Sofia, pages 71-73. (Translated from 


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ethnic Turks of 1984-1985 created an international uproar due – in greatest part – to Turkey’s 

forceful protests. Nervous and apprehensive about a broader international condemnation, the 

communist regime in Bulgaria closely monitored every move of the Turkish government. Between 

June 27 and July 3, 1987, alone, the regime registered a number of developments in Turkey regarding 

the revival process. An intelligence report observes the following, among other things: 

The radio station, The Voice of Turkey, was steadily transmitting news about the revival 

process; 

The Voice of Turkey spoke directly to the Muslims of Bulgaria, because of which, measures 

were put in place “to jam the transmissions of The Voice of Turkey.” 

At a protest rally in Istanbul on June 27, 1987, the united organization of the Bulgarian 

immigrants in Turkey voiced the opinion that the Turkish government should pressure 

Bulgaria into signing an agreement allowing the Muslims of Bulgaria to leave the country. In 

response, the communist regime vowed to “[c]ontinue the smear campaign against the 

leaders of the anti-Bulgarian-movement in Turkey in order to inflict discord in it.” 105 

On 21-24 June 1987, the Istanbul Lawyers Association held a symposium about “the politics 

of repression against and assimilation of the Turkish ethnic minority [in Bulgaria]”; 

The production of a new anti-Bulgarian documentary was being planned in Turkey, titled 

“Belene – The Death Camp.” The regime cautioned in this regard: “It is possible that this and 

other such films would attempt to be smuggled into our country on videotapes to keep high 

the hopes for immigration to ‘the mother-country, Turkey’ of the Bulgarian citizens with 

revived names.” 

Turkey’s President Kenan Evren met with Jordan’s King Hussein, during the latter’s official 

visit to the country, where Kenan expressed concern over the revival process in Bulgaria. 

According to the information, Kenan said: “…Our nation will be grateful if the Islamic 

countries use their influence with Bulgaria to help us on the matter …” King Hussein replied: 

“We believe that a just solution will be found regarding the human rights and cultural 

105 Ibid., 2. 

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identity of the Muslim minority in Bulgaria. We will attempt to persuade Bulgaria to respond 

positively to such just demands.” 106 

Spearheaded by Turkey, international indignation at the treatment of Muslim in Bulgaria 

steadily grew after 1985. Pomaks and Turks, for their part, reacted with massive demonstrations 

against the regime and its revivalist policies by early 1989. What became known as The May Events of 

1989 resulted in the expulsion of “scores of native Turkish [and Pomak] intellectuals, leaders and 

potential leaders” of the anti-revivalist movement, 107 and Ramadan Runtov was among them. 108 As 

foreign pressure on Bulgaria mounted, the Chairperson of the State Council of the People’s Republic 

of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov, delivered a dramatic speech on May 28, 1989. It was broadcasted on all 

electronic media in Bulgaria and disseminated through the printed press. In this speech, Zhivkov 

called on Turkey to open its borders for all those who “wished” to leave Bulgaria temporarily or on a 

permanent basis. As Eminov describes it, “[a] week after the start of [the] demonstrations, the 

government announced on national television that those Bulgarians who … wished to visit Turkey 

would be issued passports on demand. The response to this announcement was unanticipated and 

overwhelming. The passport offices were besieged by hundreds of thousands of Turks [and Pomaks] 

immediately after the announcement. Passports were issued rapidly and the Turks [but not the 

Pomaks] were told to put their affairs in order quickly and leave…” Thus, the epic expulsion of 

Muslims by the communist government of Bulgaria began. To save face, the regime deliberately 

called it the “Big Excursion.” Hundreds of thousands of Muslims left Bulgaria during this forced 

“excursion,” most of them never to return. 109 

106 Information about Turkey’s Activities against the Revival Process for the period 27 June – 3 July 1987. The 

document is dated July 3, 1987 and signed by then Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Gen. Lieutenant St. Savov, 

pages 1-6. (There is no archival reference on the document). 

107 Eminov, 97. 

108 Read about Ramadan Runtov in the next chapter. 

109 Eminov, 97. 

“Between June and August,” Eminov continues, “when Turkey closed its borders with Bulgaria to emigrants 

without proper visas, over 350,000 Turks [and Pomaks] left the country. The mass exodus of Turks [and 

Pomaks] from Bulgaria over such short period of time caused severe economic and social dislocations in the 

country which contributed to the downfall of the Z[h]ivkov regime on 10 November 1989. Eventually, especially 

136

When Zhivkov promised to let all Muslims go, “hundreds of Pomaks” from the Rhodopes filed 

applications for passports to emigrate as well. As Eminov accurately points out, whereas Bulgaria’s 

Turks received “passports by the tens of thousands,” Pomak applications were denied. “Local party 

officials explained that Z[h]ivkov’s announcement did not cover the Muslims living in the Sofia and 

Plovdiv provinces [i.e. Pomaks] because they were ‘another category of people’, presumably meaning 

Bulgarians.” Accordingly, regional bureaucrats in charge of issuing immigration papers “categorically 

stated that they would not allow anyone to immigrate to Turkey and threatened anyone who 

persisted in their demands with arrest, imprisonment, and even death.” 110 According to official 

statistics, as of July 6, 1989, in excess of 370,000 Pomaks submitted applications for passports to 

leave the country (Appendix 3.2A). Of those, only about 125,000 were issued the necessary 

documents to travel abroad (Appendix 3.2B). They were mostly political undesirables like Ramadan 

Runtov. Despite the difficulties, however, an estimated 111,336 Pomaks had already left the country 

by July 6, 1989 (Appendix 3.2C). 

2. The End Is Near or Is It? 

By late 1989, the political and economic situation in Bulgaria was so unstable that the regime 

finally awakened to reality. As the Soviet Union’s leader Mikhail Gorbachev spoke of communist 

perestroika (reformation), the peoples of Eastern Europe marched for democracy. Consequently, the 

communist regimes throughout the Eastern European bloc diminished politically. Reacting to this 

pervasive agitation, the Bulgarian Muslims rallied for freedom and demanded reversal of the revival 

process. Although nervous, the communist Caesars of Bulgaria remained arrogant and remorseless. 

Believing the status quo to be retainable, they hatched a plan to expel all ethnic Turks from the 

country, thus, resolving “the national problem” once and for all. In a matter of months in 1989, more 

than 350,000 Muslims—overwhelmingly Turks but many Pomaks as well—were deported from 

after the ouster of Z[h]ivkov from power, over 150,000 Turks [and Pomaks] returned to Bulgaria, but more than 

200,000 chose to remain in Turkey permanently.” (Eminov, 97.) 

110 Eminov referencing Ashley, 106-7. 

137

Bulgaria. This was the single largest mass exodus of refugees in Europe since the Second World 

War. 111 

Because the Muslims were the major workforce of the country’s agrarian sector and because 

they were driven out in the middle of the summer, Bulgaria experienced a severe labor shortage for 

the fall harvest of 1989. The national agricultural economy accordingly collapsed. In a desperate 

move to survive, on November 10, 1989, the regime ousted from power the main Ceasar Todor 

Zhivkov, and blamed the total political and economic disaster on him. Meanwhile, the communist 

party renamed itself to the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and continued to rule the country. 

However, it was already making amends with the Muslims by revising the disastrous revival process. 

On December 29, 1989, the “reformed” regime reversed the revival process and proclaimed it an 

anomaly of the Zhivkov era. In June 1990, during the first multi-party elections in decades, Bulgaria 

elected the first democratic Parliament, which undertook to abolish the assimilation policy and 

ensure a democratic rule of government. 

Accordingly, on May 6, 1990, the Parliament passed the Law on the Names of the Bulgarian 

Citizens, which denounced the revival process and condemned the violation of the basic constitutional 

guarantee for equality before the law of all citizens (Article 35 of the 1971 Constitution). Article 17 of 

the law stipulated: “Threat, coercion, violence, fraud, abuse of power or other illicit actions in 

choosing, keeping, changing or restoring a name is punished under the Penal Code.” It also ensured 

that all “Bulgarian citizens whose names have been forcibly changed may, of their own free will, 

restore their former names.” 112 Within two years, most Pomak and Turkish Muslims were able to 

regain their conventional names of Turkish-Arab origin. 

Further, the democratic Constitution of 1991 incorporated provisions to the same effect. Article 

13 (1), for example, stipulated that “The practicing of any religion shall be free.” Article 37 provided 

for freedom of conscience, thought, and religion, as well as charged the state with ensuring tolerance 

111 Eminov, 97. 

112 Ibid., 20. 

138

and respect for the religious beliefs of others. 113 Simultaneously, however, Article 13(3) established 

the Eastern Orthodox Christianity as “the traditional religion of the Republic of Bulgaria.” 114 This 

renewed identification of the political regime with the Orthodox Church, and hence with the 

Christian values of the dominant ethno-religious majority, aroused fresh fears among the 

understandably distrustful Muslims. The Pomaks were especially concerned about being able to hold 

on to their newly acquired freedom of self-expression given the history of forced assimilation. 115 

The Pomak apprehension about displaying “Muslim” (i.e. “un-Bulgarian”) identity has largely 

proven justified since the initial freedom surge following the collapse of the communist regime. 

Taking advantage of the dire economic straits of the Rhodopes in the early 1990s, as Eminov points 

out, “Orthodox priests have been extremely active among the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims since 1989 

and their success in converting [them] to Christianity is widely reported in the mass media.” In 

addition, "representatives of mainstream Protestant denominations, Evangelicals, Catholics, 

Mormons, Church of Scientology and various cults are competing with one another to ‘save’ Muslim 

souls.” At the same time, however, “Muslim missionary activity among the Orthodox population is … 

unthinkable.” 116 

Eminov registered the ongoing conversion activities among the Pomaks prior to 1997, when 

he published his book Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities. Since then Bulgaria has joined NATO 

(2004) and the European Union (2007). Regardless of these most stimulating developments, 

however, the Pomak cultural expression remains restricted. Moreover, the post 9/11 reality, 

inflaming anti-Muslim sentiments worldwide, has frighteningly normalized the negative and even 

hostile attitudes toward the Muslims in Bulgaria. Especially galling to the prevalent national 

sentiment has become the Pomak claim to Muslimness. Now, as in the past, the Pomaks—as 

“Bulgarian-Mohamedans”—have to strictly follow prescribed norms of cultural behavior, i.e. act 

113 Ibid., 62. 

114 Ibid., 65. 

115 Ibid. 

116 Ibid. 

139

Bulgarian by maintaining adherence to dominant ideas of nationalism. Thus, the post-totalitarian 

status quo has been painfully reminiscent of the revival process for many Pomaks who remember 

it. 117 

In the course of over thirty years of democratic government in Bulgaria, the appeal of a 

nationalism of the “nasty” type is growing rather than subduing. The harsh economic reality further 

enables the openly biased media to fan the flames of a tangibly hostile national sentiment. 118 As in 

1997, when Ali Eminov described it, much of the news production in Bulgaria remains in the hands 

journalists who “often manufacture evidence, expand rumors into major stories, or create rumors 

themselves.” These “stories” are then “given wide play in both print and broadcast media.” When 

these journalists get pressed for “concrete evidence” to back up their allegations, they usually furnish 

none. 119 Referencing Bulgarian scholarship, Eminov quotes actual news headlines, the likes of which 

still appear in the Bulgarian press (and other media): 

“The sinister wave of Turkish separatism is swelling”; 

“The declaration of a Turkish Republic in the Rhodopes is in preparation”; 

“Turks want to redraw the ethnic map of Bulgaria” 

“Turkey is secretly training Janissaries* for the Bulgarian army”; 

“Bulgarian Muslims are subjected to forced Turkization”; 

“Islamic fundamentalists are crisscrossing Bulgaria”; 

“Emissaries from the Middle East are scuttling through the Rhodopes.” 

* The Ottoman policy of recruiting Christian youth into the military by converting them to 

Islam is popularly labeled “blood tax” in Bulgarian folklore to suggest forced removal of these 

boys from their families. Scholars, on the other hand, agree that Christian families volunteered 

their boys into the army, because the Ottoman system otherwise prohibited non-Muslims 

(mostly Christians and Jews) from serving in the military. 120 

Several themes, smacking of populist nationalism, immediately manifest themselves in this 

roster. First, Turkey —as the Ottoman Empire’s heir—remains the “enemy” that is always scheming 

to reoccupy its former territories, including Bulgaria and “reenslave” the Christian population. 

Second, in preparation for reclaiming its empire, Turkey (as well as the Arab Middle East) is “secretly 

117 Ramadan Runtov, interview; Ismail Byalkov, interview; Mehmed Shehov, interview; Mehmed Myuhtar, 

interview; and others. 

118 See subtitle, “A Gellnerian Model of National Sentiment,” above. 

119 Eminov, 21. 

120 See Chapter II as well as Foreword for details. 

140

training Janissaries” and sending in “Islamic fundamentalists” to Turkicize/Islamize the population. 

Third, these Islamic “emissaries … are scuttling through the Rhodopes” to pervert the consciousness 

of the Pomaks and to alienate them from the Bulgarian nation. Fourth, sinister Islamic forces are 

plotting to “redraw the ethnic map of Bulgaria” to the destruction of “our” nation-state. Taking a 

“conspiratorial approach” to expressions of Muslim identity, some journalists diligently “keep track 

of the number of new mosques built and under construction,” and quite seriously claim that those are 

used “to hatch diabolical plots to destroy the Bulgarian state and nation.” Most worrisome of all, 

however, is the lack of political will to hold “people who spread unfounded and incendiary 

propaganda accountable.” 121 

3. Implications for Pomak Heritage 

This conspiratorial frenzy in the public space is inevitably coloring the prevalent national 

sentiment. On the flip side, it may also be that the press and media simply pick up on some anger in 

the popular mood and respond accordingly. Indeed, the disappointing economic and political 

developments in recent years have not been conducive to a positive national sentiment. Already 

disillusioned by several governments and hardened by economic instability, in July 2009, Bulgaria’s 

majority voted the openly nationalist GERB party to power. The political prowess of GERB is 

singularly vested in the personal charisma of its leader, Boyko Borissov, who has openly expressed 

strong nationalistic views. Along with being the current Prime Minister of Bulgaria, Borissov is also a 

former bodyguard of the long-term communist leader Todor Zhivkov. According to his own 

admission, Borissov took part in the Turkish revival process of 1984-1985 as “lieutenant” of a firefighting 

“battalion.” “As fire-fighters,” he explained in an interview, “we were sent there [to the areas 

with Turkish population] to protect the grain crops, so that they [the Turks] don’t set them on 

fire.” 122 Protecting the crops from insurgents, however, was the least of the “Party’s” concerns. In 

fact, it is now common knowledge that the communist regime threw all available forces – police, 

121 Eminov., 21-22. 

122 “Boyko Borrisov odobryava tselite na vazroditelniya protses” /(“Boyko Borisov approves of the objectives of 

the revival process”/, Mediapool, October 31, 2008, at: http://www.mediapool.bg/show/?storyid=145332. 

141

troops, fire brigades, and salaried functioneérs – against a civilian population to intimidate and force 

it into revivalist submission, including by a way of beating and murder. 123 In a highly controversial 

statement of October 31, 2008, the future Prime Minister Borissov quite seriously explained that 

while he approved of the objectives of the revival process, he disagreed with the methods of its 

implementation. In response to a reporter’s comment that imposing names on people was perverted, 

Borissov retorted: “It must be understood once and for all that the citizens of Bulgaria are Bulgarians, 

of Turkey – Turks, of Serbia – Serbs[.] [T]hat’s why, there are states and there are borders. If one is 

Bulgarian, one needs to feel that way[.] [I]f one feels Turk, let him go to Turkey. … In Bulgaria, there 

are Bulgarian citizens, and that is to be the guiding principle for every [national] cause.” 124 

Thus, the authorities in Bulgaria effectively reduce the essence of nationalism to narod, 

meaning that nation and people are one and the same thing. 125 This constraining equalization of the 

nation-state with the sentiments of the dominant ethno-cultural majority promotes exclusion rather 

than integration of vernacular heritages into the public narrative. As a result, most efforts to tell the 

Pomak version of history as dissent and oppression in the official domein are consistently met with 

hostility and censorship. 

Yet, as painful as they may be, narratives of coercion and suffering like the pokrastvane and 

the revival process should be remembered not to create antagonism, but to foster acceptance and 

reconciliation. Only by facing the past can a people move forward as a nation, and only by recognizing 

historical wrongs can a nation hold those in charge of government accountable to the benefit of all in 

society. In its essence, the revival process was the doing of a tiny ruling communist minority against a 

whole segment of Bulgaria’s population with historically Turkish-Arab names. These privileged few, 

however, victimized society at large during the nearly five decades of totalitarian rule (1944-1989), 

irrespective of ethnicity, religion, or language. In that sense, the revival process was a crime not 

against Muslims alone, but against all those who valued dignity and free conscience in the nation. 

123 Eminov, passim. See also, Vera Grozeva, Karvyashta Nostralgia (Zhar-Zhanet Argirova, 2000), passim; Salih 

Bozov, V Imeto na Imeto (Sofia, 2005), passim. 

124 Mediapool, (ibid.). 

125 See section “A Gellnerian Model of National Sentiment” above. 

142

Potentially, people’s realization of their shared vulnerability to a government without check would 

engender acceptance and lay the foundations for common heritage in the Rhodopes, among other 

places. Thus, amid the many reasons I explore the life story of Ramadan Runtov in the next chapter is 

that of his potent forgiveness and positive outlook regardless of the trauma he sustained as a political 

prisoner and exile as a result of the revival process. 

143

CHAPTER IV 

THE REVIVAL PROCESS: A POMAK LIFE OF DISSENT AMIDST CULTURAL OPPRESSION IN 

COMMUNIST BULGARIA 

Synopsis 

Revival process was the euphemistic term for the comprehensive policy of the communist 

regime in Bulgaria (1944-1989) to involuntarily replace the Arab-Turkish names of the Bulgarian 

Muslims (Pomaks) with appellations of Orthodox Christian significance during the 1960s and 1970s. 

This wholesale assimilation generated a profound disturbance in the Pomak community. Within two 

decades, a people with markedly Muslim identity were forced to rethink their way of life to comply 

with the regime’s demands for a culturally uniform nation. The underlying assimilation rationale was 

that as descendants of Christian Bulgarians, the Pomaks could not profess Islam and still be true 

Bulgarians. The regime imposed a radical transformation of Pomak identity which, in turn, provoked 

equally intense opposition. People struggled to come to terms with the new communist reality by 

either adjusting to it or by suffering the consequences of dissent via mistreatment, imprisonment, 

often death, and constant harassment. The revival process is a defining moment in Pomak history that 

calls for scholarly attention and remembering. This chapter builds an abstract portrait of the Pomak 

multitude that suffered the turmoil, survived it and made their choice of identity based on that 

experience. Ramadan Runtov’s story, acquired through interviews, is the focal point of the analysis 

because his life of a dissenter, political prisoner and forced émigré constitutes the ultimate 

expression of personal dissent and the collective Pomak struggle for self-preservation. The 

overlapping accounts of other interviewees, obtained independently, and relevant archival 

documentation, lend indispensable support to the storyline. 

Meeting Ramadan 

144

I met Ramadan in May 2007 while in Turkey conducting dissertation research that focuses 

on the Pomak Muslims of Bulgaria. Even though I knew that Pomak exiles lived in Turkey, I did not 

expect to meet so many of them in Istanbul. My guide in the city was Fikrie, a Pomak student at one of 

the local universities, who also came from my home town of Valkossel in southwestern Bulgaria. 

Because of Fikrie’s status as a student, I largely anticipated to be speaking with other students about 

the way they coped with life in a foreign country. When I turned up in Istanbul, however, life 

unraveled for me in fulfilling twists and turns. One of those was Fikrie’s connection to the village of 

Figure 4-1: On the University of Marmara’s campus, Istanbul (Turkey) 

One of the first things I did when I arrived in Istanbul in the summer of 2007 was to visit 

Fikrie’s campus. In this photograph, I am (in the middle) on the University of Marmara’s 

campus hanging out with Fikrie (right) and her friends (one of them in the picture, the rest 

having a good laugh while taking it). 

Kornitsa (her mother was from there), near Valkossel, where my informant Ramadan was born. 

Because of the forced assimilation of the Muslims during the communist period, many Pomaks were 

either expelled from Bulgaria for opposing the revival process or voluntarily left the country once the 

regime collapsed in 1989. Their primary destination was Turkey, a predominantly Muslim country. 

145

As a result, many Pomaks live throughout western Turkey today, notably in Istanbul and along the 

coast of Asia Minor. Indeed, I discovered a whole Pomak community in Istanbul, all coming from the 

Rhodopes Mountains of southwest Bulgaria, the Pomak stronghold in the country. Numbering in the 

hundreds, they all live within city blocks from each other in the suburb of Güneşli, on the Asiatic side 

of Istanbul. Ramadan was the seventy-seven-year-old patriarch of the Runtov’s clan comprised of his 

wife, three sons and their son’s families, dwelling within walking distance of one another. When 

Fikrie introduced me to her relatives from Bulgaria, they sat down with me to collectively discuss 

who the best people to approach were. From the lone nerve-racking venture I had expected, my 

research project was becoming a communal enterprise. Everybody agreed that I should be 

introduced to Ramadan Runtov. The next day, my hostess for the day, Ava, and I headed toward his 

home. After a short meandering walk, we rang the doorbell of a house to be admitted by an elderly, 

tall, and somewhat stern-looking man: Ramadan Runtov himself. Being invited in, we sat on sofas 

covered with familiar woolen bedspread, likely hand-crafted by Ramadan’s own wife and brought 

over from the ancestral home in Bulgaria. With the mandatory black Turkish coffee before us, 

Ramadan and I settled down for a quiet interview. 

I was slightly apprehensive about how to begin the conversation, because I did not want to 

appear intrusive, ignorant, or otherwise unprepared. Starting with an explanation that I was 

conducting a dissertation research on the Pomak community, a topic severely lacking in scholarly 

attention, I said to my host: “I heard that you went through a lot during the revival process. Would 

you care to answer a few questions while I record?” “Go right ahead!” instantly came the cordial 

answer. “Ask! Record! Whatever you want! It’s all right with me. I want this to be known; young 

people should know their heritage.” 1 From this point onward, Ramadan embarked on a narrative that 

recounted the struggles of his life. I did not have to say much until the very end, three hours later. 

When he finished, the coffee was cold in my cup, and I was sitting there pondering the richness and 

1 Ramadan Runtov, interview by author, Istanbul, Turkey, May 21, 2007. (Translated from Bulgarian by the 

author.) 

Note: Unless otherwise indicated, all the quotes are from the interview with Ramadan Runtov. 

146

anguish of one man’s life. He stood before me quietly smiling and apparently untroubled by 

bitterness and resentment. 

The Revival-Process Ordeal 

The revival process was only the last of a series of forced assimilations of Slavic-speaking 

Muslims in Bulgaria, better known as Bulgarian Muslims or Pomaks. Because they speak Bulgarian 

language as their mother tongue, unlike the Turkish Muslims of Bulgaria, the ruling elites have 

always promoted the Pomaks as ethnic Bulgarians whose Christian forefathers were once forcibly 

Islamized by the Ottoman Turks. It is this claim that justified the assimilation efforts. Indeed, 

restoring the Pomaks to their rightful faith, even against their will, became a patriotic obligation to 

the Bulgarian nation. The historically strained Christian-Muslim relations in Bulgaria are a direct 

concomitant of the country’s past as the heartland of the Islamic Ottoman Empire. The Turks 

conquered the Balkans in the late 1300s and held most of the peninsula well into the nineteenth 

century. Under Ottoman rule, the Orthodox Christian population, along with other religious groups, 

(including the Bulgarians) was organized in millets – self-governing religious communities, generally 

categorized as rayah, non-Muslims. Under the public law of Islam, Shari’a, non-Muslims were not 

equal to Muslims and the former were largely barred from upward administrative, political, and 

military mobility. After Bulgaria’s independence of 1878, the now prevailing Christian majority 

sought to suppress the formerly dominant Muslims. In a bid to consolidate the nation-state, 

politically as well as territorially, the authorities embarked on converting the Muslim population. 

They especially targeted the Pomaks who shared language and Slavic origins with the national 

majority. 2 

2 For a detailed account of the Pomak assimilation, see Chapters II and III. 

147

Figure 4-2: Ramadan Runtov 

Ramadan Runtov, also known as Ramadan Kurucu, is holding a book that had recently 

publicized many painful revival-process memories, including Ramadan’s own. Istanbul 

Turkey, 21 May 2007. (Photograph by the author) 

The forced Pomak assimilation has been an evolutionary process, pursued by different 

Bulgarian regimes at various stages of government, which were repeatedly aborted and resumed 

depending on political circumstances. The first comprehensive Christianization– better known as 

pokrastvane—happened in 1912-1913. In the midst of an ongoing war, 3 thousands of Pomaks were 

3 The Balkan Wars were initially fought by Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro against their former 

occupier Ottoman Turkey, and subsequently by Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro against Bulgaria, which had 

taken most of the Ottoman territories the formerly allied foursome sought to acquire (see Chapter II as well as 

Foreword). 

148

forced to formally renounce their Islamic faith and to convert to Orthodox Christianity. The affair was 

short-lived, however, and abruptly ended when Pomak protests drew the attention of the 

international community. Subsequent Bulgarian governments, in conjunction with the Orthodox 

Church, made similar moves against the Pomaks in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s by means of both 

violence and persuasion. Government-employed teachers and Christian missionaries called on the 

Pomaks to accept the “true faith” of their forefathers and permanently rejoin the ethnic Bulgarian 

body. When persuasion proved futile, however, Bulgarian gendarmerie and Christian posses stepped 

in to brutalize the population. 4 The Nazi-allied monarchic regime of Bulgaria launched its successive 

attempt to convert the Pomaks in the period 1938-1944. 

In the eve of the Second World War, Ramadan Runtov was a young boy who experienced the 

excesses of the last pre-communist conversion of the Pomak population. “I was eight-year old in 

1938, when they began to bully us again,” he reminisces. 

They forbade us to wear fezzes [the traditional Ottoman male headdress in those days]. I 

attended school back then and I would go to school with a fezz ... And there was this man, 

Boriss Baldevski, from the [Bulgarian] gendarmerie. On two occasions he took my fezz and 

cut it to pieces with his knife. Then, in the freezing cold, I would wrap a scarf around my 

head to be able to go to school. But they would snatch my scarf, too, and tramp it in the mud. 

In 1944, in the heat of the war, the Soviet army occupied Bulgaria and installed in power a 

relatively small group of Marxist and Leninist adherents, who subsequently formed the puppet 

communist government of Bulgaria. Fierce persecution of opposition activists and supporters of the 

previous dynastic regime began immediately. Thousands of inconvenient persons and organizations 

were labeled “fascist” and put to their death by a specially created extra-judicial body, dubbed “the 

people’s court.” The political witch-hunt was a matter of survival for the fledgling communist 

government as it grappled to establish control of the country. 5 As Bulgaria had a sizeable Muslim 

population, the new regime embarked on gaining their support. It won the Pomaks simply by 

aborting the conversion and reinstating their traditional names. 

4 For more information, see Chapter II. Also, read the compilation of original documents on the Christianization 

of 1912-1913 published under the editorship of Drs. Velichko Georgiev and Stayko Trifonov, eds. Pokrastvaneto 

na Bulgarite Mohamedani 1912-1913 /The Christianization of the Bulgarian Mohammedans 1912-1913/ (Sofia: 

Prof. Marin Drinov Publ., 1995). (In Bulgarian). 

5 Georgi Markov, Zadochni reportaji ot Balgaria /In-Absentia Reports of Bulgaria/ (Sofia: Profizdat, 1990). 

149

Acting as Muslim benefactors allowed the communists to jumpstart two critical 

developments. They not only expanded their support base among the Pomaks, but also conveniently 

suppressed formidable political opponents by linking them to the pokrastvane and, thus, branding 

them fascist. Among the latter group were prominent politicians, publicists, and members of the 

Organization Rodina – an entity that practically carried out the 1938-1944 Christianization. 6 Only a 

decade later, however, the regime would not only rehabilitate prominent Rodina activists, but also 

eulogize their former “fascist” activities as “patriotic.” By that the time, the communist leadership 

was planning its own crusade against the Muslims. 7 

By the mid-1950s, the communists had stabilized their grip on power and could comfortably 

consider reversing their policy toward the Pomak minority. The emerging communist nationalism 

saw the large number of Muslims in the country, comprising about one-fifth of roughly seven million 

people, as a malignant cancer within – what ought to have been – a culturally uniform nation. 

Thereafter, the pressure began on Pomak men and women to rid themselves of the traditional attire 

in favor of more modern clothing, to substitute their traditional Turkish-Arab names with Bulgarian- 

Orthodox ones, and to abandon any and all religious practices. 8 Especially affected by the 

assimilation politics were young Pomak army conscripts. 9 

From 1951 to 1953, young Ramadan Runtov was serving his mandatory military service. In 

Bulgaria, all Muslim youths were assigned to labor units, with limited access to weapons and military 

training. Instead, they did construction, mining, and other strenuous and hazardous activities. 10 

Nevertheless, it was a time of optimism for Ramadan who believed that better days were ahead after 

6 For details on the pokrastvane, see Chapters II and III. 

7 Based on original documents produced and circulated by various agencies of the communist party of Bulgaria, 

including Politburo, which took part in the revival process. Specifically, Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 1, 

Inventories 39-40, Archival Units, passim. (Courtesy of Central National Archives-Sofia.) 

8 Ali Eminov, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria, (New York: Routledge, 1997), 99-111; Ali Eminov, 

“Social Construction of Identities: Pomaks in Bulgaria,” JEMIE 6 (2007) 2. 

9 Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 1, Inventories 39-40, Archival Units, passim; Ramadan Runtov, interview. 

10 Report of Prof. Georgi Galabov, chairing the committee in charge of implementing the revival process to the 

“Propaganda and Persuasion” department of the central committee of the communist party, circa 1963. Central 

National Archives-Sofia, Fond 1, Inventory 40, Archival Unit 12, page 4. (Translated from Bulgarian by the 

author.) 

150

having witnessed the pre-communist conversion. When he was offered the rare chance to advance as 

a construction supervisor in the army, he seized the opportunity. The communist regime, on the 

other hand, needed young enthusiasts like Ramadan to win over the disillusioned Pomak population. 

In 1953, Ramadan officially became a member of the communist party. While in the army, however, 

he also received his first taste of what was coming. One day, a group of ethnic Turkish soldiers were 

brought to his army unit. “One major brought the boys,’ Ramadan said, “but he never knew I was a 

Muslim myself.” 

‘Sergeant,’ he said, ‘these are Turks. Five hundred years they oppressed us. Now, you’ve got 

to bleed them dry with work.’… That night, I introduced myself to the guys. ‘My name is 

Ramadan. Fear not. From now on we’ll cope with everything together.’ They looked at me in 

disbelief at first, but then went all at once: ‘Hey, brother, they’ve wasted us with work 

already. We’ve been cutting paving stones in a quarry day and night. By night, they make us 

build fires to keep working.’ 11 

By 1958, the communist harassment of Pomak Muslims in the Rhodopes commenced. 

Thereafter, Ramadan’s ordeal as a junior party member began, too. The first order of business for the 

regime was to force Pomak women to adopt a more revealing dress style instead of the conservative 

broad trousers and light headscarves. Pomak communists like Ramadan had to serve as personal 

example by obligating their wives first to wear dresses or skirt-and-shirt combinations. As most 

people defined their identity in terms of religion, however, they resisted participation in the revival 

affairs. Ramadan not only refused to serve as a personal example, but also dissuaded others from 

succumbing to pressure. In the early 1960s, the revival process took a nasty turn. Coercion was 

especially disturbing in the three adjacent villages of the Western Rhodopes – Kornitsa, Breznitsa, 

and Lajnitsa. 12 

Trouble in Kornitsa 

Communist bureaucrats, assisted by police (hereafter militsia) and civilian volunteers, 

routinely harassed Pomak villages in the Rhodopes, southwest Bulgaria. Because these early revival 

11 Ramadan Runtov, interview. 

12 Ibid. Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 1, Inventories 39-40, Archival Units, passim. 

151

efforts targeted first and foremost women, 13 it was also women who offered the first open resistance. 

One day, a group of communist apparatchiks, escorted by militsia, arrived in Kornitsa (Ramadan’s 

village). Hoping to prevent bloodshed, Ramadan advised the village men to take cover in attics and 

cellars while the women and children stayed out. The women armed themselves with wooden boards 

with sharp nails spiking out. These were to serve as the first line of defense before the men could 

come to their aid, if need be. Having learnt from an informer what awaited them in Kornitsa, 14 

however, the revivalists walked straight into the mayor’s office upon arrival and remained there. 

Everybody in the village waited. Gradually, the women started gathering in front of the 

council. I could see everything from behind a stairwell. The women above roared: “Dogs! Get 

out! What do you want from us!” For a while, nobody came out. Then Shopov, the lieutenant, 

and Nanchev, the mayor, showed up. The lieutenant pulled his pistol out and shot in the air 

once or twice. At that moment, ago Bayram’s daughter, Amideyka, took her board out and 

walked toward the lieutenant: “Shoot here, dog, [pointing at her chests]! Shoot here!’ He 

slowly backed up and disappeared behind the door. No one came out again that day. 

It was, thus, quickly over in Kornitsa in 1960 (?). 15 The attempt to force women into new 

attire in the neighboring village of Breznitsa days after the Kornitsa affair also failed. However, 

before they dispatched revivalists to the village, the authorities detained the young hodja (hoca, 

religious teacher) of Breznitsa, hoping that by forcing him first to renounce name and religion, others 

would follow suit. According to Ramadan, they threatened him that unless his wife adopted the dress, 

they would not release him. When the women of Breznitsa heard of the arrest, they started 

convening at the lower extremity of the village. As a jeep-load of revivalists headed toward Breznitsa, 

with the hodja, they stumbled upon an access road blocked by women. Forcing the vehicle to a stop, 

these self-styled amazons surrounded the revivalists, and Ava Darvova shattered the windshield with 

a bludgeon. The women then collectively pulled the hodja out of the jeep and safely escorted him 

home. “The militsia just stood there stupefied and did nothing,” Ramadan reports. 

13 Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 1, Inventories 39-40, Archival Units, passim (see Chapter III). 

Also, Eminov, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria, 99-111; Eminov, “Social Construction of 

Identities: Pomaks in Bulgaria,” passim. 


15 Even though Ramadan did not recall the exact year, it must have been 1960, because it is the year registered in 

the collective local memory as the time of forced resettlement, when the communist regime evicted many Pomak 

families from their ancestral homes in the Rhodopes, scattering them throughout Bulgaria. Also, by 1964-- the 

time of another assimilation attempt, Ramadan had already been exiled from Kornitsa. 

152

As a member of the communist party, the regime expected Ramadan to cooperate with their 

revival efforts. Having repeatedly failed to comply with their instructions, however, the authorities 

began to harass him. They systematically summoned Ramadan to the local police station, where the 

regime’s efforts to secure his cooperation progressed from verbal to physical abuse. On one occasion, 

he reported to the office of the local agent of State Security, who “immediately took his coat off, threw 

it on the chair, shut off the window blinds, locked the door,” and proceeded to strike Ramadan, who 

was still standing by the door. “If you hit me one more time,” he gasped in exasperation, “I will throw 

you out of the window or my name is not Ramadan…. I’ll throw you out of that window and you’ll 

burst like a pumpkin down there. They may cut me to pieces afterwards, but you won’t be sound 

either.” 

you on the spot.” 

As Ramadan took a step toward his abuser, the latter pulled his pistol out, “Stop or I’ll shoot 

Shoot if you dare, you, son of a bitch! Is this what you’ve learnt from Communism!? In fifteen 

years of people’s government, you’ve learnt to be murderers! Yours is no Communism. 

You’ve completely distorted Lenin’s directives. What did Lenin say, huh? Everyone has the 

right to be Communist regardless of religion or language. But what are you doing!? 

Then lowering his gun, the agent snapped, “‘Why are you agitating the people!?’” 16 

As the pressure on Pomak Muslims to change their names intensified, Ramadan renounced 

his membership in the communist party and began to speak out against the revival process. 

Moreover, his determination to encourage people to resist grew stronger. In 1961/62, his family, 

along with many others labeled “troublemakers,” was exiled hundreds of kilometers away from the 

ancestral home and community, from southwest to central Bulgaria. But even in exile, there was no 

respite for Ramadan. As the communist regime moved to change Muslim names in 1964, equipped 

with his ancestors’ identification papers, Ramadan went from one state institution to another trying 

to prove that they had historically borne Muslim names, not the Christian ones the government was 

forcing on the Pomaks. He even initiated a civil litigation challenging the constitutionality of the 

revival process only to be curtly informed by the judge that there was nothing he could do to stop it. 17 


17 Ibid. 

153

Figure 4-3: Ramadan with his family, circa 1959-1960 

Ramadan with his wife (left) and two infant sons (the third had not been born yet), and his 

two sisters (right and back) in Kornitsa, the Rhodopes, before being exiled to Dolno Izvorovo, 

central Bulgaria. (Courtesy of Ramadan Runtov.) 

In October 1964, Ramadan received visitors from his home village with the news that 

Kornitsa and the adjacent Pomak communities were surrounded by a revivalist force of local 

bureaucrats, militsia (police), and civilian (Christian) zealots. Scores of people fled into the woods as 

a result, and were now unsheltered, starving, and ailing for days under the relentless, cold autumnal 

154

ain. 18 It was a group of these refugees who travelled hundreds of kilometers to Ramadan’s new 

home in central Bulgaria to seek counsel and help. The same day, Ramadan took them to the Turkish 

consulate in Sofia. As he delivered the news, the consul exclaimed: “How’s that possible? Here are 

your witnesses. Ask them. Eighty people are hiding in the woods. They haven’t eaten in three days. 

They have nothing. These people will starve to death or die of cold.” The consul picked up the phone, 

and Ramadan heard him reporting the news to Ankara. Shortly afterwards, a fax came through, and 

the consul encouraged the group to go home with the reassurance that the renaming would stop. 

By the time the men reached Kornitsa on foot a few days later, the blockade had been lifted. 

The whole revival affair had already been aborted, and people were vigorously tearing off the very 

same declarations they had signed earlier, ostensibly requesting to take new names. The same was 

happening in the nearby village of Ribnovo, where the communist authorities made quite dramatic 

appearance both to appease as well as intimidate the population. According to a widely circulated 

story, the regime flew a helicopter into Ribnovo. As it landed on the fields just outside the village, 

however, the whole population came together resolved to let no revivalist in the village. 

“Whatever you have to say to us, say it here?” the people insisted. “We won’t do anything to you. Go 

home!” 19 Indeed, for the time being this was the end of the forced assimilation against the wider 

Pomak community. As oral and documentary evidence suggests, the combined factors of external 

pressure from Turkey and the regime’s own qualms about the stability of their government as early 

as 1964 temporarily halted the revival process. 20 

However, the ordeal was just beginning for Ramadan Runtov. As he collected petitions 

against the forced assimilation and submitted them to the Turkish consulate in Bulgaria, hence, 

making the affair known to the outside world, Bulgaria’s communist regime grew nervously irate. 

“We had put together an organization of sort,” Ramadan explained to me, “We (Muslims) were 

coming together from everywhere, doing prayers, discussing [the revival process] and collecting 

18 Ismail Byalkov, interview by author, Istanbul, Turkey, May 20, 2007. Also, Ramadan Runtov, interview. 

19 Ibid. 

20 Ibid.; Ramadan Runtov, interview; Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 1, Inventories 38-40, Archival Units, 

passim. 

155

petitions, which I then took to the Turkish consulate in Sofia or Plovdiv. I was delivering petitions to 

the consulate every Friday; Friday was a day for rest and prayers, and I was delivering petitions, too. 

