Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2012 ONCA ... - York University

Page: 54determination that it also engages the security of the person interest does not,therefore, subject legislation to s. 7 scrutiny where it would not otherwise havebeen subject to that scrutiny.It merely permits a principles of fundamentaljustice analysis that considers the full impact of the legislation on s. 7 rights.[121] The analysis and outcome in PHS also belies the appellants‟ contentionthat the courts must impose a strong causation requirement before finding a linkbetween interference with s. 7 interests and legislation. As outlined above, theSupreme Court held that the prohibition against possession of narcotics at Insiteinfringed the addicted persons‟ security of the person.The court went on,however, to hold that the prohibition, considered in the context of the entireCDSA, was consistent with the principles of fundamental justice and did notviolate s. 7. In PHS, the constitutional failing was not with the legislation creatingthe criminal prohibition, but with the Minister‟s exercise of his discretion underanother section of that legislation which effectively shut Insite down.[122] The appellants also submit that the real cause of any infringement on therespondents‟ security of the person rests in their decision to engage inprostitution. That decision, according to the appellants, is a matter of personalchoice that inevitably places the respondents at risk. The appellants contendthat the personal decision to engage in prostitution, an inherently dangerous andanti-social activity, effectively breaks the causal chain between any added risk ofharm and the criminal prohibitions that limit the venues at which, and the manner