Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...

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Bashar’s Syria 375from the person whose “portfolio” the subject belongs to. 51 Furthermore, the resultof these “consultations” under Bashar tends to be the adoption of a consensus. Thiswillingness to listen to different opinions seems to encourage competition among theelite for the ear of the president. This, too, strengthens those relatively new but nowsenior figures in the party who can manufacture a group consensus. In cases in whichthese officials also have executive powers delegated to them, they find themselvesoperating in the terra incognita of a decentralized regime and allow themselves totake actions that their predecessors would not have dared to contemplate in the daysof the senior Asad. In the Hafez al-Asad era, the various organs of the regime carried out the president’sorders out of a combination of personal loyalty, fear, deference to the wisdom ofhis decisions, and faith in the stability of the existing order. These components areconsiderably lower in regard to Bashar. The operational hierarchy does not owe himthe same loyalty that his father’s “gang” did and he lacks the aura of personal authoritythat makes subordinates obey orders even when they do not really understandthem. The faith in the future of the regime and the existing order has diminishedgreatly.With the fading of the old guard in Bashar’s regime and the integration of youngertechnocrats, some of the bureaucratic psychology in the regime has changed and opened thedoor for more internal debate. However, while the inner circle has changed, the “intelligenceculture” of the Syrian has not. Therefore, while Bashar has expressed his belief that Syrianeeds to revamp its bureaucracy, he has taken no steps to create an autonomous nationalsecurity mechanism. At the same time, none of the present heads of the security or militaryapparatuses have relations with Bashar that come close to the intimacy that his father hadwith his confidantes. The turnover of senior officials in key positions is indicative of thissituation. Unlike his father, Bashar has no personal relationship with most of his advisors.This limits the influence of many of these advisors on the President at any given time or onany specific issue.As a result, Bashar’s capability to implement his decisions—such as they are—isconsiderably less than his father had. According to one count, by the end of 2003 Bashar hadpersonally issued as president no less than 1900 decrees, laws, and administrative orders;most have been ignored or blocked by the Ba’th party bureaucracy. Examples includeBashar’s decree (June 2003) to grant individual amnesty to exiled oppositionists, whichremained a dead letter, blocked by the Mukhabarat; and Decision 408, mentioned above,which calls for separation of the party apparatus from that of the state, and which had noreal impact. If anything, the role of the party apparatus in running the state has grown,and the decision to return lands that were expropriated in the agrarian reforms of the earlydays of the Ba’th regime were blocked by the party (to whose members the lands had beentransferred).It is noteworthy that among Bashar’s younger civilian advisors and top Ba’th figures inthe Regional Command, there are no conspicuous experts on international affairs or strategy.This remains the fiefdom of the military establishment. Nevertheless, the changes in Syria’sstrategic posture from the late president’s circumspect brinkmanship and tendency to hedgehis bets when having to rely on other Arab (or any other) allies to Bashar’s embracing ofIraq, Iran, and Hezbollah as Syria’s “strategic hinterland” indicates influences other thanthose of the old guard.Five years after Bashar came to power, the “generation factor” has become less pivotal.The incumbent leadership and bureaucracy is, for the most part, appointed by Bashar and,
376 S. Barexcept for those with family, economic or tribal power bases of their own, beholden to himfor their status. But even the relatively independent status of these “oligarchs” is regimedependent. Unlike many of the “oligarchs” of the former Soviet Union (and the presentRussian leadership), who had metamorphosed from Soviet nomenklatura to post-Sovietleaders and oligarchs, the Syrian elite is well aware that in case of regime change “‘á laMiddle East,” they stand little chance of surviving as an elite (or even surviving physically),either collectively or individually. This understanding underlines the sense of “hang togetheror hang separately” within the regime.The ostensibly objective factors of resources (economy) and geopolitics are interpreteddifferently by various figures in the elite and these differences have a bearing on the entiredecision-making process. Many of the elite see a healthier economy as a sine qua non forregime resilience and survival and therefore call for economic reforms. Others point outthat Syria muddled through the entire Hafez al-Asad era with a sick economy, subordinatingeconomic considerations to those of regional politics (to achieve a strong regional statusfor Syria), domestic