On one occasion I took a petition to the consulate with 3,800 signatures collected from across the 

[Muslim] villages. … [W]e were protesting. We wanted to let everybody know what was happening 

[in Bulgaria] and that it was against our will. So we took our petitions to the Turkish consulate.” 21 

For Ramadan and the wider Pomak community, most of the 1960s passed in protesting, 

anxious waiting, and toiling on the land for economic survival. Whereas Ramadan made a living for 

his wife, three sons and himself as a construction worker and farmer in central Bulgaria, most Pomak 

families in the Rhodopes grew tobacco as a cash crop. Then came the 1970s. “It was May 11, 1972. 

This I vividly remember.” Ramadan reminisces. “I was working for this Bulgarian [Christian] in one 

village. He was a communist, a member of the local party committee. We had a good relationship, 

though, he and I. One day he bluntly warned me: “Ramadan, don’t show up for work tomorrow. They 

are conspiring to arrest you and change your name.” Thus began the most harrowing chapter of 

Ramadan’s and most Pomaks’ life in communist Bulgaria: the final and complete revivalization. This 

bold move occurred in response to fundamental political changes within the larger communist bloc. 

After Joseph Stalin’s death in 1953, the new Soviet Union’s leader Nikita Khrushchev 

denounced Stalin and eliminated his cult of personality, thus, ushering in a gradual process of easing 

of dictatorial rule across Eastern Europe. As a result, by the late 1960s, such reform-minded 

communist leaders as Czechoslovakia’s head of state Alexander Dubček embarked on political and 

economic democratization of the country. The liberalization and decentralization of the 

administrative authority in Czechoslovakia, however, did not sit well with the Soviet Union, which 

saw in it a dangerous precedent for the rest of the communist bloc and a direct threat to its total 

dominance over the communist states. Thus, in the spring of 1968, the Soviet army occupied the 

country, viciously crushing the budding Czechoslovakian democracy. (History poetically recorded 

this tragic event as the Prague Spring.) The Soviet brutality sent shockwaves across the region. 


156

Whereas most ordinary people, especially dissidents, trembled in fear and desperation, the loyal 

communist rulers of Eastern Europe, especially in Bulgaria, relished the sense of all-empowerment. 22 

By 1972, with firm confidence in their absolute authority, the Bulgarian communist party relaunched 

the revival process. Moreover, the regime was determined to complete the renaming of the 

Pomaks once and for all. In his place of political exile in the village of Dolno Izvorovo, Kazanluk 

Region (central Bulgaria), Ramadan resumed his anti-revivalism out of necessity. As Pomak villages 

were once more besieged by heavily armed troops, militsia, and patriotic civilians—on a much larger 

and more aggressive scale—Ramadan and his co-villagers organized the defense of Dolno Izvorovo. 

However, just as the regime was determined to successfully conclude the name changing, so were the 

Pomak dissenters prepared to resist. As the menace of forced assimilation loomed larger, the 

villagers armed themselves with farm implements, wooden boards, extra gasoline, and even Molotov 

cocktails to defend themselves. 

In 1972, Ramadan’s anti-revivalism was taking place on two fronts, hundreds of kilometers 

apart: in his native village of Kornitsa, southwest Bulgaria, and in his place of exile, Dolno Izvorovo, 

central Bulgaria. Similar to many exiled Pomaks, Ramadan and his family kept in touch with Kornitsa 

and the wider Western Rhodopes through a network of relatives, friends, and co-villagers who 

travelled back and forth from southwest to central Bulgaria to visit with family members. As the 

danger of revivalism reemerged in the early 1970s, these visiting patterns acquired a new meaning. 

They effectively transformed into a network of reconnaissance and communication, where people 

exchanged information about what was taking place on the other end and coordinated their actions 

accordingly. A vocal opponent of the revival process and a respected member of the community, 

Ramadan soon transpired as one of the leaders of the Pomak organized resistance not only in his 

place of exile—Dolno Izvorovo, but also at home, in Kornitsa. 

Trouble in Exile 

In May 1972 trouble in Dolno Izvorovo began for the Pomak families that had been forcibly 

resettled from the Rhodopes in the early 1960s. In a determined effort to prevent the name changing, 

22 Markov, passim. 

157

the whole village populace got together to keep the revivalists at bay. In Dolno Izvorovo (Lower 

Izvorovo), just like in the Rhodopes, the Pomaks made a living by farming collectivized land to grow 

crops for little cash and personal consumption, as well as to graze a few heads of sheep and cattle. 

Most men supplemented their family income by doing construction work, while women worked in 

the local textile factories. There was a factory in the nearby village of Gorno Izvorovo (Upper 

Izvorovo), where most of the women from Ramadan’s village worked. And they were home from 

work by 10 o’clock every day. This particular day in May 1972, however, they were not. Already 

suspecting new assimilation moves, Ramadan immediately dispatched a youngster, in possession of a 

precious motorbike, on a reconnaissance mission: “Shaban, ride your bike to the factory and see 

what’s going on with the women!” Recognizing the urgency of the situation, Shaban returned 

promptly to report that the women were being held in the factory against their will. Ramadan and 

the rest of the village men hastily convened for a council. The first order of business was to barricade 

the main artery connecting the string of villages to the main provincial city of Kazanlak in order to 

ensure that the women would not be transported into town. In Kazanluk, with large militsia and 

army units, the anti-revivalist group would have no leverage at all to rescue their wives, daughters, or 

mothers. Adjacent to the men’s blockade position was a military base that housed a tank division. The 

soldiers were out on a drill that day—deliberately, according to Ramadan—to “scare the population,” 

and nip potential resistance in its bud. 

“So we stood there guarding the road, armed with wooden boards which had nails sticking 

out.” Ramadan explains. “And we stopped every vehicle to make sure that none of our women were 

inside. Then we let them go.” Whoever refused to comply, the men stopped by placing the boards 

along the width of the road so the vehicle’s tires would blow out. They stopped military cars as well. 

On one occasion, they forced the vehicle of a captain to a halt, who objected: “’What right do you have 

to stop military personnel?’ ‘We have every right.’” Ramadan replied for all of them, and the men 

proceeded with their business. “Then, we saw a jeep heading straight for the fields to avoid us...” But 

even before that, a young woman by the name Fatme, overlooked in the bathrooms, had managed to 

sneak out of the factory and had rushed to inform the men: “Ago Ramadan, all women are being held 

158

in the factory and they are getting ready to change their names.” So, Fatme was there when the jeep 

cut straight through the fields in an apparent attempt to escape the roadblock. 

In the vehicle, besides the driver, there were two men occupying the back seats. As Ramadan 

and his collaborators tried to question the driver over the maneuver, Fatme recognized the two 

passengers: “These two detained the women?” They were prominent local apparatchiks. While 

pondering over what to do with the two apparent revivalists, Ramadan’s group received the news 

that seven of their co-villagers—forest workers—had been arrested in the nearby village of Enina. 

After brief deliberation, Ramadan turned to the jeep’s occupants and made his proposition: “Listen, 

you see all these people here – children, women, and men? You see how many of us there are, right? 

Well, seven of our people have been arrested in Enina. We will let you go now, but if they are not 

reunited with us within the next hour and a half, this entire multitude--you see right here, in front of 

you—will be heading your way, to Enina. We will burn the council’s building down no matter how 

much militsia you have to protect you.” Indeed, before the deadline had expired, the seven foresters 

were safely back in Dolno Izvorovo, as well as the women. 

From May 11 to September 25 of 1972, the villagers stuck together awaiting the worst. For 

nearly five months, no man, woman, or child ventured out of the village. No one was able to work in 

the fields either. “All summer long we spent each night sticking together in someone’s house. The 

women slept indoors, and we--the men--napped outside while taking turns to patrol the village. We 

had to be alert at all times to make sure no intruders came in.” However, while Ramadan’s village was 

arming with farm implements, kitchen utensils, and Molotov cocktails, “a couple of snitches among us 

… had been informing the authorities of all we did,” Ramadan tells me. Meanwhile the crops, planted 

in the spring, were rotting in the fields without being harvested. As the agricultural cooperative grew 

anxious about the empty granary, they spoke to the local bureaucrats of the urgency to harvest the 

crops and the need to postpone the revival process. The authorities apparently relented and took 

steps to convince the wretched population that no renaming would take place if they resumed their 

farm work. Thus, on September 25, 1972, “the women began harvesting the crops, while the men 

went back to construction.” Life continued more or less peacefully in Dolno Izvorovo until February 

159

12, 1973, when the harassment resumed and the name changing was formally finalized. 23 While 

seemingly reconciled, most Pomaks accepted identity papers with new names, but continued to use 

their traditional names among each other. 24 The ordeal for those like Ramadan, however, who 

refused to take Bulgarian names, was just beginning. 

Bloody Revival in the Rhodopes 

If the Pomak renaming in Dolno Izvorovo, and elsewhere, went without major incidents, it 

was not the case in Kornitsa. As the regime stepped up with the revival process, guns were fired and 

blood was spilt in the Pomak stronghold of the Rhodopes. Drawing from the experience of Dolno 

Izvorovo of 1972 and using the visiting/reconnaissance network, Ramadan Runtov encouraged the 

population of Kornitsa to resist by sticking together and by letting no revivalist force in the village. 

Although the regime restricted his movement to the village of Dolno Izvorovo and its vicinity only, 

Ramadan was able to send instructions, along with anti-revivalist literature, to Kornitsa through 

various visiting family members. 

Thus, facing guns yet again in 1973, the people of Kornitsa met the fully armed intruders 

with clubs, knives, and domestic implements, as Dolno Izvorovo had done nearly a year earlier. They 

barricaded the village and did not let anybody in. For six days, a 1996 news clipping attests, the 

population managed to ward off the revivalists and to keep the renaming at bay. “The reason for the 

1973 revolt of the Pomaks,” the article confirms, “was the name changing. It made the Hassans into 

Ivans, the Ahmeds into Assens and so on. And Kornitsa did not like that.” On the night of March 28, 

“about 2,000 horse police were thrown against us! But people of the neighboring villages Lajnitsa 

and Breznitsa came to our aid,” the then mayor of Kornitsa, Bayram Zul, is quoted as saying. Five 

people were killed during these events. According to the official version, cited by the news clipping, 

they had fallen victims to ricocheting bullets or were stampeded by the crowd. But eyewitnesses had 




1978, and numbered 005805, pages 60-80. Central National Archives-Sofia, pages 71-73. (Translated from 


160

a different story to tell. “They killed Ismail a few days later,’ recounts a relative of the late Ismail, 

‘[after he refused to sign a declaration to change his name].’ … ‘They killed my father without reason,’ 

says the 28-year-old Shazie …‘They buried the bodies somewhere along the [Greek] border. These 

people never received proper burial.’ 25 

Figure 4-4: A commemorative monument in the village of Kornitsa 

A monument in the center of Kornitsa today commemorates the death of 69-year-old 

Moharem Bargan, 45-year-old Hussein Karaalil, 35-year-old Salih Amidein, 22-year-old Tefik 

Hadji of Breznitsa and 50-year-old Ismail Kalyor. 26 

The inscription reads: “Always alive in our hearts. In memory of those killed as a result of the 

assimilatory politics of the communist regime, March 1973. Hussein Karaalil, Moharem 

Bargan, Salih Amidein, Tefik Hadji, Ismail Kalyuor.” 27 (Courtesy of Mustafa Bayalk) 

25 Pavlina Trifonova, “Kornitsa pak izpravi na nokti Bulgaria” /”Kornitsa Made Bulgaria Nervous Again.”/ Sega 

Newspaper, Issue 13 of 4-10 April 1996, pp. 22-23. 

26 Kornitsa.com. (Also, ibid.) 

161

Another news clipping, clearly reflecting the communist version of the story, confirms the 

bloodshed in Kornitsa and attests to Ramadan’s involvement in orchestrating the resistance. These 

“most dramatic and tragic” events in Kornitsa happened only because “Ramadan Runtov had 

established an illegal organization there. … He was persuading the villagers not to change their name 

and to insist that they were Turks [Muslims]. … He was distributing brochures … that made 

allegations of killing and rape of Muslims in our country.” 28 

Figure 4-5: Ismail Kalyuor of Breznitsa died as a result of the events of March 1973 

(Courtesy of Mehmed Byukli) 

Among other things, the author of the article Boncho Assenov effectively reveals how the 

rioting began in Kornitsa. In January 1973, Pomak employees of the local agriculture and forestry 

cooperatives were summoned to Gotse Delchev, the regional administrative center, supposedly on 

work-related matters. Upon returning to Kornitsa, however, these people claimed to have been 

27 Translated from Bulgarian by the author. 

28 Boncho Assenov, “Kakvo stana prez 1973 godina?”/ “What happened in 1973?”/ Sega Newspaper, Issue 13 of 

4-10 April 1996, p. 23. 

162

eaten into signing declaration to change their names. Thereafter, remembering the turbulent 1964, 

Kornitsa immediately went on the defensive. Everything began on January 23, 1973, as Assenov 

accurately notes, when a (Christian) militsioner (communist policeman) allegedly travelled to 

Kornitsa to see a friend. The more likely explanation for this ill-timed journey, however, appears to 

have been spying. But true intents aside, the villagers – clearly suspicious – did not let him into 

Kornitsa. Then, allegedly without any reason, the entire Pomak populace of Kornitsa suddenly 

refused to work in the fields, stopped their children from attending school, and completely shut 

themselves in. Moreover, they started congregating on the public square in organized round-theclock 

vigils, apparently armed with pocket knives, kitchen knives, axes, clubs, and even two pistols, as 

Assenov explains referencing the items confiscated after the renaming. They had also set up signals 

of communications with the neighboring villages of Lajnitsa and Breznitsa, which, according to the 

author, “had promised to come to their aid.” Aid against what and whom, the question arises, if 

indeed the regime did not plan to carry out the revival process, as Assenov maintains. Ultimately he 

solves the problem by charging Ramadan Runtov with establishing an “illegal organization” in 

Kornitsa from hundreds of kilometers away, in exile, and taking “control of the village for two months 

practically setting a pro-Turkish government with almost military regime.” Thus, Assenov—similar 

to many other “patriots” in Bulgaria—blames the brutal renaming in Kortnitsa of 1973 on people’s 

opposition, not on the heavily armed troops, militsia, and civilians enforcing the revival process. 29 

Having organized the supply of firewood during the two-month-long vigil on Kornitsa’s 

public square, Ismail Byalkov (a former political prisoner) relates an altogether different version. I 

interviewed Ismail just hours before I met with Ramadan Runtov in May 2007, and neither had been 

aware of my research or me until the moment I knocked on their doors. I interviewed them 

independently, and received the same general storyline of the events in Kornitsa: Ismail as he 

witnessed them, and Ramadan as he learnt about them from deliberate envoys, keeping the 

connection between Dolno Izvorovo and the Rhodopes. Thus, on January 23, 1973, as Ismail 

recounts, the village population was assembled on the public square. When the authorities first 

29 Ibid. 

163

arrived in Kornitsa, they tried to pressure all local party members and salaried individuals to take 

part in the renaming. As the people remained on the square frightened but reluctant to change their 

names, so did the authorities. “If they had left [Kornitsa],” Ismail says, “the people would have 

dispersed and that might have been the end of it.” But it was not to be. Awaiting the worst, the whole 

Pomak population of Kornitsa clung to each other for support inside the village, while an assortment 

of troops, militsia, fire brigades, and armed civilians were laying siege on them from the outside. 

Figure 4-6: At Ismail’s 

Once Fikrie (the student from my hometown who met me in Istanbul) introduced me to the 

Pomak community in the suburb of Güneşli, my dissertation research in Istanbul became a 

communal enterprise. In the photo (from left to right): Ibrahim Byalkov, his father Ismail 

Byalkov (my informant), Ibrahim’s wife, and my Güneşli hostess Ava Cesur (right) with her 

teenage daughter, as well as a neighbor and good friend of Ava’s with her little girl who tagged 

along (unfortunately, their names escape me)—all originally from Bulgaria. (Photograph by the 

author) 

This tense state of affairs continued from January 23 to March 28, 1973. The whole village 

had gathered on the public square and remained there throughout that time. “We stayed put day and 

night, in snow and rain, all of us: children and adults. We were building big fires to keep warm. We 

164

slept in shifts: while some slept, the rest kept vigil!” recalls Ismail. He and a few other men were 

responsible for collecting firewood to maintain the fires. Then, on the morning of March 28, 1973, the 

village was surrounded by a combined force of horseback police, fire brigades, and plainclothes. 30 As 

Ismail explains, “[t]hey were all dressed in civilian clothes: fire brigades …everyone. Now, whether 

they were civilians from the neighboring [Christian] villages or militsia, I couldn’t tell. Very few of 

them wore [military] uniforms; they were on horses. But those that did the beating wore plain 

clothes. … [T]here were loads of them. The whole village was surrounded.” 31 

As bullets began to rain on the multitude on March 28, “the whole square was smeared in 

blood,” Ismail tells me. After terrifying the population to numbness, wounding scores, and leaving 

five dead, the regime began the arrests. Everyone spotted on the public square was rounded up and 

stuffed in a building used at the time as a sports club in Kornitsa. When they were brought in, the 

people were lined up along the wall, facing inwards. According to Ismail’s testimony, a wrestling ring 

occupied the center of the sports club’s interior and a pond of blood had already formed in the 

middle of it – “blood from the beatings.” “There was so much blood there that you could scoop it with 

a bucket. I saw this with my own eyes: When they took me in, I saw two individuals, naked from the 

waste up, each wielding a club, just waiting for someone to move or shift position to strike.” Ismail 

immediately noticed the person standing near the door—Uruch Bachev of Breznitsa (a neighboring 

village), because his cheek was slashed open and a piece of the flesh was dangling about. As the 

regional militsia chief, Stoychev, walked in, the wounded man addressed him: “Comrade Stoychev, I 

gave blood yesterday and I lost more today … Can I sit down?” When given leave to do so, another 

person asked: “May I sit down?” but immediately received a blow to the head. Ismail just saw the 

man collapsing to the floor. From where he stood, he could not recognize who he was. The man 

survived that day. Whereas Ismail avoided a beating in the sports club, he was nevertheless arrested 

and endured six years of harsh treatment as a political prisoner. “That’s what happened [ in 1973 in 

Kornitsa], Fatme!” my informant concludes. “And all this was video-taped. The authorities 

30 Eminov, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria, passim; Trifonova, passim; National Archives-Sofia, 

Fond 1, Inventories 38-40, Archival Units, passim; Ramadan Runtov, interview. 

31 Ismail Byalkov, interview. 

165

documented everything, but it will probably never see the light of day. They had brought a big video 

camera with them and filmed everything. I saw that personally.” 32 

Thus, in spite of the bloodshed and probably because of it, the regime finalized the revival 

process. By 1974, the Pomaks had acquired new identities. Their Bulgarian-Christian names now had 

to appear on all identification papers, including passports, birth certificates, and savings accounts. 

Those without proper documentation not only could not access their salaries, pensions, or bank 

accounts, but also they faced unemployment, fines, and even imprisonment. 33 

Prison Tribulations 

1. Arrest, Detention, and Trial 

Singled out as particularly dangerous, the communist regime lost no time in detaining 

Ramadan, along with his closest collaborators. His arrest was most carefully organized. In 1973, 

Ramadan and his crew were working on a construction site, when an army jeep with two or three 

individuals approached him. “Ramadan, you’ll have to come with us to take measurements for a new 

construction site in Sheynovo, so we can go ahead with digging out the foundation.” When Ramadan 

picked up his instruments and got into one of the jeep’s back seats, he noticed that the vehicle’s 

interior was blackened out. As they drove off, Ramadan heard one of the men, who had come to 

collect him, transmitting on the radio that they had left the site with him. They indeed took Ramadan 

to Sheynovo, where he put the foundation markers for a new building. But when the jeep drove out of 

Sheynovo and into the deserted fields, a traffic police stopped them. “Everyone out!” they ordered. 

“We need to inspect the vehicle.” As soon as Ramadan scrambled out of the dark interior of the jeep 

and into the blinding daylight, two of the militsioners (policemen) immediately restrained his arms 

twisting them backwards. In his initial fright, he managed to extricate himself from the captors’ grip 

to be instantly overpowered by others. At that moment, “I felt a stinging pain in my [lower] leg …” 

Ramadan explains. “They must have struck me with a piece of metal or something. To this day I have 

a scar there. Squatting down to protect myself, I felt blood streaming down my leg. Then—what 

32 Ibid. 

33 Eminov, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria, 107. 

166

seemed to me like—a whole crowd – civilians, militsia, and two dogs – ganged on me. And—My 

God!—in their eyes it looked as if they’d caught this Big Enemy!” After restraining him, Ramadan’s 

abductors blindfolded him, pushed him at the back of the jeep, covered his head with a blanket, and 

took him to the police station in Stara Zagora. “When we arrived in Stara Zagora, there was a crowd 

of journalists waiting to photograph me. Yeah! They had caught The Big Enemy!” Ramadan laughs. 

What transpired that day was rather bizarre to Ramadan. Perceiving himself of no particular 

importance as a political dissenter, he was totally taken aback by the publicity given to his arrest and 

even more puzzled by the great lengths to which the regime went to detain him. “They could have 

taken me any time and place they wanted.” He struggles to find explanation, for example, as to why 

the militsioners did not just arrest him on the job site, but chose instead to abduct him while posing 

as employers/traffic police. In Ramadan’s own estimation, he constituted a “nobody” back in the 

1970s. He had nowhere to hide. Nor had he influential protectors to look after him. He saw himself as 

a person— among many others—who disagreed with the regime and stood his own grounds, but 

who feared the potentially dangerous consequences for himself and his family. The authorities, 

Ramadan thought, accorded him far greater significance than he deserved, once, by painstakingly 

organizing his abduction and, then, by making a spectacle of his arrest. Perhaps, as the celebrated 

Bulgarian dissident writer Georgi Markov suspected, the regime felt the need to overstate the danger 

– whatever and whenever – in order to distract the nation from the economic hardship and 

deepening political oppression, as well as to convey the warning that no dissent would be tolerated. 34 

By the mid-1970s, as Markov’s case brilliantly illustrates, 35 political dissent was on the rise in 

Bulgaria, as elsewhere in the Eastern Bloc. Thus, one may speculate that by dramatizing Ramadan’s 

case, the regime was hoping not only to channel the popular sentiment against “subversive” Muslim 

34 Markov, passim. 

35 Markov, a well-known dissident writer, defected from Bulgaria in 1969. Relocating to Great Britain, he offered 

rigorous criticism of the Bulgarian communist regime as a broadcaster and journalist for the BBC World Service, 

the US-funded Radio Free Europe, and Germany's Deutsche Welle. It is believed that as a result of these 

activities, the Bulgarian government disposed of him, with the help of KGB. He was killed in London in 1978 by 

someone, who stabbed his leg with umbrella, thus, injecting the hard-to-detect-poison ricin in his body. 

167

(pro-Turkish) elements, but also—and more importantly—to cut short the nascent Pomak 

resistance. 36 

After he was arrested, Ramadan spent the next several months in pre-trial detention. 

Awaiting trial, he was moved from facility to facility, starved, abused, and kept in an information 

blackout. While in the State Security headquarters in Sofia, the authorities held him in an 

underground cell. “They had a network of tunnels underground. They kept me in these tunnels at 

night. And there was a plaque in every cell saying: ‘If your arms are tied up at the waist, prepare for a 

long journey…’ That referred to the detainees [like me]. ‘If your arms are bound in front, you will be 

hanged. If your arms are bound at the back, you will be shot.’” One day, they bound Ramadan’s arms 

seemingly for execution by shooting. Plain-clothed personnel with machine guns took him out of the 

cell and led him about twenty meters into the tunnels. The light was on. The order came: “Stand still. 

Don’t turn back, or you will be shot.” He stood there and waited in suspense for hours. Finally, 

someone came down for him, and Ramadan heard a voice saying: “Bring him upstairs. It’s not going 

to be tonight.” The intent was not to dispose of Ramadan, however, but to extract confession from 

him for conspiring to overthrow the government. It was vital for the communist regime to maintain 

the charade of treasonous conspiracy in order to stifle dissent while banking on xenophobic 

sentiment. 37 

After months of pretrial interrogation in State Security’s headquarters in Sofia, Ramadan was 

moved to a prison in Burgass, a city in southeast Bulgaria. There for the first time, he was allowed to 

write a letter to his family and receive visitation. This was also a ploy. As his wife and two of his sons 

came to see him in prison, they were instructed to persuade him to change his name. It did not work. 

Despite the continuing harassment, however, Ramadan was also happy to see his family after months 

in detention and disinformation. From Burgass, Ramadan was moved to a facility for political 

36 Eminov, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria, passim. Also, Information about Turkey’s Activities 

against the Revival Process for the period 27 June – 3 July 1987. The document is dated July 3, 1987, and signed 

by then Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Gen. Lieutenant St. Savov, pages 1-6. (There is no archival reference 

on the document). For details, refer to Chapter III (Conclusion). 

37 Ibid. 

168

prisoners in Stara Zagora (a city in central Bulgaria) near his village of exile—Dolno Izvorovo, where 

his trial finally began. 38 

Ramadan and his companions, as Krum Karakachanov--the defense attorney--recalled in an 

interview from the year 2000, “were prosecuted for treason; for organizing a rebellion to overthrow 

the people’s government.” “When I heard the charge,” he said, “I thought to myself: ‘My God! That is 

an Article 70 crime, the most serious crime under the [then] Penal Code!’” 39 Whereas Ramadan was 

officially tried for treason, his sentence was relatively mild, because with no evidence to prove it and 

no confession, the authorities could not pursue a lengthily prison sentence or capital punishment. He 

received eight years in prison instead of twenty or the death penalty, as the law (Article 70 of the 

Penal Code) required, while the rest got between three and eight years. Ultimately, the reason for the 

discrepancy between charge and penalty stemmed from the regime’s recognition that neither 

Ramadan, nor any of his co-activists truly intended or had the capacity to overthrow the communist 

government. To downplay the revival process, as well as to discourage dissent among the people, 

however, the authorities put on a good performance for the masses. Peppering it with accusations of 

treason, they effectively played on people’s fears to inspire support for the revival process. In his 

early forties when first arrested, Ramadan spent more than a decade behind bars as a political 

prisoner. 

2. Tortured Prisoner 

After his sentencing, the prison authorities kept Ramadan on a regimen of constant 

harassment, starvation, and sleep deprivation. At one point he spent forty-five straight days in 

solitary confinement, in extremely cold temperatures, deliberately flooded cell floor to keep him 

standing, and a single layer of ragged clothes. “Although I was exhausted from sleeplessness,” he told 

me, “I determined not to fall asleep by endlessly walking around the cell and singing to myself in 


39 Petar Marchev, ed., “Buntat na pomatsite, obvineni e izmqna i predatelsvo.” / “The rebellion of the Pomaks, 

charged with treason and betrayal”/, Iskra Newspaper, Issue 19 of 10 March 2000. 

169

Turkish.” 40 Under the pretense of singing, Ramadan got to know some of his prison mates, as well as 

to communicate with them occasionally. Thus, he discovered that people from Kornitsa had been 

arrested as well, among which was Ismail Byalkov, my other key informant from Istanbul. Ismail 

independently confirmed Ramadan’s grueling account of isolation, abuse, and chronic starvation in 

prison. Branded as one of the masterminds of Pomak organized resistance, Ramadan was deemed 

particularly dangerous and kept in a heavy security ward. Whereas the regime viewed the majority of 

Muslim political prisoners simply as “troublemakers,” Ramadan was in an entirely different 

category. 41 He was not allowed to work in the prison woodshop, farm, or construction projects like 

most prisoners. Giving a job to Ramadan, already used to hard work, in addition to letting him 

socialize with other inmates, was tantamount to rewarding him. Thereby, they kept him alone and 

barely fed. His basic prison diet consisted of bread and water. Bread, at that, was in such short supply 

that without the help of working inmates he could have starved to death. Ismail often shared his 

meager rations with Ramadan out of profound respect for him. As Ramadan explains, most often 

Ismail, or another inmate, would save a piece of bread and hide it in the bathroom’s trashcans. This 

was the only place to safely hide food intended for a “dangerous” prisoner without too much risk for 

one’s own wellbeing. The rest of the time, Ramadan would forage the garbage containers for scraps 

of food that other prisoners had discarded. Whatever he found, he shared with another inmate, 

Fikret, a Turkish national convicted of spying for Turkey, and kept in similar conditions as Ramadan. 

We were in the same predicament, Fikret and I. So we’d go to the toilets and scavenge for 

food—any food. The prison population was tossing all their filth there, but sometimes they 

would throw excess food they weren’t permitted to keep. Whichever one of us found any 

bread, we shared it. It worked like this: Whenever they’d let him out for a walk, he’d 

scavenge the trash containers for scraps of bread. If he found any, he would eat half of it and 

leave the rest behind for me. When back in his cell, he’d knock on my wall to let me know if 

there was any bread or not. A double knock meant there was bread for the other. I did the 

same for him when out. …That’s how we survived. 

Feeding from the garbage was a dangerous affair, Ramadan found out, for he almost died of 

food poisoning one time. But hunger was unbearable. One day, it was his turn to scavenge the trash 


Note: This information was independently confirmed by Ismail Byalkov who spent time in solitary confinement 

under the same conditions and in the same facility as Ramadan. (Ismail Byalkov, interview.) 

41 Ismail Byalkov, interview. 

170

containers. They had not found anything for days. As Ramadan turned the container upside down in 

desperation, at the very bottom of it, he found a piece of bread, “all black and such … tossed there a 

long time ago. But I took it – took half of it. The other half, I buried back in. I tried to wash the bread 

with water somewhat. It softened up a little bit. I had no place to hide it. If the guards were to catch 

me with it, I’d be beaten. …So, as soon as I was back in my cell, I knocked twice to Fikret and ate my 

half immediately. It was just a tiny little piece. He got his own half as well.” No more than thirty 

minutes later, “I felt violently sick at my stomach. “Mother, I’m dying!” – I thought. I could neither 

keep still, nor lay in any comfortable position. I was cramping so badly that I almost lost my wits.” As 

Ramadan was pacing back and forth in the cell, it occurred to him to drink water—as much as he 

could swallow—to induce vomiting. He swallowed until he started throwing up. “The more I drank 

the more I threw up. The pain was excruciating.” Gradually, it subdued and Ramadan was able to take 

a breath of relief. Then, he heard “frantic striding and stomping” on Fikret’s side of his cell. 

Fikret, what’s going on? 

I’m dying. 

Did you eat that beard? 

I did. 

Then drink! Drink as much water as you can and try to vomit. That’s your only salvation. Drink 

water and vomit! Drink and vomit! 

We never slept that night, but we were still alive in the morning. 

Chronic starvation was not the biggest of Ramadan’s problem. The abuse was worse. If 

constant slapping, punching, and kicking were daily existence, beating to unconsciousness occurred 

with terrifying frequency. One evening three wardens beat him to unconsciousness. As he tried to sit 

up upon regaining his senses some time later, blood gushed out of his mouth. 

I reached for the bucket and pretty much bled over it for most of the night. At that moment I 

truly believed I was a broken man. …By the morning, I couldn’t open my mouth. It was livid 

and swollen. They had been kicking me in the face apparently… In the morning, they brought 

me some tea. I had never been given tea before. One cup of tea … and some bread! Well, I was 

very hungry, but I couldn’t eat. 

As the days progressed and Ramadan ate nothing, they called a medic to see him. The medic, 

visibly nervous, opened his mouth with some difficulty and pretty much pulled out several of 

Ramadan’s teeth with his bare fingers. “‘I can only apply this medicine now,’ he told me, ‘and I hope 

that the rest of your teeth will stay intact.’ He smeared me with some green medication that caused a 

171

tightening sensation in my mouth.” Within a month and a half, though, Ramadan lost all his teeth. 

“They simply fell out,” he tells me. 

Ramadan spent a total of two months and eight days in solitary confinement under extreme 

and restrictive conditions. Whereas the cell was plenty tall, it was not wide enough for a person to sit 

or lie down in any comfortable position. A small aperture, with a single broken piece of glass on it, 

rattling with the every gust of winter wind, was located high beyond the eyes’ reach near the ceiling. 

The isolation cells were flooded with water that turned into ice and kept the prisoners’ feet— 

protected only by rubber galoshes and torn socks—cold at all times. In solitary confinement, the 

prison authorities stripped the inmates’ of their warmer regular attire and gave them worn-out 

clothes instead, complemented by two thin blankets to keep them alive at night. During the day, they 

took away one of the blankets, too. 42 

To keep himself from freezing to death, Ramadan had to stay awake. He followed a regiment: 

When they would let him out to the bathroom in the morning, he would sprinkle the upper part of his 

body with (cold) water. Then, back in his cell, he would wrap himself in all the clothes and blankets 

he had. Shivering, he would gradually warm up a little and catch an hour or so of slumber. This was 

the only way he could sleep for a brief while; roughly one hour out of every twenty four. “Sleep was 

impossible at night.” Ramadan shares. Those who succumbed to it at night were pretty much 

doomed. One morning, he heard the guards dragging away an inmate who apparently had fallen 

asleep and frozen badly. “He screamed with pain and fright—I guess—when he saw the livid nails of 

his limbs in the daylight: ‘My nails are falling off! My nails are falling off!’ he screamed, as the 

wardens told him: ‘Don’t worry! You’ll grow new ones.’” Placing Muslim prisoners in freezing 

isolation was part of the deliberate strategy to make them sign papers declaring willingness to 

change their names. Because Ramadan persistently refused to so, thus instigating others to resist, the 

authorities were particularly brutal with him. One of Ramadan’s fellow prisoners, a young man from 

his native village, Kadri, could not make it past the third night in isolation. Ramadan just heard him 

42 Ramadan Runtov, interview; Ismail Byalkov, interview. 

172

calling: “Get me out! Get me out here! I’ll sign! I’ll sign anything you want me to!” Indeed, they took 

him out and changed his name. Ramadan carried on. 

Even though the prison authorities had already changed his name to Radan, they continued 

to press him to submit a written consent. Such extorted evidence was important for the regime for 

one and only reason: to serve as solid proof that the name changing was voluntary. From its 

inception in the yearly 1960s, the revival process was carried out clandestinely, and when 

information of the excesses against Muslims leaked into the public space, they were presented as 

legitimate battle against extremist and traitors. In case this rationale failed to convince the Bulgarian 

people or the international community, should the revival affair become known, the regime would be 

able to furnish signed declaration as hard evidence of consent to name changing. 43 Ramadan, 

however, remained adamant in his determination not to yield to pressure and sign a document to 

change his name both in prison and outside. 

3. Release and re- imprisonment 

In his early forties when first arrested, Ramadan was almost fifty when first discharged from 

prison. By that time his sons had grown to young adulthood. While still in confinement, however, my 

interviewee learnt that his eldest son had fled Bulgaria and made his way to Turkey. So after his 

release, Ramadan, his wife and two remaining sons, one of whom was doing military service, settled 

into a life of hardship in Dolno Izvorovo. Even though he was a master stonemason and there was 

dire shortage of skilled laborers like him, Ramadan was not allowed to work. In a reality, where 

everything was state-owned and controlled by the communist party, he was denied even the most 

menial of jobs. Instead, he became the village’s cattle herder, where people collected money among 

themselves to pay his meager wage. But Ramadan was happy to be back with his family and even 

happier to know that his eldest son was building a life for himself in Istanbul. Then trouble struck 

again. Barely two or three years out of prison, Ramadan was arrested once more after his two 

remaining sons, two nieces, and other young people attempted to escape from Bulgaria, but were 


This can also be inferred from archival documents at the National Archives-Sofia, Fond 1, Inventories 38-40, 

Archival Units, passim (for details, refer to Chapter III). 

173

captured. Believing Ramadan to be the instigator of this venture, the regime detained him 

immediately. Unable to prove his involvement, the authorities plea-bargained: “You take the blame 

on yourself and we’ll release the two girls and your younger son?” Taking pity on the girls, who had 

never been separated from their families before, as well as considering his underage son, Ramadan 

accepted. “I agreed and they kept their promise.” Ramadan says, “They let the girls and my youngest 

son free without trial.” The rest were sentenced to prison terms. Ramandan’s son, who had deserted 

the army, intending to cross the border, received a year and eight months. Ramadan was given three 

years, and all the rest were handed between a year and two months to two years of incarceration. 

Ramadan, now over fifty years old, spent two years and two months in the Sofia prison. He was 

immediately put in the seventh ward. It was a high security ward, with no work privileges. 

“Everybody else could work, but me.” Ramadan reminisces. “I lived through two and a half months of 

beating there.” 

They were beating me with a club. Every morning, when I’d go to the bathroom to wash 

myself and get some water, the guard at my door would hit me with a truncheon. As I’d walk 

in the bathroom, another one would strike me there. After returning to the cell, I’d be beaten 

one more time. This was every day. While most prisoners shared cells with five or six other 

inmates, I was locked alone. My cell was adjacent to these of death-row inmates. I was kept 

with the death-row inmates. And no matter how hard I tried to avoid the wardens’ clubs, I 

could not escape them. Morning, evening – thrashing! This lasted for two and a half months. 

Having survived almost a decade of extreme prison abuse already, Ramadan weathered this 

second imprisonment with the same stoicism. He was released in 1982, after serving two years and 

two months of his original three-year prison sentence. In or out of prison, however, his life was a 

veritable inferno. While behind bars he endured beating on a daily basis, outside he had to report to 

the local police station day after day, wherein they locked him up for hours on end. This constant 

harassment was due to the fact that Ramadan persistently refused to accept a passport with a new 

Bulgarian name. Thus, he had no identity papers, and he could not work. Even though his name had 

already been changed in prison, he refused to accept a passport with the name Radan, which was 

strikingly similar to Ramadan. This was no coincidence. In their attempt to make the name changing 

appear as harmless as possible, the communist regime often opted for those Bulgarian names 

sounding closest to people’s original names, perceived with somewhat neutral meaning. That was 

little consolation to most Pomak Muslims, however, especially the likes of Ramadan who vividly 

174

emembered the last forced conversion and to whom a name was either Muslim or Christian, never 

in between; never neutral. Therefore, to accept a passport with Bulgarian name – any forced name – 

was tantamount to betrayal of faith and identity for Ramadan. 44 

Because his name was changed in prison, Ramadan’s passport picture was also taken there. 

When he was first imprisoned, the primary purpose of his solitary confinement, sleep deprivation, 

drastically reduced food rations, and routine torture was to induce a name changing with consent. As 

Ramadan refused to do so, verbally or in writing, the prison authorities simply proceeded to chose a 

name for him and issue new identification papers. For his new passport, however, they needed his 

photograph. One day, prison wardens came to his cell: 

‘Come with us.’ 

‘Why?’ 

‘The bosses need you.’ 

They took me to a room, where a photographer was getting ready to take my picture – 

passport picture. 

‘Sit down.’ 

I sat down. When he tried to take my picture, I jerked my head sideways. Two individuals 

immediately restrained my arms on each side. 

‘Raise you head.’ 

I did it. But as soon as the photographer prepared to snap the picture, I dropped it again. 

‘We can’t photograph him like this.’ 

They were angry but hesitant to beat me in front of the photographer, an outside civilian. 

Ultimately, one of the guards grabbed Ramadan’s hair and pulling his head back, he 

instructed the photographer: “Shoot like this.” The person did so and Ramadan was returned to his 

cell. “I had barely sat down,” recalls my informant, “when they came back.” 

‘Get up. Out again. The photograph is faulty.’ 

‘I’m not coming out of here.’ 

‘Get out.’ 

‘No. You can get me of here only dead.’ 

At length, they brought down the deputy prison chief, a bureaucrat by the name Zhelekov, to deal 

with Ramadan. 

‘Why don’t you comply with the orders?’ 

‘I don’t want to comply with such orders.’ 

‘Get out.’ 

‘No. Only dead will you get me out of here.’ 

