Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2012 ONCA ... - York University

Page: 109s. 212(1)(j) by reading in the proposed limitation also preserves the presumptionin s. 212(3), which the Supreme Court in Downey held was an important tool tofacilitate the prosecution of pimps.[272] Seen in this light, reading in is not a substantial intrusion into the legislativesphere and in no way changes the nature of the legislative scheme. On thecontrary, reading in the element of exploitation preserves the essential core ofthe offence and more closely identifies the real target of the legislation.[273] We are persuaded that we can employ this remedy despite the fact thatthe Attorney General of Canada did not seek it. The reason is that, by reading inwords of limitation, we propose to clarify the intent of the provision, rather than toamend it. That distinguishes this case from a case like Baron v. Canada, [1993]1 S.C.R. 416, where the Supreme Court declined to read words into a statute toremedy a constitutional defect in the absence of submissions from counsel.[274] At issue in Baron was the constitutionality of a provision in the Income TaxAct, S.C. 1970-72, c. 63, that required a judge to issue a warrant if certainprescribed conditions were met.The Supreme Court held that this was anunjustified infringement of the right against unreasonable search and seizure ins. 8 of the Charter, because the provision foreclosed the possibility of judicialdiscretion in the issuance of the warrant. The problem could presumably havebeen remedied by replacing the mandatory instruction “shall” with the permissive