control, and elite cohesion (by providing economic perquisites to theelite and denying them to the general public).The predominance of regional politics also is debated. While some see Syrian regionalrelevance as a necessary condition for creating regional and international interest in thesurvival of the regime, others claim that Syria’s regional involvement (in Lebanon, and Iraq,and with the Palestinians) is actually counterproductive to the survival of the regime. Theprice of Syria’s support for Palestinian terrorism, Lebanese instability and Iraqi insurgency,they claim, far outweighs their benefits as tools for maintaining Syria’s regional status.It appears that this debate is integrated into the day-to-day decision-making process inDamascus.As a result, the “reading” of communications arriving from foreign powers (includingthe U.S.) is deeply colored by the composition of the people advising Bashar whenthe communication is dealt with. While the Syrian ambassadors in Washington and Londonare Bashar’s appointees, there is little indication that their reporting or advice carriesenough weight to counterbalance the combined advice of the people surrounding Basharin Damascus. 52 The regime’s incompetence in reading strategic conditions was manifestedin its behavior toward the Mehlis report. 53 There is no doubt that during the process ofthe Mehlis inquiry, the regime saw it and UNSC 1559 as no more than ploys for puttingpressure on Syria. It did not understand that it was incrementally losing its legitimacy andallowing the U.S. to set the stage for even harsher sanctions.Bashar, however, has retained one trait of his father’s policies: an aversion to directmilitary confrontation with Israel. This aversion was amply demonstrated when escalationbetween Israel and Hezbollah in the Har Dov/Shab’a area 54 between the Golan Heightsand Lebanon threatened to spill over into an Israeli–Syrian confrontation. Each time thatpossibility appeared, Asad took care not to respond, even to Israeli bombing of Syrianmilitary sites and a Palestinian training camp near Damascus.Decision making, of course, is only a point on a vector beginning with collection andanalysis of information regarding important issues and ending in implementation of thedecisions. The process under Bashar is weak not only in the first stage (collecting correctinformation) and in the decision making itself (weighing contingencies and consequences,hedging risks, and mapping courses) but also in the implementation of decisions.Hafez al-Asad was probably best known for his tough negotiating tactics—long hoursof meetings without any breaks, filibuster monologues on the history of the region, andrefusal to speak any language other than Arabic. He was, however, also known for hisreliability once an agreement was concluded.
Page 4 and 5: Bashar’s Syria 355of political im
Page 8 and 9: Bashar’s Syria 359a-Zur province
Page 11: 362 S. Barof Lebanon, with which Sy
Page 17 and 18: 368 S. Barnaturally come with the s
Page 19 and 20: 370 S. BarSimilar behavior on the p
Page 21 and 22: 372 S. Bardemocracy” must be foun
Page 23: 374 S. Barcultural, political and m
Page 27 and 28: 378 S. Barthe provisions for nonpro
Page 29 and 30: 380 S. Bar The ups and downs in rel
Page 31 and 32: 382 S. Barfamily is also linked by
Page 33 and 34: 384 S. Bar2. The “second generati
Page 35 and 36: 386 S. BarThe reformist trend withi
Page 37 and 38: 388 S. Barwould allow the younger g
Page 39 and 40: 390 S. BarFigure 3. Heads of the Sy
Page 41 and 42: 392 S. Bar Disruption of the “hie
Page 43 and 44: 394 S. Bar(Majlis Milli), composed
Page 45 and 46: 396 S. Bar Other prominent Syrians
Page 47 and 48: 398 S. BarSyrian civil society—su
Page 49 and 50: 400 S. BarMany of the Muslim Brothe
Page 51 and 52: 402 S. BarThese elements find reson
Page 53 and 54: 404 S. BarIran’s proxy, Hezbollah
Page 55 and 56: 406 S. BarWest—and specifically t
Page 57 and 58: 408 S. BarBashar is well aware that
Page 59 and 60: 410 S. BarBashar did not read these
Page 61 and 62: 412 S. Bartoken withdrawal while ma
Page 63 and 64: 414 S. Barlegitimacy had eroded. Ne
Page 65 and 66: 416 S. Barin the wake of the al-Har
Page 67 and 68: 418 S. BarIt was Russia, however, t
Page 69 and 70: 420 S. Baror so, with competitive p
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Page 73 and 74: 424 S. Bar44. See Flynt Everett, In
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426 S. Barinternet news site, all4s
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428 S. Bar100. As one Sunni Syrian
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430 S. Bar125. Radio Damascus, 21 O
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432 S. BarBengio, Ofra and Gabriel
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434 S. BarNews agencies and Newspap
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Regional Command;Central CommitteeR
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Main Figures in the Syrian Ba’th
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Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...

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