Then, he gave up: ‘Let him be. Don’t bother with him for now.’ 

And I remained in my cell. 


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“Take the Passport or Die” 

Ramadan was set free in 1982 after serving two separate terms of eight and three years 

respectively. His lot in life, however, was not about to get any better. Once Ramadan was out of 

prison, the harassment to accept the new passport resumed immediately. Every day the authorities 

summoned him to the police station trying to force him to take the passport, and every time he threw 

it to the ground for which he would spend the day in jail. Then, one day, a major from the militsia, for 

whom my informant had done masonry work in the past and who was very sympathetic to him, 

pleaded with Ramadan in desperation: “Please, take the damn passport and burn it, if you will, 

afterwards. Just take it and get out of here. They are planning to beat you to death tonight, if you 

refuse again, and dump your body somewhere. You’ll die for nothing. You must take it. Take it now 

and do whatever you want with it later.” Having no reasons to distrust the officer, Ramadan realized 

that the regime had had it with him and would no longer waste time to silence him. When he walked 

out of the police station that day, he opened the new passport and realized for the first time why the 

photograph was “faulty.” It clearly indicated how a disembodied hand was forcing Ramadan’s head 

up while pulling back his hair 

The very next morning Ramadan wrote a long letter to Todor Zhivkov, Bulgaria’s long-term 

head of state and supreme leader of the communist party. In it, he poured the harrowing story of his 

life in prison: solitary confinement, torture, hunger, broken health, everything. Enclosing his new 

passport with the “faulty” photo as –what he believed to be—the indubitable testament to his ordeal, 

Ramadan concluded the letter with the following appeal: “Take a look at my passport picture and see 

the way it is taken! I plead with you to stop your subordinates from violating our honor for we are 

human beings, too.” Then, Ramadan placed the letter in an envelope and sent his son with it to 

Gabrovo, a neighboring town, to mail it from there. In Kazanlak, he was already a well-known 

“subversive element,” because of which, Ramadan was afraid, the postal officials would refuse to mail 

his letter. From Garbrovo, however, they did. A week later, he received a reply from the Council of 

Ministers reading simply: “Your complaint has been received and will be considered.” Nothing more! 

Thereafter, Ramadan continued his anti-revivalism. 

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Conclusion 

The last decade of communist rule in Bulgaria was a turbulent one. Having revived all Pomak 

Muslims by the mid-1970s with remarkably few consequences, the regime abandoned all caution and 

moved against the ethnic Turks of Bulgaria a decade later. Unlike the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims, 

however, who had been recurrently targeted in the past based on nationalistic claims to their 

Bulgarianness, the Turkish-speaking Muslims were quite culturally distinct and numerous in 

comparison. Since the Turkish revival process is beyond the scope of this research and an event that 

has been well-documented already, it suffices to say here that it was imperative for the regime to 

assimilate the Turkish Muslims precisely because they were the largest (Muslim) minority within the 

prevalently Christian nation-state of Bulgaria (encompassing as many as 10 percent of an eightmillion-strong 

population). 45 Thus, the regime proceeded to change the names of the ethnic Turks in 

full villain’s style—with troops, militiamen and guns against unarmed civilian population, in much 

the same fashion as against the Pomaks, but on a mammoth scale. As news of violence and bloodshed 

erupted, Turkey—“the mother country”—raised the alarm, generating an international uproar. Four 

years later, in November 1989, the communist regime in Bulgaria collapsed and the revival process 

was gradually reversed. 46 

Whereas the end of totalitarianism in the country came about in the context of the larger 

Soviet perestroika (political and economic reformation) and economic collapse across Eastern 

Europe, dissenters like Ramadan and their human network ultimately spread the news of the revival 

process and other atrocities taking place in Bulgaria. Ramadan met Iliya Minev, Petar Boyadjiev, and 

Priest Blagoy Topusliev, three of the most eminent Bulgarian dissenters from the 1980s, in prison 

and befriended them. After Petar Boyadjiev fled to France in the 1980s, Ramadan, his sons and a 

multitude of like-minded Bulgarians, both Muslim and Christian, set up lines of communication and 

45 See footnote 3 of Chapter III. 

46 For details on the revival process against the ethnic Turks, see Eminov, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in 

Bulgaria, passim. Also, refer to Chapter III of this dissertation. 

177

secretly transmitted news about the revival process to Boyadjiev in Marseille, France, who 

subsequently alerted western media 47 and journalists. 48 

Figure 4-7: The happy, post-communist days 

Ramadan Runtov with his son Ibrahim and granddaughter (Ibrahim’s daughter) 49 

By the spring of 1989, Bulgaria—as most of Eastern Europe—was rocked by massive 

demonstrations. People demanded freedom and the right to dignified existence. The nation’s Muslim 

community likewise protested though hunger strikes, petitions, and mass rallying to demand 

religious freedom and reversal of the revival process. As Ramadan and his sons continued to transmit 

news to Western Europe, they were detected and promptly arrested. Clinging to the last remnants of 

power and unable to do more, the regime rounded up the family, put them on a Vienna-bound train, 

and forced them out of the country with just fifty USD in cash. Ramadan and his family joined the first 

47 Among the media transmitting on the revival process were BBC World Service, America-funded Radio Free 

Europe, and Deutsche Welle in Germany. 

48 Petar Dobrev, “Balgasrkata 1989-a: Ivan ot Sliven i golemiat protest sreshtu komunuzma” /The Bulgarian 

1989: Ivan of Sliven and the Big Struggle against Communism/”, News.bg, 26 November 2009; Elisaveta 

Kovacheva, “Bivshi polit-emigranti osporvat zaslugite na lidera na DPS” 

/”Former political Immigrants dispute the role of the MRF [Movement for Rights and Freedoms] leader [Ahmed 

Dogan]”, Kontinent Newspaper of 10 August 1992; Ramadan Runtov, interview. 

49 Kornitsa.com. Last accessed June 8, 2010. 

178

group of 170 people collectively deported from Bulgaria on May 21, 1989. Three hundred fifty 

thousand Turkish and Pomak Muslims would follow suit within the next few months. 50 

May 21, 2007, when I interviewed Ramadan Runtov at his home in Istanbul, was the day of 

the eighteenth anniversary of his coming to Turkey. I did not think of it at the time, but after relistening 

the interview, it struck me that neither had my informant shown awareness of it. This openhearted 

man was more concerned with living a good life in the present than dwelling on the past in 

bitterness. Because it was his experiences that made him who he was—honorable, compassionate, 

and forgiving—Ramadan had nothing to regret. The life stories of exiles like Ramadan are not only an 

engaging narrative of dissent, but also an essential component of Pomak heritage. Being a direct 

concomitant of one of the pivotal episodes in the community’s existence—the revival process, 

Ramadan’s experience reflects a life pattern common to thousands of Pomak expatriates, still 

permanently living abroad. 

Even having achieved comfortable living for themselves in Istanbul (and elsewhere in 

Turkey), these Pomak émigrés maintain a strong connection with their home communities in the 

Rhodopes. They periodically return – many every year – not only to visit with friends and family, but 

also to attend the funerals and marriages of loved ones. Most of the Pomak immigrants in Güneşli 

come from Kornitsa, Breznitsa, and Ribnovo, the three adjoining villages which put the strongest 

resistance to the revival process in 1973. Consequently, people from these villages left Bulgaria in the 

greatest numbers during and after 1989, the final year of communist rule. Those who remained in 

the Rhodopes, however, resolved to keep the Pomak heritage alive by reviving suppressed customs 

and making local traditions more visible than ever before. One such tradition is the stunning Ribnovo 

wedding, whose most recognizable manifestation today is the colorful mask of the bride. 

50 Eminov, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria, passim. Of the 350,000 Muslim refugees who left 

Bulgaria in 1989, about 150,000 returned by 1991 while 250,000 permanently settled abroad, mostly in Turkey 

(ibid., Eminov, 97). Subsequently, economically motivated exodus of Bulgarian citizens with Muslim religious 

affiliation continued to pour into Turkey well into 1994. Thousands of Pomaks, whom the regime had prohibited 

from leaving the country prior to November of 1989 when it collapsed, left Bulgaria for Turkey (and elsewhere) 

as well (see Chapter III for details). 

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CHAPTER V 

THE RIBNOVO WEDDING: A POMAK TRADITION 

Introduction 

When I happened upon Eudora Welty’s novel, Delta Wedding, 1 the title intrigued me. First, it 

was set in the Mississippi Delta of the American South where I currently reside. Second, I was about 

to begin writing a chapter on the elaborate wedding rituals in Ribnovo, a Pomak village in my native 

southwest Bulgaria, as part of my dissertation project on Pomak heritage. Before I read the novel, I 

had thought that it would be a good idea to draw some parallels between the wedding ceremonies in 

the Delta and in Ribnovo. In all honesty, I did not consider that an easy – or even – possible task. But 

as soon as I began to read Delta Wedding – set in the early twentieth-century Mississippi-Yazoo Delta 

– I realized that there is much in common. In fact, I could not help thinking that were I to transplant 

the act of wedding preparation Eudora Welty enfolds from the Delta to Ribnovo (or anywhere in the 

Rhodopes for that matter), I should not have to change much in terms of social mores and behavior to 

fit it with the new environment. Topographically, the Rhodopes, sheltering the village of Ribnovo, is 

not the flat landscape so characteristic of the Delta, but mountains much like the Ozarks. Neither are 

there the vast cotton fields and imposing rivers like Mississippi, nor fiercely biting mosquitoes and 

all-pervading humidity. Instead, there are picturesque undulating hills sporadically covered with ageold 

trees, thick shrubs, tobacco and corn fields, or grassy patches that move in waves with every gust 

of the wind. For most of the year, the climate is pleasant ranging from moderately cold in the winter 

to occasionally hot in the summer. 

The people and their places, however, are agrarian. The Delta of the first half of the twentieth 

century is a land of expansive cotton plantations with predominantly black labor force, white 

overseers, and (mostly) Anglo-Saxon owners. The local planters’ aristocracy lives in mansions built 

1 Eudora Welty, Delta Wedding (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1946). 

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on the farm, served largely by blacks, amidst a community of extended family and fellow landowners. 

The Rhodopes of today, on the other hand, harbor communities who still work the land for living: 

largely small-scale tobacco farming for cash, and fruit and vegetable growing for private 

consumption. Ribnovo is one of those agricultural communities. From early spring to late fall, from 

sunrise to sunset, the villagers are busy planting, chopping, picking and processing the tobacco while 

simultaneously cultivating potatoes, corn, various fruits and vegetables on small patches of arable 

land. But come winter, there is time for respite … and weddings. The Ribnovo wedding is, first of all, 

an opportunity for public merrymaking whereby everyone in the community partakes either by 

being intimately associated with the family-and-friends circle or simply by dancing, observing and 

gossiping as a member of the general village population. Only second to being a public celebration is 

the Ribnovo wedding an elaborate ritual, a unique and vibrant tradition, saturated with colors and 

excitement. Almost invariably, the wedding festivities take place in the fall or winter, just after the 

farm work is completed. 

The Ribnovo wedding is a unique and remarkable Pomak ritual surviving only in Ribnovo 

today as a living testimony to the richness of bygone traditions. The process of the wedding is an 

intricate historical blending of what is purely local understanding of life necessities and aesthetics – 

including in dress, in the purpose and way of celebration, as well as in the usefulness of the dowry – 

on one side, and the Islam-influenced belief system, on the other. Thus, the Ribnovo wedding, as most 

Pomak customs, is the result of an intensive interaction among three sets of elements: religious, 

linguistic, and ethno-cultural. As a Muslim community, the Pomaks are inextricably linked to the 

ethnic Turks with whom they shared the status of Ottoman Umma 2 in the not-so-distant past of 

Bulgaria as an Ottoman domain. As a Bulgarian-speaking people, the Pomaks are connected to the 

Bulgarian Eastern Orthodox Christian majority, which caused them to be singled out for religious and 

cultural assimilation on more than one occasion since Bulgaria’s independence of 1878. 3 However, 

the relatedness to both Turks and Bulgarians via religion and language complicates the Pomak status 

2 The totality of Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire. 

3 Detailed accounts of the assimilation of Pomaks in Bulgaria are provided in Chapters II, III and IV. 

181

as an ethno-cultural minority. Although religion unites them, their different mother tongue also sets 

the Pomaks apart from the Turkish-speaking Muslims of Bulgaria. On the other hand, even though 

they share language with the Bulgarian majority, the Pomaks profess a religion that has been 

historically construed as the “enemy’s faith” by the predominantly Eastern Orthodox Christian 

Bulgarians. Thus, the Rhodopean Muslims have been placed in precarious ethno-cultural position 

that simultaneously connects and distances them from the two dominant contenders for their 

identity within Bulgaria: the ethnic Turks and the ethnic Bulgarians. The lack of clear sense among 

most Pomaks as to just what ethnic group they belong, deepens the identity quagmire they are 

pushed into by various external forces assigning them identities not necessarily accepted by the 

group. 4 Yet, those shaky grounds have been conducive to the development of a heritage that is 

uniquely Pomak – Rhodopean; local; typical of the Rhodope Muslims. The Ribnovo wedding is one of 

many exquisite expressions of Pomak culture that needs preservation. In this chapter, I set out to 

make my own modest contribution to documenting and preserving it. 

More specifically, the purpose of this chapter about the wedding tradition in Ribnovo is 

multifold. First, I provide a step-by-step analysis of one truly remarkable ritual, as part of the Pomak 

culture, which is by no means unknown. 

5 

This section of the chapter includes two parts: an 

introduction of Ribnovo as a place and community the way I saw it during visits in 2004 and 2009 

and a descriptive narrative of the traditional wedding rituals with special emphasis on the bride’s 

decoration and dowry (cheiz). Second, adopting a comparative approach, I examine similarities 

4 Although I discuss this matter elsewhere in the dissertation study, I will briefly mention that the main 

contestants in the dispute over Pomak identity are Bulgaria, Turkey and Greece. While Bulgaria forwards 

linguistic arguments about the Bulgarian ethnicity of the Pomaks, Turkey points to shared religion as the main 

indicator of cultural identity. At the same time, because of the strategic location of the Rhodopes between 

northern Greece and southern Bulgaria, Greece insists that the Pomaks belong to the Greek ethnicity since they 

descend from ancient Thracian tribes that had been once Hellenized, subsequently Romanized, Slavicized, then 

Ottomanized, and finally Bulgarianized. In addition, both Bulgaria and Greece point to physical appearance – the 

predominance of fair skin and blue eyes among the Pomaks – as proof of the Pomaks’ Bulgarian and/or Greek 

origin. (Ali Eminov, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria, (New York: Routledge, 1997), 102 & 

passim.) 

5 Because of the uniqueness of the bridal make-up, not only (Bulgarian) national-and international media have 

broadcasted the Ribnovo wedding, but also journalists, local interest groups and individuals have broadly used 

Internet to publicized it via photographs, videos, or films. Among these media are bTV, a leading Bulgarian 

television, the Bulgarian National Radio (BNR), Reuters, as well as Internet sites such as Pomak.net, 

Ribnovo.com, and others. Some of the photos and video materials produced by or publicized via those entities 

are used in this chapter. 

182

etween the wedding traditions of Ribnovo today and the Mississippi-Yazoo Delta of the American 

South in the 1920s, as described in Welty’s novel. Most significantly, in both communities the 

wedding tradition has importance as a family affair, a public celebration, and a stage for enacting 

social norms. Third, employing an approach advanced by the early twentieth-century Belgian 

anthropologist Arnold van Gennep, I analyze the wedding tradition as a major rite of passage. 6 In 

accordance with van Gennep’s concept, as updated by Robert Ingpen and Philip Wilkinson, 7 I analyze 

the Ribnovo wedding as a major turning point not only in the lives of the individuals who marry, but 

also of their families and community. Through marriage, two people simultaneously undergo 

separation from the life of single individuals, make transition into the world of spousehood and 

experience reincorporation (get reintroduced) into the village society as a family unit. 8 

This chapter also examines a truly unique wedding tradition that has all but disappeared 

outside of Ribnovo. What makes it even more special is that the wedding, in its full ritualistic 

splendor, occurs only rarely. Many young couples conduct their nuptials simply: without the intricate 

bridal décor so appealing to outsiders; without the live music that accounts for most of the public 

entertainment; and without the processions, dowry display, or other trappings typical of the colorful 

Ribnovo wedding. When a marriage takes place in all its ritualistic manifestations, the splendor is 

complete. Ironically, the typical backdrop of all the flow of colors and excitement accompanying the 

festivities is the gray-autumn- or white-winter landscape. The drabness of the cold-season setting, 

however, only enhances the vibrancy and appeal of the colorful Ribnovo wedding. 

Ultimately, this chapter examines the Ribnovo wedding in the context of documenting and 

preserving significant and interesting aspects of Pomak culture. First, because the wedding ritual, as 

practiced in Ribnovo, is unique, beautiful, and forgotten elsewhere in the Rhodopes, it naturally 

stands out as an important heritage attribute. Second, I can safely claim the Ribnovo wedding to be 

Pomak tradition, because the community itself identifies as Pomak. Moreover, there is evidence, 

6Arnold van Gennep, Rites of Passage (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 10-11. 

7 Read in section, Marriage: A Major Turning-Point in Life, of this chapter. 

8 Van Gennep, passim. 

183

surviving in oral testimonies and family photographs, that similar wedding rites have been widely 

practiced among the Pomaks of the Western Rhodopes as early as the 1940s and all the way until the 

1970s. The Ribnovo wedding appears to be neither a new cultural invention, nor a borrowed 

tradition. Surviving evidence suggests that the phenomenon, as seen in Ribnovo today, is a remnant 

of a long-standing cultural custom once typical of and widely practiced by the Slavic-speaking 

Muslims of the Western (and possibly of the whole of) Rhodopes. As the ritual went extinct after once 

being the cultural norm among the Rhodopean Muslims, this chapter describes and analyses the 

Ribnovo wedding with a view to its literary preservation as a unique manifestation of fading Pomak 

traditions. 

Ribnovo: Place and People 

Ribnovo, in the Western Rhodopes, is the last bastion of the traditional Pomak wedding, the 

most distinctive feature of which nowadays is the exquisite facial decoration of the bride. While in 

most other villages in the area, the tradition was swept away by the revival process 9 and has since 

disappeared, in Ribnovo it undergoes unusual revival and popularity. In fact, one can only discover 

genuine Pomak traditions and images in a remote village like Ribnovo, which has remained relatively 

unaffected by modernity, at least, in terms of social mores and dress style. Ribnovo, as it is, standing 

isolated at the bottom of a mountainous country road in the Bulgarian hinterlands – in the deep 

reaches of the Rhodope Mountains – harbors patriarchal values and traditions perhaps less affected 

by global uniformity than most other places in the region (Figure 5-1 10 ). 

I first visited Ribnovo in the fall of 2004 on a business-related trip, while I was still living and 

working in Bulgaria. I returned in March of 2009 to conduct dissertation research. Although I have 

been to Ribnovo only twice, I know much about the way of life – the social and economic 

environment, the people and general traditions – since I was born and grew up in the Western 

9 For a detailed account of the revival process, see Chapters III and IV. 

10 Ribnovo.com. Photograph last accessed on May 20, 2009. 

Ribnovo.com is a locally maintained website that publishes photographs from Ribnovo, very often by anonymous 

authors. 

184

Rhodopes, barely an hour away from Ribnovo. In addition, I have worked and still actively 

communicate with many local people, including from Ribnovo, who have continuously rendered 

invaluable assistance to the present research. 

The closest city to Ribnovo is Gotse Delchev, about 25-30 kilometers away (approximately 

twenty miles). In order to get to Ribnovo from Gotse Delchev, in 2004, I had to take an old, beat-up, 

uncomfortable socialist-style bus, so different from the comfortable private buses in use today, and 

travel uphill along a one-lane, rugged asphalt road, perforated with potholes like a Swiss cheese. 

After an hour of wobbling, shaking, meandering, crawling, and pausing in villages to deposit and 

accept a few passengers, the bus finally left me on a dirt road in the middle of a small settlement. 

Figure 5-1: Ribnovo 

(Courtesy of Ribnovo.com) 

This was Ribnovo. From where I stood, it looked like a cluster of houses seemingly sitting atop each 

other, because of the ascending, picturesque summits snuggling the village on all sides.The 

surrounding scenery of rolling hills covered with conifers and rocks was breathtaking. It was truly 

beautiful! In the crisp-clean morning air I breathed lightly and smiled for no apparent reason. 

185

The dirt road where I stood – a sort of main street – zigzagged in opposite directions from 

me, lined on both sides by rows of stone-and-brick houses. The houses did not strike me as luxurious, 

but rather as large and solid edifices providing homes for the inhabitants. The faces of the people 

emanated warmth, friendliness and curiosity all at once upon meeting my bemused glance. It was my 

first time in Ribnovo, but I was not nervous. I knew that the moment I spoke in one of the native 

Rhodopean dialects, any ice would break completely, on the spot. But non-natives are not strangers 

here, either. The villagers frequently encounter journalists, as well as all sorts of professional and 

amateur photo-researchers flocking to Ribnovo to catch a glimpse of the community’s unique 

lifestyle. All in all, lacking clear indication of malicious intent, any stranger would receive the same 

welcome as one from the area such as me. So, the locals are not the least surprised when an 

unfamiliar face shows up in Ribnovo and approaches them with questions, followed by the inevitable 

request to take a few pictures. 

Moreover, a timid visitor 

would most likely be aided by 

the people if he or she 

appears lost in some 

predicament. There are no 

hotels or rooms for rent in 

Ribnovo. Those seeking 

overnight accommodations 

would board in someone’s 

house either by preliminary 

Figure 5-2: Ribnovo’s public square: horo dancing 

(Courtesy of Ribnovo.com) 

arrangements or simply as serendipitously invited guests, free of charge. According to traditional 

strong hospitality, no one should be refused shelter and meal, especially non-residents, for the locals 

all know each other and they can immediately tell a native from a guest. During my first visit in 2004, 

I stayed with a good friend of mine in the neighboring village of Ossikovo. 

186

I returned to Ribnovo in early 2009, accompanied by my brother in his old Opel Frontera. 

The Swiss-cheese road had been repaved, albeit still a one-lane affair. Although the village looked 

familiar, the houses gave an impression of more vibrancy and affluence. Most were now splashed in 

light colors and boasted marble railing and ornamentation on the outside. The two of us parked on 

the same public square, where the bus had left me almost five years earlier. This place marks the 

broadest part of Ribnovo’s main street and, in conjunction with the local schoolyard, serves as the 

main venue for public dancing – 

horo 11 – during weddings (Figure 5- 

2 12 ). 

Feim “Foxi” Osmanov, a 

twenty-three-year-old student of the 

South-Western University in 

Blagoevgrad (Bulgaria) at the time, 

was supposed to meet me there. I did 

not know Foxi in person – at least not 

yet – but that is how one conducts 

one’s business in the Rhodopes. When 

need calls, one trusts people one has 

never met in person, almost never 

Figure 5-3: Kadrie and Feim Hatip from Ribnovo as 

bride and groom in February 2005 

being disappointed. The evening 

before I went to Ribnovo, I still did not 

know I was going. At that point, I had no one to rely on, for the people I knew – as it turned out – had 

all moved away or were otherwise unable to help. But as it always happens in the Rhodopes – 

completely coincidentally – that Friday evening some relatives of ours were socializing at my 

11 This is a type of dance where people hold hands to form a link that often curls up into double or triple rings 

depending on the availability of room. The musicians often play their instruments standing inside the ring(s) of 

dancers, while the crowds of spectators occupy the outer space. 

12 Ribnovo.com. Photograph last accessed on May 20, 2009. 

187

ancestral home (in Valkossel) whereupon I expressed the concern that my original plans to visit 

Ribnovo had failed. A second cousin of mine, Dzepa, was among the visitors that night. While 

mentioning she had a classmate from Ribnovo, Dzepa pulled her cell phone out and dialed someone. 

The very next moment she handed me the phone and a short while later my trip to Ribnovo was 

arranged. On the next Saturday morning, a brown-haired young man of average build met me on the 

public square in Ribnovo. That was Foxi. He took my brother and me to his home, where I proceeded 

to conduct a four-hour group interview with Foxi, his mother and sister while watching a video of a 

traditional Ribnovo wedding. 

My original idea was to attend an actual event, based on the erroneous belief that all 

weddings in Ribnovo were the typical colorful affair. But as it turned out, there were plenty of 

weddings to be had during my time-frame in Bulgaria, but none was conducted in full ritual. At this 

point, I need to explain that, albeit all weddings take place in a time-honored tradition – most 

notably, not in the proverbial white gown of the bride, but in the colorful local attire (Figure 5.3 13 and 

Figure 5.4), not all elements of the complex ritual such as the bridal mask, live music, procession, and 

others are always included. Some weddings are greatly simplified to curtail expenses. 14 Even though 

I was unable to witness the full traditional wedding personally, the Osmanov family of Ribnovo and 

the Gotse Delchev-based Safet Studio for moving images, as well as a bTV documentary walked me 

step-by-step through the Colorful Fairytale Ribnovo. 15 Many other people have also become a 

valuable source of information – both verbal and visual – for this project. 

Colorful Fairytale Ribnovo 16 

13 I took these snapshots from video materials – including a wedding video of Kadrie and Feim’s wedding – 

kindly provided by Safet Studio, Gotse Delchev (Bulgaria). 

Note: All snapshots from Kadrie and Feim Hatip’s wedding herein are from the same material. 

14 A wedding cost can absorb from 80 to 100 percent of an average family’s annual income. Very often, the 

overall expenses may be compensated or even exceeded by the amount received as wedding gifts, but that is not 

generally the case. The cost of the bride’s cheiz (dowry) and the building of a new house for the newlyweds can 

be really steep for the couple’s families. 

15 A bTV documentary. bTV is a leading television media in Bulgaria (below). 

16 Sharena prikazka Ribnovo / Colorful Fairytale Ribnovo / was first broadcasted on April 6, 2008, in the series 

“bTV Reporterite” /“The bTV Reporters”/. bTV kindly gave me permission to use parts of the documentary for 

the purposes of this chapter. 

188

When bTV, a leading television media in Bulgaria, broadcasted a thirty-minute documentary 

of a Ribnovo wedding, they named the film Colorful Fairytale Ribnovo. Indeed, “colorful” is perhaps 

the adjective 

that best 

describes the 

full-blown 

traditional 

Ribnovo 

wedding. Most 

everyone and 

everything – 

from the bride, 

through her 

make-up and 

cheiz (dowry), 

to young 

Figure 5-4: A happy bride 

The bride Kadrie as she appeared during one of the days of her wedding. 

She is posing for the shoot in front of her dowry 

Ribnovo women – emerge in bright, sparkling, astonishing dazzle of colors and sequins for two full 

days (photos). 

On the other hand, “fairytale” is the noun that most truthfully captures the spirit of the 

wedding season for two fundamental reasons: First, it marks the time of respite from hard work in 

the fields usually going on for most of the calendar year. Second, it presents the best opportunity for 

Note: This section is also based on the following sources: 

1. The Osmanov Family (Feim, Fatme and their mother), interview by author, Ribnovo, Bulgaria, March 7, 2009. 

2. Wedding of Kadrie Gyulyova and Feim Hatip of 12 February 2005. Video by Safet Studio, Gotse Delchev 

(Bulgaria). Snapshots taken by author. 

3. Unspecified wedding from Ribnovo. Raw video material by Safet Studio, Gotse Delchev (Bulgaria). 

4. Daniel Lekov, “Lovets na migove: Ribnovo, Bulgaria,” 359 Magazine 2 (2007): 64-77. 

5. Anastasia Pashova et al., Semeystvo, Religiya, Vsekindevie na Myusyulmanite v Zapadnite Rodopi /Family, 

Religion, Lifestyle of the Muslims of the Western Rhodopes/ (Sofia: IK Sema RSH, 2002). 

6. Pomak.net. Photographs by unspecified local authors. Pomak.net is a local website devoted to popularizing 

Pomak cultural traditions and providing forum for their discussion. 

7. Mehmed and Havva Cesur’s family album, Istanbul (Turkey), May 2007. Wedding photographs of Fatme 

Agouleva Sadouleva, Kornitsa, 1967. 

8. Mehmed and Sanie Myuhtar’s family album. A photograph from their wedding, Valkossel, February 1972. 

189

entertainment that the populace can get. A “fairytale” life for the community would, thus, be the time 

of weddings when the worries of the harvest season are left behind and everyone is making merry 

dressed in their finest. The description of the Ribnovo wedding as a “colorful fairytale” acquires even 

greater significance, because the community itself, in the person of one female interviewee, puts it 

forward before the bTV reporters: 

You haven’t seen anything as colorful as this and you’re fascinated! It’s like from another 

world to you. It’s like a fairytale really: it comes and goes. The wedding comes and goes, then, 

life continues as usual [italics added]. 17 

Life on the semi-mechanized farms in Ribnovo, and throughout the Western Rhodopes, is not 

an easy one. While only plowing and partial hauling of the produce (tobacco, vegetables, and other) is 

done by tractors and other motorized machinery, almost everything else is manually handled. 

Apparently, factors like the relatively small size of the average farm (about twenty acres) and the 

difficult terrain of the Rhodope Mountains, allowing only for small and disconnected parcels of land 

to be cultivated, limit the cost-effectiveness of mechanization. Once plowing takes place in the fall 

and/or early spring, the intensive work continues all through the spring, summer, and fall 

whereupon crops are planted, grown, picked, processed, and readied for sale. Cultivating the tobacco 

– the standard cash crop of the Western Rhodopes – usually occupies the time from February-March 

to October-November when the process starts with germinating the tobacco seeds. After that, the 

tobacco gets transplanted, repeatedly chopped and picked in stages, sun-dried and arranged in 

rectangular bales ready to be sold. Baling begins with the autumn rain which softens the desiccated 

tobacco leaves and makes them amenable to manipulation. This work often continues well into the 

winter, but it is not as time and labor-consuming as the rest of tobacco farming is. The cold season, 

albeit still demanding, remains more relaxed compared to the rest of the year and, thus, conducive to 

entertainment. 18 This is the time of the Ribnovo wedding. 

On a chilly morning, when the village awakens to the languid sound of woodwinds and 

drums, the wedding has begun. Usually, the typical colorful event lasts two days. This is very much in 

17 bTV documentary. 

18 For sources, see footnote 16. 

190

keeping with age-old traditions where wedding festivities went on for days. Nowadays, the cheiz, or 

everything that the bride will bring to her husband’s house, is exhibited during the first day of the 

wedding, normally a Saturday. In the evening on the same day, the bride’s hands are decorated with 

henna, making delicate garnet coloration in various patterns. 

The Ribnovo wedding is largely a public event. Apart from the few private aspects of it, 

including the bridal decoration and the dowry arrangement, the entire village participates in the 

wedding one way or another. One very important occurrence is that no formal wedding invitations 

exist. 

Figure 5-5: Young women hold gifts at Kadrie and Feim’s wedding 

191

Figure 5-6: The wedding begins 

The Ribnovo wedding begins ... with the groom’s (Feim) brother leading the musicians to 

Feim’s house 

Members of the community simply decide to attend the reception as relatives, friends, age-mates, 

neighbors, or in whatever other capacity. Weddings across the Western Rhodopes are open to the 

community at large, thus, being planned for a sizeable number of people. The Ribnovo community, 

particularly the womenfolk, partakes in the first-day festivities mostly by scrutinizing the cheiz and 

dancing horo on the public square or another venue in the village suitable for large congregations. 

The wedding is a special invitation to merrymaking for both unmarried and married people in 

Ribnovo. For the former, it largely means an opportunity to find a potential spouse, while for the 

latter – to get some entertainment before the farm work resumes. The first day of the Ribnovo 

wedding is also a day when only the groom feasts with his family, relatives, and friends. The bride’s 

side of the family does the feasting on the next day. The expenses are incurred by the parents of both 

bride and groom for their own guests respectively. The wedding guests, on their part, bring gifts in 

192

the form of food, money, and various household items. The young couple must be present during 

both receptions to formally accept gifts and congratulations. 

On the second day of the wedding, normally a Sunday, the groom’s side of the family 

prepares the so-called bayraks (photos). Typically, these are “T”-shaped wooden constructions of 

various sizes, suspended from which are all the gifts the groom has prepared for his future wife and 

in-laws. Usually, the gifts include articles of clothing and paper currency. The groom’s relatives carry 

Figure 5-7: Live music 

Accompanied by musicians, the groom’s family brings the gifts prepared for the bride 

and her relatives to her parents’ house on the second day of the wedding and the groom 

takes his bride home. Behind them are two other bayraks with fabrics and clothes 

respectively. All these gifts will go to the bride and her family. 

the bayraks, as well as other gifts, to the bride’s house accompanied by live music and a throng of 

participants or mere curious spectators. At the head of the procession is a close relative (a brother or 

cousin) of the groom who carries a blue flag – symbol of hospitality – topped with a bouquet of 

evergreens and money. When the slow-moving procession finally arrives at the gates of the bride’s 

193

home, they will have to face a small party of young men – bride’s relative – blocking the entrance. As 

tradition requires, the groom’s family literally buys their way in by handing the youngsters some 

cash in return for being let in. Gaining access to the bride has a vital symbolic significance at this 

point since the groom has essentially arrived to take his bride home. Once the groom’s procession is 

past the gate barrier, they pass the bayraks on to the parents of the bride. This time around, it is the 

bride’s family’s turn to pay for accessing the gifts. A male relative – normally the father or older 

brother of the bride – hands out small monetary bills to each bayrak-bearer, thereafter, taking 

possession of the gift. 

After the cash-bayrak 

exchange, along with pausing 

for photographs, it is time for 

the bride’s parents to bid 

farewell to their daughter and 

ritualistically surrender her to 

the in-laws. The groom and his 

family will take the bride to 

her new home for the first 

Figure 5-8: Kardie’s father lifts the bayrak with one hand and 

drops a bill to the bearer with the other 

time. She now wears the 

elaborate mask which prevents 

her from opening her eyes and lips. The bride walks out of her parent’s home silently and blindly, 

gently assisted by her mother and father or other family members along the way (Figure 5-10). 

194

While wearing the 

make-up, she keeps her eyes 

shut and carries a mirror 

before her. Tradition requires 

that she does not look back – 

she can only look in the 

mirror, if at all – at her 

girlhood home, because it is 

considered a bad omen for the 

stability of her future life as 

wife and mother. On a more 

Figure 5-9: Kadrie’s mother and father carefully assist her 

out on the way to her new life as a wife 

mundane level, the purpose of the mirror is a very practical one: to help the bride navigate her way 

forward since her gaze is inevitably obstructed by the heavy sequin make-up applied on her eyelids 

as well. 

Figure 5-10: Kadrie wearing full bridal make-up 

195

It is not clear how the tradition of 

decorating the bride with sequins and tinsel started. 

But a clue to the mask’s possible purpose may be 

found in a comment by Dr. Margarita Karamihova, 

ethnographer at the Bulgarian Academy of Science: 

All we know about this proverbial colorful bride – 

as you put it – is that it is some type of decoration 

that replaces the bride’s veil, which also signifies a 

clear transition in status [of the bride, from girlhood 

to matrimony]. This means that you change your 

appearance: disappear in the dark, covered one way 

or another, including by veil or garment. Then, 

when the [wedding] ritual is over, you reemerge in 

a new status [of a married woman], including by 

change in appearance.* As yet, however, none of us 

[scholars] can tell when and how this tradition 

came about. 19 

Figure 5-11: A Ribnovo bride fully 

arraigned in the traditional way 

(Courtesy of Kimile Ulanova). 

*[For instance, married women in Ribnovo are usually 

less adorned and wear more mundane clothing than 

girls.] 

Regarding bridal veiling, Arnold van Gennep makes 

an interesting reference to the ancient Greek 

philosopher Plutarch who once rhetorically 

remarked, “’Why do people veil their heads when 

worshiping the gods?’” “The answer is simple: [they 

do that] to separate themselves from the profane 

[secular] and to live in the sacred [religious] 

world.” 20 In similar line of reasoning, one might 

Figure 5-12: Bride Kadrie Kadieva 

(Courtesy of Kadrie and Inrahim Kadiev). 

19 Ibid., bTV documentary. Translated from Bulgarian by the author. 

20 In his book, The Rites of Passage, Arnold van Gennep places a great importance on the distinction he makes 

between the concepts of the sacred and the profane while analyzing the rites of passage. In a nutshell, unlike 

other cultural scholars of his time, Gennep does not see religion as the underlying force of all ceremonies in a 

196

interpret the elaborate “veiling” of the Ribnovo bride as a symbol of her separation from the world of 

adolescence and girlhood and permanent incorporation into the world of wifehood and potential 

parenthood. The physical act of bridal veiling may be a temporary—rather than permanent 

condition, van Gennep says, but when the veil falls, it permanently shuts one door and opens another 

one that leads to the next stage of the bride’s life: the world of family responsibilities. 21 

Despite the uncertainty as to origins, however, the tradition of bridal decoration is not a new 

invention. Oral and photographic evidence suggests that the ritual was thriving in the (Western) 

Rhodopes during the early twentieth century, but completely disappeared by the mid-1970s, when 

the revival process uprooted it. Indeed, Margarita Karamihova’s submission that the bridal mask is a 

sort of veil replacement appears to be correct. According to the oral testimony of Vassilka Alimanska, 

a (Bulgarian Christian) school teacher in the village of Debren, Western Rhodopes (near Ribnovo) 

during the 1930s and 1940s, the following was typical of Pomak weddings: 

Weddings in those days went on for weeks. The bride used to be covered with red veil. 

That’s the way the brides were done until 1944 [the year of communist takeover]. On the 

forehead, in the form of wreath, multicolored sequins were arranged. I loved to go to 

weddings and look at the brides for hours. The brides’ adornment existed until 1975 [the 

year the revival process among the Pomaks was finalized], but without the veil: dressed in 

purple shalvars [broad trousers], sequined aprons, and embroidered tyulbens [headscarves 

of sheer fabric]. During wedding, the women of the family and the neighborhood would 

make pastries and go to see the bride. 22 

This testimony very precisely points at the reason and timeframe of change and 

disappearance, first, of the bridal veiling, and, then, of the decorative mask. Apparently, the veil – an 

integral part of Muslim women’s attire in Ottoman times (roughly 1400 to 1900) – was still worn by 

at least some Pomak women until the 1940s. Veiling certainly appears to have been a part of the 

bridal attire. However, Bulgaria’s persistent attempts to assimilate the Pomaks, including by 

given societies. Instead, he holds that the sacred is not an absolute value, but one that is relative to the situation. 

However, since this distinction does not have a major bearing on this chapter, I have altogether excluded it from 

discussion. (Van Gennep, 168). 

21 Van Gennep, 168. 

22 A. Pashova et al., Semeystvo, Religiya, Vsekindevie na Myusyulmanite v Zapadnite Rodopi /Family, Religion, 

Lifestyle of the Muslims of the Western Rhodopes/ (Sofia: IK Sema RSH, 2002), 79-80. Memories of Vassilka 

Alimanska, school teacher in the village of Debren, Western Rhodopes, from the 1930s and 1940s. 

Translated from Bulgarian by the author. 

197

suppressing traditional attire, resulted in the disappearance of veiling by the 1940s. 23 By 1975, when 

the renaming of all Pomaks happened, the last remnants of a range of cultural traditions peculiar to 

the community – notably, the bridal decoration – died out as well. 

