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Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...

Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...

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388 S. <strong>Bar</strong>would allow the younger generation to come to the fore, <strong>and</strong> for “self-criticism,” purgingthe party of “flaws, exploitation, <strong>and</strong> interests” <strong>and</strong> of those who had “harmed the party<strong>and</strong> the public morality <strong>and</strong> have contributed to the creation of an image unbecoming to theparty due to their personal or family behavior <strong>and</strong> due to their lack of integrity.” 78Despite the disappointment of the elections, the Congress was preceded by rumorsthat it would make “courageous decisions” <strong>and</strong> Bashar’s own declaration that the Congresswould be “the greatest leap in the history of <strong>Syria</strong>.” <strong>The</strong> Congress was expected to dealparticularly with the bleak domestic scene, 79 though it was also widely expected that theresolutions of the Congress would change the very essence of the party <strong>and</strong> of <strong>its</strong> holdon the regime. Some of the more far-reaching specific expectations that were voiced—including by delegates to the Congress included. 80 A new party law would permit: theformation of political parties outside of the NPF, as long as they are not based on “ethnicity,religion or regionalism” (i.e., neither Islamist nor Kurdish), <strong>and</strong> changing Article 8 of theconstitution, which defines the role of the Ba’th party in the state; 81 endorsement of freeparliamentary elections in 2007; granting citizenship to the 100,000 disenfranchised Kurdsin the Hasakah region; 82 abrogation of the state of emergency that has existed since 1963<strong>and</strong> of law 49 of 1980, which stipulates capital punishment for membership in the MuslimBrotherhood; changing the triple slogan of the party (Unity, Freedom, Socialism) to “Unity,Democracy, Social Justice” in a bid to gradually turn it into a “social democrat” party,along the lines of processes that Communist parties in the former Soviet bloc went through;dismantling the national (pan-Arab) leadership, <strong>and</strong> finally, changing the name of the partyto “<strong>The</strong> Ba’th Arab Socialist Party in the <strong>Syria</strong>n Region” (i.e. to downplay the pan-Arabideology of the party) or to the “Democratic (Ba’th) Party” (to emphasize the “democratic”character of the party), <strong>and</strong> defining the party as a “democratic socialist national (Qawmipan-Arabnational) political organization which struggles for achieving the great goals ofthe Arab Nation for Unity, Freedom <strong>and</strong> Socialism,” based on “the principles of citizenship<strong>and</strong> democracy <strong>and</strong> respect of human rights <strong>and</strong> implementation of justice among thecitizens.”<strong>The</strong>se expectations were, to a large extent, based on the assumption that Bashar was a“closet reformer” who could not show his true colors because of the interference of the “oldguard.” Many <strong>Syria</strong>ns expected the 10th Congress to imitate the 1996 conference of theSoviet Communist Party under Gorbachev. <strong>The</strong>se expectations were not unfounded; theytook their cue from Bashar’s own public statements <strong>and</strong> those of his confidants. 83 Most ofthe Ba’th reformers, though—<strong>and</strong> certainly the civil-society movement—had no illusionsthat they could achieve even some of those goals. <strong>The</strong>y realized that the goal of the partyleadership was “to repair—not to reform,” <strong>and</strong> that this should be done step by step <strong>and</strong> notby leaps <strong>and</strong> bounds. One informed source claims that the reformists intentionally spreadrumors about far-reaching reforms in order to create a level of expectation that would helpset the stage for further pressure on the regime after the Congress failed to deliver.<strong>The</strong> 10th Congress was not the doctrinal watershed that pre-Congress rumors hadprophesied. <strong>The</strong> Ba’th doctrine was not changed, but rather played down <strong>and</strong> relegated tominor reiterations of the original ideals of the party. Article 8 of the constitution <strong>and</strong> the“internal regime” remained in force <strong>and</strong> none of the reforms listed above were adopted.Arab unity is mentioned en passant <strong>and</strong> the dem<strong>and</strong> for revolution <strong>and</strong> socialism in theentire Arab world is not mentioned at all. In fact, the 10th Congress was used by Bashar torevive the party as a mainstay of the regime <strong>and</strong> as an instrument for control of the publicspace, which the civil society movement had encroached upon. This was reflected in thecomposition of the delegates, the newly elected bodies, the agenda <strong>and</strong> the final resolutionsof the Congress.

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