Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...

430 S. Bar125. Radio Damascus, 21 October 2000.126. Al-Wasat, 13 May 1994.127. See above.128. This is the classic Syrian position as expressed in various utterances by senior Syrians.129. Syria demands Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders, which would give it territory thatit took between 1948 and 1967. Israel insists on the principle—as in the Egyptian, Lebanese andJordanian cases- of the international borders that were in existence between the British Mandate ofPalestine and the French Mandate of Syria.130. Syria is particularly opposed to an agreement that would preclude a breach of diplomaticrelations in case of a crisis.131. This assessment is supported by interviews with individuals who were involved in thenegotiations between Israel and Syria.132. “One of Hariri’s Legacies—A Massive Debt for Lebanon,” Inter Press Service, March 10,2005.133. The new law subdivided northern Lebanon into two electoral districts, combining theMaronite Christian town of Becharre with Muslim towns to which it was not contiguous, makingvictory by an independent Christian candidate impossible, dividing Beirut into three districts calculatedto reduce al-Hariri’s power, and increasing the number of seats in parliament from 108 to 128. Thechanges amplified the power of pro-Syrian elements because in the Lebanese system the voters castballots for multisectarian slates of candidates with seats reserved for each community (Christians ofall sects, 64; Sunnis, 27, Shiites, 27, Druze, 8, Alawites, 2). By combining Christian communities withmore populous muslim districts, Muslim voters could determine which slates—and therefore whichChristian representatives—entered parliament. As a result, only 15 MPs out of 64 “representatives”of the Christians were really elected by the Christians. The rest were elected by Muslims. Since thesystem required voters to cast their ballots in their ancestral homes, Shiites who moved to Beirutfrom south Lebanon effectively were disenfranchised, leaving the Shiite slate in south Lebanon toHezbollah.134. Bashar said to Joumblat (according to the latter) that Lahoud’s Presidency in office willbe extended “because I am Lahoud.” Some Syrian’s claim that this too was symptomatic of Bashar’slack of political flexibility; faced with the need to shore up Syria’s status in Lebanon, he could onlyresort to the existing proxies that he had inherited from his father. His father had extended formerPresident Elias Hiwari’s term, but did so in collaboration with the US and France. Had Bashar readthe signs of opposition to Lahoud as a blatant symbol of Syrian domination, he could have replacedhim with an alternative proxy without having to force a constitutional change.135. After al-Hariri, the anti-Syrian journalist Smair Qasir was murdered, May Chidicac wasseverely wounded in a bombing; formerly pro-Syrian Elias Mour, who had quarrelled with the SyrianGeneral Rustum Ghazaleh and Marwan Hamadeh, anti-Syrian Druze, were also victims of assassinationattempts.136. Eyal Zisser, Asad’s Legacy, p. 161.137. In the autumn of 2000, Syria allowed Iraq to begin pumping oil through an old pipelineto Syria. The economic logic of this was obvious, though it violated the sanction regime. In responseto an American demarche, the Syrians claimed (at the level of Bashar himself to Colin Powell andin communication with President Bush) that the flow of oil was no more than a temporary technicalexamination of the pipeline, which had been idle for almost two decades. One would imagine thatBashar was aware of the scope of the pumping (not only a test) and of the capability of the U.S. tocollect precise information through SATINT. His denial therefore was not plausible. If he had hopedto negotiate American acceptance of his special relationship with Iraq (similar to the tolerance ofJordanian and Turkish violations of the sanctions), he did not offer anything in return.138. As-Safir (Beirut), Mar. 27, 2003; Asad’s speech at the Arab summit, Sharm al-Sheikh,Syrian television, Mar. 1, 2003; Radio Damascus, Mar. 10, 2003; al-Hayat, Mar. 10, 2003.139. Farouq a-Shara’ to Ar-Ra’y al-‘Amm (Kuwait), Apr. 13, 2003; Reuters, Apr. 12, 2003.140. Nasrallah himself admitted at one time that he had never had a personal, face-to-facemeeting with Hafez Al-Asad. al-Manar TV, June 10, 2001.