Another testimony from the village of Breznitsa (Western Rhodopes) not only provides 

further details about the tradition of decorating the bride earlier in the twentieth century, but also 

alludes to its common practice throughout the Western Rhodopes: 

The most interesting was the decoration of the [bride’s] face and head. A specially 

commissioned woman would come to decorate the bride: the face would be thickly covered 

with belilo [literally, whitener, i.e. cosmetic crème], the eyebrows would be blackened, and 

two circles would be drawn on the cheeks with lipstick. Then, the sequins and especially 

made, rhomboid shapes cut out of colored foil would be arranged on the face. A small cap 

would be placed on the head, the visible side of which was decorated with various bead 

strings and small gold coins suspended from the cap’s top. A white veil would then be placed 

over the cap, on top of which came [sheer] red or blue veil floating freely on both side of the 

face. Her [the bride’s] hands were painted with henna. The bride would then place her hands 

on the belly with one palm resting atop the other. Henna covered her hands because she did 

not wear apron [to hide them under]. Then she would be shown out from the balcony – 

givya-ing, [i.e.] not looking or talking at all – to a crowd of onlookers that had come especially 

to see her. 

The quote continues: 

When the bride walked out of her parental home, her eldest brother would cover her with 

the fereje [outer garment], because from then on she was a married woman and the fereje 

would become part of her attire. Her mother placed three kernels of corn wrapped in 

kerchief under her right arm so that she could bring the nafaka [good fortune] into her new 

home. Her face and head were covered with red fabric called duvak. While she was coming 

down the stairs, her father would sprinkle her with oat grains and small candy pieces, sifted 

through a colander which he would be turning to the exit door. Once in the groom’s house, 

[…] he [the groom] would come down and uncover her face. Here, she would sit down on the 

bed to givey [sit motionless and speechless] again till sundown. In the evening, the hodja 

[Muslim religious teacher] would arrive to marry the couple. 24 

Photographic evidence, on the other hand, also testifies that similar rituals of bridal masking and 

(tinsel) veiling existed throughout the Western Rhodopes all the way to the mid-1970s, when most 

23 The first comprehensive pokrastvane happened during the 1912-1913 Balkan Wars (see Chapter II), followed 

by partial attempts at Pomak Christianization in the 1930s and 1940s. After the communists’ takeover in 1945, 

the assimilation culminated in the 1972-1974 revival process, which put an end to all remnants of the bridal 

masking tradition in the (Western) Rhodopes. The eradication of veiling and fezzing as the ultimate symbols of 

Muslim dress was an objective already achieved in pre-communist Bulgaria. 

24 Pashova et al., 80-81. 

The authors quote the book Breznitsa – Minalo, pesni i traditsii /Breznitsa: Past, Songs, and Traditions/ 

(Blagoevgrad, 2002). (Translated from Bulgarian by the author.) 

198

Pomak traditions were altogether discouraged as part of the communist regime’s sustained effort to 

assimilate the community. 25 

Figure 5-13: Sanie and Mehmed Myuhtar 

As bride and groom in 1972, Valkossel, Western Rhodopes (the author’s parents). The 

bride is decorated with colored sequins arranged in floral patterns, but without the 

cakey belilo on the face. Instead, an egg white is used to secure the sequins in place. (The 

Myuhtar Family album. Wedding photograph of the author’s parents, Valkossel, January 1972.) 

25 For sources, see footnote 16, as well as footnotes accompanying the photographs’ captions. 

199

Figure 5-14: Wedding of Fatme Aguleva of Kornitsa, Western 

Rhodopes, 1967 

While the bride is certainly decorated, it cannot be established to 

what degree, mainly because of the tinsel veiling over her face. 

(The Cesur (Mehmed and Havva) Family album) 

Figure 5-15: Wedding photograph Atie Hadjieva of Valkossel, 1971 

The bride Atie is decorated in a slightly different fashion than the 

typical belilo-based, lipstick-circle centered bridal make-up (below). 

With no crème foundation, the facial adornment forms branches and 

leaves rather than flower petals emanating from a red midpoint. (The 

Hadjiev Family album) 

200

Figure 5-16: Wedding Figure of 5-0-1 Atidje and Mustafa 

Chavdarov of Valkossel, 1972 

(The Chavdarov Family album) 

Figure 5-17: Wedding of Atidje and 

Mustafa Chavdarov of Valkossel, 

1972 

The bride Atidje, with husband 

Mustafa and relatives, decorated in 

the - more or less - traditional style: 

sequins arranged around two large 

red cores on both cheeks, as well as 

two spread-out floral patterns on 

the chin and forehead respectively. 

The bride has no belilo foundation. 

Most probably, the sequins were 

applied onto the bride’s face via egg 

white or another natural glue 

substance. 

Figure 5-18: Wedding of Gyula and Mustafa 

Chavdarov of Valkossel, early 1970s 

201

Figure 5-19: Wedding of Fatma and Mehmed 

Chavdarov of Valkossel, late 1960s 

Figure 5-20: Ayshe and Mustafa Drelev of 

Valkossel, early 1970s 

Figure 5-21: Wedding of Sadbera and Izir 

Chavdarov of Vakossel, 1968 

Figure 5-22: Wedding of Nadjibe and Natak 

Dermendjiev of Valkossel, early 1970s 

202

As the above oral and 

photographic 

evidence indicates, 

the process of 

decorating the bride 

in Ribnovo today 

appears to be 

uniform with the 

past. The belilo, or 

Figure 5-23: The bride is about to be decorated 

This is the first stage of the adornment process, where the bride’s face 

is covered with belilo foundation. 

thick cosmetic crème, 

remains the primary 

foundation for the 

elaborate mask, albeit the decorative pieces are now conveniently replaced by industrially 

manufactured 

sequins, Rhine 

stones, beading, and 

tinsel. The modern 

Ribnovo bride is 

always prepared by 

women who have a 

great deal of knowhow 

regarding bridal 

adornment. The 

decoration involves 

the following process: 

Figure 5-24: Ribnovo women demonstrate a decoration 

(Courtesy of K. Ulanova) 

203

The bride’s face is 

thickly covered with 

belilo. Using a lipstick, 

usually red, the 

decorator marks 

several red spots on 

strategic points of the 

bride’s face, usually two 

larger spots on each 

side and two smaller 

Figure 5-25: Fully decorate Kadrie is about to be dressed 

(Courtesy of Kadrie and Ibrahim Kadiev) 

ones on the forehead 

and chin. Shiny, colorful 

sequins are then arranged around the red “cores” – directly over the belilo – to form various floral 

patterns. When the floral arrangement is complete, the decorator colors the bride’s lips and darkens 

her eyebrows. After some finishing touches and last-minute corrections, the make-up is ready. Now 

the bride’s face is essentially a mask that she has to preserve intact for up to several hours. She does 

that by keeping an expressionless face. Once the facial adornment is done, the bride arranges her 

attire with the help of other women. She already wears basic bridal clothing when the facial 

adornment is in process. Afterwards, she is dressed in warmer top garments and veiled. 

The outer layer of the garment consists of (1) a highly ornate bodice that clasps at the waist line 

below the chests, (2) an apron, hand-woven of bright treads, and (3) a light black cloak-like garment, 

fereje, customarily worn by married women in the community (Figures 5-26, 5-27, and 5-28, pp.205- 

6). Veiling the bride is a fundamental and complex part of the dressing process. It occurs on three 

levels: 

Veiling the Bride: 

204

Figure 5-26: Veiling the bride - Step 1 

The bride’s hair is tucked behind a 

triangular under-veil, two ends of which 

are then tied together at her neck (Courtesy 

of Kimile Ulanova). 


A second, rectangular white veil covers the 

first one, but it rests freely on the bride’s 

shoulders. Silk flowers are then inserted 

under the veil, contouring the bride’s 

hairline. 

In the past, the decoration of the bride took place in strict privacy, only in a very narrow 

family circle. Although it remains a largely intimate ritual, those especially interested, including 

journalists and researchers, may negotiate access to it with the family. Once the heavy facial make-up 

is applied, the bride can no longer talk or hold her eyes opened. As a result, it has become traditional 

for the bride to keep silent lips and closed eyes to preserve the intricate mask which must remain 

intact from midday to nightfall on the second day of the wedding. Dr. Karamihova (above) 

contemplates the importance of being silent for the bride on the day she parts with girlhood to 

become a wife: 

The bride is the center of attention that day without touting her presence. She is quiet. This 

is her biggest day. After that, the whole world would fall on her shoulders: the world of 

children; of life without a husband, for he would probably be far away – abroad – earning a 

living. Perhaps this solitude is good for her. She has the day to herself – to think about all she 

is giving up [as a single woman] and receiving in return. That’s why, perhaps, this 

205

decoration – like a mask – is beautiful! Because it hides her emotions! It helps her keep them 

to herself. 26 

When the bride walks out of her parental home, 

she pauses to present her in-laws with gifts, 

prepared in advance as part of her dowry. To 

show respect and acceptance of her mother- and 

father-in-law as her new family, she kisses their 

hands. “When the gelina [bride] comes out,” says 

the bTV bride’s sister-in-law, “she presents us – 

the nearest [groom’s] relatives – with gifts. And 

now, after she has done that, we will take her 

home. We will collect her dowry and bring her 


Finally, a glittering red veil is placed on top 

and decorated with tinsel garlands that flow 

with us. There, the groom will remove her makeup 

and … that’s it.” 27 

The two day-wedding ritual culminates 

into the couple’s becoming a husband and wife at 

the end of the second day. That means that the bride and the groom will be intimate for the first time 

that night. In fact, in Ribnovo, only a girl that goes chaste to her husband’s house can become a bride 

or gelina. If a girl elopes before being married in the traditional way, she cannot be a bride within the 

religious ritual. While most young people marry with their parents’ consent, sometimes eloping 

occurs where the girl- or boy’s parents disapprove of their son- or daughter’s choice of partner. Once 

the young couple has eloped, however, the parents have to accept the situation. The girl joins her 

husband’s household only after a mundane civil marriage. But there is no traditional wedding ritual 

to celebrate the occasion. 28 

The Cheiz: 

26 bTV documentary (above). (Translated from Bulgarian by the author.) 

27 Ibid. 

28 Ibid. 

206

Like the mask and bridal attire, the dowry is an important attribute of the vibrant Ribnovo 

wedding. Tradition requires that the groom’s family provides a dwelling for the newlyweds, while 

furnishing the new home is the responsibility of the bride’s parents. Thus, the cheiz includes 

everything that is deemed necessary for establishing a new household. While the volume, variety and 

value vary from bride to bride depending on her family’s means, common dowry items include 

articles of clothing and fabrics, rugs, bedspreads, pillows, towels, furniture and kitchen appliances. 

Referencing the Safer Studio video material, Kadrie’s dowry contains bedding, bedroom furniture, 

carpets, curtains, appliances, dishware, glassware, living-room furniture, a television and other 

electronics (Figures 5-29, 5-30, 5-31, and 5-32, pp.208-9). 

It is a tradition in Ribnovo to display the bride’s dowry on special lumber constructions 

placed along the street in front of the bride’s parental house so that everyone could see it. Although 

the colors are rich and the composition seemingly chaotic, the overall arrangement pleases the eyes. 

This should come as no surprise since the women of the bride’s household execute the arrangement 

with a great deal of fuss and attention to details. They are painfully aware that their work will be 

scrutinized by the entire female community of Ribnovo and beyond. That is why, early on the first 

day of the wedding, the bride’s family works busily. The men erect timber frames and help with 

moving the heavier items, while the women arrange the cheiz according to their own rules of 

harmony and proportion. The most obvious practical rule is to move from the largest to the smallest 

article in the process of arrangement. Thus, the women place the largest rugs, carpets and covers on 

the frames first. Onto those they affix the smaller table-cloths, fabrics, pillow cases, and suchlike, with 

the tiniest and most decorative units resting atop everything else. The furniture and kitchen utensils 

are displayed separately. Overall, the more colorful the ensemble, the more beautiful it is perceived 

to be. Once the cheiz is exhibited, crowds of spectators – mostly women – gather to observe and trade 

comments. Below are photographs of Kardie’s cheiz which is perhaps more opulent compared to 

most brides’ dowry: 

207

Figure 5-29: Cheiz I 

Rugs, covers, curtains, pillows and knits are exhibited for public scrutiny 

Figure 5-30: Cheiz II 

Television set, stereo, coffee machine, and storage cabinets on this picture 

208

Figure 5-31: Cheiz III 

Refrigerator, washing machine, microwave oven, vacuum cleaner. 

Figure 5-32: Cheiz IV 

Living-room set, decorative pillows and a coffee table. An assortment of 

containers for various household uses arranged in front 

209

From Ribnovo to the Delta 

I started this chapter with a reference to Eudora Welty’s book, Delta Wedding, commenting 

how marriage traditions, originating in the opposite ends of the world at different times, connect. But 

just what are these similarities? The wedding enfolded in Welty’s novel takes place in the fall 

(September) of 1923 29 while it is still hot and humid in Mississippi and the fields are white with 

cotton. Battle Fairchild, his wife Ellen, their many children and the extended family of numerous 

aunts, uncles and cousins, are preparing for a wedding. Battle’s daughter Dabney is marrying their 

plantation’s overseer Troy Flavin, somewhere from the hills of Tennessee. Thus far, there is not much 

resemblance with life in Ribnovo! The novel revolves around the Fairchilds’ preparations for 

Dabney’s wedding during the week before the event. Life in the course of that time is simultaneously 

intimate, communal, hectic, vivacious, exhausting, exciting, disappointing, gloomy, hopeful, 

conciliatory, bountiful and gossipy. It is in this web of complex emotions, reflective of the 

conservative-patriarchal social and cultural environment of the community that the similarities 

between the Delta and Ribnovo – and, to an extent, the Rhodopes – begin. 

The institution and ritual of marriage matter to the Delta and Ribnovo people to the same 

degree as they invest equal effort and care in preparation for it. However, while the wealth of the 

American Delta planters’ class in the early twentieth century allowed them to spend lavishly on the 

marriages of their offspring, the relatively modest means of the Ribnovo people, in comparison, limits 

their spending abilities. That does not stop many Ribnovo parents, though, from going above and 

beyond their resources to procure – what they perceive to be – the best for their sons or daughters, 

especially in terms of dowry. In particular, among the principal similarities between the 1920s Delta 

wedding, as described by Welty, and the modern Ribnovo tradition are the following: 

✔The wedding is primarily a family affair: It is the family of the bride, the groom, or both 

together that organize the event, bear the cost of it, actively participate in it and altogether make the 

wedding possible. Moreover, marriage brings people together not only during the preparation and 

celebration of the tradition, but also for life by creating ties between families and communities. 

29 Welty, 1. 

210

✔Communal feasting is a vital component of the wedding: At Dabney and Troy’s wedding, the 

Fairchilds provide a sumptuous feast not only for the extended family, but also for neighbors and the 

plantation’s workforce. Likewise, in Ribnovo, each of the newlyweds’ families invites their relatives 

and friends to a banquet to celebrate their son or daughter’s marriage. Interestingly enough, 

however, the families feast separately. The groom’s side gathers for an afternoon meal, gift-giving 

and dancing on the first day of the festivities at a local restaurant or eatery especially booked for the 

occasion. The bride’s side does the same on the following day, or vice versa. Overall, it is more 

traditional in the Western Rhodopes for the groom’s family to bear all reception expenses, while the 

bride’s parents provide the dowry. However, since a wedding can be very costly, sharing expenses is 

important (see footnote 14). The solution to a financial predicament in Ribnovo is ingenious: 

detached feasting and half the cost per family. 

✔ The wedding is a “grand” community celebration: In Delta Wedding, just like in Ribnovo, 

not only the extended family, but also the entire community of neighbors turns out at the wedding 

festivities for socializing and good cheer. Eudora Welty best expresses the extent of it in the following 

passage: 

Everybody for miles around came to the reception. Troy said he did not know there could be so 

many people in the whole Delta [emphasis added]; it looked like it was cotton all the way. The 

mayor of Fairchilds and his wife were driven up with the lights on inside their car, and they 

could be seen lighted up inside reading the Memphis paper …; in the bud vases on the little 

walls beside them were real red roses, vibrating, and the chauffeur’s silk cap filled with air 

like a balloon when they drove over the cattle guard. Shelley’s heart pounded as she smiled; 

indeed, this was a grand occasion for everybody, their wedding was really eventful [emphasis 

added]. 30 

Not only is the fully traditional Ribnovo wedding “a grand occasion for everybody” to be entertained, 

but it is often the only occasion, particularly for women. There are no bar clubs or discothèques in 

Ribnovo. Although there are plenty of cafés to congregate in and chat with friends, these are 

exclusively the domain of men. In this extremely conservative social environment, eligible bachelors 

and bachelorettes meet on the street, before everybody’s eyes. Young people in Ribnovo date while 

partaking in the so-called dvijenie (literally, movement) during which girls – in groups of two, three, 

30 Ibid., 218. 

211

or more – walk back and forth along the main street of the village so that (potential) boyfriends could 

meet and talk with them. The dvijenie usually continues until dusk. It is particularly dynamic during 

the wedding season, when farm work is at a standstill. 

✔ The wedding is an arena for enacting socio-cultural norms: The author of Delta Wedding 

unequivocally establishes the social norms existing in the Mississippi-Yazoo Delta in the 1920s 

through her characters. The bride’s mother Ellen is extremely upset about Dabney’s marrying 

“beneath” her status as a planter’s daughter to a mere plantation overseer. Awareness of her 

powerlessness to prevent this bad match drives Ellen to find consolation in the thought that her 

brother-in-law George also married “beneath him,” for love, and he was happy. Her solace collapses, 

however, with the news that George’s wife, Robbie Reid, has left him, thus, becoming the object of 

angry and indignant discussion among the Fairchild clan. They now look at Dabney’s marriage as 

almost tolerable in comparison. When Robbie Reid, a “mere” daughter of a worker in the plantation’s 

store, ventures to come to the wedding, the Fairchilds are angry at her, but also relieved that 

George’s “honor” has been saved from scandal with the “flighty” wife’s return. 

Apparently, all George’s brothers and sisters – who belong to the refined Southern society – 

will tolerate Robbie Reid and Troy Flavin as long as they conduct themselves in accordance with the 

Fairchilds’ expectations: be meek and subservient, as behooves their station, not defiant. What fuels 

their emotions are the social norms of the patriarchal Delta society that literally stipulates the 

following: First, a match between a planter’s daughter and an overseer is bad. Second, a match 

between a gentleman and a working woman is intolerable. Third, the act of an angry wife – especially 

one of humble status like Robbie Reid – leaving her husband is foolish, reckless, and shameful. In the 

patriarchal Southern society, as in Ribnovo, men make the rules and break them with virtual 

impunity, unlike women. In Ribnovo, although both men and women are expected to live up to rigid 

social norms of moral integrity and connubial truthfulness – norms influenced by Islam – a husband’s 

indiscretion is far less likely to break a marriage than a wife’s one. It would be a matter of personal 

honor for a man to divorce an unfaithful wife and one of social survival for a woman to stay in a 

disloyal union. Likewise, if a bride is not a virgin on her wedding night, she would likely be shown the 

door unless the groom bears the “guilt” of it all. The type of class-related antagonism, markedly 

212

observable in Delta Wedding, however, is less pronounced in Ribnovo since most people share the 

same status of small tobacco farmers. 

Similar to the Delta, it is paramount for the young people of Ribnovo to marry within their 

village community where they feel most comfortable. This is especially true for women who rarely 

marry outside Ribnovo. To wed someone from the village is more prestigious than marrying an 

outsider. Those who choose a non-Ribnovo husband, after all, do it either for love or because they 

cannot find a suitable match in their home community. 31 In Delta Wedding, Eudora Welty strongly 

expresses the importance of community and the continuity of tradition. On several occasions, one or 

another character of the novel utters words indicative of how vital it is in the patriarchal society of 

the Delta not only to marry their daughters and sons well, but to marry them in the Delta. This is to 

ensure that life in the community, so intimate and dear to those who live it, would not be disrupted; 

i.e. “things aren’t going to be any different” after marriage. 32 All too often in the novel the 

conversation among the Fairchilds about Dabney’s wedding and Robbie Reid’s fleeing follows the 

course reflected in the following passage: 

‘And we can’t let poor Tempe know—she just could not cope with this [Robbie Reid’s 

running away],’ said Battle in a soft voice. ‘Hard enough on Tempe to have Dabney marrying 

the way she is, and after Mary Denis married a Northern man and moved so far off. Can’t tell 

Jim Allen and Primerose* and hurt them [emphasis added].’ 33 

* Tempe, Jim Allen and Primerose are Dabney’s aunts, as well as Battle and George’s sisters, 

while Mary Denis is Tempe’s daughter. 

Ultimately, what is important to the people in both Ribnovo and the Delta is not merely 

keeping with rigid social norms, but preserving the world they know the way they know it through 

observing the norms. Life in a familiar and controlled environment is secure and predictable, while 

life beyond people’s reach is foreign, frightful and unwanted. “The Fairchilds would die, everybody 

said,” writes Welty, “if this [wedding] happened. But now everybody seemed to be just too busy 

31 The Osmanov Family (Feim, Fatme and their mother), interview by author, Ribnovo, Bulgaria, March 7, 2009. 

32 Words of Jim Allen, Dabney’s aunt, to Dabney just before her wedding (Welty, 48). 

33 Welty, 52. 

213

[preparing for it] to die or not.” 34 Indeed, the Fairchilds may be unhappy about Dabney and Troy’s 

marriage, but they have come to terms with it. What is more, they make the wedding possible by 

organizing it and actively participating in it. Similarly, in Ribnovo, not only will parents suffer the 

undesired partner of choice of their offspring, but – much in the Fairchilds’ way – they will take steps 

to prepare for the wedding, usually by incurring all cost of it. As long as the integrity of the family and 

community is ensured and life goes on as usual, every union – even an initially deplored one – will 

come to be accepted and even celebrated via the wedding ritual. Thus, the custom of marriage 

emerges as a vital act of – and even quest for – preserving the status quo in the community both: (1) 

by ensuring smooth transition from singlehood to marriage for two young individuals and (2) by 

averting a crisis that may arise out of opposition to a “bad” union. In other words, the wedding ritual 

rises as a flag of celebration when a marriage is desired and as a white banner of surrender when it is 

not so, all for the purpose of averting crisis and keeping family affairs going. 

Marriage: “The Key Turning Point in … Adult Life” 

35 

According to Arnold van Gennep, 36 responsible for first systematizing the rites of passage in 

the social sciences, marriage is one of the major rites of passage in human existence together with 

child birth, coming of age and death. 37 Expanding on van Gennep’s proposition, Robert Ingpen and 

Philip Wilkinson write: 

Birth, coming of age, marriage, death. Whoever we are and wherever we live, we cannot 

avoid these great climaxes and crises of life. People need to ease these changes in a number 

of ways. And a change of status needs to be made known to the community. Rituals to signal 

and mark these key life changes – rites of passage, as they are called – occur in all human 

societies and they seem to fulfill a basic human need. 38 

34 Ibid., 31. 

35 Robert Ingpen and Philip Wilkinson, A Celebration of Customs and Rituals of the World (New York: Facts on 

File, Inc., 1996), 77-78. 

36 Van Gennep is a Belgian anthropologist and folklorist who became influential with his concept of the rites of 

passage in cultural theory at the turn of the twentieth century. 

37 Van Gennep, passim. 

38 Wilkinson and Ingpen, 43. 

214

The authors contend that all humans experience major life changes – “crises of life” – during 

the birth of a child, puberty, marriage, or the death of loved ones. Once those changes take place, the 

person(s) affected re-enter society in a new role, status, or position as mothers or fathers, husbands 

or wives, widows or widowers, and so on. People feel the need to go through these life changes as 

close to their normal routine as possible under the circumstances of crisis. As a result, the community 

performs rituals to help smooth the transition of any given members from their old to their new 

status, as well as to announce the change to society at large. Thus, principal rituals such as weddings 

are designed not only to mark a major change in the lives of two people, but also to facilitate their 

transition from the world of singlehood to matrimony and to ensure their successful reintroduction 

into society as a family unit. 

In 1908, when van Gennep’s Les Rites de Passage first appeared, no classification of rites 

existed. 39 Published initially in French, his theories languished in semi-obscurity for over fifty years. 

With the release of an English edition in the 1960s, van Gennep’s rites-of-passage classification and 

the concept of schema (meaning pattern, process, structure, and/or dynamics) have become 

recognized contributions to anthropology and social theory in general. In a nutshell, van Gennep 

defines the customs and rituals that mark major disruptions in the life of an individual or group as 

rites of passage. The basic schéma of these rites of passage incorporates three stages: a) separation 

(séparation), b) transition (marge), and c) incorporation (agrégation). 40 Clarifying on the concept of 

the schéma, van Gennep says: 

Rites of separation are prominent in funeral ceremonies, rites of incorporation at marriages. 

Transition rites may play an important part, for instance, in pregnancy, betrothal, and 

adoption, in the delivery of a second child, in remarriage, or in the passage from the second 

to the third age group. 41 

Based on van Gennep’s overall notion of schema, one can generalize definitions of separation, 

transition and reincorporation that apply to all major rites of passage. Separation occurs not only at 

death, but generally when a person parts with his or her present social role to accept a new one. 

39 In the introduction to The Rites of Passage (above) by Solon S. Kimbali (van Gennep, xxv). 

40 Kimbali, in van Gennep, vii. 


215

Thus, the rites of marriage and (first) childbirth can also be interpreted as rites of separation since, in 

the first instance, two people part with singlehood to re-emerge as family and, in the second instance, 

they separate from the status of non-parenthood to join that of parenthood. Transition is the period 

of adjustment to a new role, status, or position a person has acquired in society. As Wilkinson and 

Ingpen indicate, transition often manifests itself by physical and social transformations 42 such as 

those accompanying a woman’s motherhood or an individual’s puberty when some exterior features 

change and social responsibilities grow. Reincorporation happens when an individual is successfully 

reintegrated into society in his or her new status. At puberty, for instance, a former child would be 

successfully reintroduced into society as a young adult if he or she becomes a productive and lawabiding 

member of it. In marriage, two former single persons would have successfully re-entered 

society as a unit after establishing a solid family and potentially raising healthy children. The customs 

and rituals are there to help ease the stress on people as they undergo “life crises” and re-establish 

themselves as productive members of society. 

In A Celebration of Customs and Rituals of the World, Ingpen and Wilkinson describe the 

intended purpose of rituals in any given cultural community in the following quote: 

By relieving the stress within a community that can surround change, they [rituals] help to 

prevent social disruption. By bringing people together, they foster cooperation. By providing 

clear instructions to individuals, they help people to live up to society’s expectations. 43 

Customs and rituals, they contend, are important in society for three essential reasons: 

‣ They help smooth the transition from one crucial stage of human existence into another 

without disrupting society’s life; 

‣ They bring people together and create a sense of community among them; 

‣ They provide important guidance to the young generation as to the values, norms and 

responsibilities in society. 44 

42 Ingpen and Wilkinson, 43. 

43 Ibid. 

44 Ibid. 

216

Indeed, the passage from one stage of a person’s life into another – from single to married 

life, for instance – entails a major change not only in that person’s social condition, but also in the 

social condition of his or her family group and potentially of the whole community. Because 

difficulties accompany these changes, rituals play a pivotal role in alleviating the stress that people 

experience. As van Gennep aptly puts it: 

Such changes of condition do not occur without disturbing the life of society and the 

individual, and it is the function of the rites of passage to reduce their harmful effects. That 

such passages are regarded as real and important is demonstrated by the recurrence of rites 

… among widely differing peoples [and societies] … [emphasis added]. 45 

“The life of an individual in any society,” van Gennep continues, “is a series of passages from one age 

to another and from one occupation to another. […] [P]rogression from one group to the next is 

accompanied by special acts, like those which make apprenticeship in our trades.” 46 Those acts that 

accompany major changes in human existence “are enveloped in ceremonies” to ease the transition 

“so that society as a whole will suffer no discomfort or injury.” Overall, 

Transition from group to group and from one social situation to the next are looked on as 

implicit in the very fact of existence, so that a man’s life comes to be made up of a secession 

of stages with similar ends and beginnings: births, social puberty [different from physical 

one], marriage, fatherhood, advancement to a higher class, occupational specialization, and 

death. For every one of these events there are ceremonies whose essential purpose is to enable 

the individual to pass from one defined position to another which is equally well defined 

[emphasis added].” 47 

Because people design and enact them with a view to alleviating social disturbances 

occurring at key points in every person or group’s being, customs and rituals are indispensable for 

the proper functioning of any given society. Marriage, therefore, is one of those fundamental rituals. 

In fact, van Gennep defines marriage as “the most important of the transitions from one social 

category to another, because for at least one of the spouses it involves a change of family, clan, village, 

or tribe, and sometimes, the newly married couple even establishes residence in a new house.” In 

other words, marriage constitutes a major disturbance in the life of two individuals, two families, and 

their community, so the wedding ceremony is intended to facilitate the process of adjustment from 


46 Ibid., 2-3. 

47 Ibid. 

217

single to married life of the couple, as well as to jumpstart their successful reintegration into society 

as a family. Thus, theoretically, the longer and more elaborate the process, the smoother the 

adjustment. Or so the conclusion seems, according to van Gennep’s concept of transition. This crucial 

period of transition in marriage is betrothal. In van Gennep’s terms, 

A betrothal forms a liminal period between adolescence and marriage, but the passage from 

adolescence to betrothal involves a special series of rites of separation, a transition, and an 

incorporation into the betrothed condition; and the passage from the transitional period, 

which is betrothal, to marriage itself, is made through a series of rites of separation from the 

former, followed by rites consisting of transition, and rites of incorporation into marriage. 48 

Put differently, although it is essentially a rite of transition, betrothal itself can go through its own 

micro-stages of separation, transition, and (re)incorporation, especially in the case where betrothal 

is prolonged (i.e. goes on for months or years). Thus, where a couple goes through a lengthily 

betrothal, and where the bride-to-be joins her husband’s family, she goes through a sort of rehearsal 

stages of separation from her kin and incorporation into the family of in-laws. This entire process 

constitutes the larger rite of transition into marriage. Once marriage takes place, however, it becomes 

the new permanent stage of reincorporation into society of two previously single individuals as a 

family unit. 

Marriage, van Gennep states, is essentially a social act of permanent reincorporation into a 

new environment for both spouses and families. However, more than just the couple and their 

families are involved in the act of matrimony. The anthropologist identifies at least five groups that 

participate in and receive long-term effects from the rite of marriage. Those are: (1) the two gender 

groups at the wedding, especially represented by the bridesmaids and ushers; (2) the patrilineal or 

matrilineal descent groups; (3) the families of each spouse; (4) particular defined groups such as agemates, 

co-workers, friends, hobby peers and church circles, and so on; and (5) the local community 

such as the neighborhood, village, and/or town. 49 

As so many people take part in the initiation of a new family, they have a stake in the 

marriage and certain share of that stake is economic. Thus, the economic aspect is inherent in the 

48 Ibid., 11. 

49 Ibid., 118-19. 

218

wedding rite. This is clearly indicated in the gift exchange between two families, the bride’s dowry, 

the bride’s price (where applicable), and the overall wedding expenses. Often, the parties involved 

have a pronounced vested interest in the economic component of the marriage, but none of them 

more so than the couple and their immediate families who usually incur the bulk of the wedding 

expenses. On a more abstract level, the extended families-, friends- and community’s stake lies in the 

future success of the marriage. The effort and expense the latter put into organizing the ritual 

transpires as important investment into the proper functioning of society. As van Gennep puts it, “the 

bonds of marriage have joined not only two individuals, but above all the collectivities to which the 

maintenance of cohesion is important.” 50 

In the author’s terms, moreover, 

[t]o marry is to pass from the group of children or adolescents into the adult group, from a 

given clan to another, from one family to another, and often from one village to another. An 

individual’s separation from these groups weakens them but strengthens those he [or she] 

joins. 51 

In the case of Ribnovo, the bride is the one who leaves her family to join her husband’s kin. As a 

result, it is the bride’s family that gets weakened. To postpone the weakening as much as possible, 

the members of the bride’s clan symbolically place obstacles before the groom on his way to the 

bride. Such obstacles can be barring the gate before the seekers who have come to uproot the bride 

from the security of her parental home to plant her into an alien environment, the groom’s place. 52 

The groom and his family have to pay their way into the bride’s house in order to gain access to her 

so that the marriage ceremony can proceed to its expected culmination, the formation of a new 

family. 

Further in the analysis, van Gennep makes another important observation applicable to the 

case of Ribnovo. He points out that every marriage poses a social disturbance in any given 

community’s equilibrium. 

53 

But while that 

50 Ibid., 120. 

51 Ibid., 124. 

52 See section “Colorful Fairytale Ribnovo” of this chapter. 


219

phenomenon is scarcely noticed in … [the] big cities, … it is more apparent in remote corners 

of our countrysides where weddings are occasions for a stoppage of production, an 

expenditure of savings, and an awakening from the usual apathy. 

… 

The impact of a marriage on a group’s daily life seems to me to explain … why marriages are 

held in spring, winter, and autumn—i.e., at the time of little activity and not at the moment 

when there is work in the fields. … It is often said, on the other hand, that this is chosen 

because the agricultural work is completed, the granaries and treasures are full, and there is 

a good opportunity for bachelors to establish a home for themselves for the winter. 54 

In this passage, the author makes several fundamental inferences that are very relevant to 

Ribnovo as a small rural community. First, unlike in the big city where people pretty much remain 

anonymous to one another, in Ribnovo everyone knows everybody else. Second, as an agricultural 

society, weddings occur in the cold season when most of the farm work is done and there is plenty of 

time for merrymaking. Third, by the winter, crops have been harvested and either stored for private 

consumption or sold for cash. Resources, therefore, are now available to pay for weddings. In 

Ribnovo, money comes from two main sources: (1) the sale of tobacco and mushrooms, grown and 

harvested throughout the year and/or (2) family members (mainly fathers) who, having worked 

abroad, return home in the fall to spend the hard-earned cash on home improvements, as well as on 

the education and marriages of their children. In marriages, the groom’s family resources go toward 

supplying a house for the newlyweds, while the bride’s kin assembles a dowry to furnish the place. 

Asserting Identity through Custom 

All the flow of money into costly wedding ceremonies, when money is often hard to come by, 

may seem unreasonable, but it is essential to the Ribnovo community. A group’s culture is nothing 

short of that group’s sense of identity which is periodically reasserted and reinvigorated through 

customs and rituals. The wedding tradition is among the strongest expressions of identity for the 

people of Ribnovo. Moreover, it has made them interesting, likeable and known to the outside world 

(read above). Through the medium of wedding ritual, the community not only projects a positive 

image of themselves, but also proclaims an identity of their own making. 

54 Ibid. 

220

As documentary producers, journalists, researchers and scholars are increasingly curious 

about the unique wedding rituals of Ribnovo, they bring questions of Pomak identity to the fore. It is 

in the bTV documentary, Colorful Fairytale Ribnovo, and I have heard and seen it numerous times on 

television, in newspapers, on internet, and in the multiple formal and informal interviews I have had 

with Bulgarian-speaking Muslims, including from Ribnovo: When asked about their identity, people 

insist on being Muslim. Not Turkish; not Bulgarian; but Muslim; and Muslim not so much to express 

strong attachment to religion, but rather to indicate cultural rootedness. This means that the Pomaks 

are increasingly prone to differentiate themselves from both the ethnic Turks and Bulgarian 

Christians to essentially resist outside prescriptions as to who they are. This effectively reflects the 

emergence of a more confident sense of self among the community in recent years whereby the 

identification Pomak is increasingly being used by members of the group to define themselves. 

The appellation Pomak, however, has not always been a comfortable one to bear, mainly 

because non-Pomaks have used it in a derogatory fashion. As a result, many Pomaks continue to 

substitute it for – simply – Muslim, especially when talking to outsiders. It feels somewhat safer to do 

so. This is not to say, though, that they do not accept Pomak as self-appellation. The name is old and 

familiar to the community. As Stoyu Shishkov – a (Christian) Bulgarian author – observes, the term 

has been historically used in reference not only to the Rhodopean Muslims of Bulgaria, but also to the 

Slavic-speaking Muslims in Turkey, Greece and Macedonia. 55 In the time of the Ottoman Empire, part 

of the Rhodope population was designated as Pomaks to distinguish them as local Muslims who stood 

apart from the Bulgarian rayah (the local Christians or non-Muslims in general). But since Bulgaria’s 

independence from Ottoman rule in 1878, the name Pomak has been indiscriminately used by both 

Christian Bulgarians and Bulgarian Turks to connote “traitors” of the Eastern Orthodox Christian 

faith or “impure Turk” respectively. The Bulgarian label is based on the assumption that the Pomaks’ 

predecessors were once Christians who converted to Islam, although that claim has never been 

established beyond any doubt. The Turkish connotation of the name in more recent times, on the 

other hand, rests on the incorrect – partly unwitting – synonymization of “Turkish” and “Ottoman” in 

55 Stoyu Shishkov, Balgaro-mohamedanite (pomaysi) /Bulgarian-mohamedans (Pomaks)/ (Sofia: Sibia, 1997), 15 

& passim. The book was originally published in 1936. 

221

espect to the Pomak status in the Ottoman Empire as Ottoman subjects of non-Turkish (Slavic?) 

descent. 56 Following this historical pejorativization of the word, many have stopped short of 

declaring themselves Pomak. Moreover, after a series of compulsory assimilations in Bulgaria, many 

members of the group have felt it risky to declare any such affiliation. In the last twenty years, 

however, the Rhodopean Muslims are not only becoming comfortable with the name, but also find 

new meaning in it. The meaning is one of identity of their own: the identity of Bulgarian-speaking 

Muslims; the identity of Pomaks. 

To be Pomak for the community not only means knowing who they are, but also standing up 

for one’s own sense of self. That is why, in Colorful Fairytale Ribnovo, the people of Ribnovo while 

conceding to be Bulgarians, also emphasize the difference of religion and identify as Pomaks. Dr. 

Margarita Karamihova, ethnographer at the Bulgarian Academy of Science, ponders on the reasons 

for this dual cultural self-identification: 

The traumatic memory from the different periods when the Bulgarian Muslims had their 

names changed is still very painful [to them]. The first generation, free of such memories, 

still matures. They are still young. 

Very painfully, very slowly, with great difficulty, people reminisce [when interviewed] of 

what happened to them. The harsh assimilatory politics of the past drives people into 

looking for another form of identification [than simply that of Bulgarians]; into finding 

another name for themselves [- Pomaks]. Islam [i.e. identifying as Muslim] seems to provide 

the most acceptable one to them. 57 

What Karamihova perceptively observes is the root cause of it all: the feelings of hurt and 

humiliation that the people in Ribnovo and across the Rhodopes still carry as a direct result of the 

revival process and the earlier pokrastvane. 58 

The phrase “Ribnovo republic” dates back to the 1960s 

and 1970s, when there were violent clashes between the police and Christian civilians enabling the 

revival process, on one hand, and the inhabitants of several villages in the Western Rhodopes, 

including Ribnovo, on the other. The Ribnovo villagers put a strong resistance and defiantly – but 

largely symbolically – proclaimed their place “a republic,” the dream land of self-determination and 

56 Shishkov, passim; Ali Eminov, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria, (New York: Routledge, 1997), 

passim. 

57 bTV documentary, Colorful Fairytale Ribnovo (ibid.). 

58 For detailed accounts of the revival process and the pokrastvane, see Chapters II and III. 

222

freedom. Of course, there never was or could be any actual “Ribnovo republic,” but the term has 

become a catchphrase ever since to mockingly denote Ribnovo as a backward society. 59 Historically, 

the people of Ribnovo defended their sense of identity even when guns were turned against them. 

