Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...

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Bashar’s Syria 377To what extent can the negotiation style of Hafez al-Asad be attributed to cultural ornational values and therefore be expected in Bashar’s regime or in future Syrian regimes?It appears that what has come to be known as “Syrian negotiation techniques” (mainlyin negotiations between Syria and Israel via the American conduit) were quintessentiallythose of Hafez al-Asad. Unlike cases such as Iran, Japan, China, and the U.S., where certainnegotiation styles can be attributed to cultural characteristics and values, this does not seemtenable in the Syrian case. Hafez al-Asad brought to his negotiation style the personalbackground of a military officer from a minority community with a culture of defensivesecrecy. He had fought his way up, had betrayed, and had been betrayed and had honed hisstyle over decades. Bashar has none of these factors in his background.Bashar has been involved in too few negotiations with the outside world since he cameto power to construct a reliable picture of his negotiation style or even indicate that he wouldhave a personal involvement of the sort his father had in Syrian negotiations with foreignparties. This is not necessarily because the opportunity has not arisen, but rather becauseBashar is hesitant to place himself in a position that would force him to take strategicdecisions. This is particularly a problem since the long rule of Hafez al-Asad left his sonwith no other model for negotiation.In those few cases in which Bashar has been involved in negotiation, a number of traitshave come to light: Bashar is said to be well briefed before meetings with foreign representatives. However,he seems to have less of a capacity than his father to make use of these details.A case in point is the confrontation with the U.S. over the pumping of Iraqi oil inthe Syrian pipeline. Bashar does not negotiate or take decisions alone, he depends on his team and defersto them. He has a distinct need to merge with the consensus of his advisors. Butunlike his father, his counselors change both according to the issue discussed andfrequently by chance. The dynamics between these advisors therefore is a constantstruggle for the ear of the president. The absence of coherent schools of policy amongthe advisors and the predominance of personal considerations among the advisorsmay contribute to what seems to be an erratic decision-making process under Bashar.His lack of self-confidence almost precludes his overruling of impasses created byhis lieutenants. Bashar tends to make liberal use of his apparent weak position. In messages throughback channels and even in direct meetings he points out that he is not in total control(in his words: “not a dictator”) and is constrained by the mentality of the “old guard”and the “structure” of the regime. Such a resort to apologetics would never have beenused by his predecessor and is rather reminiscent of the explanations/excuses thatYasser Arafat was accustomed to make to justify his lack of complete control.A possible window into the negotiation style of the Bashar al-Asad regime is the EU–Syria negotiations over an association agreement in the context of the Barcelona processwith the EU. Syria participated in the Barcelona Conference in 1995 and in the BarcelonaDeclaration. The Framework Convention necessary for starting the implementation ofcooperation under the MEDA programme was only signed in 2000. Negotiations for an AssociationAgreement, the second main pillar of the EU–Mediterranean partnership, startedin 1998, but little progress was made in the first four years. At the end of 2001, progresswas made. Since then, progress in the negotiations and in related economic and legal reformshas been made by the government under Prime Minister Al-Otari, which took overin September 2003. In December 2003 an understanding was reached on all issues except
378 S. Barthe provisions for nonproliferation of WMD. Finally, an agreement on the text for suchprovisions was agreed upon in September 2004 and negotiators from the commission andthe Syrian Government initialled the texts of the agreement on 19 October 2004. The agreementhas since been submitted to the political authorities at both sides (the Council in theEU case) for final approval and signature. 