Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2012 ONCA ... - York University

Page: 80violate the principle against shifting purpose: see R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R.731, at p. 761. Just as it is not open to the courts to invent new objectives for thepurpose of s. 1, so it is the case for s. 7. The appellants‟ submission is not amere shift in emphasis but a wholesale re-evaluation of ancient legislation toaccord with modern values. It must, therefore, be rejected.[192] Accordingly, we agree with the application judge that the objectives of thebawdy-house provisions are combating neighbourhood disruption or disorder andsafeguarding public health and safety.[193] We emphasize that these are not necessarily narrow objectives. Theconcept of public health and safety is a broad one, capable of evolving withoutviolating the prohibition against shifting purpose: Butler, at p. 496. In our view,legislative concern for public health and safety is wide enough to encompassmeasures that target human trafficking and child exploitation, both of which maytragically arise through the operation of bawdy-houses. The fact that there arespecific provisions that also deal with these alarming social problems does notmean that Parliament cannot rely on more general measures such as the bawdyhouseprovisions to combat them: see Malmo-Levine, at para. 137.(3) Are the bawdy-house provisions arbitrary?[194] The application judge was satisfied that there was some evidence thatbawdy-houses can cause nuisance to the community and, thus, there is some