Essentially, all they wanted was their names unchanged and their religious traditions intact. They 

needed the community the way they knew it, not the way others thought it should have been. In 

Ribnovo, more than in any other Pomak community of the Rhodopes today, rootedness in cultural 

tradition matters so much that any threat of change only makes people cling more faithfully to 

tradition. 60 

Pomak as a cultural identity in Bulgaria is highly politicized to this day. Any reference to a 

distinct cultural heritage is problematic. That is why, the Muslim community of the Rhodopes, and in 

Ribnovo in particular, still avoid promoting their customs and rituals as Pomak culture. Instead, they 

safely present them as the celebration and honoring of age-old local traditions. But people are acutely 

aware of the Pomak nature of these traditions that are practiced neither by their Christian nor by 

their Turkish-speaking neighbors. Thus, the Ribnovo wedding, although unique to the village today, 

has its past precedents in the Pomak villages across the Western Rhodopes. Despite the 

preponderance of western-style garments and secular traditions in modern-day Rhodopean 

weddings, certain fundaments of tradition are characteristic to all Pomak nuptials even today. The 

foremost commonality is that the wedding is always a family affair, whereby the two connecting 

families – and notably the groom’s one – organize, most actively participate in and pay for the 

wedding. Another shared trait is the assumption that the bride provides the dowry, while the groom 

– the house. A third uniting feature is the way receptions are held. They are typically open to the 

59 My interviewees Ramadan Runtov-Kurucu and Ismail Byalkov, both from Kornitsa – currently residents of 

Istanbul (Turkey) – were taken as political prisoners during the final stage of the revival process in 1973. Ago 

Ramadan recounted how the four villages of Kornitsa, Lajnitsa, Ribnovo and Breznitsa were surrounded by 

armed militia in the early 1960s, while the population within prevented the “revivalists” from entering the 

villages by blocking the main arteries coming in. The villagers were armed with clubs and farm implements 

against armed contingents of police, communist apparatchiks, and Christian civilians. This tense situation went 

on for three months until, finally, the authorities revoked the campaign, for fear of international scandal. 

Ultimately, in 1973, the villages rebelled again, but this time the resistance was crashed and five people died as a 

result. This issue is extensively discussed in Chapters III and IV. 

60 This information is based on archival documents from the Central National Archives-Sofia and the author’s 

interviews with Ramadan Runtov and Ismail Byalkov. Both groups of sources are comprehensively used in 

Chapters II, III and IV respectively. 

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community at large, with no formal invitations; expenses are generally born by the groom’s family. A 

fourth – albeit decreasing in relevance – similarity is the expectation that the bride should marry a 

virgin, or, alternately, have had no other “boyfriend” than her husband-to-be. Yet a fifth, and by no 

means final, commonality is the live music accompanying the newlyweds every step of the way for 

the duration of the wedding. 

This roster of shared characteristics in the wedding customs of most Pomak communities is 

far from complete. But in combination with existing past similarities of marriage traditions across the 

(Western) Rhodopes and the lack of such thereof with other cultural groups, it provides sufficient 

grounds to claim that the colorful Ribnovo wedding is indeed a unique and meaningful expression of 

Pomak heritage. Due to the fact that Pomak culture remains largely unexplored, or compulsorily 

explained in terms of belonging to the mainstream Bulgarian culture, many valuable cultural 

traditions – including weddings – are rapidly fading away without ever being documented. I chose to 

describe, interpret and analyze the colorful Ribnovo wedding in an attempt to preserve an exciting 

Pomak tradition, which has sadly gone extinct outside of Ribnovo. 

The wedding custom indeed matters to the people of Ribnovo, because it provides them with 

sense of continuity, rootedness and, ultimately, with sense of self. But what is the nature of tradition 

after all? If culture – and, by extension, tradition – is “our entire way of life in society,” 61 then culture 

records a community’s entire knowledge and experience. Thus, preservation of tradition through 

customs and rituals is – by definition – an indispensable human drive. The people of Ribnovo, like all 

other human societies, therefore, have the natural urge to protect and preserve the status quo. 

Customs and rituals ensure continuity of tradition from the past into the future through their cyclic 

re-enactment in the present. Furthermore, a summary of important reasons strewn throughout 

Ingpen and Wilkinson’s book, A Celebration of Customs and Rituals of the World, points to the 

following directions: 

► The (re-)enactment of customs and rituals fulfills basic human needs. For the people of 

Ribnovo the basic human need fulfilled by the ritual of marriage is pretty straightforward: the 

61 Ingpen and Wilkinson, 6. 

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wedding provides them with an opportunity to get together, as a community, to make merry and 

celebrate a new union. Thus, the ritual of marriage not only ensures the advancement of society, but 

also secures a much needed respite and entertainment to the people after a long season of hard work. 

►Customs and rituals are tools for passing on knowledge to future generations, thus, linking 

the past with the future through the present: If human culture is “the totality of habits and skills that 

people learn from each other” 62 then it is vital to preserve that knowledge by the formula of rituals 

and their re-enactment. The unique colorful wedding of Ribnovo is an extinct tradition outside of the 

community as a result of which people adhere to it ever more steadfastly. 

►Performed collectively, traditions (customs and rituals) assist in achieving a sense of 

“fellowship, friendship and kinship between family members, and between individuals, families and 

societies.” 

63 

This is particularly true for Ribnovo. The principal component of the wedding ritual is the 

communal celebration. There would be no proper Ribnovo wedding if there were no community to 

organize and celebrate it. 

►Traditions (customs and rituals) help “transcend everyday life,” especially in marriage 

rituals, were activities such as singing, dancing, communal feasting, special costumes and/or masks, 

collective merrymaking and processions raise the emotions of the participants beyond the normal 

range and create a sense of elevation. 

64 

►Customs and rituals further matter, because they: 

foster unity on all levels, family, community, nation, region, human civilization; 

imbue human life with spirituality; 

help manage one’s own sense of identity; 

help preserve the past; 

provide a sense of tradition and order; 

and nurture a feeling of rootedness and continuity within a place and society. 

62 Ibid. 

63 Ibid. 

64 Ibid., 9. 

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Drawing on a large variety of examples from around the world, Wilkinson and Ingpen define 

the ritual of marriage as having dual functionality: (1) in making everyone happy and (2) in 

reinforcing social continuity. 65 More specifically, the wedding, including in Ribnovo, does all of the 

following: 

brings two people together 

brings two families together; 

brings the community together; 

provides an avenue for communal entertainment via music, dancing and feasting; 

“helps the couple to prepare for a major change in their lives”; 

creates a new family unit in society; 

opens the potential for bringing more children into society; 

instructs two people on how to behave as a family in society; 

serves as an arena for negotiation economic contracts between two persons and their 

families supplying dowry and gifts to help set a new family; 

allays “the stress that accompanies change by making the transition enjoyable” not only to 

the couple, but to their families and the community at large; 

and proclaims the new social status of two people as a husband and wife. 66 

Ultimately, as van Gennep says, “marriage establishes the girl and boy into the category of the 

socially adult women and men, and nothing can take this from them.” 67 

The passage into matrimony, as any other established ritual, is a curious phenomenon, 

indeed. It begins as fulfilling the basic human urge to establish family, continues as a public 

entertainment, and ends with bringing a new family unit into society. Various communities celebrate 

it differently depending on beliefs, resources and needs. In Ribnovo, the wedding tradition is as much 

about the desire of the people for tradition, rootedness, and continuity as everywhere else. The 

traditional Ribnovo wedding has survived despite – and perhaps because of – its disappearance 

elsewhere in the Western Rhodopes. Having established itself at the end of a solitary mountain road, 

the community has preserved Pomak heritage more than any other community in the vast Rhodope 

65 Ibid., 88. 

66 Ibid., 79-80. 


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Mountains. What the people of Ribnovo know is what they love most, and what they love is what they 

cannot let go. Clinging to tradition has become a second nature to the villagers, because to them it 

means identity, stability and future. Recently, as the community has fared better economically, 

weddings are only getting bigger and more elaborate. Most parents just compete to provide richer 

spectacles during their sons or daughters’ wedding through the lavishness of the dowry, gifts, music 

and bridal ornamentation. Fortunately, at this point in time, the unique, colorful Ribnovo wedding, it 

seems, will endure as tradition, as identity anchor and as Pomak heritage. 

*** 

Cultural tradition is an important element of identity and heritage, but it is by no means the 

only one. Whereas this chapter effectively establishes the Ribnovo wedding as a highly visible Pomak 

ritual, there are “stories” that clearly pertain to history as well. Indeed, it must be acknowledged that 

heritage is more than custom or culture. In fact, heritage has a strong historical component, which 

leads to the pertinent question: Is there an identifiable Pomak history? 

Naturally, there is a history associated with the Pomak people, as with all human 

communities. Regrettably, the most visible aspect of that history has been the religious, political and 

cultural oppression of the Pomaks in Bulgaria, beginning with the pokrastvane of 1912-1913 (see 

Chapter II) and culminating in the revival process of 1972-1974 (see Chapter III). While this is valid 

history, which inevitably influences the preservation and projection into the future of any Pomak 

heritage, there are also positive aspects to Pomak history that await identification, contextualization, 

and incorporation into the collective Pomak narrative. The next chapter advances one such 

opportunity to reclaim a potentially uniting historical component of a renewed Pomak, Rhodopean, 

local heritage. 

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CHAPTER VI 

PRESERVING HERITAGE THROUGH MICROHISTORY: THE CASE OF SALIH AGA OF PAŞMAKLI, 

POMAK GOVERNOR OF THE AHI ÇELEBI KAAZA OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1798-1838) 

This chapter deals with the legacy of Salih Aga of Paşmaklı, the forgotten Pomak governor of 

the small Ottoman province of Ahı Çelebi from the first half of the nineteenth century. Relying largely 

on oral history documentation, I reconstruct the life story of this remarkable lord registering in local 

memory as tough – indeed, often ruthless – but relentlessly evenhanded enforcer of justice who 

elevated the status of Christians to that of Muslims despite the discrimination inherent in Shari’a, the 

normative law of the Ottoman Empire. One major problem that prevents the construction of 

standard narrative histories of Pomak heritage, particularly in the case of Salih Aga, is the lack of 

direct historical evidence. That is, within the larger framework, Pomak history has been traditionally 

subsumed into, initially, Ottoman and, subsequently, Bulgarian historiography. In other words, 

Pomak history does not explicitly exist in written documentation, but must be gleaned out of it, often 

with the help of oral history. Specifically, there are two main information obstacles to applying a 

strictly historical interpretation to Salih Aga’s case. First, as a highly local and fairly minor Ottoman 

governor, Salih is largely absent from the annals of Ottoman history. Second, whatever archive 

existed from his time as administrator of Ahı Çelebi was destroyed in the Balkan War of 1912 and 

subsequently, when Bulgarian forces looted his konak (palace) and Bulgarian authorities demolished 

it in 1931 (details in the chapter). While the construction of Pomak histories may be difficult, 

however, it is far from impossible. But it will likely require scholars to embrace methodologies that 

employ nonstandard sources of information. One such opportunity is the microhistory approach that 

I use to study and recount the life of Salih Aga. 

Heritage as Microhistory 

228

The fundamental unifying characteristic of the books The Cheese and the Worms, The 

Question of Who, The Return of Martin Guerre, Masquerade, and The Sea Captain’s Wife by the Italian 

and English authors Carlo Ginzburg and Jonathan D. Spence, and by the American scholars Natalie 

Zemon Davis, Alfred F. Young, and Martha Hodes respectively is the fact that they belong to a 

relatively recent brand of history – microhistory, that has been developing in both the United States 

and Europe since the last decades of the twentieth century. 1 Microhistory assigns the function of 

history-making to generally anonymous or forgotten individuals and events that have been dug out 

of oblivion, often through sheer serendipity, by dedicated academics researching in archives as well 

as using local memory. Authors of microhistory not only have taken keen interest in the fate of their 

discovered heroes, but they also have invested precious time and resources into describing their life 

stories in scientific terms, filling the gaps of what remains unknown with qualified speculations. 

Presented this way, however, the definition of microhistory may simplistically suggest that it 

is up to the historian to shoot some obscure historical figure into academic stardom solely by virtue 

of his or her masterful research and prose. In fact, it takes more than an accomplished historian and 

surviving records or oral history to create an authentic and engaging narrative of the past. It takes 

extraordinary persons like Domenico Scandella – Menocchio, 2 John Hu, 3 Arnaud du Tilh (posing as 

Martin Guerre), 4 Deborah Sampson Gannett, 5 and Eunice Stone Connolly 6 to capture the attention of 

1 Carlo Ginzburg, The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller (Baltimore, MD: John 

Hopkins University Press, 1992); Jonathan D. Spence, The Question of Hu (New York, NY: Vintage Books, A 

Division of Random House, Inc., 1989); Natalie Zemon Davis, The Return of Martin Guerre (Cambridge, MA: 

Harvard University Press, 1983); Alfred F. Young, Masquerade: The Life and Times of Deborah Sampson, 

Continental Soldier (New York, NY: Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, Inc., 2004); and Martha Hodes, 

The Sea Captain’s Wife (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006). 

2 Menocchio was a late sixteenth-century miller who acquired a profoundly humanistic understanding of the 

universe at an inopportune time that caused him to be burnt at the stake by the Italian Catholic Inquisition. See 

Carlo Ginzburg, The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller (Baltimore, MD: The John 

Hopkins University Press, 1992), passim. 

3 John Hu was a Chinese convert to Catholicism whose eventful eighteenth-century journey to Europe, driven by 

his desire to see the Pope, provides a curious theme even for the most bare-bone of descriptions. See Jonathan D. 

Spence, The Question of Hu (New York, NY: Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, Inc., 1989), passim. 

4 The story of Martin Guerre enfolds in sixteen-century France, surpassing even the most imaginative Hollywood 

plots in sensationalism and excitability: a wayward husband, brother, and nephew’s place is claimed by another 

for more than three years before being found out upon the return of the actual Martin Guerre. See Natalie Zemon 

Davis, The Return of Martin Guerre (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), passim. 

229

committed storytellers who by virtue of their narratives would forever transform them from murky 

figures of the past into makers of history; at least on micro-(local-)history level. In other words, what 

matters even more than the aptitude of the scholar to construct a good historical narrative of local 

significance is the compelling (to say the least) presence of the story and/or person that inspire(s) 

microhistory. 

Thus, the process of (micro)history-making implies reciprocity. While the historian lends his 

or her skills and time to history, history provides exciting plots for a narrative in the form of 

countless nameless or forgotten Menocchios 7 whose captivating life tales – or interesting fragments 

of them – have been preserved in dusty papers or in vernacular memory. All these individuals have a 

fascinating presence. Placed in their time and space, they would certainly stand out as individuals 

amidst a multitude of pedestrian compatriots either because of personal merits or because of some 

life predicament that drove them into unconventional conduct. These individuals, who lived in flesh 

and blood at different times and locations in history, inspired Ginzburg, Spence, Zemon Davis, Young, 

and Hodes to write captivating pieces of microhistory which read as novels without the benefit of 

fictional garnishments. Thus, one may say that the discovery of a good story contributes immensely 

to the making of microhistory. 8 

In this sense, microhistory can be an extremely effective tool of presenting local heritage. It 

may particularly be the case when the heritage in question is little known, largely unexplored, and 

somewhat contested. Such is the heritage of the Rhodopean Muslims of Bulgaria (Pomaks), who are 

5 Young Deborah Gannett was an indentured servant and weaver before enlisting in the army during the 

American Revolutionary War disguised as a man driven by her vulnerable status of a single woman in a 

patriarchal society. See Alfred F. Young, Masquerade: The Life and Times of Deborah Sampson, Continental Soldier 

(New York, NY: Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, Inc., 2004), passim. 

6 Eunice Connolly, a nineteenth-century Anglo-Saxon New Englander, spent the better part of her life as an 

impoverished wage earner, carpenter’s wife, widow and mother of two young children, when she took the path 

of marrying a black man of means in spite of a society that was intensely race-biased and unforgiving of such 

transgressions. See Martha Hodes, The Sea Captain’s Wife (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), 

passim. 

7 I will adopt the name “Menocchio” as a general term of reference for qualifying subjects of microhistory. 

8 Jill Lepore discusses the definition of microhistory in an article called “Historian Who Love Too Much: 

Reflections on Microhistory and Biography,” The Journal of American History 88, no. 1 (June 2001): 129-44. 

230

just awakening to the process of shaping, (re-)claiming, and affirming their cultural identity. 9 My 

contribution to resurrecting and preserving an interesting episode of the local Pomak heritage, using 

microhistory methodology, explores the life and personality of Salih Aga of Paşmaklı, a Pomak 

governor of the Ottoman kaaza of Ahı Çelebi from 1798 to 1838. 10 

I develop the story on the basis of surviving archival evidence, abundant oral history, and 

legends about Salih and his time. Because of the incompleteness of the existing sources, however – at 

least in the sense that they recount episodic stories about Salih rather than provide any 

comprehensive account of his life – my goal is not to attempt a biography of the governor, but to 

reveal him the way he has survived in local memory by piecing together the existing snippets of 

information. Because Salih lived and ruled in turbulent times, his – in many ways – conventional 

achievements stand out as staggering feats of moral integrity, a sense of justice, and pursuit of order. 

Finding My Own Good Story 

I have definitely found a worthy subject of microhistory in the person of Salih Aga. 11 

Moreover, reviving the memory of an admirable person like Salih, who has been written out of 

history, merits any and all frustration involved in my efforts to reconstruct his personality and— 

what is left of his—life story. Although the governor is not the typical anonymous figure from the 

past like Menocchio, Martin Guerre, or John Hu since he was a regional mover-and-shaker for forty 

years, he has been completely forgotten. Moreover, albeit a small feudal ruler in the context of the 

vast Ottoman Empire, Salih was a powerful force in the Middle Rhodopes (see Figure 2-1, p.38), and 

continues to be a name integral to the history of the city of Smolyan (formerly Paşmaklı) and its 

vicinity. The governor particularly matters within the context of Pomak heritage today, because – as 

9 For Pomak identity, refer to Chapters II and III. 

10 The Ottoman state had a tripartite level of administrative government based on territorial districts: (1) the 

largest district, called vilayet (province), could be the size of a small country and was ruled by the highest 

ranking-governor (Pasha); (2) the districts within the vilayet were called sancak (sanjak, sub-provinces); and (3) 

the administrative units within the latter were known as kaaza, both ruled by lesser governors (Aga). The size of 

these administrative districts could vary significantly. The Ahı Çelebi Kaaza was part of the Gümürcina Sancak 

within the Vilayet of Edirne, the Province of Rumelia. 

11 Aga or Bey is a title by which feudal nobility was addressed in the Ottoman Empire. Aga is often used as 

synonymous to governor. In modern Turkish, bey remains in use as a polite address to men, corresponding with 

the English sir. 

231

my informant Ivan Terziev once said – his positive legacy of equitable treatment of Muslims and 

Christians during his lordship over Ahı Çelebi could prove a potent “unifying factor” of the 

Rhodopean communities of both faiths. The combination of Salih’s fascinating presence in the 

indigenous folklore and the relatively limited surviving records about him make this obscure 

Ottoman governor an extremely desirable, but equally challenging candidate for microhistory. 

Although I was born in the Western Rhodopes not far from the place where Salih lived and 

ruled, I had never heard about him before the summer of 2007 when I delved into the region’s 

history. Salih Aga became the forgotten governor of Ahı Çelebi for two correlated reasons: (1) After 

the country gained independence from Ottoman rule, Bulgaria’s national historiography associated 

him with the former “Turkish oppressors,” and, consequently, (2) the official memory chose to ignore 

Salih until his legacy fell to obscurity. The Rhodopean community today remembers little beyond the 

name Salih, which is frequently mentioned in vernacular references to prominent local sites such as 

“The Gorge of Salih Aga” (presently, the Waterfall of Smolyan) and “The Konak of Salih Aga.” 

The place I happened upon Salih Aga is Smolyan, a city of about forty thousand inhabitants, 

formerly known as Paşmaklı. For almost a hundred years, Paşmaklı was the capital township from 

which Salih and his family ruled the Ahı Çelebi Kaaza. The former Ottoman kaaza occupied an area 

naturally enclosed by picturesque mountain ridges, running along the Arda River in the Middle 

Rhodopes, southwest Bulgaria (see Figure 2-1, p.38). During Salih’s time, the Rhodope Mountains 

were still overgrown by thick pine forests – here completely covering gently sloping hills, there the 

base from which sharp, rocky peaks jutted skyward. The place is rich in history and legend. One 

legend has it that the Rhodopes were the home of the mythical singer Orpheus who roamed the 

woods, hiked the hilltops, and drank from the clear streams that Salih Aga presided over three 

thousand years later; perhaps barely changed. For millennia, the naturally protected and largely 

inaccessible Rhodopes provided home to peaceful sheep- and goat-herding population. But the 

mountains were also a hideout for dangerous outlaws and vile bandits who would pillage and 

plunder the fertile valleys of Thrace and then withdraw to safety, heavy with spoils. 

Smolyan lies in the heart of this magnificent and ancient mountain range. I visited the town 

in the summer of 2007 wishing to learn more about the history and culture of the predominant 

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Muslim population of the Rhodopes, the Pomaks. Ivan Terziev, a local Bulgarian Christian whom I 

have known for many years, gracefully agreed to be my guide in Smolyan. From our preliminary 

phone conversation, Ivan knew that I was interested in conducting oral history research in the area, 

and that I wanted to talk to some local folks about their traditions and historical memory. When one 

is interested in a community like the Pomaks, one has to pay particular attention to oral history, 

because it is the principal source of emic (insiders’) historical knowledge. While the majority of 

ethnic Bulgarians profess Eastern Orthodox Christianity, the Pomaks are Muslims. Since Bulgaria’s 

independence from Ottoman rule, there have been numerous attempts to assimilate the Pomaks, 

including forcibly converting them to Christianity and replacing their Turkish-Arab names with 

Slavic-Bulgarian ones, but subsequent reversals of policy have helped preserve their identity as 

Bulgarian Muslims to this day. According to my host Ivan’s estimates, the ratio of Muslims to 

Christians in the city of Smolyan today is 40-to-60 percent, but the surrounding villages are largely 

Muslim. Nowadays, Bulgarians of both faiths co-exist well as neighbors and friends in the Rhodopes. 

Figure 6-1: The konak of Deli-Ali Bey in Smolyan 

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Presently, the building is state-owned and operated as a hotel with no indication whatsoever 

about its past history (A simple plaque would have been a nice thing!). (Photograph by the 

author, June 2007.) 

Figure 6-2: Melike Belinska 

Melike gives me a tour of the konak of Deli Bey – her great-grandfather and the nephew of 

Salih’s father Süleyman Bey – in Smolyan. (Photograph by the author, June 2007) 

When I first arrived in Smolyan, Ivan and I sat for a chat in a local eatery. I asked him to 

show me or tell me about interesting places or people from the region’s past. Anticipating my 

interest, he had already arranged for me to meet with Mrs. Melike Belinska, a descendant of Deli Bey, 

another feudal lord from the Ottoman past and blood relative of Salih Aga, so that she could show me 

around the konak (the ruler’s headquarters) of Deli Bey and tell me stories that she might have heard 

from her parents and grandparents. Unlike the konak of Salih Aga, which was about three times the 

234

size of this one and destroyed in 1931, 12 the beautiful edifice of Deli Bey, finished by one of his sons 

Ali Bey, survives (pictures above). Nationalized by the communist regime in the 1960s, the municipal 

government operates it as a hotel. Visibly excited, I asked Ivan when the meeting was supposed to 

take place. He answered that we should leave as soon as I finished my meal. I quickly swallowed the 

cheese sandwich, collected my recording equipment from the table, and was ready to go in less than 

two minutes. We were to meet Melike in the konak itself located in downtown Smolyan. On our way 

there, Ivan mentioned that the man I ought to hear about was Salih Aga. He told me that the spot in 

town where his residence once stood is still known as the konak of Salih Aga. And although the konak 

did not survive, a number of roads, arched bridges, and aqueducts remain as silent testimony to 

Salih’s legacy. Salih Aga had a vital impact on the area not only for building extensive infrastructure, 

but also for inviting Christian population to settle and take roots in his domain. The governor 

protected the Christians from harassment and allowed them to prosper on equal footing with the 

privileged Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire. 13 Ivan’s reference to his just treatment of 

Christians was the first time when I heard the name Salih Aga. With such positive clue in mind, I was 

looking forward to meet Ab(l)a 14 Melike so that I could learn more about this elusive governor. 

Unfortunately, she could not satisfy my curiosity either, because – like most other people – she had 

no definite knowledge about him. She did, however, share some fascinating stories about her own 

branch of the Mehmed Kör Hoca’s (Hodja’s) family. 

Salih Aga and His Time 

12 Matey Mateev, Srednorodopski konatsi /Konaks of the Middle Rhodopes/ (Plovdiv: Natsionalna Akademiya na 

Arhitekturata /National Academy of Architecture/, 2005). 

The quote is from the section about the konak of Salih Aga, published separately as: 

Matey Mateev, Konakut na Salih Aga Pashmakliisky /The Konak of Salih Aga of Pashmakli/ (Plovdiv: Natsionalna 

Akademiya na Arhitekturata /National Academy of Architecture/, 2005), 15. 

13 Vassil Dechov, Minaloto na Chepelare /The Past of Chepelare/, Volume I (Sofia: Fatherland Front Pbl, 1928), 

72-96; Nikolay Haytov, “Smolyan: Tri vurha v srednorodopskata istoria /“Smolyan: Three Pinnacles in the 

History of the Middle Rhodopes”/ (Sofia: National Council of the Fatherland Front Pbl, 1962), 18-31; Vassil 

Dechov, Tetradka na V. Dechov, 1924: Istoricheski belejki za roda (?) na Kör Hoca [Hodja] i Salih aga 

Pashmakliyski /Diary of V. Dechov: Historical Notes about the Family of Kör Hoca [Hodja] and Salih Aga of 

Paşmaklı/ (National Archives-Smolyan), passim. 

14 Aba or abla is respectful title given to an older woman used in the (Western) Rhodopes. 

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Salih Aga governed the Ottoman kaaza of Ahı Çelebi for forty years. Paşmaklı – modern-day 

Smolyan in Bulgaria (see Figure 2-1, p.38) – served as his administrative center, where Salih chose to 

build his konak. During his long reign, the residents of Ahı Çelebi and the adjacent areas enjoyed 

peaceful co-existence, as well as economic and political equilibrium in spite of an Islamic public law, 

Shari’a, which relegated non-Muslim to the status of rayah, lesser subjects. Thus, in the local 

community’s oral history, the name Salih Aga is still synonymous with “iron law,” an image enhanced 

by the political volatility plaguing the Ottoman Empire at the time. 15 

The governor was in charge of a strategically important region of the Ottoman realm, sitting 

on – what is today – the border of Bulgaria and northern Greece. He inherited the governorship from 

his father, Süleyman Aga, and his grandfather, Mehmed Kör Hoca (Hodja). Popularly endorsed by 

both Muslims and Christians, Mehmed Kör Hoca became the first native governor of the kaaza in the 

year 1751. He set the beginning of a dynasty that would rule the Middle Rhodopes for the next one 

hundred years. Salih Aga’s reign constituted the apex of that family’s rule. 16 He is best remembered 

for bringing much-needed political and economic security to the area for both Muslims and 

Christians in times of growing instability and rampant banditry in much of the imperial Ottoman 

state. In fact, Salih was so successful in instituting order and justice in the kaaza that Nikolay Haytov, 

a leading Bulgarian historian, defines the period of his governorship as a “pinnacle” in the history of 

the Middle Rhodopes. 17 Salih’s handling of the province as his private feudal realm, however, in 

conjunction with his favorable disposition toward the Christians, would ultimately provoke the 

distrust of an already paranoid central government 18 and create serious problems for him. 

15 Dechov, The Past of Chepelare, Volume I, 72-96; Haytov, “Smolyan,” 18-31. 

16 Dechov, The Past of Chepelare, Volume I, 72-96; Haytov, “Smolyan,” 18-31. 

17 Haytov, 18-31. 

18 This was a difficult time for the central government of the Ottoman Empire, vested in the Istanbul-based 

Sultanate, for three reasons: First, local feudal nobility resisted the government’s efforts to centralize the Empire 

and therefore limit their powers, so they often challenged Constantinople with their own private armies. 

Second, the ambitions of the Russian Empire to gain access to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean posed a 

serious and constant threat to the territorial integrity of the Ottoman state. In fact, at the time before Salih’s 

death (1838), the Ottomans had just concluded another war against the Russians (1828-1829), which enabled 

Greece’s independence. Third, the Christian populations in the Balkans were prone to rebellions in the 

nineteenth century, largely inspired by the success of the Greek Revolution of 1821-1829. 

236

Whereas his rather independent rule of Ahı Çelebi was slow to attract imperial attention, the 

governor’s failure to strictly enforce Shari’a and differentiate between his Muslim and Christian 

subjects was readily apparent. Being a Rhodopean native and not an appointed administrator from 

outside, as was the standard practice, Salih Aga spoke the same Slavic language as everyone else in 

the Rhodopes; be they Muslims or Christians. This evident linguistic kinship underwrote Salih’s 

policy of equitable treatment of people in his realm. But just what accounted for this linguistic 

homogeneity and religious dichotomy? When the medieval Christian kingdom of Bulgaria fell under 

Ottoman rule in the late fourteenth century, it remained so until the late nineteenth century – full five 

centuries. During this time, many people converted to Islam to attain higher socio-political status 

since Muslims were more privileged under Shari’a than non-Muslims. For instance, non-Muslims 

were barred from pursuing lucrative military and political careers. In addition, they had to pay 

special taxes, not required of Muslims, such as ispençe (landowning tax), haraç (in-kind land tax), 

cizya (per-capita tax), and others. 19 

When and under what circumstances exactly the population of 

the Rhodopes became Muslim, however, has not been authoritatively and unanimously established. 

The fact of the matter today is that the Pomaks are a Bulgarian-speaking community who profess 

Islam in a largely Christian nation. But, in Salih’s time, the Ottoman Empire was undisputedly 

Muslim-dominated. 

Throughout the nineteenth century, inspired by the rising ideology of nationalism, 20 the 

(Slavic-)Christian populations (Bulgarians, Serbs, Croats, and Greeks) of the empire started a wave of 

rebellions to establish sovereign national states of their own. 21 In Bulgaria, the bloody quelling of the 

pro-independence April Uprising of 1876 by the Ottoman forces – only two years before the creation 

of the Bulgarian Principality – and the subsequent retaliatory violence of Bulgarian Christians against 

For more details on the Ottoman Empire, read Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922: New 

Approaches to European History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 

19 A letter signed by Salih Aga testifies to the fact that one non-Muslim (his name is not mentioned) paid his 

ispençe dues in the year 1810. National Archives-Smolyan, Fond 415k, Inventory 23, Archival Unit 52. 

20 For the emergence of nationalism after the French Revolution of 1789 and its spread throughout Europe and 

the Balkans during the nineteen and early twentieth century, read Chapter II. 

21 Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1955), 

passim. 

237

Muslims following the Russian-Turkish War (1877-1878) 22 gave rise to mutual hostility and distrust. 

Due to residual resentment, many positive elements of Bulgaria’s Ottoman past have either been 

misrepresented or entirely left out of the official historiography. Consequently, the modern cultural 

discourse in Bulgaria has largely ignored the Ottoman governor of Pomak parentage, Salih Aga. 23 

Amazingly, however, he survives in the local memory of Smolyan, where informed individuals of both 

faiths relate the name Salih Aga to law and justice in Ahı Çelebi during an era of violence and political 

turmoil. 

Salih’s achievements were momentous not only because of overcoming the equality 

limitations of Shari’a, but also because he ruled in trying times for the Ottoman Empire. The end of 

the eighteenth- and the beginning of the nineteenth century was a period of rocky transition for the 

empire from a highly decentralized feudal social order to a more consolidated central government. 

As a result, feudal lords, accustomed to autonomy and absolute control over their realms, felt 

threatened by the effort of the Ottoman Sultanate in Istanbul to strengthen its authority and limit 

local power. Understandably, those who were confident in their potency rose against the central 

government. Most of the forces supporting the rebellious feudal lords consisted of kardjalii, called by 

the Rhodopeans hayti – bands of outlaws serving under a warlord who willfully plundered 

prosperous settlements for personal enrichment. 24 The kurdjalii posed a very serious challenge to 

the political stability of the empire during Salih’s time. They practically controlled whole provinces of 

the Ottoman state. Some of their leaders were powerful provincial or sub-provincial governors such 

as Osman Pazvantoglu of Vidin, who turned his kurdjalii on Constantinople itself in an attempt to 

overturn Sultan Selim III (1761-1808). 25 In steady, organized attacks, the hayti turned whole towns 

22 This war was just one of a series of wars between the Ottoman and Russian Empires beginning in the 

seventeenth until the late nineteenth centuries for domination over the Black Sea and the eastern 

Mediterranean. The Russian-Turkish War of 1876-1878 is also known as the War of Liberation in Bulgaria, 

because it resulted in the creation of the independent Principality of Bulgaria following half a millennium of 

Ottoman rule. 

23 Thus, Salih Aga is mentioned in the book of architect Matey Mateev (discussed below), who has published a 

comprehensive study of the Middle Rhodopean architecture and discusses the governor in the context of his 

remarkable konak (palace) (read further in the chapter for details). 

24 Nikolay Haytov, Rodopski Vlastelini /Rhodopeian Lords/ (Sofia: Fatherland Front, 1976), 71-146. 

25 Ibid. 

238

into ashes, took property, women and livestock, thus, causing immeasurable suffering and loss to the 

peaceful civilian population. The heavy woods and rugged terrain of the Rhodopes provided many 

bands with a quick escape from justice, when imperial troops or locally operating military units went 

after them. Nikolay Haytov describes the situation at the turn of the eighteenth century: 

[T]he whole Ottoman Kingdom was in turmoil; the kurdjalii leaders Mehmed Sinap, Mehmed 

Dertli, Emin Aga, Karamanaff Ibrahim and others were burning the towns and villages of 

[modern-day] Bulgaria, and, come winter, they withdrew in their fortresses [within the 

Rhodopes] with abundant spoils. 26 

Official fermans (royal decrees) authorized regional rulers like Salih Aga to arm every able-bodied 

man – Muslim or Christian – within their entrusted province in order to resist the bandit plague. 27 

When the hayti raged, all daily business would halt as the frightened population was unable to tend 

to crops, livestock, or to any usual activity. 

In the midst of this prevailing chaos, Ahı Çelebi stood secure. Its people went about their life 

unobstructed as Salih saw to the safety of the kaaza and of those who dwelled within it. Salih Aga was 

a determined ruler, frequently prone to ruthlessness when it came to enforcing the law. He 

maintained order in Ahı Çelebi by reciprocating the brutality of the hayti, but only when he deemed it 

absolutely necessary. Particularly vulnerable to willful aggression, the Christian population 

especially appreciated Salih Aga’s swift rendition of justice. Historical memory among Rhodopeans of 

both faiths celebrates him as a ruler who punished Muslim and Christian malefactors on an equitable 

basis. Haytov describes the essence and impact of his archaic, but extremely efficient “Solomonian 

law”: 

His [Salih’s] Penal Code consisted of four paragraphs: For banditry – shot. For pillaging 

and insubordination – hung ... For minor offences – cursed; and for moral transgressions 

against girls and women – threw the perpetrators from the notorious Gorge of Salih Aga. 

Finally, for trespassing livestock – shot the ‘offending’ animal, and administered fifty to a 

hundred lashes to the owner. 

The laws of Salih Aga applied with equal force to both Christians and Mohammedans 

[(Muslims)]; they were enforced mercilessly and absolutely, and the good results were 

immediate: Agricultural life in the Ahı Çelebi kaaza did not stop as it did in the adjacent 

regions ravished by the bandits. The roads were safe, the nights – peaceful, and the brigands 

26 Ibid., 218. 

27 Dechov, The Past of Chepelare, Volume I, 127-41. 

The fermans are cited in full, in Bulgarian translation, within the respective pages. 

239

were forced to steer clear of Ahı Çelebi. [Consequently,] Smolyan became the only place, 

where refugees from Dimotika, Haskovo, and Ardino, who had escaped the kurdjalii 

pestilence, found a safe heaven. It was during that time when [Bulgarian Christian] families 

like the Tomovs, Stanchovs, Kiryanovs, Uzunovs, Nachovs, and Takovs settled there. 28 

Salih Aga frequently imposed stern punishments by modern sensibilities. For instance, for 

immoral advances toward women and girls, he would have a man’s hands and legs bound before the 

perpetrator was thrown from the top of the Smolyan Waterfall, known to this day as The Gorge of 

Salih Aga (Figure 6-3, p.241). Thus, a victim would often suffer a slow and painful death of broken 

bones, blood loss, and/or drowning. As brutal as this form of punishment may seem, it was crucial in 

deterring rape or general abuse of women, crimes all too common at the time to be neglected. Known 

as a particularly strict moralist, Salih became downright sadistic when adjudicating on sexual 

offences. 29 

By rendering just such a punishment in one case, Salih made a mortal enemy of one of his 

formerly close associates, Petko Tsarvulan Kehaya of Dereköy, a wealthy Christian livestock owner 

who later supported the baseless accusations of treason against the governor. Tsarvulan Kehaya’s 

son, a young unmarried man, pursued a girl from Ustovo (now a neighborhood of Smolyan) in an 

offensive and indecent manner. The young woman complained to her father who, in turn, reported 

the case to Salih Aga. Because of the strong need to contain lawlessness and keep order, the governor 

had to consistently appear firm, impartial, and fair in his administration of justice. So, friendship 

notwithstanding, Tsarvulan’s son was duly arrested, tried, and thrown down the waterfall 

whereupon he died. Eventually, Tsarvulan Kehaya would play a role in bringing about the governor’s 

demise to the detriment of all in Ahı Çelebi. 30 

28 Haytov, “Smolyan”, 22-23. 

See also Dechov, The Past of Chepelare, Volume I, 78. 

29 Haytov, “Smolyan,” 18-31; Dechov, The Past of Chepelare, Volume I, 72-96. 

30 Dechov, Historical Diary, 22-23; Dechov, The Past of Chepelare, Volume I, 87. 

240

Figure 6-3: The Smolyan Waterfall, also known as “The Gorge of Salih Aga,” postcard, c. 1960 

In Salih’s system of justice, males found guilty of molesting a woman, were thrown into this 

rocky ravine with tied hands and legs. The few fortunate ones who survived the ordeal were 

allowed to live as their miraculous survival was interpreted as God’s mercy. After such a 

narrow escape from death, however, miscreants were undoubtedly forever deterred from 

approaching a woman for indecent purposes. The height from which the water falls is about a 

hundred feet onto a rocky bottom. During Salih’s time the water flowing through the gorge 

was probably fuller. (Courtesy of National Archives-Plovdiv). 31 

Who Wrote about Salih Aga 

Salih Aga is a powerful figure in the oral tradition of the Middle Rhodopes. Despite his 

folklore pervasiveness, however, Salih is absent from the officially endorsed historiography. Only 

31 National Archives-Plovdiv, The Petar Marinov Collection, Fond 959k, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 225. 

241

three authors, with strong connections to the Rhodopes, provide partial accounts of his life. The most 

trustworthy among them is Vassil Dechov, a local Bulgarian Christian historian and ethnographer, 

who also served as mayor of the Middle-Rhodopean town of Chepelare (see Figure 2-1, p.38) at the 

turn the twentieth century. Dechov published a two-volume history of the Cheperale in 1928. The 

first volume, incorporating oral history research which the author conducted over a span of few 

decades, has a section on Salih Aga’s family history. 32 The section in question is based on an earlier 

handwritten journal, in which Dechov had recorded stories specifically and solely dedicated to Salih 

Aga. The journal dates back to 1924. For convenience, I refer to it as the Historical Diary. 33 In the 

document, Dechov identifies Mehmedali Tahirbey, the grandson of Salih Aga and the son of Tahir Bey 

(the oldest of Salih’s son, see Figure 6-7, p.253), as one of his sources of information about the 

governor. 34 In Dechov’s own words, “Tahir Bey’s son and Salih’s grandson Mehmedali Tahirbeya, who 

gave me a detailed account of his grandfather, is a gentle, quiet, and extremely good-natured person. 