55The expedition of the negotiations with the EU was attributed by EU officials to thegovernment reshuffle in Damascus, which brought in reform-minded ministers at mosttechnical and sector ministries but moreover to Bashar’s personal “hands on” intervention inthe process, overruling the fossilized bureaucracy. The follow-up of the agreement, though,is indicative of the real process. While Bashar apparently did make decisions that enabledthe signing of the agreement, he could not impose on a static and stagnant bureaucracy thedynamism needed to solve the multitude of detailed sub-issues necessary to implement theagreement. The Syrian economic bureaucracy had been trained to manage a static economy,wherein most aspects of a free enterprise economy were forbidden except for a selectedfew, regulated and usually in the exclusive hands of certain members of the nomenklatura.Hence, the Syrian bureaucracy never had to develop the tools that exist in liberal states forconstant updating and adjustment of the minute details of taxes, levies, customs, export andimport agreements, and so forth.Translated to the political realm, an ideological worldview that was no less static thanthe economy and dictated from above (and by Hafez al-Asad’s desire to set Syria’s policypersonally) spared the bureaucracy the need to develop a decision-support mechanismwith tools for creative scenario building and presentation of alternatives that diverge fromthe president’s directives. In Syrian negotiations with Israel, this was manifested in theperception of Israeli negotiators that their Syrian interlocutors lacked the wide latitude thatthey had and that attempts to propose “creative solutions” were an exercise in futility.Syrian negotiating acumen has been put to the test in the wake of the Mehlis reporton the al-Hariri assassination. In an attempt to indicate Syrian willingness to cooperatewith the investigation, Bashar sent letters to members of the UN Security Council beforethe discussion of the report. According to diplomats who reviewed the letters, there wereat least two slightly different versions of Asad’s letter, diplomats said. One version wasdelivered to the United States, Britain, and France, and it included the sentence: “I havedeclared that Syria is innocent of this crime, and I am ready to follow up action to bring totrial any Syrian who could be proved by concrete evidence to have had connection with thiscrime.” A second version omitting the pledge went to other Security Council members. 56The difference between the two versions raises serious questions regarding the reasoningbehind it. It should have been obvious to any Syrian with experience in the UN that thelatter version would come to light and damage the credibility of the former.Given the lack of trust between Syria and the U.S. administration, Syrian negotiatingtactics resort to back channels and attempts to influence the administration through publicopinion. One example is the letter sent on 5 October 2005 to Congresswoman Sue Kelly,which reiterates the Syrian stance. 57 Syrian Deputy Prime Minister Daradari has stated thatthere will be a number of political reforms in Syria regarding the parties law, the Kurdishquestion, and political prisoners. Also, the decree (96 of 2005 issued on 28 October) onthe formation of an investigatory committee to “investigate any Syrian civilian or militarypersons in all issues related to the mission of the independent international investigationcommittee, formed in April by the UN Security Council resolution 1595,” to be headed bythe public prosecutor of the Republic of Syria and the membership of the military publicprosecutor and a judge nominated by the justice minster, should also be seen as an attemptto play for time and to influence international public opinion.
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Page 17 and 18: 368 S. Barnaturally come with the s
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Page 21 and 22: 372 S. Bardemocracy” must be foun
Page 23 and 24: 374 S. Barcultural, political and m
Page 25: 376 S. Barexcept for those with fam
Page 29 and 30: 380 S. Bar The ups and downs in rel
Page 31 and 32: 382 S. Barfamily is also linked by
Page 33 and 34: 384 S. Bar2. The “second generati
Page 35 and 36: 386 S. BarThe reformist trend withi
Page 37 and 38: 388 S. Barwould allow the younger g
Page 39 and 40: 390 S. BarFigure 3. Heads of the Sy
Page 41 and 42: 392 S. Bar Disruption of the “hie
Page 43 and 44: 394 S. Bar(Majlis Milli), composed
Page 45 and 46: 396 S. Bar Other prominent Syrians
Page 47 and 48: 398 S. BarSyrian civil society—su
Page 49 and 50: 400 S. BarMany of the Muslim Brothe
Page 51 and 52: 402 S. BarThese elements find reson
Page 53 and 54: 404 S. BarIran’s proxy, Hezbollah
Page 55 and 56: 406 S. BarWest—and specifically t
Page 57 and 58: 408 S. BarBashar is well aware that
Page 59 and 60: 410 S. BarBashar did not read these
Page 61 and 62: 412 S. Bartoken withdrawal while ma
Page 63 and 64: 414 S. Barlegitimacy had eroded. Ne
Page 65 and 66: 416 S. Barin the wake of the al-Har
Page 67 and 68: 418 S. BarIt was Russia, however, t
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428 S. Bar100. As one Sunni Syrian
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430 S. Bar125. Radio Damascus, 21 O
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434 S. BarNews agencies and Newspap
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