He is now about 65-year old [emphasis added].” 35 Additionally, at the end of Volume I of The Past of 

Chepelare, the author attaches a list of more than 160 informants, 36 among which is the name 

Mehmed Tahirbeev of Paşmaklı (the 90 th informant from the top). Even though this informant’s 

relationship to Salih remains undetermined, it is likely that Mehmedali, son of Tahir Bey, grandson of 

Salih Aga, is either the same Mehmed Tahirbeev or a Mehmed’s descendant. Regardless of these 

minor uncertainties, it is abundantly clear that Salih Aga’s own family was among the most valuable 

Dechov’s informants, including Salih’s very own grandson. 37 At the time of the interview, as the 

author indicates in the Diary (quote above), Mehmedali was a sixty-five-year old man. It is quite 

possible that Mehmedali was old enough to have more than fleeting memories of his grandfather 

Salih if Dechov interviewed him during the early years of his four-decade long research effort, i.e. as 


33 Historical Diary, passim. 

34 Ibid., 15 & 42 (or pages 7 & 34 of the typed version of the Diary). 

35 Ibid., 42 (or 22). 


37 Dechov, Historical Diary, 15 and 42. 

242

early as the 1890s. Unfortunately, I have no way of ascertaining when the interview(s) took place. 

However, I can safely conclude that Mehmedali (and/or Mehmed) transmitted intimate family 

knowledge about their legendary predecessor. Salih’s grandson Mehmedali appears to the source of 

at least two crucial pieces of information: first, exactly how Salih died and, second, what occurred in 

the konak after news of his death reached Paşmaklı. 38 

The second author who wrote about Salih Aga is Nikolay Haytov, a prominent Bulgarian 

writer and historian, who published a paper “Smolyan: Three Pinnacles in the History of the Middle 

Rhodopes,” in 1962 39 and a book, Rhodopean Lords, in 1976. 40 Both works contain narratives directly 

concerning the governor or about events and individuals related to him. 41 The third author is Petar 

Marinov, another Bulgarian author, who in the late 1930s published the play Salih Aga. The play 

incorporates well-known stories about the ruler of Ahı Çelebi, which had originally been reported by 

Vassil Dechov. 42 

The central source of all these works appears to be the oral tradition of the local community. 

Vassil Dechov’s volume contains, among other things, the earliest and most comprehensive written 

account on the family of Salih Aga, starting from his grandfather, Mehmed Kör Hoca (Hodja). Kör 

Hoca was originally from the township of Chepelare, where Dechov lived and, therefore, had 

unfettered access both to archival material and rich oral history. Nikolay Haytov, for his part, 

conducted research on Salih Aga and his governorship while serving as a forest guard in the Smolyan 

region during the 1960s and 1970s. Although Haytov propagandistically portrays Salih Aga as 

38 Ibid. 

The list further includes as informants “Adji Aga’s grandchildren,” Salih’s grand-nephews and offspring of his 

brother Adji Aga’s sons, Salih’s bitter enemy. The list most probably contains the names of other close 

descendants, but I cannot be certain of it since Dechov does not specify his informants’ kinship ties (except a few 

only) to the family. 

39 Haytov, “Smolyan,” 18-31. 

40 Haytov, Rhodopean Lords, 197-234. 

41 Ibid. 

42 Petar Marinov, Salih Aga, Rodopski voyvoda i deribey: Cherti iz jivota i upravlenieto mu – Dramatizatsia po ustni 

predaniq i legendi v pet deystvia /Salih Aga, Rhodopean Lord and Governor: Features of His Life and Governorship – 

Dramatization Based on Oral History and Legends in Five Acts/ (Collection Rodina, 1940). National Archives– 

Plovdiv, Fond 959, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 52. 

243

Bulgarian patriot largely to comply with the ideology of the communist regime, his account is an 

invaluable contribution to reviving Salih’s legacy in Bulgaria as late as 1976. 

Petar Marinov, on the other hand, writes with agenda. In the 1930s and 1940s, he was a 

founding member of the Organization Rodina, which played a major role in the Pomak pokrastvane of 

1938-1944. 43 His play, Salih Aga, quite purposely recasts the Ottoman governor Salih Aga as a 

Bulgarian nationalist a century and half before the Bulgarian nation-state was even founded. 

Understandably, Marinov wrote the play to inspire the kind of patriotic consciousness Rodina sought 

to instill in the Pomaks when carrying out the pokrastvane. 44 To that end, as evident from the archival 

inventory of the Petar Marinov Collection (housed in National Archives-Plovdiv), Rodina sponsored a 

series of live performances of Salih Aga in the Rhodopes between 1938 and 1944 as part of the 

sustained assimilation campaign (see Fugures 6-10, 6-11, 6-12, and 6-13, pp.262-5). Ironically, the 

only (unintended) effect of Marinov’s play was reinstating Salih Aga to his rightful place in Bulgaria’s 

historical discourse – at least for a short while – albeit for all the wrong reasons. The play, however, 

has one undisputed quality: Salih’s personality comes remarkably alive from the pages, due in large 

part to the authentic Rhodopean dialect Marinov uses to render his characters compelling. 

Beyond these limited accounts, little has been published or said about the Pomak governor 

of Ahı Çelebi. 45 Indeed, a cursory examination of the modern Bulgarian historiography reveals that 

the prevalent mode of presenting the Muslim-Ottoman heritage is either negative or dismissive. 46 

43 Rodina, a nationalist organization with a mixed Bulgarian Christian and Pomak membership, was set up with 

the help of the Bulgarian authorities in 1937 to facilitate the conversion of the Pomaks in the period 1938-1944. 

For details, see Chapter III. 

44 See Chapters II and III for more details on the pokrastvane. 

45 This was particularly the case in the period from the 1950s to the 1980s when the communist regime in 

Bulgaria completely banished all things akin to “foreign” (un-Bulgarian) heritage. The combined effect of 

religious suppression and ethnic assimilation during the communism era (1945-1989) resulted in a detrimental 

forgetting of the past, particularly among the Pomaks who were among the primary targets of the assimilation. 

46 In 2006, for instance, the Austrian academic Ulf Brunnbauer and his Bulgarian colleague Martina Baleva made 

an attempt at lanching a new scholarly perspective about the proverbial Batak Massacre. According to the 

official version of the events, thousands of Bulgarian Christians were massacred by Muslims during a wave of 

rebellions in 1876, including children, women, and men. Their skeletal remains are prominently displayed in the 

church of Batak to this day. Brunnbauer and Baleva were immediately accused of serving foreign interests that 

wished to re-write Bulgarian history, and they were forced to terminate their work in Bulgaria. 

In fact, all Martina Baleva ever said was in the spirit of the following quote from an article she 

published in the weekly Kultura: 

244

The works of Dechov, Haytov, and Marinov, however, portray Salih as righteous and likeable ruler, 

who often exerted a form of harsh justice for the greater good of law and order. It is worth noting 

that Dechov, Marinov, and Haytov – three Bulgarian-Christian scholars – speak very highly of the 

Ottoman governor of Pomak lineage Salih Aga. To be sure, the pursuit of a pokrastvane agenda played 

a part in Marinov’s profuse exaltation of the governor. Likewise, Haytov’s obvious reverence for Salih 

may be partially explained with his alleged Pomak parentage. 47 Dechov’s work, on the other hand, is 

tarnished neither by suspicions of ulterior motives, nor is he known to have been a pokrastvane 

crusader. Dechov wrote as a historian who was passionate about preserving local history and as a 

person who largely stayed away from political propaganda. Overall, his reads as a straightforward 

and unembellished account of Salig Aga. All three chroniclers, however, share one unmistakable trait: 

They were fascinated by Salih’s personality and their admiration of the governor seems quite 

genuine. 

But neither these authors’ positive depiction of Salih nor the governor’s reputation for 

integrity in the local collective memory could prevent the destruction of his heritage in Smolyan. The 

governor’s exclusive palace complex (konak), for example, endured systematic neglect and vandalism 

after 1912-1913, when much of the Rhodopes permanently became a part of Bulgaria. The konak was 

completely demolished in 1931 (Figures 6-4, 6-5, and 6-6, pp.246-8). Attesting to the uniqueness of 

the edifice, the Bulgarian architect Matey Mateev – who published an excellent work on the 

Less known perhaps are the following facts [about the Batak Massacre]: Even before the ensuing 

Russo-Turkish War (1877-78) and the creation of the Bulgarian national state, the dreadful events in 

Batak were almost as quickly forgotten as they were revived 16 years later to become the central focus 

of public attention in Bulgarian society. Between 1876 and 1892, the only evidence about the bloody 

past of Batak are two well-known pictures by the Plovdiv-based photographer of Greek origin, Dimitar 

Kavra, depicting survivors of the massacre and the Batak church containing the skeletal remains [of the 

massacred], both from 1878 [i.e. two years ofter the fact], as well as Stambolov’s translation from 

1880.* All of a sudden, in 1892, an enormous amount of literature and imagery on Batak appeared, 

which continues to this day.” 

*Baleva is referring to the report of J. A. MacGahan, an American journalist of Irish descent married to a 

Russian aristocrat, published in the Daily News. This report and the two pictures, produced two years after the 

massacre, constituted the whole evidence about it. Baleva’s comment about J. A. MacGahan is that the author 

“does not try to conceal his pro-Russian sympathies ... and his exceptionally negative attitude toward the 

Ottoman state and Islamic religion.” (Kultura, Issue 17 (2412) of 3 May 2006). 

47 Nikolay Haytov is a renowned Bulgarian writer and historian, as well as a great promoter of thesis about the 

Bulgarian-Christian heritage of the Pomaks. His father’s name is Shandyo, a conventional Pomak name that 

derives from the Muslim name Rushan, widespread among Rhodopean Pomaks. It is common knowledge in the 

Rhodopes that Haytov was of Pomak parentage, although he never addressed the issue publicly. 

245

architectural heritage of the Middle Rhodopes in 2005 – defines Salih’s palace as “the most significant 

building complex [of its kind] in the entire Asia-Minor- and Balkan expanses of the Ottoman 

Empire.” 48 He goes on to describe the sustained destruction of the konak as “utterly reckless and 

unlawful attitude of the then [Bulgarian] authorities toward the cultural heritage [of Bulgaria’s 

Ottoman past].” The konak’s site was subsequently filled by an army compound which, according to 

Mateev, could not even begin to compare with “its precursor in terms of magnitude, architectural 

quality, and style.” 49 Quite amazingly, the name of Salih Aga not only remains largely untarnished in 

local memory, but it has actually acquired a measure of reverence in the public discourse via the 

praise of such committed promoters of Bulgarian nationalism as Petar Marinov and Nikolay Haytov. 

Figure 6-4: The konak of Salih Aga in Paşmaklı, 1920 (copy of original photograph) 

The palace complex, described as “a unique architectural ensemble” and the largest of its type 

on the Balkan- and Asia Minor’s territories of the Ottoman Empire by architect Matey Mateev 

in his masterpiece Middle Rhodopean Konaks, 50 was thoroughly destroyed in 1931. Today, its 

48 Mateev, The Konak of Salih Aga of Pashmakli, 9. 

49 Ibid., 15. 

50 Ibid., 9. 

246

site is occupied by the old army compound; parts of the konak had been incorporated into the 

building, but nothing to give an idea of how the original structure looked like. Fortunately, 

enough pictures have survived to testify to the konak’s splendor. (Courtesy of National Archives- 

Plovdiv). 51 

Figure 6-5: The konak of Salih Aga in Paşmaklı, undated 

(Courtesy of National Archives-Smolyan). 52 

51 National Archives-Plovdiv, The Petar Marinov Collection, Fond 959k, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 903, page 1. 

52 Copy of the same picture is preserved in National Archives-Plovdiv, The Petar Marinov Collection, Fond 959k, 

Inventory 2, Archival Unit 225. 

247

Figure 6-6: The konak of Salih Aga in Paşmaklı, 1921, gift from Todor Georgiev to Petar 

Marinov 

(Courtesy of National Archives-Plovdiv). 53 


248

Salih’s Family Tree 

Salih Aga was the grandson of Mehmed Kör Hoca (Hodja), the first native governor of the Ahı 

Çelebi Kaaza who ruled from 1751 to his death in 1779. Between the sixteenth and eighteenth 

century, the Middle Rhodopes had been in the hands of outside, absentee landlords. The area 

acquired its name from the Sultan Selim I’s personal doctor, Ahı Çelebi, who in 1519 received the 

Middle Rhodopes as an estate grant from the Emperor. The name survived until 1912, thereafter 

losing its significance within the newly independent Kingdom of Bulgaria. The imperial doctor did 

not keep the land for himself, but dedicated it instead to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. 54 The 

vast vakıf (donated property) remained under the custodianship of Ahı Çelebi’s descendants until the 

early 1700s. After that, the political power-vacuum in the Middle Rhodopes resulted in violent rivalry 

among several prominent local families, which destabilized the whole region. As the population grew 

tired of the chaos, they petitioned the Ottoman government to appoint a permanent governor in the 

kaaza to institute order and stability. 

Mehmed Kör Hoca was among the most suitable candidates. He was a local and highly 

educated man, modest, relatively wealthy, and with a reputation for exceptional moral integrity. He 

also enjoyed the support of the majority Muslims and Christians in the area. Kör Hoca, however, put 

two conditions to accepting the governorship: (1) the office was to become hereditary, and (2) his 

capital township was to be Paşmaklı. In 1751, a ferman from Constantinople formalized the 

appointment of Mehmed Kör Hoca as governor of the Ahı Çelebi Kaaza, with Paşmaklı as his 

administrative center. According to Dechov, the population that came out to greet their new 

governor as he was moving his household into Paşmaklı (from Chepelare) observed two unusual 

things: 

a) whereas his children and servants were all clad lavishly, the new governor was dressed 

modestly, in very simple attire; b) the women of the household were not covered as 

Mohamedan [Muslim] women usually were, but bore open faces with only white scarves 

over their hair; 55 

54 Dedicating a property is an Islamic tradition where private persons or entities donate property (normally 

land) to a religious body (e.g. mosque) which draws income from it by either renting it out or selling the produce 

from it to support itself. 

55 Dechov, The Past of Chepelare, 75. 

249

Thus, the Kör Hoca (Hodja) family established themselves as the ruling dynasty of the Middle 

Rhodopes for nearly a century. According to both Dechov and Haytov, Kör Hoca’s governorship 

(1751-1779) brought a measure of stability in the region to both Muslims and Christians. In fact, it 

was Kör Hoca who initiated the tradition of equitable treatment of Muslims and non-Muslims, which 

was more or less institutionalized in the days of Salih Aga. His eldest son and heir, Süleyman Aga 

(1779-1798) continued this non-discriminatory practice. Although a benevolent ruler, however, 

Süleyman lacked the charisma and determination of his father, Mehmed Kör Hoca, and heir, Salih 

Aga. 56 

Süleyman Aga had deeply personal reasons to extend benign treatment to the Christian 

population, too. According to Haytov, he married a Christian woman by the name Stana (or Maria), 

whom he patiently courted for several months before she responded to his feelings. 57 This was a 

somewhat unusual demeanor for an Ottoman feudal lord. Indeed, their standard portrayal in 

Bulgarian folklore is one of willful and violent characters who took by force what they fancied, 

including women. The reported behavior of Süleyman, however, defied this popular depiction. Not 

only did he wait for Stana to obtain her parents’ permission to marry him, but the governor was loath 

to polygamy, a tradition allowed by Islam. Süleyman had one wife at a time. After he was widowed 

from his first wife, mother of three of his sons – Salih, Mustafa (Adji), and Liman-Shishman, Süleyman 

married Stana – renamed Ayshe – who mothered Brahom Bey, Süleyman’s fourth son. Although 

Haytov appears to be mistaken about Stana’s being the mother of all four of Süleyman’s sons, the 

author describes his marital situation: 

Even before becoming governor, Süleyman was widowed and married a second time to a 

[Christian] woman from Raykovo – Stana, whom he met and fell in love with during harvest 

time at a place known as Rumin Preslop. Soon after the wedding, the family moved from 

56 Haytov, “Smolyan,” 18-31; Dechov, The Past of Chepelare, Volume I, 72-96. 

According to Dechov’s Historical Diary, Kör Hoca (Hodja) died in 1779 and was buried in the old Turkish 

cemetery next to the mosque and near the Imamov’s homestead in Raykovo (now a neighborhood of Smolyan). 

In 1924, when Dechov was compiling his Diary, the headstone marking the grave was still there. The inscription 

on it simply read, “Mehmed bin Isein 1779.” Dechov, Historical Diary, 6-7. (Dechov, The Past of Chepelare, Volume 

I, 75.) No titles, no pompous self-appellations. Kör Hoca (Hodja) wished to be remembered as he lived, modestly. 

57 In “Smolyan” Haytov talks about a woman named Maria, and in Rhodopean Lords, he mentions Stana. 

250

Raykovo [now a Smolyan’s suburb] to Smolyan, where his [Süleyman’s] four sons were born: 

Salih, Liman Shishman, Brahom, and Mustafa later named Adji Aga. 58 

“Süleyman, like his father,” Dechov notes, “was educated, quiet, pious, kind-hearted, and a 

good care-taker, but for the demands of the time – not a good ruler.” 59 During his reign of nineteen 

years, the internal strife for political dominance in the realm continued. When Süleyman died in 

1798, his eldest son Salih Aga succeeded him as governor of the Ahı Çelebi Kaaza, retaining Paşmaklı 

as his capital town. Along with the leadership, however, Salih inherited the difficult task to put an end 

to the chaos that had been tearing the district apart. Ultimately, he would do just that. 60 

Like his father Süleyman, Salih had one wife. In fact, he was married to the same woman 

throughout his life, which history remembers simply as Salihagovitsa (The Wife of Salih Aga). 

Together, they had two sons Tahir Bey and Emin Bey and at least four daughters. Salih’s sons jointly 

ruled the kaaza for a brief period between 1842 and 1850. But none of the preceding or following 

governors of Ahı Çelebi would match the legendary Salih Aga in popularity or accomplishments. Salih 

died in Gümürcina in the fall (the exact date is disputable, but Dechov points to September) of 1838, 

at the age of eighty. 61 

58 Haytov, Rhodopean Lords, 201. 

Based on Dechov’s note about Brahom Bey’s being from a different mother, as well as the National-Archives- 

Plovdiv’s description of the photo (above) that Stana was the mother of one of Süleyman’s sons, I am inclined to 

think that Haytov is in the wrong. 

59 Dechov, The Past of Chepelare, Volume I, 76. 

60 Dechov, Historical Diary, 7. 

Süleyman died in Paşmaklı, and his headstone (Dechov does not clarify where he was buried, but probably in the 

same cemetery as his father) was destroyed in 1912-1913 when Bulgaria took control of the Rhodopes and 

launched a violent, but short-lived Christianization of the Muslim population. 

61 Dechov, The Past of Chepelare, Volume I, 72-96; Dechov, Historical Diary, passim. 

251

Mehmed Kör 

Hoca (Hodja) 

(1751-1779) 

govern 

Süleyman 

Aga 

(1779-1798) 

govern 

Pir Aga 

Cafer 

Dervişa 

Isen Aga 

SALIH AGA 

(1798-1838) 

Mustafa 

Adji 

Aga 

Liman 

Shishman 

Aga 

Brahom 

Bey 

Deli Bey 

Tahir Bey 

(circa1842- 

1850) 

Ali Bey 

Mehmedali 

Tahirbeev 

Emin 

Emin Bey 

(circa1842 

-1850) 

Rukie 

(daughter) 

Daughters 

(four?) 

Melike 

Belinska 

Figure 6-7: Family Tree 

Partial Family Tree of Salih Aga according to governorship of the Ahı Çelebi Kaaza, as well as 

according to family connection of one of his indirect descendants and my informant, Melike 

Belinska. 62 

62 Dechov, Historical Diary, 1-10. 

Vassil Dechov incorporates most of his Historical Diary in Volume I of the book, The Past of Chepelare, 72-96; 

Mateev, The Konak of Salih Aga of Paşmaklı, 20. 

252

Figure 6-8: Inscribed metal dish 

A (metal) dish with inscription (Figure 6-9) indicating that it belonged to a Christian family 

from Raykovo, Stana’s parents. After marrying Süleyman Aga, Stana converted to Islam and 

took the name Ayshe. Consequently, she became the mother of one of Salih’s three brothers. 63 

According to Dechov’s Historical Diary, Brahom Bey was the one from a different mother 

(Dechov, 7). Stana being Süleyman’s second wife and Brahom appearing to be the youngest of 

Salih’s brothers both suggest that Stana was Brahom’s mother (Courtesy of the National 

Archives-Plovdiv). 

I am particularly grateful to Ivan Terziev for helping me entangle Dechov’s handwritten family tree. Of the 

extensive family tree of the entire Kör Hadja family, I only reconstruct the part related to Salih, as well as Abla 

Melike whom I met in person. 


253

Figure 6-9: Inscribed metal dish, close view 

Salih, the Family Man 

1. Mustafa, Adji Aga 

Salih Aga’s greatest supporter and enemy were within his family. As a family man he was 

blessed and cursed at the same time. He was blessed with a wife who, contrary to the traditions of his 

time and society, was his partner rather than just the woman who obediently served him and shared 

his bed. Salihagovitsa was her husband’s most trusted advisor in matters of marriage and family who, 

on her independent initiative, took in orphaned girls and destitute women as part of the household. 

Salihagovitsa rarely interfered with the governor’s political decisions, but when she did, he always 

heeded her opinion. Thus, Salih was often heard saying, “All people in Ahı Çelebi obey my command, 

254

ut in the konak only my wife’s orders count.” 64 The governor, however, was also cursed with a 

mortal enemy, his own brother Mustafa, dubbed Adji, (bitter, bad-tempered) because of his obnoxious 

disposition. Salih and Mustafa were also brothers-in-law. Both were married to the daughters of the 

wealthy Mehmed Kehaya of Raykovo (now within Smolyan’s city limits) or Smilyan (a nearby 

village). 65 

In outer appearance, Haytov writes, “these two brothers – Mustafa the Bitter and Salih the 

Pure [as engraved on the governor’s seal, Appendix 6.2],” 66 

they looked very much alike: both were short in stature, very energetic, bearded, and both 

loved power. But in everything else, they were the total opposite. Adji Aga was irascible and 

hot-tempered, and ‘would kill a person for no reason.’ [While] Salih Aga was sensible, calm 

and with good judgment; he had an affinity for order, so he condemned his brother’s hayti 

for the crimes they committed and prosecuted them relentlessly... 67 

Indeed, Adji Aga was hayta. In fact, he was so reviled by the local population for his 

licentiousness that Salih himself turned against his brother and ultimately killed him. Between 1798 

and 1806, Mustafa led his henchmen – an assortment of Muslim and Christian mercenaries – against 

some of the most prosperous settlements in and around the Rhodopes, ravaging towns and villages 

and leaving destitute populations behind. Initially, Adji Aga was very careful to conceal his odious 

exploits from the governor, but as he accumulated wealth, his arrogance increased. Around 1798- 

1799, the Bitter and his cohorts plundered two of the wealthiest towns in the region, Gümürcina 

(now in northern Greece) and Stanimaka (modern-day Assenovgrad in Bulgaria). The public outcry 

was so great that the imperial government in Constantinople responded with a ferman for the 

capture and execution of Adji Aga. Thereafter, Mustafa was on the run as a wanted criminal. Whereas 

they could comfortably hide in the impregnable Rhodopean forests for most of the year, life as 

fugitives became intolerable for Adji and his companions in the harshness of the winter. Without the 



66 The word Salih translates as pure. A document (Appendix 6.2) about a paid ispençe tax is signed by Salih in the 

following way, “May my deeds be as honorable as the name Salih is /pure one/.” (National Archives-Smolyan, 

Fond 415k, Inventory 23, Archival Unit 52.) 


255

promise of pillaging and riches, most of the hayti gradually abandoned Mustafa Adji Aga. Finally, 

alone and beaten, he clandestinely surrendered to the governor. Banking on Salih’s brotherly love, 

Adji anticipated to be quickly forgiven and spared the execution. 68 

Relying on oral history, Haytov envisions the scene of the surrender in the following terms: 

- ‘Come brother! Where have you been – starving, cold and eaten by lice?’ - Salih received 

Adji Aga with audible excitement in his voice. 

Adji approached weeping. With eyes turned down, he answered: 

- ‘Brother, if I deserve to be shot, you shoot me. If I deserve to be hanged, you hang me. If I 

deserve to be beaten to death, you do it. If I deserve to be pardoned, you pardon me. But do 

not hand me over to my enemies.’ 

- ‘Come, come brother! Don’t be afraid!’ - Salih Aga uttered, deeply moved by his brother’s 

despondent appearance. 69 

Indeed, the governor hid his fugitive brother in a secret chamber of the konak, where the 

floor was strewn with thick carpets and soft pillows. A servant-woman, Sofa, was assigned to take 

care of his every need (and/or Salih’s own daughter Fatme did that, in another version of the story). 

According to Haytov, Adji was changed and bathed several times a day to rid him of the lice and filth 

he had brought in from the woods. Reportedly, only Salih, Salihagovitsa, Sofa (or Salih’s daughter 

Fatme, in another version), and the governor’s trusted secretary Abdullah Effendi knew of Mustafa’s 

true whereabouts. Under good care and abundant food, Adji Aga was able to recover quickly. With 

strength and confidence regained, however, his lust for power and plunder returned. In the passing 

days, Salih agonized over what to do with his brother, the outlaw. He could not pardon the hayta. To 

set him free would compromise Salih’s own position as governor and bring further suffering to many 

who would inevitably became victims of Adji’s inherent greed and brutality. So, Salih did the only 

thing he could do at that moment – to bide his time and wait. His sense of honor certainly prevented 

the governor from betraying or killing his own brother. But Salih’s uneasy dilemma soon resolved 

itself. 70 

68 Dechov, The Past of Chepelare, Volume I, 72-96; Dechov, Historical Diary, passim; Haytov, Rhodopean Lords, 

197-234; Haytov, “Smolyan”, 18-31. 


70 Ibid., 226-31. 

256

One day, Sofa, who took care of Adji Aga, informed Salihagovitsa that while cleaning Adji’s 

room she discovered a pistol under his pillow. ‘But how had Mustafa acquired a weapon?’ – she 

pondered – ‘And what did he need it for on the first place? Was he distrustful of his own brother or 

was he planning something sinister?’ Salihagovitsa shared her misgivings with Salih Aga. The latter, 

however – according to popular knowledge – promptly dismissed the warning as “Women’s 

drivel!” 71 , and went about his usual business. Several days later, the governor was returning home 

from an inspection of his nearby fields. As he rode through the gates on his horse and into the inner 

courtyard of the konak, someone shot at him but missed. Frantic commotion ensued in the konak 

immediately. While women and children were screaming, soldiers were running about the premises 

and taking defensive positions. With no more shots to be heard, however, a sort of tense normality 

slowly returned to the konak and investigation began: ‘Who shot at the governor? Where did the 

shooting come from? Why?’ Soon it was clear that the gunfire came from the direction of Adji Aga’s 

secret chamber. Salih suddenly recalled his wife’s warning of a pistol. Finally, he realized that Adji 

Aga – his own brother – had just attempted to kill him. 72 

Instead of succumbing to a momentary rage, however, Salih took his time to deal with the 

hayta. Initially, he ordered that all articles of comfort be removed from his room. Leaving Adji 

without food and drink for eight days, the governor “aimlessly walked from room to room, pulling 

hairs out of his beard, weeping,” and muttering in disbelief how blindly he had kept a snake in his 

bosom. In his frustration, Salih repeatedly called on the guards to kill “the dog dishonoring my 

house.” However, none of the soldiers dared to execute the order. When, after a time, Salih inquired 

why they had ignored his pleas, Strahin (according to Petar Marinov), his lieutenant, answered: 

“Today he may have been your enemy, but tomorrow you could have remembered he was your 

brother, and blamed his death on us.” 73 Thus, Salih had to deal with his family problem on his own. 



73 Ibid., 227-28. 

The same answer, worded differently, is reported by Vassil Dechov and Petar Marinov as well. 

257

Salih and Mustafa were more than full-blood brothers. They had wed the daughters of the 

same mother. Their mother-in-law, however, did not share the same fondness for both brothers. She 

hated the Bitter and advised Salih Aga to get rid of him, even though one of her own flesh and blood 

had born at least four sons to Adji Aga. According to Petar Marinov, she spoke the following words of 

advice to Salih Aga, at a juncture where neither Salih’s trusted Secretary Abdullah Effendi nor his 

beloved wife had – or rather dared not offer – any to him: 

Aga! That dog will finish you. The dog has gone mad. One of you will die while he lives. That 

mustn’t be you! Your children are mostly female [Salih had two sons and four (?) daughters] 

and they will need their protector. He should die! His children are male. They can make it on 

their own. This much I can tell you. 74 

As the days went by following the assassination attempt, Salih’s frustration subdued but his 

anger augmented. ‘Not only did he offer compassion and protection to his deviant brother, who had 

only done harm, but the criminal had raised a gun against his own brother and benefactor.’ Salih 

finally determined that Adji should die. And since no one else would kill him, the governor had to do 

it himself. Salih was now fully aware that while Adji lived, no one was safe, least of all himself and his 

children. Neither would the central government or the local populace be pleased to have him freed. 

So, one day, Salih resolutely walked in Mustafa’s confinement chamber and shot him dead. “My 

children won’t be orphans on your account, but yours will!” - he reportedly said before walking out 

“pale and shaking.” 75 

Despite the fully justified execution of his brother – already officially condemned to death by 

a ferman on which he, as governor, was obligated to act – Salih did not take Adji Aga’s death lightly. 

Deeply affected by the murder, Salih mounted his favorite horse, and giving a warning that no one 

should follow him, stormed out of the konak towards the nearby river. Because it was spring time, 

the snowy mountain caps were melting and causing the river to overflow its banks. Lost in distress 

and obviously unaware of his surroundings, the governor rode his horse straight into the raging 

water. When the frightened animal stood up on his back hoofs refusing to step in, mindless of his 

actions, Salih took out his gun and shot his beloved horse in the head. The very next moment, both 

74 Marinov, 22. 


258

horse and rider collapsed into the river – the horse already dead and Salih very much struggling for 

his life. Finally back to his senses, the man who just had killed his brother managed to pull himself 

out of the water. On the river bank, the distraught Salih sat on a rock and “wept like a child.” 76 What 

was he weeping for? Perhaps for his horse? His false brother? For the people whose good he put 

before his personal well-being but who were never satisfied? For the fact that he needed to protect 

his life from his own family? Thus, it came to pass that in 1806, Mustafa, the hayta, died from the 

hand of his brother Salih. According to Dechov, Adji was outlived by five sons – Süleyman, Emin, 

Brahom, Hassan, and Isein – who vowed to revenge their father’s death. Ultimately, they, among 

others, would take an active part in bringing about Salih’s downfall more than thirty years later. 77 

2. Salihagovitsa (The Wife of Salih Aga) 

In a short segment titled “Historical Note” and attached to the play Salih Aga, Petar Marinov 

describes the governor in terms remarkably in sync with Dechov and Haytov’s depiction of him: 

Salih Aga was strict, energetic, often hotheaded, but perfectly fair, kind-hearted, insightful, 

and generous person. The population saw in him an uncompromising arbiter of justice with 

nothing escaping his attention. He was particularly concerned with family values, 

unforgiving toward polygamy, infidelity and lewdness. Further, not only did he tolerate 

other faiths [other than Islam], but also treated Muslims and Christians on a completely 

equitable basis. It was during his time that the overwhelming majority of churches were 

built in the region [Ahı Çelebi]. The only thing that the population was unhappy about during 

his rule was that he frequently conscripted people’s free labor in the construction of roads, 

arched bridges, buildings, water fountains and aqueducts, as well as for work on his private 

estate. 78 They also did not like the governor’s intrusion in their private lives, often coercing 

people into reluctant marriages [example of this below]. 79 

Salih’s greatest supporter, most valued advisor, and the architect of many of his moral 

“intrusion[s]” was his wife. As strong as her presence beside her husband is, history never recorded 

her own name. She is simply known as Salihagovitsa, The Wife of Salih Aga. This should come as no 

surprise considering the Islamic tradition of addressing women as their son’s mothers or their 

76 Ibid. 


78 Marinov makes sure to explain that Salih provided abundant food, drink, and respite to his workers. He was 

often heard saying that nothing could be achieved on empty stomach and tired limbs (Marinov, 87). 

79 Marinov, 87 (“Historical Note”). 

259

husband’s wives, and not by their personal name. According to the oral testimonies collected by 

Dechov, Salihagovitsa “was a good woman ....lively, tidy, with very strict moral values, merciful and 

pious. She was devoted to Salih Aga and respectful his will as a ruler, but she ran her household as a 

full-fledged mistress. Salih never interfered in her household business. ... [She] was very charitable ... 

helped the poor ... especially to girls and orphaned children, without regard to their faith. However, 

she was particularly good to Christian women.” 80 

When Dechov describes Salihagovitsa as “particularly good” to Christian women – and 

generally women in vulnerable position – he speaks with two things in mind. First, Salihagovitsa’s 

own mother – the same who advised Salih to kill Adji Aga – was a Christian convert to Islam following 

her marriage to Mehmed Kehaya. Second, the author refers to a specific event, when Salihagovitsa’s 

involvement proved crucial in saving several enslaved women. When the Greek rebellion broke on 

the Halkidiki (Medenköyleri) Peninsula in 1821, Salih was ordered to send troops to help quell the 

uprising. The governor dispatched his lieutenant Agush Aga to – what is today – northern Greece 

with a small force to assist the imperial forces. Agush not only fought the rebels, but also managed to 

plunder a few townships and to enslave several Greek Christian girls, whom he smuggled into 

Paşmaklı. 81 Enraged by his lieutenant ’s actions, but – above all – urged by his wife, Salih denounced 

Agush for his lawlessness, appointed Strahin in his stead, and sent his new deputy to retrieve the 

enslaved women; by force if necessary. Agush surrendered his “bounty,” but from that day on he 

became Salih’s sworn enemy. Salihagovitsa took the women under her protection. 82 Upon joining the 

household, “these girls,” Dechov writes in his Diary, “were encouraged to practice their Christian faith 

freely, and Salih [and his wife] married all of them to Christian men from the area. All wedding 

expenses, gifts, and dowry were incurred by Salih Aga and his wife (the grandmother of Priest 


81 Under Shari’a, the public law of the Ottoman Empire, slavery was a legitimate institution. 

82 Dechov, The Past of Chepelare, Volume I, 86-87; Dechov, Historical Diary, 23-27; Haytov, “Smolyan”, 26-27. 

260

Atanass P. Raychev from Paşmaklı was one of these slave girls). ... Salihagovitsa took under her 

protection all vulnerable Christian girls she came across... They treated her as their mother.” 83 

In a scene of the play, Salih Aga, Petar Marinov wonderfully recreates the atmosphere of 

Salih and Salihagovitsa’s marriage arrangement of one of their foster-daughters, Kalina, to Manol: 84 

Salih Aga: Whose son are you? 

Manol: Niko Gulumehovski’s son from Peshtera 85 

... 

Sali Aga: What brings you here? 

Manol: I left my fiancée and came to inform you of it. 

... 

Salih Aga: You left her?! What does that mean? Don’t you know that I disapprove of such 

frivolities in my realm!? Do you wish to be thrown down the Gorge? 

Manol: Well ... the Gorge. I know all about the Gorge. That’s why I came to tell you. Do with 

me as you will. 

Salih Aga: I do not like such things. What’s going to happen to that girl now? Have you 

thought about that? Why did you leave her in the first place? 

Manol: I caught her with another man. That’s why I left her. 

Salih Aga: Well, well, well! What am I supposed to do with you in that case?! 

Salihagovitsa to Salih privately: It will be a pity, Salih Aga, for this young man to die. He is so 

young and handsome. Also, he came here to tell you about it on his own. That proves he doesn’t 

lie ... 

Salih Aga: That’s exactly why I worry. If I let him go without punishment, everyone will say, 

‘Salih Aga has grown soft...’ Everybody knows I do business with his father ... I don’t want to be 

accused of favoritism. What should I do? 

Salihagovitsa: No one will judge you. Let him live. Here is what I think. 

Salih Aga: What? 

Salihagovitsa: Since he has no fiancée, let’s marry him to our Kalina. This will put an end to 

any talk. She is a good and hard-working girl. They are both young ... What do you say? 

Salih Aga: Sounds good to me. 

Salihagovitsa: Her dowry is ready and it’s time to let her go. 

... 

Salih Aga to Manol: Since you left your fiancée, won’t you take our Kalina? All will be good 

that way. She is a servant of ours, but my wife keeps her as one of our own daughters. She has a 

good dowry ... What do you say? 

Manol: If I like her, I may ... 

Salih Aga: Allah, Allah! Do you think I’d purposely tie you to someone bad? 

... 

Salihagovitsa to Manol: Come, come with me [takes him to meet Kalina]. 86 


84 In a footnote Dechov explains that Kalina and her sister Rakshina are real women, who belonged to the family 

of Hasamovi from Dereköy – now the village of Sokolovtsi – both of them raised and married by Salih Aga’s wife 

in the towns of Peshtera and Smolyan respectively. Kalina is the great grandmother of Priest Nikola Manolov 

from the village of Chokmanovo, whom Marinov probably knew in person (Dechov, 6). 

85 In another footnote, Marinov adds that Manol was the grandfather of Manol the Painter from Peshtera, father 

of Nikola and Petar Manolov, both priests (Dechov, 19). 

86 Marinov, 19-22. 

261

This story has a happy ending, both in the play and in real life. Apparently, Kalina and Manol 

liked each other enough to marry. In due time, Kalina gave birth to her first child, a boy. In another 

scene of the play, Kalina visits Salihagovitsa in the konak accompanied by her newborn son. Marinov 

puts the two women in an intimate mother-daughter setting, wherein Kalina behaves in the manner 

of a dutiful daughter coming to her parents’ home to share the joys of parenthood with loved ones. 87 

Figure 6-10: Scene I 

Scene from the play Salih Aga by Petar Marinov, where the photographer Krum Savov 

and his wife take the roles of Salih Aga (sitting) and his wife (standing), 1938: Salih Aga and 

Salihagovitsa dynamically discussing some issue of importance. Oral history portrays Salih’s 

wife as his most important advisor, particularly in family matters (Courtesy of National 

Archives-Plovdiv). 88 

87 Ibid., 31. 

88 National Archives-Plovdiv, The Petar Marinov Collection, Fond 959k, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 243 (Photocollection). 

262

Figure 6-11: Scene II 

Scene from the play Salih Aga by Petar Marinov, with Krum Savov and his wife in the 

roles of Salih Aga and his wife (sitting), 1938: Salih Aga adjudicates on Manol’s case, with 

Salihagovitsa naturally sitting beside him, in the role of advisor. 

(The Inventory of The Petar Marinov Collection, in possession of the National 

Archives-Plovdiv, annotates many pieces of correspondence where people request to see the 

play in their home towns or villages.) (Courtesy of National Archives-Plovdiv). 89 


263

Figure 6-12: Scene III 

Scene from the play “Salih Aga” by Petar Marinov, 1938: Truthful to the oral history 

description of Salih Aga, Krum Savov - in the role of the governor – also seems to be a 

relatively small man. Unfortunately, we have no way of ascertaining how the real Salih looked 

like since no known portrait of him exists. Also, he died before the age of photography, and, 

therefore, he could not have had his picture taken either (Courtesy of National Archives- 

Plovdiv). 90 


264

Figure 6-13: Scene IV 

Krum Savov’s wife in the role of Salih Aga’s wife, 1938: There is no surviving image of 

Salihagovitsa either. What is known about her is that she was a pious and devoted wife, who 

ruled her household independently and used her good fortune to help orphaned girls and 

poor women, particularly Christian ones (Courtesy of National Archives-Plovdiv). 91 

Salih, the Public Man 

As Petar Marinov remarks, Salih built many “roads, arched bridges, buildings, water 

fountains and aqueducts” during his governorship. Most importantly, however, “[i]t was during his 

[Salih’s] time that the overwhelming majority of [Christian] churches were built in ... [Ahı Çelebi].” 92 

As far as Dechov is concerned, “all” churches in the region were constructed at Salih’s bidding. 93 To 

that effect, the historian writes: 

The first church was built in [the village of] Chokmanovo [...]. To gain a permit to erect the 

church, several dignitaries from Chokmanovo, led by Stoyan Kehaya, appeared before Salih 

Aga. They asked Salih to help them obtain ferman [royal permit] for the construction of the 



93 Dechov, Historical Diary, 7 (10). 

265

church. Salih Aga agreed to help them, but said: ‘Do not build the church too big or on too 

conspicuous a site, for it would attract a lot of unwanted attention and ... [unread words].’ 

The dignitaries agreed to select an unobtrusive location for the church, but asked if they may 

build it larger so it could accommodate the growing [Christian] population. [...] Salih advised 

them to apply for a ferman indicating smaller arshins 94 for the church, but when building it to 

make it wider and taller to meet their needs. 95 

Obviously, the stratagem suggested by Salih worked. The Christians of Chokmanovo had their church 

consecrated in the year 1835. 96 

But not only churches had a desired purpose. The availability of good roads and bridges in 

the difficult terrain of the Rhodopes was vitally important for facilitating transportation, business, 

and defense. Thus, it was Salih who commissioned the construction of key transportation arteries 

connecting Paşmaklı to other important townships in the Rhodopes and beyond. Among those were 

the roads Paşmakı-Chepelare, Paşmakı-Shiroka Laka, and Paşmaklı-Tozborun-Cheresha-Arda which 

remain major connecting lines to this day. 97 What the population did not like, however, was that they 

had to provide their free labor for the making of these roads, and for most projects of public 

significance. In keeping with the traditions of his time, Salih simply conscripted people’s labor when 

the construction of aqueducts, bridges, and roads were deemed necessary for public use. However, 

the governor made sure to provide ample food, drink, and rest for the laborers. 98 While nearly 

immaculate in most ways, Salih was prone to despotism when it came to – what he saw as – 

advancing the public good. Ultimately, he forced his will on the population when building public 

infrastructure for much the same reasons as he administered severe punishment or arranged 

marriages: Because he believed that it was his responsibility as governor to cater to the common – 

not the individual or self – interest in Ahı Çelebi. The words which Marinov ascribes to him in a 

candid conversation with his wife most truthfully capture Salih’s philosophy of government: 

Well! It’s not easy to look after the welfare of the people for forty years and keep everybody 

happy. ... How am I supposed to treat them [the people]!? My whole life I have tried to do 

94 An old measuring unit, which most internet sites calculate at approximately 28 inches. 

95 Dechov, Historical Diary, 7 (10-11). 

96 Ibid., (10). 

97 Ibid., (10-11). 


266

them good. ... Listen, all! While my human strength permits, I will enforce order. I will not let 

things slip out of control. I am the Vizier here. I am the King [emphasis added]. 99 

Figure 6-14: The Sycamore in Smolyan 

This tree is the center-point of a small square that was the site of many public events such as 

dances, meetings, and various other occasions calling for large congregations of people during 

Salih’s time. In his Diary, Dechov writes: 

He [Salih] placed an order with a peddler – a Vlah from Yanina – to bring and plant in 

Paşmaklı a sycamore tree – Chinar. The sycamore was brought by Sharya Shaban and 

planted next to the water fountain and the mosque of Paşmaklı. The sycamore – 90- 

100 year-old [in 1924?] – exists to this day. This magnificent tree ... [unread words] ... 

along with the water fountain, is the town’s most beautiful decoration. 100 (Picture by 

the author, June 2007). 

99 Ibid., 59. 


267

Figure 6-15: An arched bridge in Smolyan 

I crossed this bridge just before I walked into the small square where the Sycamore stands. 

Most probably this bridge was built during the time of Salih Aga. In any event, according to 

Dechov, Salih sponsored the construction of many bridges like this one; possibly this very 

same one as well since the Sycamore was brought and planted nearby on the governor’s 

bidding. (Picture by the author, June 2007). 

268

Figure 6-16: An arched bridge leading to Salih’s konak 

The bridge in this photograph, leading to Salih’s konak, was most definitely built in the 

governor’s lifetime. The photograph is not dated, but it was probably taken in the early 1920s, 

because it is very similar to another photograph from 1921 (following the section Who Wrote 

about Salih Aga in this chapter) (Courtesy of National Archives-Smolyan). 101 

101 The photograph is cropped from the top. 

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The Death of Salih Aga 

The Ahı Çelebi Kaaza was in close proximity to Greece, which declared its sovereignty from 

the Ottoman Empire in 1828 following a turbulent decade of rebellion. Because Salih displayed an 

unusual autonomy in his government of Ahı Çelebi and was sympathetic with the plight of the 

Bulgarian Christians, it was not difficult for his enemies to incriminate him in disloyalty to the 

imperial government. Because of Greece’s independence, the already paranoid Istanbul authorities 

speedily dispatched a ferman to the superior governor of Gümürcina, Emin Bey, authorizing Salih 

Aga’s arrest and execution for treason. Aware of Salih’s popularity and his ability to muster 

resistance if forewarned, however, Emin Bey resorted to deception. Instead of openly detaining Salih 

Aga, he concocted a plan to invite the aging governor to Gümürcina to purportedly hand him royal 

tokens of recognition for a long and exemplary service to the empire. The eighty-year-old seasoned 

ruler of Ahı Çelebi, however, distrusted Emin Bey, and with good reason. 102 

Emin Bey was cunning and, more importantly, hated Salih Aga for the latter’s persistent 

failure to bow to his authority as a higher imperial administrator. When the ferman for Salih’s 

execution was received in Gümürcina, Emin knew that he could not simply arrest the popular 

Rhodopean lord. He was determined, however, to carry out the order one way or another. Both 

Dechov and Haytov recount the story of Emin Bey’s dishonest scheming to that effect. He sent not 

soldiers, but standard horse couriers to deliver a letter to Salih, urging him to immediately depart for 

Gümürcina in order to receive the honorary distinctions of the Great Divan (the Ottoman 

government). 103 Emin Bey sent the following letter to the governor of Ahı Çelebi: 

To the Great Lord and Governor of Ahı Çelebi 

KARAHOCOĞLU SALIH AGA SON OF SÜLEYMAN 

Of Paşmaklı 

Our Glorious and Just Lord, 

102 Dechov, The Past of Chepelare, Volume I, 72-96; Haytov, “Smolyan”, 18-31. 

103 A scarlet garment and necklace, according to the remarkable ballad the people of Ahı Çelebi later composed 

about Salih, (Appendix 6.1). 

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The news has arrived from the Great Divan [Divanı Kebir], the source of all goodness, that 

our magnificent King Abdul Medjid Khan has bestowed gifts and honors upon you for so many 

years of immaculate service in governing the people of Ahı Çelebi. 

Your tokens of honor and gifts have been sent to my domain in Gümürcina. 

This is why I appeal to you, Great Lord, to leave immediately, travel swiftly day and night, 

and appear personally before me to receive them. 

I look forward to seeing you soon and embracing you as my brother. 

EMIN BEY 

Governor of Gümürcina 104 

Despite the flattery, Salih had misgivings about this invitation. In fact, Vassil Dechov 

attributes the following words to the governor who confided into his loyal secretary Ismail (rather, 

Abdullah Effendi) before leaving for Gümürcina: “I am old and life is no longer so dear to me. I will go, 

and whatever has to come, will come.” 105 Salih Aga had no choice, but to go. If he opted not to, his 

demeanor would have been interpreted as insurrection and the repercussions for his family and the 

people of Ahı Çelebi could have been tragic. From the way Dechov narrates the governor’s final 

hours, it will be safe to conclude that Salih Aga consciously put his life on the line to avert potentially 

disastrous consequences for the kaaza prompted by suspicions of rebellion. 106 

Emin Bay provided a royal welcome to Salih Aga in Gümürcina. 107 Aware of Gümürcina’s 

proximity to Salih’s stronghold Ahı Çelebi and Istanbul’s remoteness, Emin still feared Salih’s ability 

to rally popular support in his defense. Were Salih to ignite uprising in an already combustible 

environment, Emin could lose both his governorship and his head. The lavish welcome had the 

purpose to deceive, and it succeeded. Salih gradually relaxed and, feeling safe enough, he sent his 

security escort back to Ahı Çelebi with the exception of five to ten personal guards. With that, the 

opportune moment came for Emin to strike. Salih Aga occupied a bedroom at the upper levels of 

104 A Bulgarian-translated facsimile of the original letter, preserved in National Archives-Plovdiv, The Petar 

Marinov Collection, Fond 959(k?), Inventory 1, Archival Unit 1039. (Translated from Bulgarian by the author). 


106 Ibid., 72-96. 

107 Ibid., 88. 

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Emin Bey’s konak, while his bodyguards, including his lieutenant Stahin, were deliberately 

accommodated on the ground floor, away from the governor. Thus separated from his only friends in 

Gümürcina, the elderly Salih became an easy target. One evening, two assassins snuck in his bedroom 

and strangled the sleeping man with a piece of leather cord. According to a different version, Salih 

was strangled not during the night, but in broad daylight after walking out of a conference with Emin 

Bey in the latter’s private chamber. 108 Whereas it is difficult to ascertain which the correct version of 

events is, both story lines seem plausible. With his typical attention to details, though, Dechov 

records that Salih Aga was buried in the Turkish cemetery by the Polipoli (or Poshposh) River, west 

of Gümürcina. Later on, his sons Emin Bey 109 and Tahir Bey marked their father’s grave with a 

headstone, on which they inscribed the leather cord that cut his life short. When, in 1924, Dechov 

was writing his Historical Diary, he remarks that the headstone was still there. 110 If the author means 

that he actually saw the stone for himself, then it is at least certain that Salih was strangled by a 

leather cord. 

Whatever the actual circumstances of his demise, Salih never returned to his beloved 

Rhodopes. His days ended in Gümürcina sometime in the fall of 1838 because of the cunning of Emin 

Bey. The governor of Gümürcina murdered Salih Aga as much in compliance with the order for his 

execution as in satisfaction of his personal resentment for the lord of Ahı Çelebi. 

specifies, though, the story of Salih’s murder was reported to him, among others, by the governor’s 

own grandson Mehmedali Tahirbeev (above). 

Salih’s remaining guards fled Gümürcina after the governor’s strangulation and carried the 

news of his tragic end to Paşmaklı. Deep was the despair and frustration of all who depended on Salih 

Aga for protection of life, property, and welfare. Not only was Salih’s family now vulnerable to 

confiscation of property and general willful abuse, but so were his servicemen, and – above all – the 

111 

As Dechov 

108 Dechov, Historical Diary, 13-15 (23-27). 

109 In addition to title (governor), “Bey” was also the accepted form to address the feudal Ottoman nobility. 

110 Dechov, The Past of Chepelare, Volume I, 88; Dechov, Historical Diary, 24-25. 


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poor Christian and Muslim peasantry, shielded from violent arbitrariness solely by Salih’s personal 

integrity and political power. Dechov describes the general mood following his death: 

The news about the killing of Salih Aga produced a shocking effect on the entire Middle- 

Rhodopean population. Some were scared, because they did not know what to expect next, 

others rejoiced, yet third genuinely mourned their governor. But most of all mourned the 

people of Chepelare and Smolyan, because they lost their best protector and benefactor. 112 

After Salih’s assassination, Emin Bey dispatched bureaucrats and troops to Ahı Çelebi in 

order to contain potential turmoil and to take control of everything that the governor’s family 

possessed. By the time they arrived, however, Salih’s older son Emin Bey ordered all the women and 

children of the household, including servants, to leave the konak each taking out whatever they could 

hide in their clothes. The more valuable possessions were hastily hidden away in various places. 

When the Gümürcina bureaucrats arrived, they claimed the konak and what was left in it, sealing off 

all rooms and inventorying every item. All that belonged to Salih Aga was duly confiscated, his honor 

soiled, and his offspring barred from public office. 

One of Salih’s kinsmen and bitter enemies, Agush, who brought about the accusation of 

treason, managed to secure the appointment of his own sons as joint rulers of Ahı Çelebi, with 

himself as their political advisor. This state of affairs continued only until 1842, a little over three 

years. By then, Salih’s sons, Emin Bey and Tahir Bey – tirelessly petitioning every friendly ear in 

Edirne 113 and Istanbul and evoking Salih’s immaculate reputation – had restored their father’s good 

name, reclaiming possession of their property and reestablishing their family’s authority. 114 But the 

sovereign reign of the Kör Hoca (Hodja) dynasty would not be the same again. Emin Bey did succeed 

his father Salih as governor of Ahı Çelebi, but the Ottoman authorities also appointed an 

administrative judge – an ethnic Turk from Constantinople – alongside, whom they gave the 

authority to countermand Emin’s decisions. In effect, this was a measure of preventing Salih’s heirs 

from reestablishing their father’s absolute control of the kaaza. Scared by Greece’s successful bid for 

112 Ibid., 88. 

113 The Ahı Çelebi Kaaza was part of the Edirne Vilayet (large province) of the Ottoman Empire. 

114 Dechov, 95. 

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independence just a decade before, the Ottoman state was determined not to permit a regional ruler 

to grow strong; no matter how small hierarchically he was. 

The population of Ahı Çelebi, however, took immediate and irrevocable dislike to the 

Turkish kadi (judge), because “he was arrogant, corrupt, and most importantly could not speak 

Ahren language [the local Slavic language].” 115 Popular determination to get rid of him provoked an 

anonymous individual to sneak in the kadi’s sleeping quarters one night and set his bed on fire. The 

kadi burnt along with his house. The authorities blamed the murder on Emin Bey, Salih Aga’s 

successor, who was forced to resign from the office of governor by 1850. 

The distinguished and widely liked Isein Zhurnal – native of Paşmaklı and a kinsman of 

Salih’s lieutenant Strahin – received the imperial appointment as the new chief administrator of Ahı 

Çelebi. Wary of allowing the power back into the hands of another local person, however, the 

authorities in Constantinople and Gümürcina implicated Isein Bey in the kadi’s murder plot as well. 

In the course of few years following his appointment, in 1856, the Ottoman government tried, 

convicted, and effectively imprisoned Isein Bey. From then on and until 1912-1913, when Bulgaria 

permanently took control of most the Rhodopes, Ahı Çelebi was governed by deliberately appointed 

outside administrators titled kaymakam. 

116 

The Kör Hoca (Hodja) dynasty ruled Ahı Çelebi for over one hundred years and Salih Aga’s 

reign was the golden age in the Ottoman history of the Middle Rhodopes. The archives of Salih Aga, 

which would have been an invaluable source of Rhodopean history, survived until 1912 when the 

invading Bulgarian troops plundered the konak, taking away or obliterating most of what was left in 

it, including written documents. 117 This destruction, in conjunction with Salih’s preference to conduct 

his gubernatorial affairs orally rather than in writing, accounts for the sad fact that very few records 

bearing Salih’s authentic mark survive today. 

115 Ibid. 

116 Ibid., 95-96. 


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“After the death of Salih Aga,” Dechov concludes the family’s saga, “the Kör Hoca offspring 

developed a liking for alcohol and gradually sank into poverty and insignificance. But all the way 

until 1913, most of these descendants of an illustrious dynasty had preserved the physical and 

psychological characteristics of noble, intelligent, kindly, and virtuous lords.” 118 

Conclusion: Salih Aga’s Heritage 

Salih Aga was a remarkable person who not only brought stability to Ahı Çelebi in trying 

times for the Ottoman Empire, but also established a social order of a new type – one that permitted 

equality between Muslims and Christians despite Shari’a. As Nikolay Haytov sums it, the governor’s 

most remarkable legacy lies in “the fact that he elevated the status of the Christians to that of the 

Muslims in both civil and political aspect ... [which] provided the former with the opportunity ... to 

amass wealth surpassing the latter in all respect. From servants and bondsmen of the Yuruks [(a 

community of stockbreeders)], they [the Christians] became owners of vast herds of sheep, pastures, 

forests, and land.” 119 Nevertheless, the heritage of Salih Aga remains obscure and unrecognized in the 

local public history of Bulgaria to this day. 

Even Haytov, a writer well-known for promoting restrictive Bulgarian nationalism, finds this 

neglect detrimental to the national cultural narrative, albeit within the jingoistic discourse of bad 

Muslimness and good Bulgarianness. In his paper, “Smolyan: Three Pinnacles in the History of the 

Middle Rhodopes,” he concludes the section on Salih Aga with the following monologue that best 

illustrates the complexity of the problem: 

‘Celebrated?’ Can we define him [Salih Aga] as such? 

While some [Bulgarian academics] quiescently accept this, others are silent, and a third 

group straightforwardly rejects it. Was Salih Aga not the overlord, the feudal, and the 

appointed tyrant of the Sultan? Did he not wear the fezz, and was he not the one who 

condemned and hanged? Should we let him in the upper echelons of Bulgarian history in his 

tyrant’s armor? ‘No! Let him stay in the basement, in the dusty corner, where is the proper 

place for all reactionary feudal trash.’ 

But how can we let that happen, when it is a matter of fact that Salih Aga equalized 

Christians with Muslims, expurgating the very concept of ‘rayah’ 120 during his reign, and, by 


119 Haytov, “Smolyan”, 27. 

120 Derogatory term for non-Muslims, meaning second-class people. 

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doing so, broke away from the practice of all preceding and following rulers, for which he 

ultimately paid with his life! 

[...] Why can’t we see that Salih Aga obstructed Muslimness in all its forms – polygamy, 

‘Turkization,’ and depravity, preserving the traditional Bulgarian morality? 

Why should we deny that his archaic justice brought peace and order in society a 

hundred times more effectively than any formal justice system, as well as nurtured 

agricultural development and economic prosperity? 

Why? Because he is a feudal tyrant, an Ottoman governor! 

Is it possible to demand of him – a product of his time – to outgrow his age and become – 

let’s say – a partisan of the Bulgarian [independence] cause? As a ruler of Ahı Çelebi, he has 

done more for the preservation of Bulgarianness in Smolyan than a hundred [of our] patriots. 

Facts! Does it not suffice to mention that during the April Uprising not a single shot was 

fired against a Bulgarian [Christian] in Smolyan? If there were a Salih Aga in Devin or 

Chepino to curb the Muslim fanaticism, there would have been no burning of Perushtitsa, 

and no massacre in Batak. The reign of Salih Aga opened the way for the [Bulgarian] 

Renaissance in the Middle Rhodopes [...]. 

But Salih Aga ended with a loop around his neck! 

And if this last, bloody evidence is not enough [to give him due respect], then all further 

words will be in vain [emphasis added]. 121 

Yet, Salih Aga – the Pomak governor of the Ottoman kaaza of Ahı Çelebi – is gaining 

momentum in the rising discourse of Pomak heritage in Bulgaria. Because of the contentious nature 

of Pomak identity in the national discourse, the Muslim Rhodopean community has been stranded on 

a precarious crossroad with no real sense of self that is reflective of the people’s own understanding 

of past and present. Since the time of their first comprehensive pokrastvane of 1912-1913, the 

Pomaks have been consistently told to think of themselves as descendants of forcibly Islamized 

Bulgarians, whose primary patriotic duty is to return to their “true” identity. Even today, if they stray 

but a little from the prescribed identity and claim, for instance, a distinct Pomak heritage, this will 

unleash an avalanche of resentment and indignation by patriotic citizens and institutions. 122 

Challenges to any aspect of – what has become – the established history of the Bulgarian nation is 

likely to be met with overt hostility and aggression. Finding a way out of negative emotions and 

devising common grounds for the discussion of sensitive heritage issues, therefore, is paramount to a 

constructive public discourse. Salih Aga, the man who cared equally for the wellbeing of Muslim and 

Christian communities within his realm more than 170 years ago, may be able to offer just such 

shared platform. As Ivan Terziev, my (Christian) friend and host in Smolyan, said to me in the context 

121 Haytov, “Smolyan”, 30. 

122 Read the example with Baleva and Brunnbauer’s attempt to offer an alternative reading of the Batak 

massacre in footnote 46 of the present chapter. 

276

of furthering the Rhodopean cultural tourism, Salih’s legacy could be a potent factor in uniting the 

cultural interpretation of Rhodopean heritage to the benefit of all: Christians, Muslims, and tourists. 

While the formal acknowledgement and celebration of Salih’s legacy in Smolyan would immensely 

please the local Pomak community, it will also open the discussion of currently sensitive issues 

pertaining to the Ottoman past, including Pomak identity, thereby enriching local history and 

attracting cultural tourists to the region. Salih Aga may be revived in many ways to benefit tourism 

and the public discourse, including via academic and fictional writing, reconstructing his konak a as 

heritage site, and/or formally attaching his name to such places like The Waterfall of Smolyan (The 

Gorge of Salih Aga) to turn it into a tourist hotspot. My own modest tribute to Salih Aga – and the 

local Pomak heritage through him – is this narrative of his life as reflected in oral history and 

recorded by Vassil Dechov, Nikolay Haytov, and Petar Marinov. Albeit neglected by orthodox history, 

Salih of Paşmaklı is very much alive in vernacular memory and available to inspire the common 

grounds for a new, shared Rhodopean heritage. 

Ultimately, I brought Salih’s story to light not only because he is the forgotten local hero, but 

also – and mostly – to point to the fact that Pomak history merits academic exploration. Not only is it 

littered with fascinating individuals (and events) like Salih Aga, but it could also be a veritable boon 

for a diverse body of scholars, including ethnographers, cultural geographers, local historians, 

folklorists, cultural anthropologists, and scholars of nationalism. Because of the long history of 

cultural suppression, however, much of the Pomak past has been obliterated with vital consequences 

for the availability of standard historical evidence. Thus, future scholastic devotees of Pomak culture 

will have to be willing to embrace new and cross-disciplinary approaches as they delve into 

challenging, but ultimately rewarding research. 

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CHAPTER VII 

CONCLUSION 

Making Sense of the Past 

I grew up in the Western Rhodopes during the 1980s, the last decade of communist rule in 

Bulgaria. One of my fondest memories from these years is my father’s telling stories by the flickering 

candlelight and the gentle crackling of the fire in the woodstove of my childhood home. His 

storytelling usually took place in the fall and winter, when the busy tobacco-harvesting season had 

ended and before the new planting season began. In those days, I remember, power outages were 

common occurrence either caused by severe weather or purposely scheduled to save on electricity, a 

necessary relief measure for the ailing communist economy. As often as I turn back to these 

cherished memories, however, one realization strikes me all over again. As much as I loved listening 

to these tales from the local past, they also confused me a great deal. On a number of occasions, my 

father would talk about “the burning of the village” and “the fleeing of the people,” phrases that 

terrified my young mind. “What burning?” – I would ask – “What fleeing? Who was fleeing from 

whom? Why the burning? When did it happen?” 

Even though I was just a child, my father would carefully point out that what he recounted 

were not mere stories, but the memories of persons who had been long gone by the time I was ten 

years old or so. While listening to my father’s narratives, I vividly remember thinking, ‘But if 

something so frightening as burning and fleeing happened right there – in my home town and the 

neighboring communities, how come I never heard anything about it in school, from books, 

television, radio, or newspapers! Why nobody talks about it, except, perhaps, my father?’ My father’s 

inquisitive mind as a young boy drove him to pose questions about the past to his grandfather, to 

elderly neighbors and relatives, and to anybody who would care to tell him a story. During the 1960s, 

278

when young Mehmed was conducting his impromptu oral history research, elderly people were still 

the foremost repository of knowledge about the local past. On one occasion, he heard an anecdote 

about “the corrupted” hodja 1 (whose name I cannot recall) that went as follows: When Valkossel (my 

home town) was burning, people fled south – toward Greece, from where they were passing into 

Turkey. As they were abandoning the village in large numbers, the local hodja began to cajole them, 

“Hear me out, people! The cornfields are heavy with bread. Aren’t you going to harvest it? Are you 

leaving everything behind?” With heavy hearts, these refugees looked back. They saw their ripened 

crops, cast a glance at their empty homes, and faltered. Consequently, many returned to Valkossel as 

the will to leave abandoned them. “Now,” my father would add, “the hodja was a collaborator and he 

was directed by the authorities to stop the people. They knew that he was hodja in the village and 

people would listen to him.” 

This was the story in a nutshell. Plain enough! But it was perplexing to me. Who were these 

authorities? Why was the population fleeing? When did it all happen? My questions required 

answers. I needed additional information to make sense of the puzzle. The people whom I asked 

provided it to the best of their knowledge, obviously not quite comprehending my burning desire to 

know. After all, I was just a child supposed to occupy her time playing with other kids, not ask 

impossible questions. “The kaurs [Christians] burnt the village. People fled from them. The year was 

1912 th .” These answers might have been sufficient for someone with contextual knowledge or 

experience to fit the pieces together, but not for me – a child, growing up in the 1980s, amidst the 

information blackout of the “Turkish” revival process. 

2 

What frustrated me above all in those days, 

however, was not my own inability to make sense of the bits and pieces, but that the adults – 

including my father – could not make them comprehensible to me. It was somewhat distressing to 

think that the collectivity of grown-ups either did not care to know or genuinely lacked the essential 

1 Muslim religious teacher who, in those days, commanded much respect in the community. 

2 The forced name changing against the ethnic Turks was just taking place in 1984-1985 and it was accompanied 

by an active disinformation campaign, not only censoring literature, but also re-writing history to deny the 

existence of an ethnic Turkish minority in Bulgaria. For more information, see Ali Eminov, Turkish and Other 

Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria, (New York: Routledge, 1997), passim. See also Chapters III and IV of this 

dissertation. 

279

foundation of historical context to have a coherent picture of the past. Sadly, it was both. What many 

people kept, though, were transmitted oral memories. But, to me, these were so removed from a clear 

timeline or factual certainty that the whole situation gave an impression of relatively recent events 

(as I would find out) not as dependable, tangible, accurate history, but as distant, fantastical, obscure 

folktale. 

Only years later, when immersing in a dissertation research, was I able to get the full picture 

of the stories my father had recounted. The one about the “corrupted hodja” in particular stuck in my 

mind, partly because the image of the ripened cornfields, which had broken people’s resolve to 

depart following the collapse of Ottoman rule in the area, was so vivid in my imagination. The story 

dates back to the pokrastvane of 1912-1913, which Chapter II of this dissertation describes in detail. 

The Christianization of the Pomaks began in late September 1912, precisely when the populations of 

Valkossel, and the neighboring villages, were trying to escape from the marauding Christian bands 

that roamed across the Rhodope Mountains to pillage and slaughter at will. 3 Fearing that the fleeing 

of Muslims would leave a depopulated border region behind, 4 the new Bulgarian authorities tried to 

contain the lawlessness of the civilian bands and to curtail the exodus by enlisting the cooperation of 

Pomak individuals such as the “corrupted hodja.” While it is unclear whether the hodja was bribed, 

threatened, or both to collaborate, he certainly knew how to manipulate people’s deepest emotions 

in order to make them stay. Those who had originally fled the advancing Bulgarian forces, leaving all 

their earthly possessions behind, were persuaded to look back at the abandoned cornfields and their 

hearts wavered at the sight of the gently rolling hills around them. Truly, what madness possessed 

them to flee? Where were they going anyway? Could they find another place so beautiful and dear? 

Thus overwhelmed by emotions, the majority of refugees made their way back to Valkossel (and to 

villages across the Rhodopes) to suffer the religious conversion of 1912-1913, and to witness the 

killing of the village elders who refused to renounce their religion. 5 

3 See Chapter II for details. 

4 The border between Bulgaria and Greece cuts across the lengths of the Rhodopes, with the larger portion of the 

mountain being on the Bulgarian side of the line. 

5 See Chapter II. 

280

Indeed, as my father had said, the burning of the village, the “corrupted hodja,” and the 

killing of people in Valkossel were not some made-up tales. They were remembered experiences, 

originating in the pakrastvane of 1912-1913, fragmented by decades of relentless cultural 

assimilation, and surviving as scattered oral narratives into the present. More importantly, however, 

these experiences form an integral part of a body of historical memory and cultural tradition, 

preserved and practiced by the Muslim community of the Rhodopes, which constitutes Pomak 

heritage. In the sense that Pomakness, as distinct heritage, has been fractured beyond cohesiveness, 

there is an enormous need at present to study and preserve the surviving remnants. Moreover, 

heritage scholars like myself – a cultural insider at that – have the professional and moral 

responsibility to piece the fragments together and create a more complete conception of Pomak 

cultural identity. Indeed, in addition to making sense of my past, the very purpose of this dissertation, 

from the beginning, has been to promote and preserve vital aspects of Pomak heritage. As 

practitioner, however, I ought to be aware of what my responsibilities are when interpreting 

heritage. Insofar as I argue in support of pluralistic heritage presentation in the public sphere, this 

dissertation ends on a note about the responsibility of cultural interpreters to be educators in society 

rather than creators of exclusionary master narratives. 

The Role of the Heritage Broker 

In the introduction to this dissertation I made a statement about the necessity of pluralistic 

interpretation of heritage in the collective national domain. But just what does pluralistic 

interpretation mean and what ways are there to achieve it? Whereas I advance the inclusion 

argument in the context of Pomak heritage, it is only fitting to conclude this dissertation with 

suggestions about what qualifies for pluralistic interpretation and how to go about achieving it. 

In A Place to Remember, Robert Archibald effectively connects the notion of pluralism to 

usefulness. “I have come to view history,” he writes, “as the construction of useful narrative” 6 to 

everybody in the community. Since heritage interpretation is the domain of professionals, it is also 

6 Robert R. Archibald, A Place to Remember: Using History to Build Community (Walnut Creek: AtlaMira Press, 

1999), 29. 

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their responsibility to create “useful narrative.” To fulfill that duty, heritage scholars, as the formal 

community storytellers, should strive to create an all-inclusive narrative that is sensitive to the 

following: On one hand, it (1) accounts for the existence of a plurality of narratives (vernacular 

memories), and (2) acknowledges the right of that plurality to exist. On the other hand, it (3) abstains 

from aggression or disrespect towards one or many of the existing vernacular (minority) narratives, 

(4) while having no obligation to agree with all of them (as similar goal is realistically unattainable). 

This narrative then, by virtue of its all-inclusiveness, (5) constitutes the common ground for building 

a shared identity. 

However, although scholars often create this historical narrative, it is not and should not be 

their absolute prerogative. Archibald believes that everybody’s experience qualifies for a good 

history and rightly so. But it is heritage professionals who ultimately write the story while having the 

moral obligation to consider and seek the input of the community whose heritage they narrate. Thus, 

the construction of a useful narrative implies inclusion and participation of members of the 

community, because having a stake engages people’s responsibility and reinforces national identity. 

In the essay “Conserving a Problematic Past,” Clarence Mondale further suggests that 

heritage conservationists ought to consider history inherently problematic as that would enable them 

to be more critical of the way they interpret and preserve heritage. 7 Awareness of the fickle nature of 

heritage would make them more sensitive to integrating vernacular (minorities’) cultures into the 

mainstream heritage. Heritage, Mondale concludes, is politically charged, first, because of the 

frequent opposition of vernacular (minority) to official (majority) heritage, and, second, because the 

funding for conservation is controlled by the elites who generally support the dominant culture. It is 

the cultural conservationists’ responsibility, therefore, to insist on the construction of useful past – 

past based on cultural interpretation that unites rather than divides society. One avenue to reconcile 

vernacular and mainstream cultures, the author recommends, is through commoditization of 

historical heritage, i.e. developing heritage for tourists. Mondale’s rationale is that heritage for 

tourism stresses on the inclusion of a variety of cultures, including and often mostly vernacular ones, 

7 Clarence Mondale, “Conserving a Problematic Past,” in Conserving Culture: A New Discourse on Heritage, ed. 

Mary Hufford (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 15-23. 

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ecause their exoticism is more likely to attract outside visitors. Thus, in Bulgaria, the legacy of Salih 

Aga could be revived in many ways to benefit tourism and the public discourse, including through 

academic and fictional writing, reconstructing his konak a as heritage site, and/or formally attaching 

his name to such places as The Waterfall of Smolyan (The Gorge of Salih Aga) to transform it into a 

tourist hotspot (Chapter VI). 

The authors 8 of “Traditional History and Alternative Conceptions of the Past,” for their part, 

justly insist the “members of an ethnic or other community [should be able to] tell about themselves 

in their own terms.” 9 Downer at al., in other words, proposes an approach to heritage interpreted in 

emic terms, i.e. from the point of view of the cultural insiders, not vice versa. The official history, they 

claim, is not “an objective chronicle” of bygone events, but the historians’ reconstruction of the past 

on the basis of known events, surviving historical texts, and scientific findings. As all history 

advances an interpretation, state-sponsored conservation policies ought to consider vernacular 

history an authentic source of heritage as well, which merits preservation on an equal footing with 

official (dominant) memory. The authors specifically propose ethnographic consultation with local 

communities as a useful tool for identifying places of significance to them, which could then be 

considered for conservation. 10 Downer, Roberts, Francis and Kelly cement their argument with 

furnishing a personal example of successfully conducted ethnographic consultation with the Navajo 

Indians. Probing the community’s sentiments, the ethnographer-authors helped determine which 

places were sacred to the Navajo, so they could be conserved under special, federally funded projects 

for preserving Navajo culture. 11 

In “Cultural Conservation of Place,” Setha Low, for her part, suggests several useful 

techniques for overcoming challenges of pluralistic interpretation and achieving a “cultural mosaic” 

in (American) public heritage: First, cultural conservationists need to conduct ethnographic 

8 Allan S. Downer, Jr., Alexandra Roberts, Harris Francis, and Clara B. Kelly. 

9 Allan S. Downer at al., “Traditional History and Alternative Conceptions of the Past,” in Conserving Culture: A 

New Discourse on Heritage, ed. Mary Hufford (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 42. 

10 For instance, inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP). 

11 Downer at al., 39-55. 

283

consultations with local people in order to find out what matters most to them. Second, they may 

consider constituency analysis, i.e. probing the community’s interests and values so as to incorporate 

the prevalent ones into the interpretation of given place. Third, conservationists should be mindful of 

ethnicity- and class-related symbols of a place so as to include them—so far as possible—into the 

landscape’s interpretation. 12 Ultimately, Low argues that pluralistic interpretation of heritage is not 

only necessary, but also possible. It only takes the willingness and creativity of the heritage 

professional to achieve it. 13 

In Sense of History, David Glassberg suggests that the role of heritage practitioners should be 

that of facilitators of the public narrative rather than of its creators. In other words, they should 

strive to facilitate public discussion of the past rather than dominate it by promoting a particular 

version of history, not necessarily shared by other groups in society. In short, the professionals’ role 

is to broker the cultural dialogue in society rather than create it. 14 Mike Wallace further claims that in 

a world where elites control spending on heritage preservation and show disinterest in vernacular 

memory, heritage professionals face ever-shrinking resources to practice pluralistic (inclusive) 

interpretation. 15 Therefore, to obtain funding, interpreters will often need to act agreeably to donors. 

After all, there is no preservation without money. However, the professionals’ first and foremost duty 

to society is that of educators. As Wallace puts it, the heritage managers’ most “fundamental mission 

[is] to assist people to become historically-informed makers of history.” 16 Their responsibility, thus, 

is to offer knowledge upon which heritage consumers should be able to make their own conclusions 

rather than force the conclusions on the consumers. 17 The bare minimum heritage interpreters can 

12 E.g. a Chinese dragon head over a telephone pole. 

13 Setha Low, “Cultural Conservation of Place,” in Conserving Culture: A New Discourse on Heritage, ed. Mary 

Hufford (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 66-77. 

14 David Glassberg, A Sense of History: The Place of the Past in American Life (Amherst: University of 

Massachusetts Press, 2001). 

15 Mike Wallace, Mickey Mouse History and Other Essays on American Memory (Philadelphia: Temple University 

Press, 1996). 

16 Ibid., 27. 

17 For instance, if a heritage interpreter presents the American Civil War, but omits the issue of slavery from the 

narrative (with no intention to be hurtful), it may induce an African American to think that he/she is neglected, 

284

do in a politically charged reality is to offer information in an expertly and non-derogatory manner. 

Ideally, they should know the mass consumers (the average multicultural citizenry) and cater to their 

needs first, before considering donors. 

In Conclusion 

In this dissertation I argued that the heritage discipline is an applied science of 

multidisciplinary character, preoccupied with studying heritage in all its tangible and symbolic 

aspects. Heritage is socially constructed to serve the need of its creator for an acceptable identity. 

Heritage, however, depends on the prevalent social norms of the day, which (1) if marked by 

intolerance, support the heritage of the dominant group, and (2) if promoting inclusion, keep the 

governing elites in check. It is the responsibility of the heritage professional to work towards 

brokering pluralistic collective heritage in the public domain that provides grounds for integration, 

rather than separation, of all members of society. 

Whereas, theoretically, it is easy to argue in favor of pluralism, reality presents many, 

seemingly insurmountable obstacles to a holistic heritage interpretation. Vicious nationalism and 

stubborn determination to keep a single master narrative in place among previously subjugated 

nations or young democracies can be particularly crippling to inclusiveness. In Bulgaria, as in other 

nation-states, the definition of nationalism is effectively reduced to narod, meaning that nation and 

people are one and the same thing. This entails the restrictive equalization of the nation-state with 

the values and sentiments of the dominating ethno-cultural majority in blatant disregard to the needs 

of diverging groups. This sort of ideology, which has historically been a powerful tool to assimilate 

the Pomaks, is very much alive and working in Bulgaria. As a result, efforts to promote a Pomak 

heritage – one that is separate from the ethnic Bulgarian (Christian) narrative – in the official public 

domain have consistently turned into frustration for interested professionals as well as amateur 

enthusiasts. 

and, moreover, excluded from the narrative. An imbalanced interpretation would, thus, automatically alienate 

part of the public sector. The same would hold true for American Southerners if an interpreter decides to 

present the Civil War fundamentally as a war against slavery. 

285

As culture is the lifeblood of every identifiable human group, however, people need identity 

and sense of rootedness to achieve fulfilling existence. The Pomaks—as well as other similar 

communities—feel the need to establish a heritage that will provide them with a stable sense of self. 

Having been consistently denied access into the official domain, they have sought other outlets to 

express themselves. A curious phenomenon is happening lately. The inability to freely promote the 

culture as Pomak via publications, museum exhibits, cultural sites, and narratives has prompted a 

growing number of people to use the World Wide Web to voice their opinion and express their 

creativity. Passionate heritage amateurs have created websites, opened forums, published 

photographs and stories, and formed interest groups to keep in touch and exchange information 

nation- and region-wide regarding Pomak identity and culture. Considering the continuing and 

unfortunate censorship of Pomak identity in Bulgaria, it seems almost miraculous to me to simply 

Google “Pomak,” “Ribnovo” and suchlike terms to be able to read stories about the revival process or 

see a myriad photographs of exquisitely decorated Ribnovo brides, including on informally 

established Pomak heritage websites. 

My own contribution to this surging heritage activism is this dissertation. Because Pomak 

culture has much to offer in the way of enrichment and nothing in the way of harm, I made it a 

personal mission to work for its survival and promotion, starting with a dissertation research. 

Whereas the lack of reliable literature on the subject matter inevitably cost me much initial 

frustration, it ultimately proved a blessing. As early as my preliminary research, I encountered so 

many good stories in the form of fascinating personalities, traditions, and events that it would have 

been extremely disheartening had I been forced to concentrate on one instead of five narratives. But 

even as I expand from the legendary Salih Aga of the Ottoman past to the colorful Ribnovo wedding 

today and from the 1912 pokrastvane to the communist revival process, I have barely scratched the 

surface of what is yet to be defined as Pomak heritage. Doubtlessly, historians, ethnographers, and 

folklorists will find Pomak culture to be an endless source of fascination and enjoyment once they 

have won the hearts of their target communities. For me, however, the issue of exploring Pomakness 

has a deeply personal dimension, too. 

286

Beyond fulfilling academic obligations, this research has enabled me to make sense of 

childhood memories as well as of my own perception of self and belonging. Growing up and into 

young adulthood, I remember being utterly uneasy to declare myself a Pomak. The discomfort came 

not from some shameful past or unclean identity of the collectivity of Pomak people. Rather, it 

originated in Bulgarian nationalism and the brutal propaganda that accompanied the nation-state’s 

struggle for self-determination following the country’s independence from Ottoman rule in 1878. In 

the late nineteenth- and early twentieth century, my native Bulgaria was still a fledgling national 

state just emerging from the chaos of the disintegrating Ottoman realm. Forced into a savage 

competition for land and resources with other newly forming Balkan states, Bulgaria had to quickly 

forge a national identity to survive. Since Bulgaria defined itself as a Christian nation, 18 it waved the 

banner of anti-Muslimness to distinguish itself from its former Islamic Ottoman “oppressor” and to 

stake its own claim to dignified existence. One speedy and effective way to that end was the 

assimilation of the Pomaks, who spoke the Bulgarian language, compactly inhabited the disputed 

realm of the Rhodope Mountains, but problematically professed the Islamic faith. The leaning to 

convert the Rhodopean Muslims to Eastern Orthodox Christianity, therefore, became a determined 

policy almost immediately. Accordingly, state ideology duly labeled the Pomaks “pure-blood” 

Bulgarians to justify the conversion, as if identity ran in the DNA and not in historical circumstances. 

Thus, from Ottoman Muslims until the Balkan Wars of 1912-1914, the Pomaks became “Bulgarians” 

overnight, and they were hard pressed to switch religious affiliation in order to fit their new label. 

Whereas the Balkan Wars pokrastvane was the first sustained religious conversion of 

Pomaks in Bulgaria, it was only the beginning of a long and grueling process of cultural assimilation. 

The legacy of religious suppression and forced name changing made a derogatory term of the 

appellation “Pomak,” explaining it to mean “pomachen,” i.e. “tortured” into becoming Muslim. 

Thus, from a name describing the collectivity of Slavic (Bulgarian)-speaking people of the Islamic 

19 

18 Not unlike its neighbors Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania. 

19 It is a widely known thesis; freely floating within Bulgaria’s public domain, and still vigorously defended in the 

official historiography despite the lack of evidence to suggest that the Pomaks were ever forced to convert to 

Islam (see Chapter II for details). 

287

faith in the Rhodopes, “Pomak” came to be associated with ‘descendants of Bulgarian Christians who 

had been forcedly Islamized by the Turks,’ as if “Bulgarian” was some pre-existing identity. Moreover, 

with the later revival process, Pomak not only became synonymous with “tortured,” but also 

developed the damning connotation of “traitorous.” That is, because of their stubborn resistance to 

the forced assimilation, the Pomaks were gradually assigned a kind of collective guilt for the 

presumed failure of their “forefathers” to die for the Christian faith instead of succumbing to Islam. 

These two words, therefore - “tortured” and “traitorous” - held the key to my (and other people’s) 

uneasiness to call themselves Pomak. I used to feel – rather, I was made to feel, as so many still are – a 

profound sense of shame for belonging to a people who had turned themselves into historical 

outcasts because of spinelessness and blatant inability to stand up for their cultural heritage. But 

even believing so, I was struggling with a dilemma: ‘If the Pomaks could succumb to Islamization so 

easily, how is it that they have not reconciled to Bulgarianization (to be understood forced 

assimilation) yet?’ As this dissertation points out, they did not succumb in the sense, which Bulgarian 

nationalism puts into the term. Rather, Rhodopean accepted conversion for various reasons. In later 

years, albeit belatedly, Bulgarian historians have begun to concede that conversions to Islam across 

the Ottoman Balkans were voluntary rather than forced. Ottoman subjects of various cultural and 

religious backgrounds adopted Islam for prestige and socio-political opportunity prior to the 

nineteenth century, because – contrary to the Romantic nationalism’s propaganda – they lacked a 

sense of national belonging. Thus, Greek, Bulgarian, or Serbian national identity was only cultivated 

in the nineteenth century when the ideology of nationalism penetrated the Balkans and imbued the 

subjugated Christian populations of the Ottoman Empire with aspirations for independent 

statehood. 20 

Considering that the community of Bulgarian-speaking Christians within the Ottoman 

Empire only developed a collective self-consciousness in the later nineteenth century, could the 

Pomaks feel Bulgarian in the seventeenth century, when their purported Islamization occurred? Is it 

possible to talk about Bulgarianness at all before such national identity even existed? Can one be 

20 See the relevant sections of Chapters II and III. 

288

traitorous to a national identity or culture even before one has one? Quite simply, the whole 

contemporary debate about Pomak identity is a modern predicament generated in the age of 

nationalism and driven by the nascent nation-state’s need to affirm sovereignty. The problem, 

however, lies not in the need – or even innate right – of the nation-state to survive, but in its inability 

to give up its coercive practices long after the need has been met and stable national society has been 

established. In the modern world of democracy and plurality, it no longer makes sense to practice 

counterproductive coercion. Yet, the exclusion of Pomak identity from the public domain in Bulgaria 

remains remarkably aggressive. Because it is narrowly defined to mean the community’s rejection of 

their Bulgarian origins, the concept “Pomak” is simply unacceptable outside the official discourse of 

Bulgarian heritage. Ironically, this stance stems not from a legitimate concern for fragmentation of 

the national identity – for nothing is more contributive to it than forced assimilation – but from the 

irrational fear of losing control if plurality gains acceptance. Such fragile state of national selfconfidence, 

however, is consistent with the nation-state’s history of subjugation, authoritarian 

(communist) government, and lack of democratic traditions. 

Above fulfilling academic, professional, or moral requirements, this dissertation has given 

me the courage to explore my cultural roots without cringing at the thought of what I might find out 

there or how my conclusions would be received in an environment of still fervent nationalism. The 

goal of this study throughout has not been to maliciously antagonize peoples and narratives, but to 

put across the message that everyone’s heritage counts; that everyone should be able to explore, 

maintain, and preserve their identity in a dignified and constructive way without fear of censorship 

or retribution. Insofar as I believe that fashioning one’s outlook is first and foremost one’s own 

prerogative, I also claim that a group’s identity should be the group’s own domain before it is 

someone else’s. In other words, the Pomaks – or any community anywhere, for that matter – need 

not be told what to think of themselves. 

289

APPENDICES 

Appendix 2.1: 

Pomak population in the Provinces Thrace and Macedonia during the Balkan Wars 

Province of Thrace 

District 

Number of towns, villages, and 

hamlets 


Ahı Çelebi 32 35,000 

Dövlen 30 26,810 

Egridere 24 20,000 

Darıdere 26 16,990 

Gümürcina 34 10,625 

Xanti 6 4,500 

Koşukavak 13 3,757 

Soflu(?) 7 3,570 

Baba Eski 5 3,385 

Hayrobolu 7 3,205 

Üzünküprü 11 1,200 

Total 195 129,042 1 

Province of Macedonia 

District 

Number of towns, villages, and 

hamlets 


Nevrokop 74 26,962 

Drama 31 11,179 

Kavala 6 2,710 

Razlog 7 8,870 

Petriç 3 865 

Melnik 3 700 

Eski Cumaya 6 3,900 

Doyran 2 1,270 

Total 132 56,456 2 

1 Stoyu Shishkov, Balgaro-mohamedanite (Pomatsite) /The Bulgarian Mohammedans (Pomaks)/ (Plovdiv, 1936), 

32-34. 

2 Ibid., 30-31. 

290

Appendix 2.2: 

Report of Pazardjik activists for Pomak conversion to Archbishop Maxim 

It was not easy to make compromise with our consciousness in order to decide that we have 

to persuade the ignorant Pomaks that through the faith we hope to achieve their Bulgarianization. 

This courageous idea was born in the mind of one of our activists, Todor Iv. Mumdjiev. From the very 

beginning of the mobilization (October 10, 1912), he wrote a long letter to His Excellency the 

Archbishop of Plovdiv, Maxim, signed by ten people, his co-ideologists, among which the town’s 

mayor Iv. Koprivshki, Iv. Voyvodov, and others. ... 

[As a result of our initiative], a population of about 150,000 people was delivered to the 

Bulgarian Orthodox Church, and to the Bulgarian nation. ... 

Several days after the above [Mumdjiev’s] letter was sent, there was a convention of citizens [in 

Pazardjik], inclusive of those who signed the letter [a total of 22 people signed it, among which were 

6 teachers, 4 merchants, 4 lawyers, 2 soldiers, one engineer, one student, one retiree, one banker, one 

mayor, an one person with unspecified profession], where they decided to organize the “Committee 

for Assistance of the Newly-Converted Christians;” the Committees’ purpose is to popularize and 

spread the idea for Christianizing the Pomaks. ... The committee decided to start the realization of 

this goal by converting of the Pomaks in Chepino first. ... 

[L]ed by priest Konstantin Koev, our co-ideologists embarked on a mission trip through the 

Chepino region to propagate the idea of pokrastvane. Just because they were asked to consider 

whether it would not be in their best interest to convert to Christianity voluntarily, some fanatics 

(about 10-20 households) along with their families fled to Peshtera; some even traveled to Sofia and 

Plovdiv to complain to the authorities and foreign consuls. 

... Meanwhile, however, in each village our co-ideologists managed to organize themselves in 

the so-called local committees for conversion. On the appointed day [29 December 1912], we 

marched into [the village of] Ladjene where we encountered a convention of local mayors and other 

leading Pomaks from neighboring villages gathered to hear us. 

... Mumdjiev spoke first . ... [He told them] ... that the Qur’an obstructs their progress, that 

their forefathers had been Islamized by force, ... that the faith of Mohammed resembles a tattered 

coat which cannot warm the soul and soften the heart; that Christianity brings high moral values and 

gives freedom of conscious; that they are a compact mass of about 300,000 who speak the pure 

Bulgarian language so dear to us; that their folklore is ours, and so on. ... 

Molla Mustafa Kara-Mehmedov from Rakitovo spoke on behalf of the Pomaks – a wealthy, 

intelligent, sixty-years old person, who had served as a district councilor and who can read Bulgarian 

excellently. He literally said the following, ‘Gentlemen, what the people from Pazardjik said is just; 

but what can be done when there are 2,000 behind us (speaking of his village) who are simple and 

ignorant people and they do not understand how they could change their faith. This seems to us like 

impenetrable forest, how can we found our way out of it? Anything is possible, but we ask to be 

allowed some time?’ To that, the people, the audience objected: ‘We have been waiting for you 35 

years to become Bulgarians and you have not; if the Turks were to invade us now, you would rise to 

massacre us, as you did in Batak. ... You must convert now.’ 

... It was decided that the conversion would be done en mass, not village by village, or family 

by family; the Pomaks themselves wished it that way... 

On the day of baptism, the entire population of Ladjene and Kamenitsa was gathered together in 

order to facilitate the job of the conversion activists, as well as to stimulate the Pomaks to select their 

godfathers and godmothers [from among the Christians]. By 3 pm that day all petitions for 

conversion addressed to the Archbishop [of Plovdiv, Maxim] were signed, and many [Pomaks] 

already had their religious advisors selected. When all were announced for conversion, the men and 

their families were urged to go to the river for baptism and prayer. ... 

The soldiers, who helped collect the population, had been stationed in these villages from 

mobilization time when they had disarmed the Pomaks in order to prevent them from doing damage 

to the Bulgarian troops. These soldiers performed their task admirably. More than 1,300 people 

[Muslims] were present for the baptism. ... 

291

...We had brought several trunks full of hats for the men and boys, and brand new 

headscarves for the women. Priest Koev preached about Christianity, Mumdjiev talked about the 

social-political benefits of accepting Christianity, and Ushev told the story of how the Pomak were 

forced to Islamize. 

... But none [of the Pomaks] ventured to come first; then their godfathers and godmothers 

came forward and in a few minutes only all fezzes were replaced by hats, and all yashmaks – by 

headscarves. ... 

The ceremony of baptism concluded with kissing the cross, kissing the priest’s hand, and 

sprinkling them with water. Personal congratulations followed, then every family went home; the 

Bulgarians left for their villages, too. 

Some of the women teachers were tireless in spreading the new ideas among the women ... 

Committees of 15-20 individuals consisting of men and intelligent misses began house-to-house 

visits on the following day asking the new Christians to select their new names. To assist the 

committees in their name-replacing campaign, the godfathers and godmothers of the new converts 

accompanied them. ... 

The former mosques were converted into churches, chapels, or Sunday schools. Photographs 

were made of the baptizing in Rakitovo, Banya, and Ladjene 

... In Rakitovo, the photographs captured the moments when the converts were sprinkled 

with water, and when they were kissing the cross and the priest’s hand; the Bulgarian women were 

helping the Pomak women to take off their yashmaks and put on the headscarves, all the while 

teaching them how to do it; the children competed with one another for a better hat. The crowd, 

including the new converts, saluted the general, the local governor, and shouted three times, ‘Long 

live the King and Great Bulgaria.’ ... 

The ceremony of baptism went in the following way: the whole family approached the kupel 

[vessel with holy water]; they denounced the Mohammedan faith; the priest then poured holy water 

over the father and mother’s heads, and sprinkle some in their children’s faces. Then a prayer was 

said, followed by announcement of the converts’ new names, at which moment the priest performed 

the sign of the cross on them by placing the crucifix on the foreheads, chests, and two arms of the 

converts. ... 

...The ceremony of baptism took place in the temples ... or in the premises of former mosques 

that had been converted to chapels. ... 

Both good and bad reactions came as a result of our initiative. But our conscience is at peace, because 

we did not admit casualties or violence to take place. Up to date, 32 weddings in the village of Banya 

and 20 – in Rakitovo have happened among the new Christians and they have been performed in the 

Christian tradition. 

... [A]n association “Brotherly Love” was founded in the village of Ladjene for the purpose of 

the moral, religious, cultural, and material uplifting of the new Christians in Chepino. 3 

3 Confidential report of the Pazardjik activists on Pomak conversion to the Holy Synod, to Archbishop Maxim of 

Plovdiv, and to several Ministries, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture and 

Forestry, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice, The Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of War, and 

others from 22 February 1913. National Archives-Plovdiv, Fond 67 к, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 107, pages 79- 

85. (Velichko Georgiev and Stayko Trifonov, eds., Pokrastvaneto na Bulgarite Mohamedani 1912-1913 /The 

Christianization of the Bulgarian Mohammedans 1912-1913/ (Sofia: Prof. Marin Drinov Publ., 1995), 157-71.) 

292

Appendix 2.3: 

Excerpts from the Carnegie Report on the Balkan Wars, 1914 

1) Appendix A, No.7, Testimony of Ali Riza Effendi from the Kukush: 

... [He] states that the Bulgarian bands entered Kukush on October 30 [1913], after the Turks 

had left. Toma of Istip, their leader, installed himself as governor, and told the people to have no fear. 

Both Ser[b]ian and Bulgarian detachments passed through the town, but only a very few soldiers 

were left there while the main army went on to Salonica. After the occupation of Salonica, disarmed 

Turkish [Muslim] soldiers in groups of two to three hundred at a time marched through Kukush on 

their way to their homes. They were captured by the Bulgarian bands and slaughtered, to the number 

of perhaps 2,000. A commission of thirty to forty Christians was established, which drew up lists of 

all the Moslem inhabitants throughout the district. Everyone was summoned to the mosque and 

there informed that he had been rated to pay a certain sum. Whole villages were made responsible 

for the total amount; most of the men were imprisoned and were obliged to sell everything they 

possessed, including their wives' ornaments, in order to pay the ransom. They were often killed in 

spite of the payment of the money in full; he, himself, actually saw a Bulgarian comitadji cut off two 

fingers of a man's hand and force him to drink his own blood mixed with raki [alcoholic beverage]. 

From the whole county (Caza) of Kukush £1,500 were taken. The chief of bands, Donchev, arrived 

and matters were still worse. He burnt three Turkish [Muslim] villages in one day, Raianovo, Planitsa 

and Kukurtovo— 345 houses in all. He shut up the men in the mosques and burnt them alive; the 

women were shut up in barns and ill used; children were actually flung against the walls and killed. 

This the witness did not see, but heard from his Christian neighbors. Only twenty-two Moslem 

families out of 300 remained in Kukush; the rest fled to Salonica. Twelve small Moslem villages were 

wiped out in the first war, the men killed and the women taken away. He was in Kukush when the 

Greeks entered it. The Bulgarians in leaving the town burnt nothing but the bakers' ovens. The 

Greeks systematically and deliberately plundered and burnt the town. He believes that many aged 

Bulgarian inhabitants were burnt alive in their houses. He himself found refuge in the Catholic 

orphanage. 4 

2) Appendix A, No.8, “Report Signed by Youssouf Effendi, President of the Moslem Community of Serres, 

and sealed with its seal,” 

... On November 6, 1912, the inhabitants of Serres, sent a deputation to meet the Bulgarian 

army and surrender the town. Next day Zancov, a Bulgarian Chief of bands, appeared in the town 

with sixteen men, and began to disarm the population. A day later the Bulgarian army entered Serres 

and received a warm welcome. That evening the Bulgarian soldiers, on the pretext that arms were 

still hidden in the houses of the Moslems, entered them and began to steal money and other 

valuables. Next day the Moslem refugees from the district north of Serres were invited to appear at 

the prefecture; they obeyed the summons; but on their arrival a trumpet sounded and the Bulgarian 

soldiers seized their arms and began to massacre these inoffensive people; the massacre lasted three 

hours and resulted in the death of 600 Moslems. The number of the victims would have been 

incalculable had it not been for the energetic intervention of the Greek bishop, and of the director of 

the Orient bank. 

The Moslems of the town were then arrested in the cafes, houses and streets, and 

imprisoned, some at the prefecture and others in the mosques; many of the former were slaughtered 

with bayonets. Bulgarian soldiers in the meantime entered Turkish houses, violated the women and 

girls and stole everything they could lay their hands on. The Moslems imprisoned in the overcrowded 

mosques were left without food for two days and nights and then released. For six days rifle shots 

4 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the 

Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars” (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1914), 

280. 

293

were heard on all sides; the Moslems were afraid to leave their houses; and of this the Bulgarian 

soldiers took advantage to pillage their shops. Moslem corpses lay about in the streets and were 

buried only when they began to putrefy. ... In a word, during the Bulgarian occupation the Moslems 

were robbed and maltreated both in the streets and at the prefecture, unless they had happened to 

give board and lodging to some Bulgarian officer. The Bulgarian officers and gendarmes before 

leaving Serres took everything that was left in the shops of Moslems, Jews and Greeks, and pitilessly 

burnt a large number of houses, shops, cafes, and mills. 

September 5, 1913. 5 

5 Ibid., 280-81. 

294

Appendix 3.1: 

Broken Tombstones 

Muslim tombstones in the village of Valkossel (Western Rhodopes), broken down in the 1970s and 1980s 

and stashed in the corner of a cemetery. The stone inscriptions are in Ottoman Turkish expressed 

through the Arabic alphabet, which was the standard script of the Ottoman Empire. 

Photo 1 

Photo 2 

Photo 3 

295

Photo 4 

296

Appendix 3.2A: 

Applications for emigration submitted by Pomaks 

Year 

1989 

As of June 

15 th 

NUMBER OF APPLICATION TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY SUBMITTED BY BULGARIAN- 

MOHAMEDANS 6 

Total 

number for 

the country 

Varna 

Region 

Razgrad 

Region 

Burgass 

Region 

Haskovo 

Region 

50,608 20,592 27,983 84 

Sofia – City 

and 

Region 

On June 15 th 8,631 3,470 3,603 52 

On June 16 th 8,252 2,444 4,069 26 

On June 17 th 5,400 - [no data] 

- [no data] 

On June 18 th 89,148 3.396 - [no data] 10,594 - [no data] 

On June 19 th 8,980 3,235 1,842 3,414 62 

On June 20 th 10,577 5,301 1,260 3,508 57 

On June 21 st 10,727 4,217 2,412 3,115 35 

On June 22 nd 13,110 4,349 3,927 4,627 56 

On June 23 rd 9,259 3,881 196 4,148 25 

On June 24 th 3,034 2,976 - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] 

On June 25 th - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] 

On June 26 th 10, 482 76 1,763 318 7,702 43 

On June 27 th 9,899 - [no data] 3,438 299 5,422 8 




On July 1 st 176 - [no data] 80 60 - [no data] - [no data] 

On July 2 nd - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] 

On July 3 rd 6,324 97 2,890 2,994 11 

On July 4 th 5,402 - [no data] 2,436 123 2,643 19 

On July 5 th 3,768 - [no data] 1,772 87 1,414 8 

Total as of 

July 6 th , 1989 370,291 89,321 124,543 42,438 97,194 539 

[Notice: There are no statistics available for the period prior to June 18 th , 1987, countrywide, and 

prior to June 22 nd , 1987, for Varna Region.] 

6 Statistical information of Bulgaria’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, No. I 3839 of July 7 th 1989, prepared for 

Lyubomir Shopov, a member of the central committee of the communist party. Central National Archives-Sofia. 

(There is no archival reference on the document.) 

297

Appendix 3.2B: 

Number of passports issued to Pomaks 

Year 

1989 

NUMBER OF PASSPORTS TO TRAVEL ABROAD ISSUED TO BULGARIAN-MOHAMEDANS 7 

Total 

number for 

the country 

Varna 

Region 

Razgra 

d 

Region 

Burgass 

Region 

Haskovo 

Region 

Sofia – City 

and 

Region 

174 

As of June 15 th 

On June 15 th 13 

On June 16 th 113,851 60,352 31, 298 6,900 11,768 28 

On June 17 th 

- [no data] 

On June 18 th 215 

On June 19 th 4,850 - [no data] 4,798 - [no data] - [no data] 52 

On June 20 th 73 - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] 51 

On June 21 st - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] 28 

On June 22 nd - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] 4 

On June 23 rd - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] 4 

On June 24 th - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] 

On June 25 th - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] 

On June 26 th - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] 61 

On June 27 th - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] 7 



On June 30 th 1,795 - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] 1 

On July 1 st 299 - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] 

On July 2 nd - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] 

On July 3 rd 1,009 - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] 

On July 4 th 1,612 - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] 

On July 5 th 1,230 - [no data] - [no data] - [no data] 27 

Total as of July 

6 th , 1989 

125,441 60,352 6,900 11,768 460 

7 Ibid. 

298

Appendix 3.2C: 

Statistics on Pomak Immigration 

Year 

1989 

NUMBER OF BULGARIAN-MOHAMEDANS THAT HAVE LEFT THE COUNTRY 8 

Total number 

for the 

country 

Varna 

Region 

Razgrad 

Region 

Burgass 

Region 

Haskovo 

Region 

As of June 

15 th 23,192 

On June 15 th 4,516 


16,755 12,911 5,134 11,383 13 





On June 21 st 4,772 1,512 1,264 760 959 4 

On June 22 nd 4,943 1,894 1,281 529 867 4 

On June 23 rd 4,694 2,027 1,205 211 687 16 

On June 24 th 4,479 2,051 1,444 385 495 9 

On June 25 th 4,331 2,059 1,360 77 615 4 

On June 26 th 4087 1,863 1,115 26 903 13 

On June 27 th 4,313 1,914 1,170 60 838 6 

On June 28 th 4,420 1,236 1,622 399 1,017 8 

On June 29 th 4,707 743 1,467 768 1,381 2 

On June 30 th 5,038 747 1,499 555 1,960 0 

On July 1 st 3,570 461 1,412 662 940 0 

On July 2 nd 2,980 335 1,036 308 1,074 5 

On July 3 rd 3,666 920 1,615 513 558 0 

On July 4 th 3,363 447 789 478 1,441 11 

On July 5 th 5,155 1,350 1,102 816 1,644 4 

Total as of 

July 6 th , 1989 111,336 36,314 32,197 11,681 26,662 99 

Sofia – 

City 

and 

Region 

8 Ibid. 

299

Appendix 3.3: 

Statistics on Zagrajden Municipality 

The following charted statistics, collected by the regime, for the municipality of Zagrajden, Smolyan 

Region, provides an interesting insight into the reality of the years 1969, 1970 and 1971. In 

particular, the charts include statistics on population size, number of people with changed names, 

typical industries of Pomak employment, household appliances acquired by Pomak families, 

education, as well as number of exiled individuals from the region: 

Chart 3.3.1 9 

Permanent population of Zagrajden Municipality as of 31 October 1971 

Villages and hamlets Total Included in the total Included in the total are: 

number of are: 

Pomaks 

Turks 

people Men Women Men Women 

Zagrajden 1,056 518 538 516 534 6 

Valchan Dol 413 181 232 181 231 1 

Glogino 499 212 287 211 287 1 

Ribin Dol 606 296 310 231 259 116 

Hambar 348 164 184 164 184 - 

Dve Topoli 408 211 197 2 6 400 

Malko Krushevo 207 111 96 - 1 206 

Total: 3,537 1,693 1,844 1,305 1,502 730 

Total 2,807 

Chart 3.3.2a 10 

Number of People (children under one year of age excluded) with “Revived” Names 

Villages and 

hamlets 

1969 1970 As of Oct. 31, 1971 

Total 

number 

people 

Total 

number 

people 

Total 

number of 

people 

- of them 

with 

“revived” 

names 

- of them 

with 

“revived” 

names 

- of them 

with 

“revived” 

names 

Zagrajden 1,051 341 1,054 233 1,050 282 

Valchan Dol 428 34 423 46 412 206 

Glogino 495 86 503 48 498 203 

Ribin Dol 498 34 495 77 490 185 

Hambar 347 20 350 28 348 222 

Dve Mogili 9 - 9 - 9 1 

and M. 

Krushevo 

Total: 2,828 515 2,834 432 2,807 1,099 

9 Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 1Б, Inventory 38, Archival Unit 11, page 130. 

10 Ibid., 131-32. 

300

Chart 3.3.2b 11 

Villages and 

hamlets 

Number of Newborns Registered with Bulgarian (Christian) Names 

1969 1970 (As of Oct. 31) 1971 

Total 

number of 

Pomak 

newborns 

- of them 

with 

Bulgarian 

names 

Total 

number of 

Pomak 

newborns 

- of them 

with 

Bulgarian 

names 

Total 

number of 

Pomak 

newborns 

- of them 

with 

Bulgarian 

names 

Zagrajden 17 8 13 11 8 8 

Valchan Dol 4 2 12 9 3 3 

Glogino 7 1 10 7 8 8 

Ribin Dol 7 - 7 5 7 7 

Hambar 11 1 7 4 6 6 

Total: 46 12 49 36 32 32 

Chart 3.3.3 12 

Number of People Exiled from the Region 

Year 1969 1970 1971 

Number of People 45 29 19 

Chart 3.3.4 13 

Employment of the Pomaks 

Employment 

Sectors 

1969 1970 As of Oct. 31, 1971 

Men Women Men Women Men Women 

Industry 

Agriculture and Forestry 112 197 107 201 119 298 

Construction 27 

Retail 37 8 37 8 36 8 

Transportation 15 - 15 - 16 - 

Other non-production 50 25 48 24 46 28 

sectors [teachers, medical 

professionals, etc.] 

Total: 214 230 207 233 244 334 

Total number of 

unemployed people:* 

299 337 303 341 297 341 

11 Ibid., 130-31. 

12 Ibid., 138. 

13 Ibid., 133. 

301

[*Note: The statistics is for people who did not have salaried jobs, but otherwise worked the land given 

them by the state for private use, largely to grow tobacco.] 

Chart 3.3.5 14 

Villages 

and 

hamlets 

A. Education of the Pomaks as Oct.31, 1971 

High school Technical school College University 

Total 

number 

of 

people 

- of 

them 

employ 

-ed 

locally 

Total 

number 

of 

people 

- of them 

employed 

locally 

Total 

number 

of 

people 

- of them 

employed 

locally 

Total 

number 

of 

people 

- of them 

employed 

locally 

Zagrajden 27 24 38 31 2 2 2 2 

Valchan 4 3 7 5 2 2 1 1 

Dol 

Glogino 3 3 6 6 1 1 1 1 

Ribin Dol 5 4 3 2 - - - - 

Hambar 5 4 7 7 2 2 - - 

Total: 44 38 61 51 7 7 4 4 

A. Number of People Graduating by Academic Year 

Level of Education 1969/1970 School Year 1970/1971 School Year 1971/1972 School Year 

8 th grade 47 43 45 

High School 12 11 13 

Technical School 16 18 19 

College 3 5 9 

University 2 2 3 

Total: 80 79 89 

Chart 3.3.6 15 

Household Appliance Purchased by Pomaks 

Appliances 

Total Number of 

Appliances 1969 1970 As of Oct. 31, 1971 

TVs 132 58 29 32 

Radios 442 52 47 42 

Cassette players 37 7 11 17 

Refrigerators 102 15 35 19 

Electrical stoves 123 3 72 6 

Gas stoves 93 15 16 8 

Motorcycles 53 7 5 2 

Cars 2 1 1 - 

14 Ibid., 135. 

15 Ibid., 134. 

302

Mopeds 5 2 3 - 

Houses 427 4 6 8 

Furniture 431 70 127 21 

Radio transmitters 92 78 5 9 

Chart 3.3.7 16 

Pomaks with New Names and IDs in the Smolyan Region as of 15 August 1972 

Municipality 

Total number of 

people ELIGIBLE 

for IDs 

- of them 

supplied 

WITH new IDs 

People NOT 

supplied with 

new IDs yet 

Percentage (%) 

of those already WITH 

new IDs 

Devin 3,356 1,907 1,449 56.82% 

Zlatograd 5,260 3,270 1,990 62.16% 

Laki 1,751 1,500 251 85.66% 

Madan 3,118 1,650 1,468 52.91% 

Rudozem 2,216 920 1.296 41.51% 

Smolyan 4,280 3,339 941 78.01% 

Chepelare 1,053 980 73 93.06% 

Arda 1,080 730 350 67.59% 

Barutin 1,256 572 684 67.59% 

Breze 605 445 160 73.55% 

Bukovo 1,217 518 699 42.56% 

Varbina 2,920 1,020 1,900 34.93% 

Davidkovo 1,799 1,235 564 68.64% 

Dospat 1,502 540 962 35.95% 

Elhovets 1,840 704 1,136 38.26% 

Zagrajden 1,659 666 993 40.14% 

Zmeitsa 863 478 385 55.38% 

Zabardo 591 533 58 90.18% 

Ladja 2,530 1,671 859 66.04% 

Lyaskovo 805 605 200 75.15% 

Mihalkovo 415 235 180 56.62% 

Mugla 1,128 683 445 60.31% 

Mogilitsa 1,421 614 807 43.21% 

Nedelino 3,660 2,019 1,641 55.16% 

Petkovo 1,172 784 386 66.89% 

Slaveino 1,136 650 486 57.22% 

Sredets 1,149 316 833 27.50% 

Smilyan 1,806 1,618 188 89.59% 

Startsevo 1,300 700 600 53.85% 

Selcha 740 433 307 58.51% 

Trigrad 842 636 206 75.53% 

Taran 1,274 440 834 34.54% 

Chepintsi 1,143 454 689 39.72% 

Yagodina 981 578 403 59% 

16 Central National Archives-Sofia, Fond 1Б, Inventory 38, Archival Unit 16, pages 1?5-1?6 (? indicates 

unreadable number). 

303

Total 57,868 33,433 24,425 57.10% 

Chart 3.3.8 17 

STATISTICS 

“On the Descendants of Mohamedanized in the Past Bulgarians with Still Un-revived 

Bulgarian Names as of March 30 th , 1977” 18 

[Area] * 

[Number of people] 

1. Blagoevgrad 150 

2. Burgass 32 

3. Varna 5 

4. Veliko Tarnovo 32 

5. Vidin 17 

6. Kardjali 281 

7. Lovetch 230 

8. Pernik 16 

9. Plovdiv 1,705 

10. Razgrad 43 

11. Ruse 6 

12. Silistra 16 

13. Sliven 6 

14. Sofia – City 4,034 

15. Sofia – Region 2 

16. Stara Zagora 21 

17. Tolbuhin [Dobritch] 23 

18. Targovishte 58 

19. Haskovo 11 

20. Shumen 20 

Total 6,718 

Notice: The statistics is prepared by the Executive People’s Committees Commission at the Council of 

Ministers [of the Bulgarian Communist Party] 

*[Although it is not clear whether the statistics refers to the cities alone or to their respective 

municipal and/or regional areas, my assumption is that the data refer to the cities.] 


central committee from July 17 th , 1970, concerning the Pomak revival process. The document is dated May 8, 

1978, and numbered 005805, pages 60-80. Central National Archives-Sofia. (There is no archival reference on the 

document). 

18 Ibid., page 78. 

304

Appendix 6.1: 

Ballad about the killing of Salih Aga 1 

Such a summer arduous 

arduous and desperate 

never has been remembered 

never has been known. 

Summons after summons come 

from Stambol* – the great city 

news after news arrive 

from the Gümürcina** town 

from the governor of Gümürcina 

from the kadi*** of Geliboli. 

Salih Aga**** they instruct 

to do whatever he must 

to Gümürcina he is to depart 

to Stanbol he is to go 

before the King***** he is bow 

before the King and the Great Vizier. 

Laid Aga down and dozed off 

drifted into a deep sleep 

on the summer day of St. George. 

And saw he in a dream 

that clad he was in scarlet garments 

that he rode a dappled stallion 

in Paşmaklı****** he searched for water 

but a drop he never found 

his scorched lips to moisten 

his thirst to quench. 

Frightened Aga woke up 

and called for Strahina: 

”Strahine, my lieutenant, 

laid I here and dozed off, 

into a heavy sleep I drifted, 

but shortly I woke up. 

Go, Srahine, and bring me 

my brother Shishmana.” 

Hastily Shishman arrived 

and his brother he asked: 

“What has, Ago, happened? 

What have you, Ago, suffered?” 

“Limane, my brother, Shishmane, 

nothing has yet happened 

1 Recorded by Vassil Dechov, The Past of Chepelare 

(Sofia: Fatherland Front Pbl., 1928), 88-91. 

(Translated from Bulgarian by the author). 

nothing I’ve yet suffered, 

but something is coming upon me. 

Drifted I into a heavy slumber 

and saw I in my dream 

that I was clad in scarlet 

that I rode a dappled stallion 

that I roamed about roads 

but nowhere water I found. 

I’m asking you, brother Limane, 

Is it for good or not?” 

“It’s for good, Ago, for good; 

don’t you be troubled.” 

And still they talked together 

till news was to Aga delivered: 

that Tatar riders’ve been dispatched 

from Gümürcina town: 

“Last night they were in Palass 

tonight they’d be in Paşmaklı.” 

Drooped Aga his forehead 

and to Shishman he said: 

“Limane, my brother, Shishmane, 

you and I have quarreled 

let us, my brother, reconcile 

let us forgive each other.” 

And more words Aga uttered, 

more he Limana entreated, 

whilst Tatar horses trotted 

up stone-paved pathways, 

their hooves were puddles leaving 

and fire sparks were sending out. 

Tatars on the gates hammered 

off their horses they leapt 

boot-clad they walked in 

to the Aga they delivered a letter. 

When the messenger read the letter 

this was the Aga commanded: 

“Hurry up, Aga, be gone 

to the Gümürcina city, 

the King has favored you 

and the King’s name you must praise, 

for the King has sent to you, 

fine scarlet wool garment, 

a white tinsel waste-band 

and gold necklace, as tokens of favor.” 

305

Bowed Aga his forehead 

and to his sons he bespoke: 

“I know, my sons, I realize 

what are those gifts they give me 

what is that garment they send me 

what are those favors bestow on me. 

Get ready, my sons, be gone 

to the Gümürcina city 

I hope, my sons, you settle 

with the governor of Gümürcina 

with the kadi of Geliboli 

and with the Great Vizier. 

Ask they fine scarlet wool of you, 

you give them silk and tinsel. 

Ask they silver of you, 

you give them gold pieces.” 

“We went, Father, we implored, 

but empty-handed we return. 

Once was when money worked; 

this time it could not. 

It’s you, Father, they want; 

it’s you that must go 

to Gümürcina town, 

to Stambol, the great city, 

before the King you must kneel, 

before the King and his Vizier.” 

wept young shepherds 

up in the Mountains; 

mourned faithful guardians 

in the konak******** of Salih Aga; 

Imams for Salyo********* called 

from the tall minarets. 

Birds were flying and crying 

sorrowful songs of Salih Aga: 

“Slain lays, Salih Aga 

in Gümürcina town 

in the governor’s palace 

on these high balconies.” 

* Istanbul 

** Modern city of Xanti in Greece. 

*** From Turkish, judge. 

**** A term conferring the title of governor 

(local, regional, or provincial) in the Ottoman 

Empire. 

***** The Ottoman Sultan. 

****** Modern city of Smolyan in Bulgaria. 

******* The Rhodopes. 

******** From Turkish, palace. 

********* The chief Friday Prayer in Islam. 

Set out, Aga, to go 

to Gümürcina town 

with his faithful guardians 

and with many gold coins 

went he never to return... 

…. 

Birds he entrusted with these words: 

“Farewell you pass on from me 

to all up there, in the Mountain:******* 

farewell to my children, 

to my children and my people; 

Farewell to my shepherds, 

shepherds, also servicemen; 

farewell to my companions, 

companions and guardians. 

I am going far away 

and I won’t soon return.” 

Tidings of Aga reached 

Paşmaklı, the great township 

screamed fair women 

on high balconies 

cried little children 

in their cradles; 

306

Appendix 6.2 1 : 

Salih Aga’s Seal 

Ahı Çelebi Kaaza 

From the landowner, non-Muslim, is collected 

the tax “ispençe” 

/tax for landowning levied from non-Muslims/ 

Lord Salih 

1226 /Year 1810/ 

Salih, Lord of Ahı Çelebi 

/Seal on the back of the document/ 

May my deeds be as honorable as the name 

Salih is /“Pure one”/ 

Translated by: [Signature here] 

/Svetoslav Duhovnikov/ 

Note [by the translator]: This has been written 

by the hand of Salih Aga, Lord and Governor of 

Ahı Çelebi, because of which I translated it. 

1 The document is translated from Ottoman Turkish by Svetoslav Duhovnikov. Duhovnikov’s translation is 

enclosed under the actual text of the document, as well as under Salih’s seal on the back of it. National Archives- 

Smolyan, Fond 415k, Inventory 23, Archival Unit 52. 

307

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Shehov, Mehmed. Interview by author. Valkossel, Bulgaria. June 24, 2007. 

Terziev, Ivan. Interview by author. Smolya, Bulgaria. June 16, 2007. 

Osmanov Family (Feim, Fatme and their mother). Interview by author. Ribnovo, Bulgaria. 

March 7, 2009. 

Archival Materials: 

Central State (National) Archives-Sofia. Bulgarian Communist Party Collection. 

State (National) Archives-Plovdiv. The Petar Marinov Collection. 

State (National) Archives-Smolyan. The Ivan Peykov Collection. 

Video Materials: 

Safet Studio. Kadrie and Feim Hatip’s wedding of 12 February 2005 and of a second, unspecified 

wedding. Snapshots by the author. 

311

Sharena prikazka Ribnovo / Colorful Fairytale Ribnovo /. The bTV Reporters documentary. First 

broadcasted April 6, 2008. 

Websites: 

Kornitsa.com. 

Pomak.net. 

Rivnovo.com. 

Photographs: 

The Cesur Family album. 

The Chavdarov Family album. 

The Dermendjiev Family album. 

The Drevel Family album. 

The Hadjiev Family album. 

The Myuhtar Family album. 

The Runtov/Kurucu Family album. 

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BULGARIAN-SPEAKING MUSLIMS - Lalev

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